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ABSTRACT 
 
The Community Based Fisheries Management Project, Phase 2 has been 
implemented by the Department of Fisheries of the Government of 
Bangladesh with the assistance of the WorldFish Center over the period 2001 
to 2007. This paper gives an outline of the main principles behind the project 
and the activities carried out during its implementation. The project involved a 
wide range of partners including 11 NGOs who were responsible for the 
identification and development of 130 community based organisations 
managing 116 water bodies including closed beels, open beels, rivers and 
floodplains.  
 
The paper summarises the success of the project from different viewpoints. It 
also discusses some of the situations where community management did not 
work under CBFM-2 and emphasises the need for further research to build on 




The Community Based Fisheries Management Project, Phase 2 is closing in 
March 2007 following an implementation period of 5 years and 7 months. This 
was the largest and most comprehensive research project ever carried out to 
assess a range of approaches towards community based management of 
fisheries resources in inland water bodies.  
 
It followed a five year first phase of CBFM where community management 
was tested in 19 sites. The first phase, supported by the Ford Foundation was 
able to demonstrate that CBFM approaches can work. The second phase was 
designed as an action research project to look in more detail at the situations 
where CBFM approaches should be applied more extensively. It saw an 
expansion to around 120 sites including lakes (closed beels and open beels), 
rivers and floodplains. It is important to put this into context – 120 sites 
sounds like quite a large number but there are an estimated 12,000 
government owned water bodies in Bangladesh and a further 4 million 
hectares of floodplains which could benefit from improved management. 
 
WHY COMMUNITY BASED AND CO-MANAGED APPROACHES? 
 
According to Robert Pomeroy (Pomeroy and Ahmed, 2006), the potential 
advantages of co-management include: 
 
•   A more transparent, accountable and autonomous management 
system.  
•   A more democratic and participatory system. 
•   More economical than centralized management systems, requiring less 
to be spent on management administration and enforcement, in the 
long run. 
•   Through involvement in management, fishers take responsibility for a 
number of managerial functions.   3
•   Makes maximum use of indigenous knowledge and expertise to 
provide information on the resource base and to complement scientific 
information for management. 
•  Improved stewardship of aquatic and coastal resources and 
management. 
•   Management is accountable to local areas. Fishing communities are 
able to devise and administer management plans and regulatory 
measures that are more appropriate to local conditions. (Localized 
solutions to local problems). 
•   By giving the fishers a sense of ownership over the resource, co-
management provides a powerful incentive for them to view the 
resource as a long-term asset rather than to discount its future returns.  
•   Various interests and stakeholders are brought together to provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of the resources. 
•   Since the community is involved in the formulation and implementation 
of co-management measures, a higher degree of acceptability, 
legitimacy and compliance to plans and regulations can be expected. 
•   Community members can enforce standards of behaviour more 
effectively than bureaucracies can.  
•   Increased communication and understanding among all concerned can 
minimize social conflict and maintain or improve social cohesion in the 
community.  
 
Implicit in this is that co-management should result in measurable 
improvements in fisheries – improved yields, more resilient to environmental 
changes, more sustainable – and this will result in enhanced livelihoods of 
people involved in exploiting the fisheries. 
 
The project not only tested different types of approaches to fisheries 
management, including fisher managed fisheries, community managed 
fisheries and women managed fisheries, but was spread across a wide range 
of very different types of fisheries, some government owned and leased 
jalmohals (closed and open beels), some government owned but without any 





Another layer of complexity was added by encouraging a wide range of 
partner NGOs to participate in the process of water body identification, 
community group formation and continued support to community groups 
through training, mentoring and micro-credit. Each of these brought their own 
approaches and priorities: 
 
•   BRAC is the largest NGO in Bangladesh and has been actively 
involved in fisheries, micro-credit and community management for 
many years. They were involved in the first phase of the project and in 
the second phase, tended to concentrate on jalmohal sites that could 
be managed by groups of fishermen.   4
•   CARITAS is an international Christian NGO and was also involved in 
CBFM-1. They became involved in a mixture of closed beel, open beel 
and floodplain sites. 
•   Proshika is one of the larger Bangladeshi NGOs and were also 
involved in CBFM-1. In CBFM-2 they concentrated mainly on riverine 
sites but were also responsible for some open beel (jalmohal) sites. 
•   CRED is a small NGO that was involved in a single riverine site in the 
first phase. In the second phase they took on one additional open beel 
site. 
•   Banchte Shekha is an NGO based in Jessore that concentrates on 
empowerment of women. They were involved in a single site in the first 
phase and expanded to 7 other sites in the second phase. Some of the 
CBFM-2 community groups formed by Banchte Shekha are composed 
of only women, others were mixed but tended to have greater 
involvement of women than any of the other CBOs under the project. 
•   The Centre for Natural Resource Studies (CNRS) is based in 
Bangladesh and has always focused on protection of wetlands rather 
than activities such as micro-credit. They were not involved in the first 
phase but were doing similar things in another project. They tended to 
concentrate on floodplain and river sites, placing emphasis on wider 
community involvement and linking community groups into clusters. 
Whereas most of the NGOs organised and registered single CBOs for 
each water body, CNRS registered multiple CBOs at some of the larger 
water bodies and also have sites where only one CBO has been 
formed for a number of water bodies. This makes it essential to 
distinguish between “water bodies” and “CBOs” when carrying out any 
analysis. 
 
The project also involved two specialist NGOs, the Bangladesh Environmental 
Lawyers Association (BELA) who provided legal advice and support through-
out the project and FemCom who provided media and folk talent support. 
 
As well as these initial partner NGOs, a number of other NGOs became 
involved with the programme at a later stage. These include SDC which was 
involved in a single floodplain site, GHARONI which worked with 3 floodplain 
sites and SHISUK which specialised in floodplain aquaculture and had one 
site included in CBFM-2. The Department of Fisheries also took direct 




The first task was to identify water bodies to be taken on by the project. This 
was carried out through collaboration between the Department of Fisheries, 
partner NGOs and the WorldFish Center.  
 
The next steps were: 
•  Census  of  households 
•   Hand-over of water bodies from the Ministry of Land to the Ministry of 
Fisheries and Livestock   5
•   Registration of CBOs 
•   Training of CBOs 
•   Developing and implementing fisheries management plans including 
constructing fish sanctuaries, imposing gear bans, enforcing closed 
seasons and carrying out habitat restoration 
•   Signing MoAs with DoF 
•  Providing  micro-credit 
•   Building community centres 
•   Linking CBOs through networking 
 
The end result is 130 CBOs actively managing 116 water bodies spread over 
most of the country. There are approximately 15,000 CBO members directly 
involved in the project and an estimated 23,000 people who could be classed 
as direct beneficiaries. The project employed a total of 204 staff. It built 99 
community centres. Community groups have constructed 164 sanctuaries in 
81 water bodies. Partner NGOs have delivered almost 1000 courses to over 
23,000 trainees. 
 
DOES CBFM WORK? 
 
At the end of all this, the question which is always asked is: “Does CBFM 
work?” 
 
The short answer is: “Yes it does – the project has demonstrated that in most 
cases community management has improved yields and the sustainability of 
fisheries and has also enhanced the livelihoods of households participating in 
management of the fisheries.” 
 
Much more detail is given in other papers in these proceedings and in the 
reports, policy briefs and booklets by the project (Annex 1). 
 
To give a more precise answer, one needs to go back a step and determine 
from whose perspective the question is being asked. This is a situation where 
different people have very different expectations and indicators of success 
and in the words of Robert Chambers: “Whose reality counts?” 
 
An objective assessment is also prejudiced by the fact that for many people, 
community based management is so clearly the right thing to do. Intuitively we 
know that local control over natural resources must be the way forwards. It 
must make sense to replace ineffective policing as the main approach to 
preserving fisheries with self-policing by people who have the most to gain 
from their sustainable management. 
 
From the point of view of the fisheries scientist, the CBFM-2 project has 
clearly demonstrated that at most sites, the condition of the fisheries were 
improved by community management. The third paper in these proceedings 
contains more detailed information on this but it is worth emphasising the 
simple fact that despite all the variability and problems during implementation, 
the conclusion is clearly positive. According to the fisheries consultant, Ashley   6
Halls, this is the first time that this simple fact has been clearly proven – 
community management improves fisheries. 
 
From the point of view of a socio-economist, the situation is a bit more 
complicated. Measuring fish stocks is hard enough but determining real 
project impacts on household incomes and livelihoods is even more difficult 
because it is not so direct. The fourth paper in these proceedings has more 
details on this aspect of the project. It      was complicated by the rapid 
improvements in household incomes in many rural households however the 
project was able to show positive impacts in many sites and shed light on key 
issues that need to be addressed in future programmes. 
 
From the point of view of the Department of Fisheries (DoF) and the 
Government of Bangladesh, community management offers a way forwards to 
improve the management of inland open waters. It is a way to halt what is 
often seen as an inevitable process of environmental degradation, while at the 
same time benefiting communities. In Bangladesh this is a huge resource with 
great political significance. The DoF has been involved in community 
managed approaches for at least 15 years and has now incorporated CBFM-
type approaches into its Inland Capture Fisheries Strategy and PRSP 
implementation plans. There was universal support for expansion of 
community managed approaches at policy level workshops and round tables 
in 2006 and this is now being followed up by proposals for donor support to do 
this. 
 
From the point of view of the donor, DFID, the project has been a clear 
success. The Project Completion Review gave the project scores at the 




Clearly the project was designed to be part of a process. It was a pilot scale 
intervention to test approaches that could then be applied on a wider basis. If 
DFID’s funding priorities had not changed radically during the project 
implementation period, they would almost certainly be backing this expansion, 
however they have changed and there will not be a DFID funded CBFM-3. 
Project Objectives
 
Purpose: A process for policy formulation for pro-poor sustainable fisheries 
management agreed and operational. 
 
Output 1: Community based fisheries management approaches developed and tested, 
and their impacts, sustainability and potential for expansion assessed. 
 
Output 2: Co-ordination and administration mechanisms for linking local community 
management arrangements within larger fishery and wetland systems identified, tested 
and assessed, and constraints to this identified. 
 
Output 3: To inform and influence all fisheries policy stakeholders of improved 
management approaches.   7
This does not mean that the lessons learnt cannot be used by other 
programmes – the paper by Arne Andreasson in these proceedings spells out 
some of the likely next steps for the sector. 
 
Of course the most important point of view is that of the people who have 
invested their time and effort in the project on the ground. From their point of 
view, access to resources is one of the key factors. In most jalmohal sites, 
project fishers now have access to water bodies that they were previously 
excluded from. In non-leased sites (rivers and floodplains) they have been 
able to establish more effective control over the fishery. In rivers, CBOs have 
been able to turn an open-access free-for-all into a situation where access in 
controlled by the CBO – they can reduce illegal fishing and do the right things 
to improve the fishery. In floodplains, a seasonal free-for-all has been 
effectively converted to CBO controlled, private property. 
 
While community group members usually say that their fish catches have 
improved as a result of the project they also often mention the return of rare 
fish species to their water bodies. But the priorities of project participants are 
unpredictable. When asked: “What is the number 1 thing that you have gained 
from the project?” a representative of a CBO in Narail responded: 
“Participatory planning.” 
 
This might be surprising, but this is part and parcel of what the project was 
actually about. The project has resulted in the empowered CBO members 
who can stand up for themselves. They know where to look for help when 
they need it. They can plan their activities. They have social standing. 
 
They are also the strongest advocates for expansion of community 
management and could play a valuable role in this process in the future. For 
example, an Association of Fisheries CBOs is now being registered who could 
provide support services such as training to new CBOs.  
 
WHEN DOES COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT WORK BEST? 
 
Dr Elinor Ostrom (1990) considered the following conditions as crucial for 
successful community management of shared resources: 
1. There is a clear definition of who has the right to use the resource and who 
does not, and clearly defined boundaries of the resource. 
2. Users feel that their obligations for managing and maintaining the resource 
are fair in light of the benefits received. 
3. Rules governing when and how the resource is used are adapted to local 
conditions. 
4. Most individuals affected by the rules can participate in setting or changing 
them. 
5. Use of the resource and compliance with rules is actively monitored by the 
users themselves or by parties accountable to the users. 
6. People violating the rules are disciplined by the users or by parties 
accountable to them, with penalties imposed in accordance with the 
seriousness and context of the offense. 
7. Local institutions are available to resolve conflicts quickly and at low cost.   8
8. Government authorities recognize users’ rights to devise their own 
management institutions and plans. 
 
As a counterpoint to the advantages of co-management for fisheries, Robert 
Pomeroy (Pomeroy and Ahmed, 2006) adds that co-management has several 
disadvantages and problems, including:  
 
•   It may not be suitable for every fishing community. Many communities 
may not be willing or able to take on the responsibility of co-
management.  
•  Leadership and appropriate local institutions, such as fisher 
organizations, may not exist within the community to initiate or sustain 
co-management efforts.  
•   In the short-run, there are high initial investments in time, financial 
resources and human resources to establish co-management. 
•   For many individuals and communities, the incentive(s) – economic, 
social, and/or political – to engage in co-management may not be 
present.  
•   The risks involved in changing fisheries management strategies may 
be too high for some communities and fishers.  
•   The costs for individuals to participate in co-management strategies 
(time, money) may outweigh the expected benefits.  
•   Sufficient political will may not exist to support co-management. 
•   Unease of political leaders and government officials to share power. 
•   The community may not have the capacity to be an effective and 
equitable governing institution.  
•   Actions by user groups outside the immediate community may 
undermine or destroy the management activities undertaken by the 
community.  
•   Particular local resource characteristics, such as fish migratory 
patterns, may make it difficult or impossible for the community to 
manage the resource. 
•   The need to develop a consensus from a wide range of interests may 
lengthen the decision-making process and result in weaker, 
compromised measures.  
•   There may be shifts in “power bases” (political, economic, social) that 
are not in the best interests of all partners. 
•   There are those who feel that co-management is too costly and time-
consuming and that other alternatives, with stricter regulations, may be 
better. 
•   There is always a possibility of unbalanced and inequitable sharing of 
power between the government and communities and the use of co-





   9
PROJECT EXPERIENCES 
 
There may be some lessons to be learnt from situations in the CBFM-2 
project where community management has not worked. 
 
Some examples from project implementation are as follows: 
 
Betaldoba is a fairly productive closed beel that was initially included in 
CBFM-2. There were disagreements within the CBO over money – where 
some of the CBO members paid money for activities which were never carried 
out and a virtual take-over of the CBO by a few individuals. By the time the 
partner NGO and DoF reacted, the disagreements were too great and the 
water body was dropped. 
 
Naliakarma’s problems stemmed from poor initial beneficiary selection where 
a number of ‘influential’ were included in the CBO. There was also a problem 
with bauth
1 fishing in this beel and poor leadership. Again the water body was 
dropped from the project. 
 
In Hatinamaral beel, the partner NGO Proshika was forced through local 
political pressure to sub-contract a local NGO. The CBO members felt 
exploited under this arrangement as the local NGO tended to act in its own 
interest rather than supporting the development of the CBO. 
 
Shapla and Huruil beels were also caught up in the problems caused by 
political pressure on Proshika. The local DoF staff and Proshika staff could 
not work together. There was also conflict within the CBO and a take-over of 
the CBO by a few individuals. 
 
Looking at some of the case study notes for these water bodies and for the 
many court cases that have been raised under the project, power struggles 
and money seem to be main sources of problems. The question is whether 
this is just the way things happen now in rural Bangladesh or whether the 
uncertainties caused by the project have resulted in more conflict. Introducing 
a new system of tenure will always be contentious but the old leasing system 
for jalmohals also results in lots of problems. Hopefully as community 
management becomes ‘normal practice’ the incidence of conflict will reduce. 
 
These cases also highlight the need for detailed local knowledge, not just of 
the physical water bodies but also the communities around them before 
embarking on community management. It requires people skills and 
experience to do this and these have been developed through the CBFM and 
similar projects not just in the implementing organisations but also in the 
CBOs themselves. This will be a valuable resource for any future expansion 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In summary, the progress achieved by the project during implementation has 
been remarkable. Five years ago community based approaches were seen as 
an experimental system that needed to be tested – this has now been done 
and community based management is now part of mainstream policy-level 
thinking. 
 
While the immediate project objectives have been achieved, much more work 
will be required before community managed fisheries make a meaningful 
contribution at the national level. It takes time to build trust and for community 
groups to establish effective managerial control. There are around 12,000 
government owned water bodies in Bangladesh and up to 4 million hectares 
of floodplain so there is plenty of scope for expansion. 
 
As a starting point, the project leaves 130 CBOs most of whom have shown 
they can manage the resources under their control – this would be an ideal 
test bed for further fisheries research – all the hard work has been done, so 
future researchers only need to collaborate with the CBOs, inform them and 
help them develop. There are lots of questions to be answered – just on 
fisheries information is required on ideal sanctuary sizes, the timing of and the 





On a personal note I would like to say how much my short involvement with 
CBFM has enriched my life and given me hope that it is possible to ‘make a 
difference’ and do something about reversing declining capture fisheries – 
there is an alternative to aquaculture which really works. 
 
I would like to thank the many people who have been involved in this project 
in WorldFish, and my many friends in DoF and the NGOs. The other big thank 
you is to the community members who have invested time and effort in CBFM 
in the expectation of, rather than the certainty of, rewards that they can pass 
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ANNEX 1 – CBFM-2 Publications 
 
 
CBFM2 Project – Publications List 
 
Policy Briefs*  
1. Capturing the Benefits (Power relations) 
2. Fisheries Yields and Sustainability 
3. Livelihoods Impact 
4. The Right Option 
 
Booklets* 
1. Turning the Tide (General background to CBFM) 
2. Fishing for a Future – Women in CBFM 
3. Institutional Options for Empowering Fisher Communities 
4. The Legal Background to CBFM in Bangladesh 
5. Micro-credit and the CBFM-2 Project  
6. Social Capital and the CBFM-2 Project  
 
Working Papers* 
1. Case Studies of Six CBFM-2 Water bodies 
2. Livelihood Impacts of the CBFM-2 Project 
 
Consultancy reports* 
1. Building Effective Partnerships for CBFM 
2. Assessing Macro-Economic Impacts of CBFM  
3. Fisheries Impacts of the CBFM-2 Project 
4. Report on Poverty Impact Monitoring  
5. A Study on Perceptions of CBFM Stakeholders 
6. Strategy for the Management of Microfinance Activities and Funds in CBFM-2 and CBFM-
SSEA Projects 
 
*All the above documents are available on the CBFM-2 web-site: www.cbfm-bd.org 
 
International Journals:  
Thompson, P.M., P. Sultana and N. Islam, 2003. Lessons from community based 
management of floodplain fisheries in Bangladesh. Journal of Environmental Management. 
2003, 69 (3) 307-321. 
Mustafa, M.G. and G. de Graaf. Population parameters of important species in inland 
fisheries of Bangladesh. Asian Fisheries Science (Submitted). 
Mustafa, M.G. and A.C.Brooks. Status of Fisheries Resource and Management Approach in 
the Open Beels of Bangladesh: a comparative case study. Asian Fisheries Science 
(Submitted). 
Halls, A., M.G. Mustafa and M.W. Dickson, Does community-based fisheries management 
work? Experiences of the CBFM project in Bangladesh. Fisheries Research (Submitted).  
Halls, A., M.G. Mustafa and M.W. Dickson. An empirical bio-economic stocking model for 
inland waters of Bangladesh. Aquaculture Research (Submitted).  
Halls, A. and M.G. Mustafa. Empirical surplus production models for inland fisheries in 
Bangladesh. Fisheries Research (Submitted). 
Mustafa, M.G. and Halls, A., Impact of community-based fisheries management on fish 
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Local Journals: 
Ahmed, K.KU., K.R. Hasan, S.U. Ahamed, T. Ahmed and M.G. Mustafa., Ecology of Shakla 
beel (Brahmanbaria), Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. Fish. Res. Vol 8(2): 113-123. 
Mazid, M. A. Rahman, M.J. and Mustafa, M.G., Abundance, migration and management of 
Jatka (juvenile hilsa, Tenualosa ilisha) in the Gajner Beel, Pabna, Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. 
Fish. Res, Vol 9(2): 191-202. 
K. K. U. Ahmed, S. U. Ahamed, K. R. Hasan and M. G. Mustafa. Option for formulating 
community based fish sanctuary and its management in Beel ecosystem, Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
M. Haque, M. Ahmed, and G. Mustafa., Preferences of fishes to different types of Katha 
materials used in sanctuaries in three rivers of Netrokona, Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. 
Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
M. Ahmed, G. A. Latifa and M. B. Hossain and M. S. Islam., Study on the optimization of dry 
season water area for fish sanctuary in Goakhola-Hatiara Beel Area, Narail, Bangladesh. 
Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
S. A. Azher, F. Khanom, S. Dewan, M. A.Wahab, M. A. B. Habib., Impacts of fish sanctuaries 
on macrobenthic organisms in a haor river, the Mohisherkandi Boranpur, Kishoregonj, 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
S. A. Azher, S. Dewan, M. A. Wahab, M. A. B. Habib  and M. G. Mustafa., Impacts of fish 
sanctuaries on production and biodiversity of fish and prawn in Dopi beel, Joanshahi haor, 
Kishoregonj, Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
M. Khanom.,Distribution and abundance of freshwater molluscs and crustaceans in Chittra 
river (Jaleshwari - Dhalgram) in Jessore. Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
M. Hasan, Indigenous/traditional fisheries knowledge and its role in local fisheries resources 
management: a case study on Chitra river (Beel Jaleswar to Dhalgram jr), Jessore and Fatki 
river, Magura. Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
Mohammad Zafar, S.M. Nurul Amin and M. Jafar Iqbal, Biodiversity of Fisheries organisms in 
the Pagla River of Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
 M. A. Mazid, M. J. Rahman and M. G. Mustafa., Source and abundance of Jatka (juvenile 
hilsa, Tenualosa ilisha) in the Gajner Beel, Sujanagar, Pabna, Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. 
Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
M. H. Khan, A. N. H. Banu AND M.A.Mazid., Ecology and fish disease incidences in Kalian 
and Haily beel, Mymensingh. Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
 M.Z. Rahman, G.U. Ahmed, M.F.A. Mollah and M.A. Wahab., Effect of distillery and 
agricultural pollution on histopathological features of a snakehead, Channa punctatus in three 
natural reservoirs (beels) of Rangpur, Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-
2007). 
M.Z. Rahman, M.F.A. Mollah, M.A. Wahab  and M. M. Rahman., Effect of distillery and 
agricultural pollution on some physico-chemical properties of water in three natural reservoirs 
(beels) of Rangpur, Bangladesh. Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special issue-2007). 
N. Bakth and M.M.H.Kazal., Awareness and capacity building in fisheries management: An 
impact analysis of CBFM training in Sunamganj area of Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. Fisheries 
(Special issue-2007). 
M. Rakib and M. M. H. Kazal., Role of women in community based fisheries management 
(CBFM): a study in Sunamganj haor area of Bangladesh. Bangladesh J. Fisheries (Special 
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ABSTRACT 
 
A wide range of institutional arrangements were practiced in the Community 
Based Fisheries Management project in phase-1 (1994-1999) and phase-2 
(2001-2007). The project documents stated that there were three main 
fisheries management approaches; fisher-led, community-led and women-led, 
however this fails to capture the full diversity of approaches adopted by 10 
project partners (including DoF) during implementation. As a part of the 
institutionalization process, 130 CBOs were developed and established under 
the project as clear legal entities. In order to achieve sustainable management 
of the fisheries, efforts have been made towards linking these community-
based organizations (CBOs) and local institutions in CBFM-2 sites. Four 
regional CBO networking committees and a central committee were formed. 
The central committee is now being officially registered. Project partner NGOs 
were the main agencies involved in the CBO development process. To 
improve the likelihood of long-term CBO sustainability, plans have been 
prepared and are being implemented for project phase-out and post-project 
sustainability. Another important process was cluster management in CBFM. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the establishment of CBOs as local level 
institutions, cluster management and CBO networks made a positive 
contribution towards project implementation and should help to ensure that 
CBFM approaches are sustained.  
 
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
 
The definition of an institution is an organization or social unit having a 
complete stratified structure of positions that is systematically coordinated. It 
is goal-directed and task-oriented as enunciated by its doctrine. It is 
characterized by a hierarchy of positions and roles, the performance of which 
is socially regulated according to the goals and tasks undertaken. In one 
sentence, it can be said that “it is a body of persons organized for a specific 
purpose”.  
 
In common with many other developing countries, the appropriation of natural 
resources and in particular, fisheries resources has been carried out by a few 
people to ensure their livelihoods and consolidate their wealth. With 
increasing populations, there is even more pressure on these resources. In 
Bangladesh, there are over 12,000 public water bodies, which have primarily 
been used by the richer people of the community through highest bidder 
leasing arrangements thereby excluding the poorer sections of the 
community.  
 
The concept of community-based fishery management developed in the early 
1990s and has been applied for the last 13 years in Bangladesh with the aim 
of including poor fishers in the resource management system by giving them 
access rights on these water bodies. Several donor funded projects have 
been working with this system including the Fourth Fisheries Project, MACH 
and CBFM.  
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The Community Based Fisheries Management Project, Phase-2 (CBFM-2) 
started implementation in September 2001 for the ‘sustainable improvement 
of the livelihoods of poor people dependent on aquatic resources’. In order to 
achieve this goal, the project partners have focused on the formation of 
community groups and organizations, starting from the village and water body 
level through to the upazila, district, regional and central levels. Several types 
of institutions have been developed at all levels in order to facilitate the 
activities. Therefore, the concept of institutionalization is a vital issue in the 
project to deal it appropriately, so that it sustains for longer times to harness 
benefits to the poor people, particularly poor fishers in managing the common 
properties judiciously in the natural resources sector. If these institutions can’t 
play their roles properly then sustainability will be a bigger issue for the poor 
fishers in ensuring their livelihoods.  
 
PARTNERSHIPS IN CBFM 
 
The direct project partners were 11 NGOs, the DoF, the WorldFish Center 
and the CBOs. The WorldFish Center’s role was coordination, research, 
dissemination of information and reporting to the donor organisation, DFID. 
The Department of Fisheries were responsible for coordination, formulation of 
water body policy, research and uptake. The 9 implementing NGOs were 
more involved in the CBO development process, testing CBFM approaches 
through organising the communities, development of the CBOs, linking the 
CBOs through committees and ensuring their sustainability. Apart from these, 
two specialised partner NGOs were involved in providing legal advice and 
media support for the project.  
 
The main lessons that were learnt on partnerships were:  
 
•   The NGO partners needed to recruit and retain high quality staff with 
adequate programming experience from the inception of the project.  
•  There should have been more interaction between partner 
organizations through cross visits and attending each others meetings 
and workshops.     
•   It is important to identify weak areas of each partner organization from 
inception and then try to improve those gradually.  
•   NGO partners should be selected with clear capacities in livelihoods 
and community group formation  
•   It remains unclear whether the various strategies employed by the 
partner NGOs produce equally equitable benefits; the exclusion of the 
very poor may be more likely under fisher-led approaches than under 
community led initiatives.   
•   Some NGOs are involved in a range of different projects and 
approaches to CBFM and become over stretched and/or have less 
interest in continuing activities without funding.  
•   The donor requirement was to focus primarily on vulnerable groups - 
this needed to be clearly communicated to the NGOs as a core aim.  
•   Substantial progress was made in networking the CBOs of various 
projects engaged in CBFM. A series of workshops have been held at   4
which CBOs exchanged experiences and debated future strategies for 
coordination. The CBOs established their successes, failures and 
constraints to date and discussed opportunities to improve their 
effectiveness.  
•   Some cluster committees are functioning, but no higher apex body has 
yet been formally convened, although CBOs have met to discuss apex 
establishment in one place.  
•   PNGOs should document the added value of cluster committees and 
apex bodies for future reference.  
 
IDENTIFICATION OF COMMUNITY GROUPS 
 
The identification of CBFM community groups was a complex task due to the 
nature and diverse characteristics of the water bodies, floodplains and the 
communities. The community groups were identified by the partner NGOs 
based on their own selection criteria. In the Memorandum of Agreement 
(MoA) which was agreed for each partner NGO, the WorldFish Center and the 
DoF, the beneficiary selection criteria was to ensure that a major share of the 
benefits from project activities reach the poorest members of the community. 
Direct beneficiaries (eligible for training and credit from the respective partner 
NGO) were members of groups and community based organizations 
organized or facilitated by the respective NGOs. The general selection criteria 
were as follows:  
 
•   Persons who catch fish by themselves for their livelihoods;  
•   Persons who have less than 50 decimals of land including the 
homestead in floodplain sites, and persons who have up to 100 
decimals of land property excluding the homestead in haor areas;  
•   Persons who have an annual income of less than Tk. 30,000, primarily 
from manual work; and 
•   Persons who sell their labour for at least 100 days per year for their 
livelihoods. 
 
In the case of indirect beneficiaries and wider participants in management 
bodies, community organizations and decisions were to be residents of the 
villages using the project water bodies/wetlands but may be from all social 
classes.  
 
Considering the above as guidelines, the partner NGOs used fishing and land 
as the two common criteria for direct beneficiary selection. At least four other 
criteria were also used, including: income, the sale of labour, involvement with 
other NGOs and/or employment with government, and sex. Banchte Shekha, 
was the only NGO targeting women as primary group members, but the other 
NGOs were working with both males and females. It is worth noting that some 
of the CBFM project groups were modified from the previous NGO groups.  
 
After the inception of CBFM-2 project, a single round HH census was done in 
all water bodies. The main objective of this census was to identify target 
stakeholders from all HHs living around each water body, and to provide   5
population data for making more detailed sample surveys. The HH census 
started in September 2001 and ended in March 2002, except in the new NGO 
areas, which were carried out in 2003-2004.  
 
From the census, five sub-categories of HHs were identified:  
•   Category I:   Poor fisher household who fishes for income or both for 
income and food, usually does labouring work, and possesses no 
agricultural land; 
•   Category II:   Poor fisher household who does not fish for income, has 
no agricultural land, usually does labouring work, but not service or 
professional jobs; 
•   Category III:  Moderately poor fisher household, who fishes for income, 
has some agricultural land (< 100 decimals), or if occupation includes 
service or professional job and has a thatched house;   
•   Category IV: Moderate poor household, who does not fish for income, 
has some agricultural land (< 100 decimals), or if occupation includes 
service or professional job and has a thatched house;   
•   Category  V:    Better off households, who may or may not fish for 
income, have land more than 100 decimals and/or have someone with 
a service or professional job and a tin roofed/constructed house.  
 
These classifications were used because any estimates of annual income 
would be unreliable in a census. The two poor categories approximated to the 
bottom poor category referred to in poverty studies, but distinguished those 
fishing for an income from others in the same category. The moderately poor 
category was widened slightly to include up to 100 decimals of land, and 
“tomorrow’s poor” were not distinguished. The landholding categories used in 
the census coincided with those used in national statistics, with the next 
category being 100-250 decimals.  
 
FORMATION OF COMMUNITY GROUPS 
 
At completion the project covered a total of 116 water bodies including 38 
rivers/river sections sites,14 closed beel sites, 28 open beel sites, 28 
floodplain beel sites and 8 small beel sites implementing CBFM approaches in 
22 districts and 47 upazilas. The project followed three main approaches to 
CBFM: 
 
•   Fisher managed fisheries - form groups among the fishers using each 
water body and then a committee to represent each group and take 
management decisions.  
•   Community managed fisheries – the group formation process involved 
both fishers and other community members followed by the formation 
of water body management committees according to the suggestions 
of all stakeholders.  
•   Women managed fisheries – women group members take a lead in 
resource management following participatory planning involving the 
whole community. The groups may be mixed with men and women. 
   6
WATER BODY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES  
 
Following these approaches, primary groups were formed followed by the 
establishment of water body management committees. The total number of 
CBOs at the end of the project was 130 in 116 WBs. Each CBO accomplished 
the following major tasks:  
•  Opened  bank  accounts 
•   Developed a water body management plan 
•   Arranged funds for implementing their plans through a combination of 
local find raising and grants/revolving loan funds from the project 
•   Established community centres (at most sites) for use as meeting and 
training places for the community 
•   Ensured close coordination between the project participants, partner 
NGO staff and DoF staff 
•   Ensured that all fishery management measures are followed 
 
Efforts were made to link community-based organizations (CBOs) and local 
institutions in CBFM-2 sites. Four regional CBO networking committees and a 
central committee were formed on an ad-hoc basis.  
 




Source: CNRS - Concept Note on Strengthening and Capacity Development 
Support to the CBO Networking System in CBFM   
 
The Central Networking body for CBOs met as an ad-hoc committee in the 
latter stages of the project and is in the process of being registered as an 
official body – the Association of Fisheries CBOs (AFC). It a networking body 
Central Networking Body 
(AFC) 
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to represent the interests of 136 CBOs formed under the CBFM-2 and CBFM-
SSEA projects.  
 
The major tasks of the AFC are as follows: 
•   Create a united force representing the interests of the CBOs, 
•   Deal with the central policy level issues on behalf of the CBOs, 
•   Ensure support of the DoF (already committed through MoAs) at 
different levels, 
•   Monitor and ensure legal support and demarcation,  
•   Ensure smooth handover of micro-credit funds to the CBOs, 
•   Provide support and information to allow the replication of CBFM 
approaches in  non-project water bodies, 
•   Keep contact with relevant stakeholders through coordination and 
communication,  
•   Resolve water body level conflicts, and  
•   Ensure payment of water body lease money in subsequent years. 
 
CLUSTER MANAGEMENT IN CBFM 
 
The broad objective of cluster management is to facilitate ecological 
management of open-water fisheries resources, with a view to enhancing the 
livelihoods of poor fishers. The concept is to co-ordinate the management of 
linked water bodies as fish are mobile resources that need a wide range of 
habitats at different stages of their life cycle.  
 
In the CBFM-2 project, cluster management concept was followed by CBOs 
organized by the NGOs, CNRS, Proshika, Caritas, Gharoni, Banchte Shekha 
and CRED. This was achieved by the formation of cluster management 
committees dealing with particular watersheds. 
 
The benefits from the cluster management in CBFM were:  
  
•   It helps in the identification of the management boundary of a project 
water-body. 
•   It can contribute to preventing the use of harmful gears that are being 
used in the project water-bodies. 
•   It can contribute in implementing such actions that need the joint 
initiative of more than one CBO.  
•   It can play role in habitat restoration and opening of fish migration 
routes.  
•   Actions to control fishing effort (closed season, fish sanctuary, 
reduction of harmful gear use, etc) require intervention in a coordinated 
manner.  
•   Cluster committees can play a role in conflict management amongst 
CBO members and between CBOs. 
•   Cluster Committees can play a role in developing linkages between the 
CBOs and different government and development service providers.    
   8
However a number of constraints to cluster management were also noted 
including communication problems between CBOs spread over a larger area, 
the lack of a clear incentive for committee members to attend meetings and 
the shortage of scientific information for decision making by the cluster 
committees.  
 
EMPOWERMENT OF COMMUNITY GROUPS IN CBFM 
 
The community groups in CBFM-2 project areas have been empowered 
through a series of official agreements so that they have clear access rights to 
public and privately owned water bodies. For publicly owned water bodies 
such as closed and open beels, the Ministry of Land agreed to pass over 
responsibility to the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock so that the CBOs 
could utilise the water bodies initially for 10 years with a further extension of 
10 years subject to a performance review. In private water bodies, such as 
floodplains, CBOs access rights and legal rights were established through 
registration either with the Cooperatives Department or with the Social 
Welfare Department. The only exception was with Charpara Samity in 
Daudkandi, Comilla where registration was as a Joint Stock Company.  
 
A Memorandum of Agreement was also made between the local District 
Fisheries Office and the respective CBOs for the use of the 60 publicly owned 
water bodies in the project. There was also local handover of the publicly 
owned water bodies from the Deputy Commissioner (DC) to the Department 
of Fisheries (DoF) and to the project CBOs for most of these WBs.  
 
In order to further strengthen the position of CBOs, other official agreements 
have been drawn up for publicly owned water bodies between DCs and 
District Fisheries Officers which involves a 150 Taka non-judicial stamp and a 
handover agreement will be made between the respective partner NGOs and 
CBOs with the support of the Senior Upazila Fisheries Officer/Upazila 
Fisheries Office.  
 
TRAINING SUPPORT IN CBFM 
 
Training of CBO members played a key role in the process of CBO 
development. Most CBOs received training on leadership development, good 
governance in CBOs, accounts management, participatory planning, gender 
and empowerment, micro-credit management and alternative income 
generating activities (AIGAs). At the end of the project, 1000 courses have 
been delivered by partner NGOs to the 130 CBOs at a cost of 11 Million Taka. 
This represents a cost of around US $ 7 per project primary beneficiary. 
 
AREA TEAM CONCEPT IN CBFM  
 
The Area Team concept was introduced in August 2006 during the extension 
phase of the project with a special mandate to assess progress and solve the 
critical issues affecting sustainability of the CBOs. The teams brought 
together the WorldFish Center, PNGO and DoF field-based staff in each area,   9
greatly facilitating communication and lesson sharing between organizations. 
Before this there was relatively little contact between staff from different 
NGOs and the WorldFish Center staff had mainly been involved in data 
collection for research projects.  
 
Each Area Team finalized a strategic training action plan to promote 
institutional sustainability for each of the CBFM-2 CBOs. At the end of each 
month the teams met to evaluate progress, and to prepare a ‘To Do List’ for 
the forthcoming month. A total of six teams worked over the last six months of 
the project.  
 
CBO SUSTAINABILITY IN CBFM 
 
In order to assess the progress of CBO development under the project and to 
maximize the likelihood of their future sustainability, a monitoring system was 
developed by the WorldFish Center and introduced in November 2005. A total 
of three rounds of assessment have so far been carried out in December 
2005, July 2006 and November 2006.  
 
The main assessment tool is a data collection questionnaire, which is filled in 
through focus group discussions (FGDs) with CBO leaders and other CBO 
members by a group of staff from WorldFish, DoF and the partner NGOs. The 
aim of the process is to identify the present status of the CBO, and contribute 
towards the preparation of strategic and practical action plans to promote the 
sustainability of the CBO.  
 
Each of the observing points has a series of options which are later scored 
from 0-5. The numeric data are analyzed in spreadsheets to find the overall 
score (in percent) which represents the sustainability level of the CBO. The 
sustainability levels are classified as follows: 
 
 
Probability of sustainability  Required score (%) 
Very high (VHP)  75 or more 
High to medium (HMP)  65-74 
Low (LP)  55-64 
Unlikely (Unl)  54 or less 
 
As shown in figure 2, there has been a general improvement in the 
sustainability level of CBOs. More CBOs are shifting towards ‘Very High 
Probability (VHP)’ and ‘High to Medium (HMP)’. At the 3rd round assessment, 
39 and 44 CBOs (out of 128) have reached to VHP and HMP, respectively. 
This was possible by introducing ‘Area Teams’ in August 2006. The Area 
Teams included staff from WorldFish, DoF and respective partner NGOs. The 
prime objective of Area Team formation was to reinforce the efforts of the 
NGO however, the charter of an Area Team is to coordinate and synchronize 
the individual efforts of the partner organizations including the CBO. 
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Most of the better performing CBOs are managing either open beels or 
floodplains. For instance, 10 open beel CBOs and 18 floodplain CBOs 
reached VHP (72% of the total number in VHP), in the 3rd round assessment.  
 
These are water bodies with seasonal fisheries. Perhaps the year round co-
operation between farming communities means that it is easier to establish 
functioning CBOs. The additional income from fishing, the educational status 
of household heads and the social capital of the beneficiaries may contribute 
to generate better coherence, and hence to mobilize the CBO effectively.  
 
In contrast, rivers are fished almost year-round, but the CBOs performed 
much worse than those in open beels and floodplains. It difficult to draw clear 
conclusions but there are indications that ‘benefit’ is not the only issue 
affecting the institutional sustainability of a CBO, especially for the most 
disadvantaged groups of people. In addition, the mobilization of a huge 
number of beneficiaries and the efficiency level of CBO leaders might be other 
reasons for their relatively poor performance. 
 
Closed beels are usually managed as stocked fisheries with management 
regimes very similar to large aquaculture businesses. About half of them (5 
out of 11) have reached VHP. In small beels, the ‘benefit’ in terms of fish 
supply is not impressive, but all but 2 of them were able to reach HMP. The 
partner NGO for small beel CBOs, (CNRS) helped them to diversify their 
activities with the assistance of several local government agencies thereby 
enhancing their institutional sustainability.  
 






























































LESSONS LEARNED ON CBO SUSTAINABIITY 
 
The following lessons have been drawn from the CBO sustainability 
assessment:   
•   Court cases (currently 32) and conflicts are negative factors that tend 
to minimize the probability of sustainability  
•   The multiple leasing system of the government triggers conflicts. 
•   The best way to avoid conflicts is to establish and maintain better 
linkages with the local administration and elites. 
•  Inadequate leadership is another vital factor. Better leadership 
development largely relies on better community mobilization. Pro-active 
initiatives by the field staff add value. 
•   Distribution of benefits supplements better community 
mobilization/coherence, and hence leadership development. 
•   Election helps the leaders to be accountable and hence to develop 
good leadership. 
•   Fisheries management largely depends on good leadership. 
•   Effective coordination ‘is a must’ to synchronize the efforts of partners 
to attain the common goals and objectives. Coordination can make 
better progress if the coordination-initiatives are decentralized. 
•   Following institutionalization, the practical empowerment of the CBOs 
may require a considerable amount of time (i.e. another couple of 
years). 
•   It is critical to understand the biological, physical and technical aspects 
of the resources, but it is equally important to comprehend the various 
market attributes and external social, political and institutional forces 
that influence the behaviour of the various stakeholders and managers. 
•   Other user groups are very active in floodplain and open beel therefore 
an integrated resource management (i.e. fisheries, agriculture, etc.) 




Institutional sustainability has always been one of the main concerns during 
implementation of the CBFM projects. There are many examples of projects 
where the key institutions have not been sustained beyond the project 
lifetime. In the case of the CBFM-2 project, attaining a clear legal status for 
the CBOs, cluster management, CBO training and the formation of a 
management body, the Association of Fisheries CBOs, have all played a part 
in creating institutions that have a good chance of being sustained. Whether 
they will be sustained over the longer term will depend very much on what 
happens in the wider sector. Community based approaches to fisheries 
management have now been included in official government strategy 
documents and it appears likely that there will be a widespread expansion of 
this approach in both publicly-owned and privately owned water bodies. If this 
happens, the community groups formed under the CBFM projects will almost 
certainly be sustained under this wider umbrella, indeed they, as the pioneers 
of this approach, will form a key resource to be used during the replication 
process. On the other hand, if community managed fisheries approaches do   12
not expand, the future for CBOs formed during the CBFM projects will be 




The CBO sustainability part of this paper has been written mainly from the 
“Institutional Sustainability Assessment for the CBOs in CBFM-2 Project” 
authored by Mr. M.H.M. Mostafa Rahman, Dr. Malcolm Dickson, Mr. Alan 
Brooks and Mr. Md. Muzaffar Ahmed of CBFM-2 Project, the WorldFish 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The Community Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) project in Bangladesh 
aimed to promote the sustainable use of inland capture fisheries by 
empowering fisher’s communities to manage their own aquatic resources. 
This paper describes the impact of fisheries management performance using 
data generated under the CBFM project, funded by the Ford Foundation and 
the UK Government’s Department for International Development (DFID).  
 
Using quantitative indicators of catch per unit area (CPUA), catch per unit 
effort (CPUE), catch per fisher’s day (CPD), biodiversity index (H’), fishing 
intensity (DPUA) and destructive fishing ratio (DFER) at up to 86 project water 
bodies across the country representing a variety of different habitats was 
compared with that of existing fisheries management (control water bodies). 
Estimates of the slope coefficients for each performance indicator were 
compared among habitat type and between CBFM and control water bodies 
using ANOVA (GLM). Fish production was found to have increased 
significantly through time at CBFM water bodies.  
 
Trends in fish production through time were upwards at 77% of the 64 project 
water bodies that were monitored for at least three years without data gap. 
Trends in fish abundance, indicated by annual average daily catch rates by 
fishers, were also upwards at 72% of monitored water bodies. Changes in 
biodiversity index (H’) with time were found to be positive and significantly 
greater than in control water bodies. Species assemblages are richer and 
more abundant at CBFM compared to control water bodies. Trends in 
biodiversity were also upwards at 70% of monitored water bodies. 
Considering all management approaches together, the score based 
performance indicators suggests that a fisher managed approach ensured 
maximum benefits, and followed by community managed and women 
managed approaches.  
 
In conclusion, community-based fisheries management appears to perform 
significantly better than the existing management system in Bangladesh. 
Future projects might choose to place greater emphasis on identifying habitat-
specific interventions and arrangement to meet precise management 
objectives. Existing information sharing networks could support 
experimentation and learning under future initiatives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Bangladesh is endowed with enormous inland fishery resources and vast 
inland waters that are vital to millions of poor people, but production and 
species diversity are believed to be declining.  Fishers and experts have 
identified potential causes for this decline including habitat degradation due to 
siltation and conversion to agriculture, increasing fishing pressure, destructive 
fishing practices and an acute shortage of dry season wetland habitat 
(Hughes et al. 1994).  
 
The first phase of the Community Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) 
during 1994-1999 was funded by Ford Foundation grants. After an interim 
period of nearly two years with little or no community-based management 
activity, a second phase of the project (CBFM-2) began in September 2001. 
This ongoing 5-year follow-on phase, funded by the UK Government’s 
Department for International Development (DFID), is being implemented 
jointly by the WorldFish Center and the Government of Bangladesh’s 
Department of Fisheries, through a partnership involving 11 Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs).  
 
These field-based partner NGOs are responsible for organizing about 23,000 
poor fishing households around 116 water bodies representing a range of 
different habitat types (14 closed beels, 28 floodplains, 8 haor beels, 28 open 
beels and 38 river sections) and located in regions throughout Bangladesh 
(Figure 1).  
 
The study employed data collected from CBFM and control sites since 1997, 
representing a range of different habitat type and geographic location. 
Performance indicators relating to production, resource sustainability and 
biodiversity were identified together with more than 15 explanatory variables 
hypothesised to affect management performance.   
 
Impacts of the CBFM were examined in two ways.  Firstly, by testing for 
significant differences in estimates of mean values of performance indicators 
between CBFM and control sites (controlled comparisons) using general 
linear models (GLMs).  Secondly by testing for significant upward or 
downward trends in estimates of performance indicators at CBFM sites 
through time (time series analysis). 
 
For the time series analysis, significant trends in performance indicators 
through time were explored by testing the significance of the “slope” 
coefficient of regression models of performance indicators fitted using the 
GLM routine where time (year) was treated as the independent variable.  Only 
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Fig. 1: Location of monitored CBFM and control sites in Bangladesh 
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Monitoring of management performance variables at CBFM sites was 
conducted both routinely and on an ad hoc basis at both CBFM and control 
sites. Control sites were selected with similar topographic features and 
existing fishing activities to those chosen for CBFM project support. The 
assessment employed species-wise catch and gear-wise effort data sampled 
under the Project’s catch assessment survey (CAS) between 1997 and 2005 
from a maximum of 107 divided unequally between those under CBFM and 
unmanaged control sites (Table 1).   
 
Fishing activity was observed for four to eight days per month, per site. During 
the first day of each two-day sampling period, a census (complete count) of 
gears by gear type in operation is undertaken.  On the second day, randomly 
selected samples of landings (catch) by species and effort (gear hours) by 
gear are recorded for each gear type observed to be operational on the 
previous day.  The number of samples (n) recorded for each gear type on this 
second day of sampling varies was typically approximately n = 7 for gillnets – 
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Table 1. Number of monitored CBFM and control sites by habitat type and 
year. CB- Closed beel; FPB-Floodplain beel; HB- haor beel; OB-Open beel; R 
– River section.  
 
 CBFM  Control  Total
Split  year  CB  FPB HB OB R  CB FPB HB OB R   
1997-
1998  2  2     2  10                 16 
1998-
1999  5  2     2  10                 19 
1999-
2000  4  2     2  9                 17 
2000-
2001  2  2     2  8                 14 
2001-
2002  2  2     2  7                 13 
2002-
2003  9  23 6 20  16  1 4  4 4 6  93 
2003-
2004  12  24 6 27  19  1 4  4 4 6  107 
2004-
2005  12  23 6 22  20  2 4  4 4 6  103 
2005-
2006  11  22 7 27  19  2 4  4 4 6  106 
 
 
Performance Indicators and Explanatory Variables 
 
Management performance was quantified using indicators of production and 
resource sustainability.  Where appropriate, differences in scale among sites 
were accounted for by standardizing the indicator by the mean maximum 
(flooded) area of the site (MaxAreas) observed during the project duration.  
 
Annual multispecies catch per unit area (CPUA) was employed as a measure 





















g m y s Catch , , , is the estimated multispecies catch landed by gear type g, 
during month m and year y at site s measured in kg ha-1 y-1. 
 
Fish abundance indicated by multispecies catch per fisher per day or ‘catch 
per day’ (CPD) expressed as kg day-1 was employed as a measure of 
resource sustainability:  
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     Equation  2 
 
Where
y s Days Fishing Annual ,  is the estimated total number of days spent 
fishing by the fishers at site s during year y, irrespective of the gear type 
employed. 
 
Because of the fundamental importance of sustaining or improving fish 
abundance as a management objective, an alternative indicator of fish 
abundance that accounts for any changes in fishing power was also employed 
based upon observations of gillnet catch per unit effort (GNCPUE) estimates 
made between August and September (Equation 3):  
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   Equation  3 
 
Where 
y s i GNCPUE , , is the catch rate of the ith gillnet sampled at site s between 
August (month 8) and September (month 9) of year y.  The ratio was 
multiplied by 1000 because units (kg m-2 hr-1) were typically very small. 
 
Two measures of fishing effort were employed as additional (indirect) 
indicators of the sustainability of the fisheries.  The first; annual days fished 










     Equation  4 
 
The second; destructive fishing effort ratio (DFER), provided an estimate of 
the total annual fishing effort measured in hours with (predefined) destructive 
gear type (dg =1 to n) as a proportion of the total annual fishing effort with any 





























    Equation  5 
 
The predefined destructive gear types included monofilament gillnets, small-
mesh seine nets and dewatering (see Annex 1 for a complete list). 
 
Biodiversity, estimated using the Shannon-Weiner biodiversity Index (H') 
(Shannon, 1948) provided a further indicator of the sustainability of the 
fisheries from a conservation perspective. 
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RESULTS 
 
Trends in performance indicators 
 
Considering all trends, irrespective of their statistical significance, the 
presence or absence of the CBFM had a significant effect on the relative 
frequency of upward and downward trends in CPUA,  CPD, GNCPUE and H’. 
Trends in DFER and DPUA were found to be independent of management. 
The relative frequencies of the upward and downward trends indicated that 
the CBFM activities have significantly (p<0.01) benefited production (CPUA), 
fish abundance (CPD) and biodiversity (H’) at the majority (70-80%) of CBFM 
sites (Figure 2).  
 
Virtually 57% of CBFM sites exhibited downward trends in catch per unit effort 
during August and September, indicated by effort standardized gillnet catch 
rates during the period (GNCPUE).  However, these frequencies could be 
expected by chance.  Fishing intensity (DPUA) and destructive fishing 
practices (DFER) both declined at more CBFM sites than they increased at 
but these frequencies could also be expected by chance (Table 1). At control 
sites, downward trends in CPUA, CPD and H’ were more frequent than 
upward trends at but the relative frequencies could be expected by chance 
(Table 2).  The number of downward trends in GNCPUE would not, however 
be expected by chance for all, and only significant, trends, indicating 
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Figure 2: Comparison in the sustainability performance indicators trends for 
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Table 2  Frequency (upward and downward) in the performance indicators.   
 



































































  CBFM Sites only 
Frequency 
Upward 
49 46  30 29 30 48 
Frequency 
Downward 
15 18  40 35 34 21 
  Control Sites only 
Frequency 
Upward 
6 6  2 11  8 6 
Frequency 
Downward 





Mean site score was found to vary significantly among habitat type and 
between CBFM and control sites.  Significant differences in mean site score 
between CBFM and control sites were detected for closed beel (p=0.03, 1-β 
=0.60, d.f.=9), open beel (p<0.01, 1-β=0.86, d.f.=25) and river habitat (p<0.01, 
1-β=0.98, d.f.=23) (Figure 3). 















































Figure 3. Mean site score with 95% Cl for CBFM and control sites by habitat 
type.  
 
Mean slope coefficients  
 
Estimates of the mean CPUA slope coefficient (cpuab), representing annual 
rates of change in fish production, were found to vary significantly (p<0.05)   9
with habitat type, but not between CBFM and control sites suggesting that the 
CBFM has had no significant detectable effect on CPUA (Figure 4).  However, 
estimates of the mean slope coefficient for CBFM sites were greater than zero 
for all habitat except haor beel, and significantly greater than zero (p<0.05) for 
closed and floodplain beel, and river habitat (Figure 4) indicating increasing 
production through time in these habitats. Average increases in CPUA ranged 
from approximately 20 to 30% per year.  Estimates of the mean slope 
coefficient for control sites were not significantly different from zero for all 
habitats tested indicating no significant change in fish production (CPUA) at 






































Figure 4 Mean slope coefficient estimates with 95% CI for the fish production 
indicator CPUA (cpuab) at CBFM and control sites for each habitat.   
Reference line at zero indicates no change in mean value of indicator.  
 
Variation in fish abundance and fishing intensity, indicated by cpdb and dpuab 
respectively, best explained the variation in fish production (cpuab) among 
sites (R2=0.60; p<0.01 d.f.=77).  As expected, fish production increases both 
with increasing fish abundance and fishing effort although these two variables 
are typically negatively correlated. 
 
Two-way ANOVA tests (GLM) indicated no significant difference (p<0.05) in 
the estimate of the mean CPD slope coefficient among habitat type after 
accounting for differences between CBFM and control sites.  After pooling the 
data across habitat, the estimate of the mean slope coefficient was 
significantly (p=0.03) greater for CBFM compared to control sites, and 
significantly (p<0.01) greater than zero (Figure 5).  The estimate of the mean 
slope coefficient for CBFM sites translates to an increase in daily catch rates 
of 16% per annum.  Equivalent increases by habitat ranged from 10-20% per 
annum.  Rates of change in fish abundance at control sites were not 
significantly different from zero.   
 
Estimates of the mean gillnet catch rate (GNCPUE) slope coefficient (cpueb) 
were found not to vary significantly across habitat type (Figure 5).  After 
pooling the estimates across habitat, the estimate of the mean slope   10
coefficient for CBFM sites was significantly greater (p<0.05) than for control 
sites but not significantly different from zero, indicating no significant decline 
in mean gillnet catch rates at CBFM sites through time (Figure 5).  The 
estimate of the mean slope coefficient for control sites was however 
significantly less than zero, equivalent to a decline in catch rates (fish 



























Figure 5 Mean slope coefficient estimates with 95% CI for the fish abundance 
indicators CPD (left) and GNCPUE (right) at CBFM and control sites for all 
habitat sites combined.  Reference line at zero indicates no change in the 
value of indicator with time.  
 
Estimates of the mean fishing intensity (DPUA) slope coefficient (dpuab) 
representing annual rates of change in fishing intensity were found to vary 
significantly (p<0.05) between habitat but not between CBFM and control sites 
(Figure 6).  For CBFM sites belonging to floodplain beel habitat, mean fishing 
intensity increased significantly (p<0.05) by approximately 10% per annum, 
but not significantly more than at control sites.  For haor beel habitat, the 
mean estimate for CBFM sites was significantly less than zero, equivalent to a 
decline in fishing intensity of more than 30% per year.  This decline was not 
significantly different from that estimated for control sites.  The remaining 

































   11
Figure 6 Mean slope coefficient estimates with 95% CI for the fishing effort 
indicator DPUA (dpuab) at CBFM and control sites for each habitat.   
Reference line at zero indicates no change in mean value of indicator.  
 
Estimates of the mean biodiversity index (H') slope coefficient (hb) 
representing annual rates of change in biodiversity were found to vary 
significantly (p<0.05) with habitat and between CBFM and control sites 
(Figure 7).  On average, hb was 0.19 higher at CBFM compared to control 
sites.  Significant increases in biodiversity at CBFM sites through time (mean 
slope coefficient >0) were found for both closed and floodplain beel habitat 
equivalent to annual increases in H' of 0.12 and 0.17, respectively.   
Frequency distribution of (b) values for trend in biodiversity (H’) with time for 
project water bodies are shown in figure 8. Significant improvements in H’ 
through time were also estimated for control sites in floodplain beel habitat 
equivalent to 0.21 per annum. No significant (p<0.05) changes in biodiversity 
were detected at either CBFM or control sites in haor, open beel or river 
habitat. Estimates for control sites were lower than for CBFM sites for open 
beel and river habitat but not significantly (p>0.05).  A total of 156 species of 
fish and prawns were recorded from all CBFM2 project water bodies during 
2004-2005. Among the most dominant species, 20 species represented 































Figure 7 Mean slope coefficient estimates with 95% CI for the fish biodiversity 
indicator H' (hb) at CBFM and control sites for each habitat.  Reference line at 
zero indicates no change in mean value of indicator.   12
  
Frequency distribution of (b) values for trend in biodiversity (H') with time
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Figure 8. Frequency distribution of (b) values for trend in biodiversity (H’) with 
time for CBFM2 project water bodies. 
 
Table 3. Contributions of twenty dominant fish or prawn species in all CFBM2 











Puntius sophore  23.70 2.17  10.43  10.43 
Channa punctatus  17.60 1.68  8.11  18.53 
Nematopalaemon 
tenuipes  21.36 1.26  6.05  24.58 
Channa striatus  18.73 1.00  4.83  29.42 
Mystus tengra  13.98 0.92  4.42  33.83 
Xenentodon cancila  11.50 0.91  4.38  38.21 
Glossogobius giuris  12.81 0.80  3.86  42.07 
Mastacembelus 
armatus  17.47 0.79  3.78  45.86 
Nandus nandus  8.36 0.74  3.57  49.42 
Wallago attu  30.16 0.64  3.09  52.51 
Labeo rohita  15.94 0.61  2.96  55.46 
Macrognathus 
aculeatus  9.21 0.57  2.74  58.21 
Puntius ticto  12.13 0.56  2.72  60.92 
Heteropneustes 
fossilis  7.65 0.54  2.62  63.54 
Colisa fasciatus  8.32 0.48  2.29  65.83 
Cirrhinus mrigala  15.63 0.46  2.19  68.02 
Lepidocephalus 
guntea  6.93 0.39  1.86  69.88 
Catla catla  17.46 0.35  1.70  71.58 
Mastacembelus 
pancalus  10.70 0.35  1.68  73.26 
Macrobrachium 
malcolmsonii  18.84 0.34  1.66  74.92 
   13
Figure 9a shows the estimates of the mean slope coefficient (b) of 
regressions of performance indicators with time (year) by habitat for CBFM 
sites. Estimates for all habitats are provided in those cases where habitat was 
found not to be a significant factor in determining mean slope values. 










































CPUA b  CPD b CPUE b
DPUA b  H' b
 
Figure 9a. Estimates of the mean slope coefficient (b) of regressions of 




















Figure 9b. Annual rates of change (%) by habitat for CBFM water bodies- 
based on mean slope coefficient (b) of regression. Reference line at zero 
indicates no change in mean value indicator. 
 
Figure 10a shows estimates of the mean slope coefficient (b) of regressions 
of performance indicators with time (year) by habitat for control sites. 
Estimates for all habitats are provided in those cases where habitat was found 


























































































































































not to be a significant factor in determining mean slope values. Corresponding 
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CPUE b DPUA b
 H' b
 
Figure 10a. Estimates of the mean slope coefficient (b) of regressions of 

























Figure 10b. Annual rates of change (%) by habitat for control water bodies- 
based on mean slope coefficient (b) of regression. Reference line at zero 
indicates no change in mean value indicator. 
 
What Management Interventions Worked Best? 
 
























































































































































The CBFM project has provided compelling evidence to show that the fishers 
managed approach was effective in a wide range of different inland water 
body types in Bangladesh. A site score comprising the trends for all fisheries 
management performance indicators (CPUA, CPD, GNCPUE, DFER, DPUA 
and H’) was calculated for each community managed water body and 
compared among different habitats (Figure 11). The relative frequencies of 
these upwards and downwards trends indicated that CBFM activities yielded 
benefits at 90%, 84% and 80% of the CBFM2 water bodies managed by 
Fishers, Community and Women respectively. However at control sites only 
37% of sites had significant improvements and these were mainly in large 
floodplain sites. However, experimentation or adaptive approaches to 
management will be required to determine which are most important. In 
conclusion, community-based fisheries management appears to perform 
significantly better than the existing management regime in Bangladesh. 
 
 















































Figure 11. Plot of water bodies score comprising the trends of all fisheries 
management performance indicators (CPUA, CPD, GNCPUE, DFER, DPUA 
and H’) compared among different habitat through community management 
approach. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
According to the relative frequency of upward and downward trends in 
performance indicators at CBFM and control sites, the CBFM Project appears 
to have benefited fish production (CPUA), abundance (CPD and GNCPUE) 
and biodiversity (H’) at participating sites, but has had little or no apparent 
effect on destructive fishing practices (DFER) or fishing intensity (DPUA). 
Except for fish abundance indicated by gillnet catch rates (GNCPUE), which 
was found to be declining at significantly more sites than it was increasing, no 
significant (p<0.05) overall trends in management performance were detected 
at control sites. 
The analysis of slope coefficients corresponding to these trends generated 
largely consistent results to those above but indicated that some of the above   16
conclusions were habitat specific. The CBFM was found to have a significant 
beneficial effect on CPD, GNCPUE and H’, but not CPUA or DPUA after 
accounting for any natural variation among habitat type and region.  
 
Mean annual increases in fish abundance, indicated by CPD, were 
significantly greater at CBFM compared to control sites, particularly in river 
habitat (20% per annum). Furthermore, the mean change in fish abundance at 
control sites was not significantly different from zero.  Fish abundance 
increased in response to a decrease in fishing intensity (DPUA) and closed 
seasons, but these factors explained only 15% of the total variation in fish 
abundance.  Whilst gillnet net catches rates (GNCPUE) indicated no 
significant change in fish abundance at CBFM sites, a significant (p<0.05) 
decline was detected at control sites equivalent to almost 30% per annum.   
  
The fishing power index (FPI) was found not to have increased significantly 
through time within any habitat suggesting that the CPD indicator is unlikely to 
be biased from changes in fishing power.   Unlike the annual perspective of 
the CPD indicator, GNCPUE provides an index of fish abundance only during 
a two month period during the flood season when gillnets tend to target 
migratory whitefish species (Welcomme 1985).  GNCPUE may therefore be a 
poor indicator of the abundance of less migratory blackfish species, and thus 
the entire assemblage. Therefore each indicator has advantages and 
disadvantages.   
 
Irrespective of the choice of indicator, the results suggest that fish abundance 
does benefit from CBFM manifest either as increasing, or at least sustained, 
abundance. 
 
Rates of change in biodiversity were found to vary significantly among habitat 
and were on average also significantly greater at CBFM compared to control 
sites. Improvements in biodiversity at CBFM sites through time were 
significant in closed and floodplain beel habitat.  Significant improvements in 
biodiversity were also detected for control sites belonging to floodplain beel 
habitat.   
 
The slope coefficient analyses also supported the conclusion that the CBFM 
appears overall to have had little effect on fishing intensity (DPUA) although 
significant declines (31% per annum) were found at CBFM sites belonging to 
haor beel habitat and modest (10%) but significant increases were observed 
in floodplain beel habitat. No significant changes in fishing intensity were 
detected at control sites. 
 
Variation in the slope coefficient estimates for the individual management 
performance indicators at CBFM sites was significant within the majority of 
habitats categories but no discernable patterns were evident among the 
indicators to suggest that overall CBFM performance varied significantly 
among habitat, nor site size, geographic region or facilitating NGO (Halls et al. 
2006a). 
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The mean composite measure of management performance (site score) was 
found to be greater at CBFM compared to control sites in four of the five 
habitats and significantly (p<0.05) greater in three.  The size of the water body 
(MAXAREA), the NGO facilitating management and the ownership regime 
(JALMOHOL) were also found to have no detectable effects on the site score 
estimates among CBFM sites (Halls et al. 2006a).   
 
Whilst co- and community-based management approaches have long been 
advocated as a means to addresses the failures associated with conventional 
‘top-down’ approaches to management (Pomeroy & Williams 1994; Hoggarth 
et al. 1999; Wilson et al. 2003), few studies have quantitatively demonstrated 
their benefits.  On the basis of the results presented here, it is concluded that 
the practices implemented under the Community Based Management (CBFM) 
Project in Bangladesh have improved, or at least sustained, fish abundance 
and biodiversity without significant loss to production compared to those at the 
control sites.  In other words, the community-based approach adopted under 
the Project appears to give rise to better management performance than the 
existing top-down government-driven regime.    
 
Increases in fish abundance and fishing intensity explained much (60%) of the 
variation in fish production.  A companion paper (Halls and Mustafa 2006) 
describes empirical relationships between fishing intensity and production 
derived using data from this study to provide estimates of maximum yield and 
corresponding fishing effort by habitat.  These estimates may help inform 
future CBFM programmes and provide useful starting points for experimental 
or adaptive management programmes in similar habitats (see below). 
 
Greater uncertainty surrounds which factors were responsible for 
improvements in the remaining indicators.  Closed seasons appear significant 
but explain less than 15% of the variation in fish abundance (CPD) after also 
accounting for differences in fishing intensity, and only 24% of the variation in 
biodiversity (Halls et al. 2006a).  Halls et al. (2001) predicted that closed 
seasons during the rising flood period (April-July) would significantly increase 
floodplain fish production and abundance by improving both recruitment and 
yield-per-recruit.  Whilst the effect of gear bans on the response of 
performance indicators could not be separated from those arising from closed 
seasons (because the two interventions were implemented together at almost 
all CBFM sites) the observed trends in destructive gear use (DFER) indicated 
that gear bans had been ineffective and therefore were unlikely to have been 
responsible.  Hoggarth & Kirkwood (1996) predicted that gear bans do not 
increase overall yield, but can be an effective means of redistributing benefits 
to preferred gear of fisher socio-economic categories. 
 
Reserves have been recommended as potentially effective means of 
controlling fishing mortality in the floodplain environment (e.g. Hoggarth et al. 
1999; 2003) but studies robustly demonstrating their efficacy, and 
recommendations concerning minimum reserve areas, are sadly lacking.   
Here, reserves were found to have no detectable effect on any of the 
management performance indicators. Their apparent ineffectiveness here 
may reflect poor enforcement, inappropriate reserve location or simply that   18
they were too small to produce any detectable effects.  Seventy-five percent 
of the reserves occupied less than 10% of the dry season area of CBFM sites.   
 
Up to 12 CBFM and control sites were also stocked to improve production. 
Estimates of fish production employed in the CPUA, CPD and GNCPUE 
indicators excluded landings of stocked fish although the effect of stocking 
activities on performance indicators was considered.  A second companion 
paper (Halls et al. 2006b) describes a simple bio-economic model to help 
farmers select the most profitable and risk adverse stocking strategies based 
upon data collected under the CBFM Project.  
 
Future projects or initiatives may choose to place greater emphasis on 
identifying effective habitat-specific management interventions and 
arrangements with respect to specific management objectives.  For example, 
CBOs might be encouraged to experiment with closures to the fishery of 
different durations or during different months of the year (seasons), allocate 
different proportions of their dry season fish habitat as reserves, or control 
fishing effort at different levels as a means of determining the best strategy to 
increase fish production, abundance or biodiversity.  
 
The CBFM Project has already demonstrated that CBOs are motivated to 
share and disseminate their knowledge and experiences through meetings, 
exchange visits and newsletters (Halls et al 2005). Consideration might 
therefore be given to strengthening these types of CBO networks to support 
experimentation and learning under future initiatives.  Halls et al (ibid) 
describe guidelines for designing data collection and sharing systems to 
support this type of adaptive management approach.  
 
Future impact studies of this type would benefit from greater consideration to 
the sampling design to avoid the problems encountered here arising from 
missing cells and an unbalanced design, and to optimize the use of project 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the impact of the Community Based Fisheries 
Management Project (CBFM-2) on household welfare by examining how the 
various types of livelihood assets contribute to household income. The CBFM 
projects have been implemented since 1995, through a partnership of the 
Department of Fisheries, 11 NGOs and the WorldFish Center, working in 116 
water bodies with more than 23,000 households living around the project sites. 
The major objective of the CBFM was to build local fishery community 
organizations by providing training, building social awareness and giving access 
to credit facilities, with the aim of enhancing poor fishers’ capability to access to 
livelihood assets.  
 
The study reports on the results from an impact survey of 2,826 households from 
40 water bodies in four different regions of Bangladesh. It was seen that CBFM 
households had significantly improved their social capital and have got better 
access to land and fishing grounds compared to households in non-CBFM 
control sites. The results of regression analysis show that the contributions of 
social capital and natural capital factors were important in improving household 
incomes. Future policy options need to be considered as a priority to invest more 




Community Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) has emerged as one of the 
most viable options for managing fisheries resources in many developing 
countries including Bangladesh. The fisheries of Bangladesh support the 
livelihoods of millions of poor people but capture fisheries are declining as a 
result of high rates of exploitation and habitat degradation. More than 70% of 
households fish in the floodplains either for income or food (Minkin et al., 1997; 
Thompson et al., 1999). Many of the fisheries resources are state property and 
management control very often falls into the hands of rich and influential lessees. 
The leaseholders tend to allow fishing by as many fishers as are willing to pay 
user fees to ensure that they make a profit (Ullah, 1985; Naqi, 1989; McGregor, 
1995).  
 
Access to resources has been a constant debate in rural economies and the 
livelihoods of rural households. Increased access to resources depends on which 
assets are more relevant to the types of livelihood. Indicators of livelihood 
security can be grouped under five types of capitals: social capital, natural 
capital, financial capital, physical capital and human capital (DFID, 1999). 
 
•   Social capital relates to the social resources (networks, membership of 
groups, and relationships of trust, access to wider institutions of society) 
upon which people draw in pursuit of livelihoods.   3
•   Natural capital represents the natural resource stocks from which resource 
flows useful for livelihoods are derived (e.g. land, water, wildlife, 
biodiversity, and wider environmental resources). 
•   Financial capital represents the financial resources which are available to 
people (whether savings, supplies of credit or regular remittances or 
pensions) and which provide them with different livelihood options. 
•   Physical capital is the basic infrastructure (transport, shelter, water, 
energy and communication), the production equipment and means that 
enable people to pursue their livelihoods. 
•   Human capital is the skills, knowledge, labour and good health important 
to the ability to pursue different livelihood strategies. 
 
Sen (1997) argues that capabilities enhance people’s ability to be agents of 
change. Sustainable rural livelihoods can be conceptualized in terms of recent 
debates on access to resources (Berry, 1989; Blaikie, 1989), asset vulnerability 
(Moser, 1998), and entitlements (Sen, 1981). 
 
The fishers have limited access to livelihood assets, they are mostly illiterate, 
landless, and have poor housing condition, lack of employment, poor capital 
assets and lack of funds. The security of access to fisheries resources is vital for 
the livelihood of poor fishers. It is argued that inequality in livelihood assets 
among the user groups might be associated with different degrees of control and 
access of the fisheries resources. 
 
 
COMMUNITY BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
 
The Community Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) Project, funded by the 
Ford Foundation and the UK Government’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), aimed to promote the sustainable use of, and equitable 
distribution of benefits from, inland fisheries resources by empowering 
communities to manage heir own resources. The project was implemented in two 
phases: 1994-1999 (CBFM-1) and 2002-2005 (CBFM-2) by the WorldFish Center 
and the Government of Bangladesh’s Department of Fisheries (DoF) with the 
support of 11 Non Government Organisations (NGOs). By 2005 the project has 
facilitated the establishment of 130 Community Based Organisatons (CBOs) in 
different types of water bodies located in regions throughout Bangladesh 
representing more than 23,000 poor fishing households.  
 
The water bodies under the project are diverse, comprising mostly of rivers, 
closed beels, and open beels, but also significant areas of floodplains (largely 
private land) and small beels (under 8 ha). Each CBO was responsible for the 
management of a defined area of fish habitat of different types of water bodies. 
The CBOs were encouraged to implement several management interventions to 
help manage their fishery resources in a sustainable manner.  
   4
In closed and open beels, CBOs had to take over a commitment to pay the lease 
fees in return for which they secured control over management of the water body. 
This involved a clear change in tenure and access as in most cases, fishers in 
the newly established CBFM community groups (CBOs) had no access to fishing 
in those water bodies before the project because the lease was held by a single 
person or a ‘fisherman’s co-operative’ controlled by a few rich and influential 
individuals.  
 
In floodplains, the land was privately owned before the project and there was no 
effective change in access or tenure because no lease was required. The 
community groups operating in these areas were encouraged to implement 
measures to improve the state of the fish stocks in the floodplain, in particular, by 
excavating dry season refuges for fish. The situation in rivers was similar 
because leasing was abolished in 1995. This led to a free-for-all which tended to 
favour the most powerful who could afford to install and maintain fish aggregating 
areas known as kathas. 
 
The main objective of the project has been to test models for sustainable 
management of the fisheries, it has also tried to encourage fishers and others 
living in project areas to develop alternative livelihoods through training and 
credit support. This paper will provide information on whether poor fishers are 
benefited in terms of increasing income by efficient and equitable access to 
livelihood assets.  
 
METHODOLOGY    
 
Sampling and Data Collection  
 
The main tool for assessing livelihood impacts was a pair of questionnaire-based 
field surveys - a baseline study carried out in 2002 shortly after the start of 
CBFM-2 and an impact study carried out in mid-2006.  
 
The survey covered 1994 households (including both project beneficiaries and 
others) at 34 project water bodies plus 832 households in 6 control water bodies. 
The questionnaire used in the impact survey was based on the baseline survey 
format which separated households into 5 categories based on their poverty and 
fishing profiles (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 - Household categories 
Category Household  type  Characteristics 
I  Poor  fisher  Fishes for income or both for income and food, 
usually does labouring work, and possesses no 
agricultural land 
II Poor  –  Non-
fisher 
Does not fish for income, has no agricultural land, 
usually does labouring work, but not service or 
professional jobs   5
III Moderately  poor 
fisher 
Fishes for income, has some agricultural land but 
less than 100 decimals (0.4 ha), or if occupation 
includes service or professional job and has 
thatched house 
IV Moderately  poor 
– Non-fisher 
Does not fish for income, has some agricultural 
land but less than 100 decimals (0.4 ha), or if 
occupation includes service or professional job 
and has thatched house 
V  Better  off  May or may not fish for income, has land more 
than 100 decimals (0.4 ha) and/or has someone 
with a service or professional job and a tin house, 
or has a pucca (concrete) house 
 
The baseline and impact questionnaires covered a wide range of socio-economic 
and livelihood parameters, details of aquatic resource use, fishing involvement, 
access, compliance, existing NGO support and scales to measure more 
subjective indicators including social capital. Survey results were analysed using 
descriptive statistics to show differences in the key livelihoods indicators 
according to water body type (closed beels, open beels, floodplains, rivers). 




Social capital cannot be measured by a single variable. A set of variables were 
used to measure the social impact. Factor analysis was used to construct the 
indices of social capital. Principal Component Analysis is widely used to find the 
important principal components as un-rotated factor based on the criteria of 
eigen values greater than one. PCA extracts a maximum amount of variance to 
compute the factor scores calculated only from highly loaded factors. The factor 
scores are weighted according to the factor loadings. To ensure the correlations 
between the factors, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Bartlett, 1954) and Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin (KMO) was used. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant 
(p<0.05) and considered appropriate. The KMO index ranges from 0 to 1, with 
0.6 suggested as minimum value for a good factor analysis (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 1996). The variables used in the study are shown in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Definition of Variables   6
Social Capital Variable 
Membership = membership in organizations (5=most important; 1=less 
important) 
Influence = influence over access to resource  (5=strong influence; 1=no 
influence) 
Participation = participation in decision making (number of times) 
Knowledge = fisheries management knowledge (5=full knowledge;1=no 
knowledge) 
Trust = level of trust (5=strongly agree; 1= disagree) 
 
Physical Capital Variable 
Housing = value of house structure (Taka) 
Latrine = value of water sealed latrine(Taka) 
Capital assets = Value of a set of household assets (Taka) 
Homestead land = area of homestead land (ha) 
Fishing equipment = value of equipment (Taka) 
Fishing area  = measure of fishing area (ha) 
 
Human Capital variable 
Education = education of household head (years of schooling) 
Age = age of  household head (year) 
Employment = total employment days  
 
Other assets 
Credit = amount of credit received by household (Taka) 
Cultivable land = cultivable land owned by household (ha) 





The factors that contribute to household income are analyzed using a regression 
model. As shown in Equation (1) the explanatory variables included in the model 
consist of those measuring various asset endowments and demographic 
characteristics of the households. The dependent variable is the welfare of the 
household measured as annual household gross income from different sources.  
 
Equation (1) is estimated separately using the survey data from households in 
the sampled CBFM (project) and non-CBFM (control) areas:  
 
Y=α + 1 β SC + 2 β PC + 3 β EDN +  4 β CRT +  5 β CUL + 6 β EMP+  β 7 AGE + β 8 HS 
+  β 9FISA+β 10ATCM+Error,                           
(1) 
 
   7
Where 
Y = household annual income (taka)    
α  = constant 
β 1 to  β 10  =  coefficient of variables for household asset endowments and 
household  
          characteristics 
SC = household endowment of social capital (index) 
PC = household endowment of physical capital (index) 
EDN = household education (years) 
CRT = credit received by households (taka) 
CUL = area of household cultivable land (ha) 
EMP = employment days of households (days) 
AGE = age of household head (years) 
HS = household size (number) 
FISA= area fished by households (ha) 
ATCM= household head attended in community meeting (number) 
Error 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Impact of CBFM on Household Income   
 
Descriptive statistics show that there were large rises in the annual incomes of 
households over the four years between baseline and impact. Average 
household incomes
1 in project areas rose by 31%, and increased significantly 
(P<0.01)
2 in all types of water bodies – by 21% in closed beels, 24% in open 
beels, 37% in floodplain beels and 57% in rivers. However, these rises were 
matched by similar increases (average, 37%) in the household incomes of 
people living in control sites - 22% in closed beels, 42% in open beels, 33% in 
floodplains and 30% rivers (Figure 3.1). This means that the overall income gains 
in project areas cannot be directly attributed to the project. There have been 
substantial rises in average income levels in general – a clear trend that has 
been recognized in other recent livelihood studies in Bangladesh (Sen 2003; 
CARE/LMU 2005). 
                                                 
1 Adjusted for inflation 
2 P<0.01 = highly significant, P<0.05 = moderately significant   8





















Fig.1. Household incomes 
 
Incomes from fishing 
It was expected that the project activities would result in increase fish production 
in project water bodies. This suggests that there should be clear increases in 
fishing incomes, particularly by project fishers. Table 3 shows fishing incomes 
split by water body type and occupation and compares project fishing incomes 
against those in control sites. 
 
Overall annual average fishing incomes by fishers in project sites increased by 
21% from baseline to impact from Tk 15,035 to Tk 18,189. In control sites, the 
increase was less, 15%, from Tk 15,076 to Tk 17,286 however this was not 
significantly less than the increase in project sites.   
 
In floodplains and rivers, fishers’ incomes from fishing showed large increases 
(104% and 60%, respectively), whereas in open beels fishers’ incomes from 
fishing only rose by 9% and fishers’ incomes from fishing dropped by 23% in 
closed beels. The trends in control sites were significantly different to those in 
project river and floodplain sites indicating that the large increases in fishers’ 
incomes from fishing in these project sites can be attributed to the CBFM-2 
project activities. Trends in fishers’ incomes from fishing in closed and open beel 
control sites were not significantly different to those in project sites. Although 
there was an apparent rise in non-fishers incomes from fishing in control open 
and closed beel sites, these were from very low baseline levels. Nevertheless it 
may illustrate that it is easier for people to move into and out of fishing in control 
areas compared to project areas as there are fewer controls over who can fish 
and when they can fish.  
 
Table 3. Household fishing incomes split by water body type, occupation and 
project vs. control (Tk/year) 
 
Project Control 
   2002 2006 %  rise  2002 2006  %  rise   9
Fisher  15917 17256 +9%  14585 18859  +30% 
Non 
fisher  913 629 -32%  609 2125  +249% 
Open 
Beel 
Better  off  1867 1386 -26% 2441 4012  +65% 
Fisher  12967  9973 -23% 9956 7378  -26% 
Non 
fisher  731 826 +13%  553 1257  +128% 
Closed 
Beel 
Better  off  2377 2431 +3%  1150 809 -30% 
Fisher  15599 31761 +104% 13817 12314  -7% 
Non 
fisher  5023 1590 -69% 2458 2801  +14% 
Flood 
Plain 
Better  off  7682 5855 -24% 5910 6230  +6% 
Fisher  14573 23271 +60%  22379 20797  +7% 
Non 
fisher  1097 1980 +81%  3687 666 -820% 
River 
Better off  3542  3943  +12%  668  1050  +58% 
Fisher  15035 18189 +21%  15076 17286  15% 
Non 
fisher  1316 1015 -23% 1509 1773  18% 
All 
Better  off  2811 2443 -13% 2392 3304  38% 
 
Household income sources/Income Diversification 
 
Data in the impact survey shows that project fishers’ incomes from farming and 
remittances increased significantly over the project period while their earnings 
from wage labouring showed a significant decline. Although fishers generally 
have few landholdings, they are now getting access to land through leasing or 
share cropping.  Asaduzzaman (2003) and Sen (2003) argue that the agricultural 
sector remains the major sector of the economy and the better off households 
are in the best position to capitalize on the shift to high-value production. 
Agricultural growth is playing an important role in rural poverty reduction. 
 
The CBFM study found that fishers have shifted their employment from wage 
labouring to self employment activities in the agriculture (farming and fishing), 
however the control fishers still tend to rely on the wage labouring for their 
livelihoods.  The availability of micro-credit and fishing access may be important 
factors for increasing local employment opportunities.  
 
The increased income from remittances due to out migration was found to be 
significant in project sites compared to the control sites. For poor households, 
migration has been stress driven. They usually migrate to other regions or 
districts for seasonal employment in paddy harvesting, road and building 
construction, rickshaw pulling and other labouring activities. The CARE/LMU 
study (2005) found that household members are increasingly residing temporarily 
away from their village homes to find better work.   




Fig. 2: Fishers income from different sources (% of annual income) 
 
 
Access to fishing  
 
In most of the CBFM-2 project sites (closed beels, open beels and floodplains) 
fishers are now able to participate in fishing in the water bodies nearest to their 
homes compared to the situation before the project where access to water 
bodies was highly restricted. In the rivers, however, the number of fishers who 
are fishing in other water bodies has increased. The overall number of fishers 
who participated in fishing in the closed beels and floodplains in the project sites 
was less in 2006 compared to 2002 (table 4). In the control sites, the fisher’s 
participation to fishing has not been concentrated in their own water bodies 
except in the floodplains. It indicates that CBFM-2 fishers have increased their 
awareness levels and had more of an incentive to use their own fisheries 
efficiently.   
 
 
Table 4. Number of fisher got access to fishing by water body types (% of fisher) 
 
   Project  Control 
   2002  2006 
% 
change 2002 2006 
% 
change 
























Fishing  Farm  Wage labour Fish Trade Livestock Remittance Others
2006 Control 2002   11
Closed Beel                    
Single water body  199  196  -1.5  67  62  -7.5 
More than one water body  109  77  -29.4  13  17  33.3 
All 308  273  -11.4  80  79  1.3 
Open Beel            
Single water body  383  437  14.0  157  174  10.8 
More than one water body  171  147  -14.0  18  67  272.2 
All 554  584  5.4  175  241  37.7 
Floodplains            
Single water body  36  56  55.0  43  60  39.5 
More than one water body  68  36  -47.1  39  24  -38.5 
All 104  92  -11.5  82  84  2.4 
Rivers            
Single water body  117  103  -12.0  45  58  29.0 
More than one water body  37  50  35.1  19  12  -36.8 
All 154  153  -0.6  64  70  9.4 
 
 
Land and household assets 
 
The baseline and impact surveys recorded land ownership and rented or 
sharecropped land holdings. Land is regarded as one of the most important 
assets for poor people. The results show that fishers in both project and control 
sites have increased their land holdings – mainly by renting or sharecropping but 
also by purchasing land. Fishers in project sites increased their land from 31 
decimals in 2002 to 43 decimals in 2006 while in the control sites fishers 
increased their land from 33 decimals in 2002 to 54 decimals in 2006. In contrast, 
the better-off households reduced their owned as well as shared or rented land 
over the project period. They have reduced their shared land from 41 decimals in 
2002 to 30 decimals in 2006 (Table 5).  
 
The increasing land holdings of fishers correlates well with the finding that 
agriculture has become more important for many fisher households. This 
indicates that the poorest people have improved their financial situation allowing 
them to invest in land over the project period. These self-employment 
opportunities at their farm and related activities may enable them to resist 
frequent migration.   
 
Table 5. Land ownership, share cropped and rented land by household category 
in project and control sites (decimals) 
   Project  Control 
Fisher 2002  2006 
% 
increase 2002 2006 
% 
increase 
Own  Land  34 39 16  31  36 16 
Lease/share 
land  31 43 40  33  54 62   12
Total  65 83 27  65  90 39 
Non  fisher          
Own  Land  53 56 5  47  56 19 
Lease/share 
land  36 35 0  35  37 6 
Total  89 92 3  83  94 14 
Better  off         
Own  Land  334 325 -3  349  362 4 
Lease/share 
land  41 30 -28 43  40 -8 
Total  375 354 -5  392  402 2 
All          
Own  Land  104 102 -2  106  106 0 
Lease/share 
land  35 37 5  36  43 20 




Households in both CBFM project sites and control sites increased their access 
to credit from a range of credit sources. NGOs were an important source of credit 
and both beneficiary and non-beneficiary households more than doubled the 
amount of credit taken over the last four years of the CBFM project.  
 
Beneficiary households had a 273% increase in the amount of credit from 
‘interest-free’ sources such as might be used for mitigating short term crises, 
(although this was from a very low initial average amount), while the average 
amount of credit received from this source by non-beneficiaries in project sites 
decreased and non-beneficiary households in control sites increased their 
access to this type of credit by only 50%. This indicates that CBO members have 
become more trusted in lending and borrowing at the village level. 
 
Beneficiary households have also become less reliant than other households on 
money lenders (mohajans). This is the most exploitative type of lending as they 
charge very high interest rates. Households in the control sites have become 
much more reliant (173% increase) on moneylenders as have non-beneficiary 
households (163% increase) in project sites, while beneficiary households have 
only increased their borrowing from mohajans by 34% over the project period 
(Table 6). The figures also show that all types of households greatly increased 
their overall exposure to credit meaning that the potential negative impact of 
mohajan credit did not follow through to affect household incomes.  
 
Table 6. Micro-credit received by beneficiary household category and by source 
(taka/hh) 
Beneficiary  Non Beneficiary  Control site  Source 







Mohajan  562 754  34.1 423  1114 163.0 641 1753  173.5
Grocery 
shop  140 165  18.2 127  77  -39.6  204 151 -26.3 
Bank  280 408  45.8 800  1177 47.1 685 824 20.2 
Local  society  308 387  25.4 429  446 3.9  291 273 -5.9 
Relatives  635 1144  80.2 948  1386 46.2 884 1613  82.4 
Someone 
else 97  363  273.5 356  295  -17.2  437  659  50.9 
NGOs  1631 4221  158.7 1065  2443 129.3 1390 2898 108.5




Social Capital  
 
In order to measure changes in social capital, an index was constructed using 
Principal Component Analysis. Six variables with high loadings were then 
aggregated to form the Social Capital Index. 
 
Table 7.  Social Capital - Factor Pattern 
 
Performance Indicator  Factor Loading 
Membership in organization  .693 
Participation in decision 
making  .685 
Level of knowledge  .622 
Influence over decision 
making  .610 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
The scores of four separate items were aggregated to form the Social Capital 
Index. The most dominating factor found in social capital is household’s 
membership in organizations (0.693). The majority of the poorer households 
have affiliation with production oriented organizations such as NGOs, various 
cooperative societies and local credit management societies. The reason why the 
poor fishers are not involved in the social, religious and cultural organization is 
mainly due to their poverty. Their primary concern is to look for work for their 
daily food and other necessities. Good leadership exists among the community in 
three project sites. In both Chapandaha and Hamil beel, the CBFM participants 
elected their executives for Beel Management Committee through voting. The 
organized fishers have participated in stocking and other production related 
activities such as protecting and harvesting fish. Poaching is a common threat for 
stocked water bodies. This has been controlled through surveillance provided by 
the fishers in the project sites. It has been observed that there is improvement in 
fishers’ confidence in using fish culture technologies. The second social capital   14
factor is found that the participants have actively participated in the decision 
making on fisheries management rules (0.685). Fisheries management rules 
introduced by the management committee aim to enhance fish production. These 
rules are fishing restriction in the fish sanctuary, restriction on destructive gear 
used and three months closed season. The fishers strictly obeyed the first rule 
but the other two rules were sometimes violated when they could not find any 
income-earning work. The level of knowledge is important in social capital 
variable (0.622). Low level of formal education is observed among the fishing 
communities. Partner NGOs conducted awareness campaigns and training 
programs on leadership, accounting management, productive activities and 
fisheries management to improve fishers’ level of knowledge. The last social 
capital variable is the fishers’ influence on resource use (0.610). The fishers have 
exclusive access to use the fisheries resources and can resist outside threat. 
They can decide who, when and where to fish, and thus they are able to control 
overfishing on their own.   
 
Physical Capital Index 
Generally poor fishers are landless or functional landless. They have small 
amount of productive assets.  Physical assets endowments are a good indicator 
of income, welfare and livelihood. The study has found that the organized fishers 
have improved their assets over the last couple of years such as using better 
construction materials for their houses and fitted with flush latrines. The level of 
income has increased and they have got some other productive assets to be 
used in creating additional income such as rickshaw pulling, petty trade (grocery, 
tea stall and fish), and crop cultivation. Women are now engaged in cattle and 
poultry rearing using credits from the NGOs.  
 
In constructing the Physical Capital Index using the Principal Component 
Analysis, the significant variables are house materials, area of homestead land, 
sanitary latrine and productive assets. These four variables load highly on a 
single common factor (Table 8).  
Table 8: Physical Capital: Factor Pattern 
 Performance Indicator  Factor Loading 
Value of house  .748 
Area of homestead 
land  .744 
Value of sanitary latrine  .697 
Value of durable assets  .684 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
The scores of four separate items were aggregated to form the Physical Capital 
Index. Land is a very scarce resource in Bangladesh. The average area of 
homestead is 0.05 hectare in the study area. Most fisher households do not own 
any cultivable land. However they cultivate land owned by others either through 
sharecropping or mortgage arrangements. More and more poor fishers in all 
survey areas are engaged in high-yielding variety (HYV) boro rice cultivation.   15
This indicates that poorest fisher could be employed in the agriculture and non 
agriculture sectors. Improvement of housing is found to be an important factor for 
the rural households. The first important variable is the value of house (0.748). 
The area of homestead land is the second dominating variable (0.744), followed 
by sanitation condition (0.697). The CBFM participants have greater awareness 
in health and sanitation. NGOs have provided with sanitary latrines at low cost to 
their group members.  The last important variable is the  productive and 
household assets (0.684) such as livestock, rickshaw/vans, shallow tube well, bi-
cycle, watch, radio and television sets.  These assets play an important role as 
safety nets during unemployment and occurrence of natural crises such as 
floods, or cyclones which results in loss of fish and other crops. 
 
Human, Financial and Natural capital Assets 
The poor fishers are generally illiterate; access to formal education is very 
limited. Human capital includes age of household head, attendance in community 
meetings, participate in trainings and access to information. Only the level of 
formal education variable is significant in the principle component analysis. The 
role of financial capital is very important to explain livelihood of poor fishers. 
Fishers have very limited access to credit; they are not able to pay lease money 
for fisheries resources and can not invest in productive sector to generate 
income. Financial capital includes the variables: amount of credit received, value 
of household assets, value of fishing equipment and income from asset sales. 
Only the amount of credit received variable was significant. The land and fishing 
ground are considered as natural assets for the fishers. Fishers are generally 
landless, but they have traditional access to fishing in the floodplains owned by 
the private landowner or open access common property. Access to fishing to 
such fishing grounds depends on the extent of social linkages among the 
community in that particular location.    
 
One variable in each of the three types of assets was found significant in the 
PCA method: level of formal education for human capital, amount of credit 
received for financial capital and area of fishing for natural capital (Table 9).  
 
Table 9: Human, Financial and Natural Capital: Factor Pattern 
Performance Indicator  Factor Loading 
Education level of household head  .704 
Amount (Tk) of credit received by 
household   .690 
Area of fishing by household  .615 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
The mean difference between project and control for the social capital index was 
highly positive in all types of water bodies (table 10). The comparisons between 
the project and control households show that the net increment for social capital 
score is 1.228 and for financial capital is 2.209. In Bangladesh, poor fishermen 
are deprived of opportunities in making fisheries management decisions. The 
jalmahals are generally controlled by the rural elites and the maximum share of   16
benefits from fishing goes to them. The fishermen are now on average able to 
participate in making fisheries management decisions in the CBFM areas. Each 
of the participants have received  2000 taka more in the CBFM sites compared 
with the control sites, which indicates that they have the potential to increase 
their employment and income opportunities due to the project interventions. The 
value of household physical assets for the project participants is higher by 
around 500 taka. The fishing area of the participants is higher by 0.827 hectare, 
however, the level of education does not show any significant difference between 
the project and control areas (0.027).  
 
Table 10: Mean differences of Household Assets between Project and Control 
areas 
 
Project  Control  Differenc
e 
 Variables  Mean  Std. 
Deviation 





Social capital index  4.024  2.04587  2.7964  1.31348  + 1.228 
Physical capital index (1000)  5.788  6402.976  5.269  6909.645  + 0.519 
Education (year)  of household head  2.42  3.281  2.15  3.217  + 0.027 
Credit (Tk) received by household 
(1000)  6.038  5647.979  3.829  4120.728  + 2.209 
Fishing area (ha) of household (10)  2.595  25.89290  1.768  25.04423  + 0.827 
    
Under the CBFM project the government has transferred the use rights of water 
bodies and provides administrative support to the fishers. The NGOs have full 
time staffs at the village level that facilitate coordination between the government 
and the fishers. The organized fisher’s participation in making decisions has 
increased that contributed to better management of fisheries and improved 
access to livelihood assets. The CBFM participants elect their executives for Beel 
Management Committee through voting. The fishers have improved social 
linkages that enhance their ability to gain economic power and livelihood security 
in the project areas.  
 
3.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Multiple regression analysis is used to examine the link between the household 
income and various livelihood asset variables. The equation as specified in 
Section 2.3 is estimated separately for the project and control sites by the 
Ordinary Least Squares technique. The results of regression are presented in 
Table 11. 
 
The results indicate that the social capital, employment and area of fishing are 
important predictors of household income in the project area. In the control areas 
education, household size and age variables are significant. The contribution of 
social capital factor is an important variable in determining household income.    17
Thus social factor plays a very important role in poverty alleviation in 
Bangladesh.   
 
Table 11: Relationships between livelihood assets and Household income 
  
Model 1: Project  Model 2: Control 








INTERCEPT 6449.7  .580  20906.6  1.848
* 
SC 2619.4  2.225
**  995.2 .568 
PC  -.206 -.416  -.517 -.980 
EDN 413.0  .549  1693.2  2.146
** 
CRT    .576 1.288  .693 1.273 
CUL -19.4  -.793  -3.8  -.129 
EMP 50.6  3.005
*** 12.9  .865 
AGE  123.9 .641  717.9 3.375
*** 
HSZ -759.9  -.513  -5432.9  -3.914
*** 
FISA -167.8  -1.720
*  62.0 .698 
ATCM 1002.4  1.191  -385.7  -.387 
       
N  120   120  
R
2  0.22   0.21  
Adj-R
2  0.15   0.13  
F-ratio  3.07   2.78  
F-probability  0.002   0.004  
                 Note: * Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
                         ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
                       *** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
The impact of human development training conducted by CBFM partner NGOs 
helped the organized fishermen in gaining socio-political knowledge. 
Associational involvement encouraged them to participate actively in decision 
making on livelihood issues. There is also evidence that they have capability to 
influence their access to livelihood assets.   
 
The coefficient for the social capital factor is significant for the project area, as 
expected from community based management. The regression model in Table 5 
reports positive coefficient for social capital (2619) and its associated t-statistic is 
significant at the 5% level. The fishers in the project area have got easier access 
to credit due to their institutional identity. Access to financial capital is not only 
from CBFM project NGOs, other organizations are also providing credits. 
Grootaert and Narayan (2004) found that greater access to credit is a spillover 
effect due to high social capital than human capital in Bolivia.  
 
The coefficient of fishing area is negatively (-167.8) linked but is a moderately 
significant (at 10% level).  The implication of negative relationship of fishing area 
is that capture fisheries has been restricted by land owners. The land owners 
have introduced either fish farms called gher  or cultivate rice crops. The 
organized community established fish conservation strategies such as setting up 
fish sanctuaries and imposed closed season ban on fishing for 2-3 months during   18
fish breeding periods. In the control sites the fishing area coefficient is positive 
(62.0) but is not a significant determinant of income.   
 
Land is a scarce resource in Bangladesh. The coefficients are negative and not 
significant in the project (-19.4) as well as in the control sites (-3.8). The poor 
fishermen in the project areas are involved in farming mainly in share cropped 
land but their crops are subject to natural calamities. Poor people have limited 
access to financial assets due to their lack of ownership of other assets. The very 
poor people are not eligible for formal credit from banks and NGOs. The 
coefficient for credit in both project and control areas are positive (0.576 and 
0.693 respectively) but are not significant predictor for household income. 
Although credit is very important for the participants, it is not a significant 
contributor to household income. The possible reason is that the poor 
participants used their credit for non-productive activities such as household 
consumption, health care and festivals.  
 
The physical asset coefficient of both project and control areas are negative and 
are not significant predictors of household income. The important implication of 
this relationship is that the poor people cannot retain their assets during crisis 
periods. Flooding and other natural hazards occur almost every year, causing 
people to sell or mortgage their assets to meet their basic needs such as, food, 
house repair and health care.  Bird and Shepherd (2003) reported a similar 
scenario in Zimbabwe. A severe natural shock could wipe out productive assets 
which results in increased livelihood vulnerability and reduced productivity.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this paper the impact of CBFM on household welfare is examined by 
investigating how the various types of assets contribute to household income.  
Comparisons were made between the sample households from project and 
control areas.  
 
Fishers income from fishing and non fishing activities increased and the income 
rise was higher in non-leased water bodies (floodplains and rivers) compared to 
leased water bodies (open and closed beels). Fishers have diversified their 
livelihood options and have increased access to land and fisheries in the project 
areas. Factor analysis shows that social capital has contributed significantly to 
household livelihood assets in the project area compared to control area.  
 
The project households received higher amounts of credit from multiple sources 
compared to the control households, they could utilize credit for more productive 
activities. Beneficiary households of CBFM-2 have got access to non-exploitative 
sources of credit and have become less dependent on moneylenders compared 
to non-project sites.  
   19
The regression results indicate that the social capital, employment and area of 
fishing are important predictors of household income in the project area. In the 
control areas, education, household size and age variables are significant. The 
contribution of social capital factor is important to household income which 
indicates that this variable play a very important role in poverty alleviation in 
Bangladesh.   
 
The important policy implications of this study is that the user groups of 
community based organizations who primarily depend on fisheries for their 
livelihood need strong facilitation by NGOs and government to establish access 
to the fisheries. Posting of experienced staff of DOF and NGOs is vital for the 
success of CBFM. Fisher households require assets for their security during 
crisis periods. There would be a strong need for establishing a social safety net 
so that poor fishers feel secure to use their physical assets as investments. 
Provision of public works at critical times may be a good option for creating 
employment opportunities.  
 
Health services are extremely poor in Bangladesh and the poor people spend a 
good portion of income for health care.  The provision of free and effective 
primary health care facilities at the village level should be given priority. Since the 
poorest fishers rely on fishing for income and their nutritional needs, the security 
of access to the fisheries resources need to be taken as a priority in future policy 
formulation in natural resources management.   
 
 
The community based approach has been tested as an alternative to the current 
revenue orientated leasing model. Future policy makers need to consider the 
successes shown by this new model of community based institutional 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA) provided legal support to 
the CBFM-2 project and in particular to the 130 Community Based Organisations 
established under the project. The project was implemented against an uncertain legal 
background due to many changes in the way that wetlands and fisheries in Bangladesh 
have been managed over recent decades. Many of the key interventions, such as 
sanctuaries have yet to receive legal recognition. Many currently accepted norms and 
practices have come about through gazette notifications or individual decisions rather 
than being supported by Acts or clear policies. 
 
This paper outlines the legal background for community managed fisheries in 
Bangladesh and the challenges faced during implementation of the project. It also 
suggests what needs to happen if community managed fisheries are to become more 





Management of Fisheries 
 
In Bangladesh, the legal framework for the management of fisheries developed from 
two different legal regimes - “Doctrine of Public Trust” of the ancient Roman Empire in 
which the Government held certain common properties such as rivers and seashore in 
trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public and English Common 
Law in which the sovereign could own these resources but could not grant these to 
private owners if the effect was to interfere with public interest in navigation or fishing.  
 
Under the Permanent Settlement Regulation (PSR) of 1793, the Zamindars (landlords) 
owned and managed flowing rivers, their tributaries, and flood plains containing 
depressions or beels. In 1947 under the State Acquisition and Tenancy (SAT) Act, 
1950, the Government took over the rent receiving rights of the landlords as under SAT, 
public fisheries (jalmohals) became an estate that cannot be retained under private 
ownership. Most of the public fisheries are owned by the Ministry of Land, although the 
conservation of water bodies and fishes are entrusted with the Ministry of Water 
Resources, Ministry of Environment and Forest and the Ministry of Fisheries and 
Livestock.  
 
The various laws on fisheries enacted during the colonial period define fisheries as 
“public
1” and “private”
2. For management purposes, “fisheries” have also been classified 
as “open” and “closed” water fisheries in the management guidelines.  
 
                                                 
1 Section 20(2a) (ii) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 
2 The Private Fisheries Protection Act, 1889   3
The definition of “fishery” was first included in the Protection and Conservation Act, 
1950 through an amendment in 1995. In this Act “fishery” means "any water body, 
natural or artificial, open or closed, flowing or stagnant (such as river, haor, baor, beel, 
floodplain, canal etc.) where activities for growing fish, or for conservation, 
development, demonstration, breeding, exploitation or disposal of fish or of living 
organisms related to such activities are undertaken, but does not include an artificial 
aquarium of fish used as a decorative article, pond or tank"
3. 
 
This definition is inclusive only of what is commonly understood as “inland” fisheries 
while the Marine Fisheries Ordinance (MFO), 1983 defines “marine” fisheries. 
 
In general, laws on fisheries do not regulate the principles and practices of leasing or 
physical management of fisheries. This was attempted to be done by the Land 
Management Manual, 1990 that now stands thoroughly changed through subsequent 
administrative decisions.  
 
The current classification of fisheries for leasing and management purposes and their 




The Government has abolished the leasing practice of all open water bodies vide 
Gazette notification dated 4 September, 1995. The rationale behind such proclamation 
is to protect the rights of the poor fishermen and facilitate their livelihood. 
 
However, some open water fisheries can still be outside the purview of the above 
notification if the same be required by the government for development projects.  
 
Closed Fishery up to 3 Acres
4 
 
Under the existing arrangements, closed water bodies up to 3 acres are to be managed 
by local government authorities who are empowered to lease these out for a maximum 
of three years. If the valuation of the closed jalmohal is more than taka 30,000, the 
process is managed by an Upazila Tender Committee and the Upazila Nirbahi Officer 
(UNO). The final decision is made by the Upazila Development Coordinating 
Committee. 
 
Local government institutions for urban areas such as the Paurashavas and City 
Corporations can also lease jalmohals within their geographical boundary.  
 
At all levels, the lease for closed jalmohals has to be offered first to either fishermen’s 
cooperative societies, women’s cooperative societies or tribal people’s cooperative 
societies.  
                                                 
3 Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950, Section 2 (1a)  
4 20 April, 1994   4
 
Closed Fishery up to 20 Acres
5 
 
Since 1997 by virtue of notification dated 30 September, 1997, closed jalmohals up to 
20 acres are vested with the Ministry of Youth and Sports to create self-employment of 
the youth
6. Such jalmohals can be leased out to the youth community for a period of 3-5 
years. Two separate committees for City Corporation areas and areas beyond City 
Corporations have been proposed to lease out closed water bodies up to 20 acres 
within and outside City Corporation areas. The leasing shall be through tender and shall 
be allotted to the higher bidder. In getting the lease, trained (male and female) youth 
groups registered as cooperative societies get priority.   
 
Closed Fishery above 20 Acres  
 
The Ministry of Land may lease out closed Jalmohal above 20 acres for 4-10 years to 
the real fisherman cooperative society.  
 
In general, the policy documents that purport to regulate management of fisheries 
through leasing prescribe the following:  
 
•   Identification of leasing authority 
•   Requirement of tender  
•   Detailing of tender process 
•   Pre-requisition of participating parties to tender 
•  Approval  process 
•  Lease  period 
•   Mode of Appeal 
•   Amount to be deposited  
•   Mode for handing over of fishery 
•   Management Plan (development project) 
 
LAWS AND POLICIES 
 
The conservation issues related to fisheries are addressed by the Protection and 
Conservation Act, 1950 and the MFO.  
 
                                                 
5 Public Jalmohal Management Policy, 2005 
6 Water bodies included in the projects on ideal village and shelter, the vested and abandoned water bodies, khas 
water bodies adjacent to the offices of Union Land Office, Assistant Commissioner (Land), Upazila Nirbahi Officer 
and the Deputy Commissioners, water bodies in enjoyment of public easement or situated within the boundary of 
and owned by City Corporations/Municipality/ Zila Parishads shall be outside the purview of this notification.  
   5
There are as many as five definitions of “fish”
7. Under the Act of 1950, “fish” has been 
defined as all cartilaginous, bony fishes, prawn, shrimp, amphibians, tortoises, turtles, 
crustacean, animals, molasses, echinoderms and frogs at all stages in their life history
8. 
The Act sets ‘protection’ and ‘conservation’ as its prime focus, but neither defines them 
nor elaborates on what should be done to promote these measures.  
 
The Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950 that came into force on 29 June, 
1950 vide notification No. 5459 dated 22 June, 1950 was enacted to address the 
following concerns raised by the Agriculture and Industries Department in 1932:  
•   prevent depletion of fishing grounds  
•   help scientific research into fisheries 
•   safeguard the interests of the trade and of fishing communities 
•   ensure the maintenance of good order among fishermen 
•   ensure sanitary and hygienic conditions in the manufacture and trade of fishery 
products 
•   adopt restrictive measures about forms and dimensions of fish appliances, close 
times, wasteful and destructive methods of fishing 
 
The Act of 1950 empowers the Government to prohibit:  
•   killing or catching of fishes of prescribed species in certain seasons  
•   killing or selling of fish of any prescribed species below a minimum size  
•   all fishing in all waters or in any specified waters for a specified period,    
•   destruction of fishes by drying or de-watering of any fishery
9, and    
•   catching, carrying, transporting etc. of fishes below the prescribed size of any 
prescribed species throughout Bangladesh
10.  
 
The 1950 Act has, although enacted to protect "fish" and purported to regulate some of 
the growing concerns for gradual depletion of fishery and fish resources. As such the 
Act has empowered the Government to make rules regulating the depletion of fishery by 
pollution, by trade effluent or otherwise and also the construction of dams, bunds, 
embankments and other structures that may be harmful to fish
11.  
 
The Protection and Conservation of Fish Rules, 1985 prohibited the erection of fixed 
engines in rivers, canals, khals and beels, construction of dams and embankment other 
than for irrigation, flood control or drainage purposes, destruction of fish by explosives in 
inland or coastal territorial waters
12 or by poisoning/depleting water
13.  
                                                 
7 Bangladesh Fisheries Development Corporation Act, 1973, The fish and fisheries Products 
(Inspection and Quality Control)Ordinance, 1983, The Marine Fisheries Ordinance, 1983, The 
private Fisheries Protection Act, 1889 and The Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950.  
8 Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950, Section 2 (1)  
9 Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950, Section 3 (3)  
10 Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950, Section 4  
11 Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950, Section 3 (3)  
12 Protection and Conservation of Fish Rules, 1985, Rule 5  
13 Protection and Conservation of Fish Rules, 1985, Rule 6    6
 
To facilitate the augmentation and production of particular fish species including Shol 
(Channa striatus), Gazar (Channa marulius) and Taki (Channa punctatus) the Rules 
prohibited the catch or destruction of fish fry or parent fish of these species between 1st 
of April to 31st August. Except for pisciculture, the Rules also prohibited the catching of 
carps such as Rui (Labeo rohita), Catla (Catla catla), Mrigal (Cirrhinus cirrhosus), 
Kalbaush (Labeo calbasu) or Ghania (Labeo gonius) of any size in the waters of rivers, 
khals etc. during variable periods between April to July in different water bodies as 
specified in the schedule. The sale of carps, Hilsha (Tenualosa ilisha), Pungus 
(Pangasius pangasius), Silon (Silonia silondia), Bola (Raiamas bola) and Aor (Mystus 
aor) below a specified size has also been prohibited at different times of the year.   
 
As stated earlier, the Act does not define “conservation”. It has no provision relating 
ownership or management of fisheries and their physical possession. Also there is no 
mention of management of fisheries through community participation or through the 
actual fishermen’s community or NGOs. There is no definition of “fishermen” in any 
legal or policy documents of Bangladesh. This Act fails to recognize the concept of “fish 
sanctuary” as a conservation approach. 
 
The National Fish Policy, 1998 calls for production based management of open water 
fisheries as opposed to leasing. The Policy commits to promote involvement of poor and 
traditional fisherfolk in the management and conservation of both open and closed 
water bodies although it does not mention community based management as an 
approach. As a conservation mode, the Policy explicitly recognizes the concept of 
sanctuary. The other management concerns for fisheries as identified in the policy 
remain use of harmful devices, pesticides, pollutions from both point and non-point 
sources, unregulated and over fishing and so on. All these management concerns are 
claimed to have been successfully addressed by community groups working in the 
various CBFM water bodies. The Policy commitment for alternative income generation 
for the fisherfolk to reduce pressure on fishery has also to some extent been addressed 
under CBFM.  
 
LEGAL STATUS OF CBFM: LESSONS LEARNT  
 
As a model of participatory fisheries management, the CBFM implemented in two 
phases (1996-2001 and 2001-2006) had the overall objective to sustainably improve the 
livelihoods of poor people dependent on aquatic resources.  
 
The CBFM model is recognized by the Ministry of Land, Ministry of Fisheries and 
Livestock and is implemented with overall guidance and supervision of the Department 
of Fisheries. The total number of water bodies managed in the CBFM model counts to 
117 including both open and closed water fisheries. The CBFM has managed to 
develop many fish sanctuaries. 
 
The basic two legal documents on which CBFM is premised include the Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) signed between the Ministry of Land and Ministry of Fisheries   7
and Livestock and also the MoUs signed between the Department of Fisheries, the 
WorldFish Center (previously ICLARM) and the partner NGOs.  
 
These agreements required the Ministry of Land to hand over the designated water 
bodies to Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock (MoFL) for managing the same through 
NGOs in the community based management model for ten years beginning in 2001. 
The CBFM arrangements that the NGOs followed involved the participation of 
concerned Deputy Commissioners, District Fisheries Officer, Upazila Fisheries Officer - 
all having their statutory responsibility regarding management of fisheries. The NGOs, 
with support and guidance from the local authorities, formed various community 
management committees with representation of local poor fishermen and drew up 
management plans for specific water bodies. Most of the community management 
groups are registered as cooperatives either under the Cooperatives Societies Act, 
2001 or the Voluntary Social Welfare (Registration and Control) Ordinance, 1961. 
 
Although the official arrangement with the MoFL, the WorldFish Center and the NGOs 
come to an end in 2007, these community groups shall continue managing the water 
bodies in the CBFM model for another five years, i.e., up to 2011. As such, the 
sanctuaries managed as part of the CBFM approach are expected to be managed until 
2011 although no explicit legal recognition exists for this. 
 
During the implementation phase, various CBFM components faced the following 
challenges requiring legal interventions: 
  
•   Unclear demarcation of water bodies 
•   Cancellation of CBFM lease arrangements by local administration 
•   Delayed handing over of possession of water bodies due to suits filed by 
previous lessees 
•   No access to a few CBFM water bodies due to pending cases  
•  Pollution 
•   Demands by persons claiming to have competing rights as riparian fishermen 
over CBFM water bodies  
•   Legality of leasing out open water bodies under CBFM 
•   Legal status of MoUs signed between two ministries as opposed to regular lease 
agreements executed in the name of the President 
•   Absence of executive order (gazette notification) giving legality to the CBFM 
agreements 
•   Payment of taxes to the government 
•   Sub-lease of CBFM water bodies by community management groups 
•   Criminal cases  
 
At the concluding stage of CBFM, the following issues may create legal challenges for 
the community groups expected to manage the water bodies without institutional 
presence of the NGOs: 
   8
•   lack of legal recognition of management models like CBFM (challenges from 
vested interest quarters) 
•   lack of institutional support from public agencies 
•   lack of coordination between statutory agencies  
•   administrative hierarchy amongst public agencies 
•   absence of legal recognition of the CBFM management plans  
•   absence of legal recognition of fish sanctuary 
•   unclear legal status of community groups yet to register under law 
•   inadequate fund/alternative income generation facilities 
•   high lease value 
•   conflicting claims of vested interest corners over water bodies, fish resources  
•   absence of provision for continuous legal support  
•  pollution 




Initiatives like CBFM require the following legal/policy interventions to ensure 
sustainability: 
•   Appropriate legal and institutional arrangement to translate into reality policy 
commitment for upliftment of poor fishermen and their involvement in 
management of fisheries 
•   Well defined management laws/rules for public water bodies to include and 
recognize concepts like CBFM  
•   Long term commitment to management practices like CBFM 
•   Avoidance of frequent changes of policies relating fisheries management through 
leasing (checking vested interests as opposed to the interests of poor fishermen 
whom programs like CBFM targets) 
•   Appropriate legal framework to institutionalize the successes and practices of 
concepts like CBFM 
•   Clearer definition of traditional fishermen and their right to access to water bodies 
and decision making process 
•   Realistic payment requirement (lease value and other legal requirements 
including taxation) for the traditional fishermen 
•   Capacity building of the participating fisher folk and community support 
•   Legal recognition of sanctuary and other sustainable fishing practices introduced 
through innovative programs like CBFM 
•   Mandatory and well defined management plans to arrest loss of fishery and other 
aquatic resources with clear monitoring mechanism (in case of commercial 
leasing out) 
•   Avoidance of conflicts in management priorities of different government offices   
•   Clear and strengthened role and jurisdiction of the MoFL, Department of 
Fisheries in dealing with water bodies designated for CBFM and alike projects 
•   Implementation of laws on pollution and conservation of fisheries 
   9
RELEVANT LAWS, RULES, POLICIES AND CONVENTIONS 
 
Laws 
The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh 
Bangladesh Fisheries Development Corporation Act, 1973 
Bangladesh Water and Power Development Board Order, 1972 
Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 
Environment Court Act, 2000 
The Acquisition of Waste Land Act, 1950 
The Agricultural Pest Ordinance, 1962 
The Agricultural Pesticides Ordinance, 1971 
The Agriculture and Sanitary Improvement Act, 1920 
The Canals Act, 1864 
The Chittagong Port Authority Ordinance, 1976 
The Coast Guard Act, 1994 
The Culturable Waste Land (Utilization) Ordinance, 1959 
The Dhaka City Corporation Ordinance, 1983 
The Embankment and Drainage Act, 1952 
The Environment Conservation Act, 1995 
The Factories Act, 1965 
The Fish and Fish Products (Inspection and Quality Control) Ordinance, 1983 
The Fisheries Research Institute Ordinance, 1984 
The Forest Act, 1927 
The Government Fisheries (Protection) Ordinance, 1959 
The Inland Shipping Ordinance, 1976 
The Inland Water Transport Authority Ordinance, 1958 
The Irrigation Act, 1876 
The Land Reform Board Act, 1989 
The Land Reforms Ordinance, 1984 
The Local Government (Union Parishads) Ordinance, 1983 
The Marine Fisheries Ordinance, 1983 
The Mongla Port Authority Ordinance, 1976 
The Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1947 
The Open Space Protection Act, 2000 
The Paurashava Ordinance, 1977 
The Penal Code, 1860 
The Private Fisheries Protection Act, 1889 
The Protection and Conservation of Fish Act, 1950 
The Shrimp Cultivation Taxation Act, 1992 
The State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 
The Tanks Improvement Act, 1939 
The Territorial Water and Maritime Zones Act, 1974  
The Water Supply and Sewerage Authority Act, 1996 
 
Rules 
Environmental Conservation Rules, 1977   10
Marine Fisheries Rules, 1983 
Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1793 
Territorial Water and Maritime Zones Rules, 1977 
The Fish and Fish Products (Inspection and Quality Control) Rules, 1997 
The Protection and Conservation of Fish Rules, 1985 




Environment Policy, 1992 
Export Policy, 1997-2002 
Fifth Five Year Plan, 1997-2002 
Industrial Policy, 1991 
Land Management Manual, 1990 
Land Use Policy, 2001 
National Environment Management Action Plan, 1995 
National Fish Policy, 1998 
New Agricultural Extension Policy, 1996  
Water Policy, 1999 
Public Water Body Management Policy, 2005 
And various circulars 
 
Conventions 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil  
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992 
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl 
Habitat, 1971 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Among the reasons for the loss and declining productivity of Bangladesh wetlands is 
a lack of understanding of the underlying causes of wetland resource depletion. 
Other constraints to sustainable management include a need for building consensus 
among stakeholders and their inability to take up appropriate measures. Of late, it 
has been recognized that local resource users, managers and controllers can play 
key roles in wetland management. Efforts have been made to involve local user 
communities in wetland and fisheries management in various capacities since the 
mid-nineties. Different organizations and projects adopted different modes of 
community participation in project planning and implementation. This paper 
describes cluster-based management systems, formation processes, legal status, 
scope of works, and community responses to the approaches in five sites managed 
by CNRS under the Community based Fisheries Management (Phase 2) project 
(CBFM-2). The paper presents some key achievements of cluster/apex based 
approaches relevant to wider area issues such as restricting harmful fishing 
practices, reclaiming khas lands from illegal occupation, fish friendly operation of 
sluice gates, basin-wide integrated management, stopping the sale of banned gears, 
conflict resolution in upstream-down stream areas,  which may have been impossible 
for single water body-based CBOs. A cluster approach also encourages individual 
CBOs managing their respective water bodies within the wider area through periodic 
sharing of lessons, assisting each other’s needs and realizing services from local 
agencies which will have contributed towards developing capacity and sustainability 




The Community Based Fisheries Management Project, phase-2 (CBFM-2) is being 
implemented by the Department of Fisheries (DoF), Government of Bangladesh with 
financial assistance from DFID. This project is being implemented in partnership with 
the WorldFish Center and a range of partner NGOs, including CNRS (Center for 
Natural Resource Studies), in a number of water-bodies of different types located in 
a variety of ecosystems in Bangladesh.  
 
The overall objective of the project is to improve and make sustainable the 
livelihoods of poor people dependent on aquatic resources, especially on fish. This 
requires a defined mechanism for the management of water-bodies, that would help 
to enhance fish production, species diversity, establish access rights for poor fishers 
to the water-bodies, and equitable distribution. As the project has targeted open-
water fishery resources, which are dynamic in nature, enhancement of fish 
production and protection of species diversity is difficult without biological 
management of open-water areas covering interconnected water-bodies in wider 
areas. Ecological management requires a coordinated effort, involving all 
stakeholders having a stake in the resource system, to ensure project 
implementation in a basin or watershed. A basin may have numbers of water-bodies 
transected by tributaries and canals all of which need to be brought under an 
integrated and coordinated management approach. The project aims to benefit all 
possible project beneficiaries, however, it is difficult to involve all stakeholders in 
management at the water-body level. CNRS has emphasized and ensured multi-  3
stakeholder involvement in open-water fishery management through adopting a 
cluster management approach where wider watershed communities get involved in 





CNRS is implementing the project in five sites covering a wide range of habitat types 
in different ecological settings of the country. Unlike other partners dealing with 
single wetland management, CNRS brought wider wetland areas under 
management covering all forms of seasonally interconnected habitat types in each 
site. The concept of bringing wider interconnected floodplain habitats under 
management as a unit, is because the sustainability of floodplain fisheries production 
and biodiversity is not independent on single water bodies. Rather, the ecosystem is 
heavily dependent on wider areas where different forms of wetlands provide 
adequate habitats for fish to perform their various biological functions (breeding, 
feeding), to get shelter while over-wintering and to migrate between habitats.   
 
Of the five sites, two were located at haor
1 basins (Halir Haor, Surma River basin, 
Jamalgonj upazila, Sunamgonj district and Hakaluki Haor, Kushiayra basin, 
Borolekha upazila, Moulvibazar district),  two sites were in the north central 
floodplains (Jamuna River Basin, Kalihati upazila, Tangail and Brahmaputra River 
basin, Pakundia upazila, Kishoregonj district) and the fifth site is located in the south-
western floodplains in Magura Sadar, Salikha and Narail Sadar upazilas, Magura 
and Narail districts. 
 
Each site covers a number of water bodies of different habitat types including beels, 
khals, rivers and seasonally inundated flooded land (floodplains). Water bodies in 
haor sites included perennial beels where fishing peaked in the dry season when 
floodwater was receding. The north central floodplain sites cover a number of 
seasonal and perennial water bodies where fishing peaked in the post-monsoon 
draw-down. The river section in Magura-Narail site covers a combination of rivers, 
beels and khals and each has different fishing priorities depending on water flow 




The CBFM-2 project has been implemented in river sections and Beels in the 
Magura/Narail site. This includes the Fatki River which consists of 15 sections (30 
km long) of khas water-body (each section is considered as a single water body) 
located in Magura Sadar and Shalika upazila under Magura district, while the 
Dhanler and Kumuria beels are privately owned floodplains located in Narail Sadar 




This beel area is flooded for around 5 to 6 months of the year. This vast area was 
previously khas land that has since been transferred into private ownership, and 
                                                 
1 A seasonally flooded tectonic depression in the floodplain   4
most of the wetlands have since been converted into croplands. This floodplain is 
located in a Flood Control Device/Irrigation (FCD/I) project of the Bangladesh Water 
Development Board (BWDB) and is linked with the old Brahmaputra River through a 
canal on which a sluice gate has been constructed. In addition, there are also a 
number of interconnecting canals that create a network between the beels. A section 
of local elites have already started carrying out pen-fishing in some of the Beel-





This site consists of 15 water-bodies: one Jalmohal over 20 acres in size
2, (handed 
over to the project under a leasing arrangement), 1 large (above 20 acres in size) 





This site is located in a haor basin and covers two types of water-bodies, river 
sections, and beels. Within the project area there are a large number of water-bodies 
which are not under the project but are important for fishery resources. The haor 
remains flooded for about 6 to 7 months of the year during the monsoon and 
becomes a single sheet of water. In the dry season, leaseholders of water bodies 
catch fish by completely dewatering the water bodies. This site consists of 2 leased 





This site includes 2 large Jalmohals over 20 acres in size and five small beels, all of 
which are leased sites. 
 
MANAGEMENT APPROACHES  
 
Co-management of fisheries in wider areas  
 
CNRS adopted and demonstrated a co-management system to address the issue of 
managing wider wetland areas in each of the sites within the broader framework of 
the overall project management approaches of CBFM-2. The approach emphasizes 
the building of local management structures that would facilitate communities 
(resource users) and government line agencies (particularly DoF) including the local 
government bodies (Union Parishads) to take responsibility in management decision-
making processes. The approach helps communities to effectively participate in 
planning, implementing and monitoring fisheries management and community 
development interventions in a sustainable manner.  As the management unit in 
each site is comparatively large covering numbers of diverse wetland habitats the 
approach also helps the sharing of common issues among the community groups 
                                                 
2 The distinction between small and large water bodies is important because those which are less than 20 acres 
come under the control of the Ministry of Youth.   5
and secondary stakeholders in the area both on fish and non-fish issues. Thus, 
CNRS adopted a cluster-based approach to address the problems in open water 
fisheries management where the issues of each of the water bodies could be seen in 
the context of the broader cluster and where boundaries of management units were 
determined by ecological features rather than administrative limits. It was also key 
that the water bodies in larger hydrological regimes or defined catchments are 
interlinked and have upstream and downstream effects, which influence production 
systems, land-use and livelihoods.  
 
The concept of cluster management emerged from the need to ensure ecological 
management of the country’s open-water fisheries resources. As mobile resources, 
fish need a wide range of habitats, in accordance with seasonal changes in water 
regime in the floodplains and rivers, and their biological characteristics. Its multi-
stakeholder nature makes open-water systems complex, particularly for 
management. Different ownership rights and access patterns apply, even within the 
same watershed or floodplain.  Management of floodplains or the open-water 
environment needs to considering these factors and necessitated a coordinated 
management approach like cluster management, where all stakeholders are involved 
to some degree, at different management levels.  
 
A four tier management system  
 
The wetland environments in which CBFM-2 projects are planned have a variety of 
hydrological and biological characteristics, and a range of community interactions 
within them. The management structure has been formulated to optimize the 
development of individual water-bodies along with the promotion of beneficial 
interactions among communities residing within common watershed areas.    
 
To accomplish this, a four-tier management structure (Figure 1) has been 
established under the CNRS-CBFM 2 sites as follows: 
 
First Tier: Non-formal at village level - consists of beneficiary groups at village level 
comprising of mostly poor fishers and other poor households living close to the 
project wetlands who form the basis for informing management of other committees 
at the upper hierarchies. The Village Committees, however, have been formed with 
the representation of all socio-economic / professional classes. 
 
Second Tier: Formal at water body level - is the water body level management 
committee, either Beel Management Committees (BMCs) or river management 
committees (RMCs). The BMCs/RMC have been registered under the Cooperative 
Department as primary cooperative societies, or under the Social Services 
Department as a voluntary organization thus are formal bodies. The Groups and 
BMCs comprise exclusively of poor members and fishermen for the leased water 
bodies (jalmohals). However, the BMCs in privately owned floodplains were formed 
with mixed types of local people. These organizations are directly involved with the 
management of water bodies. 
 
Third Tier: Non-formal networking body at the cluster level - consists of Cluster 
Committees taking representatives from closely linked/adjacent BMCs or RMCs. The 




















Figure 1: Four tier Local Institutional Structures for Wetland/Fisheries Management  
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Upazila Level 
interventions and for conflict resolution in wider areas. The major responsibilities of 
such committees are to resolve trans-boundary issues between water bodies, and to 
facilitate conflict resolution among the fishers, farmers, pump owners, etc. Cluster 
Committees are formed as informal bodies – there are no plans to have them 
registered. 
 
Fourth Tier: Formal at Upazila level - consists of the Upazila/Apex Committees 
taking representatives of all BMCs/RMCs in an Upazila. An Apex Committee has 
been established in all project sites. The nature of Apex Committee is like the Cluster 
Committee but in a wider sphere. The major responsibilities of the Apex Committees 
are to maintain fish migration routes (allowing key fish species such as carp to come 
into the floodplains), develop linkages between the Water body Management 
Committees and government and NGO service providers, resolve inter-sectoral 
conflicts, etc. These Upazila level apex committees are currently being registered as 
central cooperative societies under the Cooperative Department, or as an apex body 
registered with the Social Services Department.  
 
The non-formal cluster committees at the third tier or at the cluster level, are 
however, treated as the formal apex committee where numbers of project water-
bodies are fewer, such as in Barolekha and Jamalgonj Upazilas. The second and 
third tiers of the management bodies have been formed with the representation of 
group / village committees and sub-cluster / cluster committees respectively. 
Management bodies at all levels have included active participation by women. 
 
Elected members, chairmen of union council, local elites / professionals, local 
government officials and NGO representatives are all involved with the process, as 
members of advisory councils, which are being formed at another level. 
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Rationale for Forming Cluster and Apex Committees 
 
The CBFM-2 project works with leased water bodies as well as rivers and private 
floodplains, which are not under the government leasing system. In these wetlands, 
as well as fishermen, there is access for people involved in other occupations each 
with their own interests. It is likely that an intervention in a water body influences 
other water bodies due to the physical links between them. It can be concluded that 
due to the physical and social contexts that prevail, managing open water fisheries is 
complex. Therefore, ecological management of water bodies (natural recruitment, 
conservation of brood stock, protection of year class of fish, dry season refuge, 
control over use of harmful fishing practices, etc.) with a social focus, demands 
management of all water bodies in a watershed rather isolated management of a 
single water body. 
 
Based on the social and physical characteristics, CNRS/CBFM-2 has identified and 
formed a number of cluster committees to address those issues. Moreover, 
degradation of water-bodies by natural siltation has been found at most of the water-
bodies in each site. Due to resource constraints, desiltation of all the water-bodies 
and establishment of fish sanctuaries was not possible in all project water-bodies, 
thus cluster committees selected suitable locations for excavation so that the 
benefits were derived by the other water bodies in the cluster. It was not possible to 
build a community centre for all CBOs, thus cluster committees selected suitable 
venues so that other CBOs could use the centre. The Cluster Committees were 
formed to achieve following specific objectives under CNRS/CBFM-2 sites: 
 
•   To resolve trans-boundary issues between the water-bodies or mouzas. 
•   To resolve conflict between the CBOs on management issues. 
•   To facilitate identification of the boundary of the water-body. 
•   To protect against bauth and force fishing. 
•   To communicate with, and receive assistance from, government / non- 
government service providing organizations. 
•   To contribute in empowering poor fishers. 
•   To develop linkages between the other stakeholders. 
 
 
THE PROCESS OF CLUSTER COMMITTEE FORMATION 
 
The CNRS/CBFM-2 project has been working at 5 sites with 48 water-bodies in 
seven different Upazilas under six different districts.  
 
The procedure of forming cluster committees is described below: 
At the beginning of the project participatory action plan development (PAPD) and 
village based general meetings were conducted where the proposal to form a 
cluster/central committee was raised. In accordance with this decision, the members 
of all of the executive committees of BMCs met in order to develop a cluster 
committee and they agreed to the proposal. In that meeting another decision was 
made that a cluster/central committee (Apex Committee) would be formed by 
including an adequate number of members from each of those committees. The 
members of that cluster/central committee would be decided by the respective BMCs   8
in their monthly meeting. According to that decision, the respective cluster committee 
elected their representatives for the cluster and central committee (apex body) in 
their monthly meeting in the presence of the project worker. Then the elected 
representatives of the respective cluster gathered in a general meeting in the 
presence of the project worker and formed a full committee in that particular meeting. 
 
CNRS has formed 17 cluster committees at 5 CBFM-2 sites (Table-1). Water-body 
management committees / CBOs (Community Based Organisations) are considered 
to be the basis for cluster committee formation. These committees have been formed 
drawing representatives from each project CBO, where representative of local elites, 
local government and local administration are involved in playing an advisory role in 
resource management. A democratic process has carried out selection of CBO 
members for cluster committees, where all CBO members met and selected 
members to represent the cluster committees at each site. The responsibilities of 
each cluster committee was also decided and defined in the committee formation 
meeting.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of Cluster Committees formed in CNRS/CBFM-2 sites 
 
Site   No. of clusters  Range of water-
bodies  
Range of members  
Magura   5  3  15 
Narail 1  3  20 
Kalihati 3  4-7  12-15 
Pakundia 6  3  15 
Hakaluki   1  7  22 
Jamalgonj   1  7  10 





Management of a 30km long reach of Fatki River and adjacent floodplains required 
strong linkage and coordination among sections by management bodies formed 
under the project. This is because discrete management of one river section will not 
be effective or applicable in improving fisheries resources and the lives of fishery 
dependent communities. The project also took into account adjacent floodplains 
where the prevalence of harmful fishing practices is even greater than in the rivers. 
Following decisions made in the RSMC (River section Management 
Committee/CBO) and BMCs (Beel Management Committee), 6 Cluster Committees 
were formed, representing the interests of people from 17 water bodies. In the river 
sections, 5 Cluster Committees have been formed that maintain 3 closely located 
river sections in a cluster.  
 
One Cluster Committee was formed in Narail site, to represent the interests of 3 
floodplain beel CBOs, including a water body under the management of Banchte 
Shekha - one of the other partner NGOs of CBFM-2 working on Sholoar beel located 
very close to the CNRS-managed Dhanler and Kumuria beels. The justification for 
the formation of this Cluster Committee in this site was that all three water-bodies   9
are interlinked and located in the same basin, and as such, intervention in one water-
body will definitely affect the others.  
 
Each of the cluster committees in river sections had 15 members. Each of the RSMC 
(River Section Management Committee) selected 5 persons from their respective 
RSMC for the cluster committee. A total of 15 RSMCs and 2 BMCs were formed 
drawing representatives from 87 village committees / fisher groups in the second tier 
of cluster management whilst village committees / fisher groups are treated as the 
first tier. A 23-member Apex Committee was formed with representatives of 17 
water-body level management committees.  
 
Pakundia, Kishoreganj site 
 
In the Pakundia site, two floodplain beels are under the management of the 
CNRS/CBFM-2 project, Beel-Bhora and Kaheterdia beel. Beel-bhora is a large 
floodplain system consisting of 63 small beels that are mostly privately owned, 
except for a few patches of khas land. A total of 19 villages are located in and 
around the project water-bodies of the Pakundia site, based on access and control 
patterns. In the first tier, 19 village committees (VCs) have been formed which are 
being registered as primary societies under the Cooperative Department. Five 
cluster committees have been formed in the Beel-bhora and one cluster committee 
has been formed in Kahetardia Beel. Access to, and control over, the water body 
area in the Beel-bhora cluster was considered when defining the boundaries for 
clusters, which was decided by a joint meeting of CBOs. Cluster committees have 
been formed with representatives from the village committees. Each of the cluster 
committees has 15 members, 5 from each management committee. In the same 
manner, 4 management committees (VCs) have been formed in the 4 villages 
around Kahetardia Beel. From this group a cluster committee of 15 members has 
been formed. Due to the number of villages covered in Beel-bhora, the decision 
making process was laborious. As a result, 3 villages were considered as a cluster, 
based on their location, area and surroundings. Finally, a 26 member Apex 
Committee has been formed at the upazila level comprising of the 6 clusters, and 
drawing representatives from the cluster committees and CBOs. 
 
Kalihati, Tangail site 
 
There are 15 water bodies, comprising of rivers, floodplains, beels, and Jalmohals in 
Kalihati site. These water bodies are located in three sub-watersheds that cover 
around 9 square kilometres area. All the three sub-watersheds are interlinked 
through a number of canals and rivers.  
   
Three cluster committees have been formed from the 15 water-bodies in the Kalihati 
project site. A cluster committee has been formed with 4 river sections, and 13 
members from the RSMCs (2/3 members from each RSMC).  A second, 11-member 
committee has been formed from 4 beels taking 2-3 members from each BMC, and 
third has been formed from 7 floodplain beels with 15 members, 2 from each of 6 
BMCs and 3 from another BMC. Members of the cluster committees have been 
selected by their respective BMC/RSMC.  
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An Apex Committee has been formed consisting of 12 members covering all 15 
project water-bodies. One member was selected by each BMC (presently registered 
as primary cooperative society) from their executive committees to act as a member 
of the Apex Committee.  
 
Jamalgonj, Sunamgaj site 
 
This site consists of 2 leased Jalmohals of above 20 acres in size, sections of two 
flowing rivers and 3 small leased beels. As the flowing parts of the river are adjacent 
to each other, one management committee has been formed for both sections. With 
the adjacent fishermen of the beel area, six management committees have been 
formed for the beels. Considering the types of water-body, the formation of two 
cluster committees was planned which are named as beel cluster and river cluster. 
The beel cluster consists of 5 water bodies (beels) while the river cluster consists of 
2 river sections. However, the river sections have not yet been handed over to the 
project, thus the cluster committee is not yet fully functional. However, the cluster 
committee formed for management of the five beels has performed as the Apex 
committee.  
 
Barlekha, Moulvibazar site 
 
Project water bodies are located within the Hakaluki Haor system in Moulvibazar 
District. It contains 7 water-bodies of different sizes, from which a cluster committee 
has been formed.    Seven BMCs have been formed for management of these 7 
beels, however, in Pabijuri and Ramerkuri, two small beels are located very close to 
each other and registration of these two BMCs has thus been taken as a single 
primary society. The Cluster Committee was formed with 14 representatives (three 
persons from each of the large Jalmohal management committees, two persons from 
each of the 4 small Jalmohals management committees) from these six registered 
CBOs of the seven water-bodies. It should be noted that this cluster committee is 
working as the Apex Committee for this site.  
 
BENEFITS OF CLUSTER MANAGEMENT 
 
The perceived vis-a-vis actual benefits are described below. As previously 
mentioned the function of the cluster committee / apex committee in the project area 
of CNRS / CBFM-2 was to: 
•   Identify the management boundary of a project water body  
•   Prevent the use of harmful gears that are being used in the project water 
bodies. 
•   Implement actions that need the joint initiative of more than one CBO.  
•   Help to carry out habitat restoration and opening fish migration routes. 
•   Impose management norms (closed season, fish sanctuary, reduction of 
harmful gear use, etc) that require intervention in a coordinated manner. 
•   Control the intensity of Katha fishing in water bodies, particularly in river 
sections  
•   Play a role in conflict management amongst CBO members and between 
CBOs.   11
•   Develop linkages between the CBOs and government and development 
service providers.  
 
During the project period the committees achieved many successes to improve 
water body management  
 
1. Removing Arbadh (bamboo cross fence across the river/canal) 
 
The hydrological status and characteristics of river sections vary greatly, and 
accordingly fishing practices also vary. It is impossible, therefore, to take 
general interventions in these sections. Cluster committees played an 
important role in making appropriate decisions, which served common 
interests. There were 164 bamboo made fixed engines (locally called 
Arbandal) across the Fatki River and adjacent floodplains, which were found 
to be detrimental to open-water fisheries resources and habitats. All of those 
Arbandal were removed from the river sections and cluster committees played 
an important role in this. During the level-2 workshop on 27 July 2003, RSMC 
members decided to form an Apex Committee with representation from all 
RSMCs to undertake united action against harmful fishing practices. 
Installation of arbandal requires considerable investment affordable by the 
community’s elite. Poor fishermen did not have any access to the river 
sections meaning that they could not catch fish in the rivers. Furthermore, 
brood stock of fish could not gain access into the beel or canal during the 
breeding period resulting in low fish production in the river sections as well as 
in the beels. At the beginning of the project, the beel management committee 
tried and failed to remove the Arbadh. The elite people of the community were 
involved with the installation of Arbandal and for this reason poor people could 
not create enough pressure to remove them. Later, with the help of the 
Upazila administration, the members of the Cluster Management Committees 
removed 164 Arbadhs from 15 sections of the Fatki River (2003).  
 
2. Implementing infrastructural activities 
 
A management committee in Beel-Bhora took the decision to re-excavate a 
canal passing through numbers of small beels in the Beel-Bhora floodplain to 
establish a link with the Singha River. It had been assumed that this 
intervention would help fish migration, which in turn would contribute in 
enhancing fish production.  Beel-Bhora has 15 management committees 
(CBOs) and this canal is to link working areas of 6 committees. However, the 
canal is a khas land, usually occupied by some local elites. Some persons 
(Landowners/lords) of the Angiadi and Bababor villages protested before 
digging, as well as while the work was taking place, in the area of Adittapasha 
committee of Pakundia site and the management committee failed to resolve 
the problem. It is notable that the Aditapasha, Angiadi and Bababor villages 
are adjacent and located in a same cluster. To solve this problem the Cluster 
Committee sat in a meeting and identified a strategy. With the help of related 
persons and after discussion with the owners of the land, this problem has 
been solved and the canal digging has been carried out.  
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Another incident occurring in the Magura site is that the Kanudar canal is 
included in two management committees. In 2002 a conflict arose as to who 
would dig that canal. In that case the related cluster committees decided that 
the Chukinagar committee would do the work and the work was completed in 
2004. 
 
3. Removing water hyacinth from Fatki River 
 
Most of the 15 sections of the Fatki River under the management of 
CNRS/CBFM-2 in Magura, were suffering from congestion with water 
hyacinth. During the dry season, when the water volume in the river was low, 
water hyacinth causes pollution (through rotting) resulting in high fish 
mortality. Several independent efforts to clear the hyacinths took place but did 
not succeed, as coordinated effort was required, to stop water hyacinth 
flowing downstream, to cleared areas.  
 
In order to remove the aquatic hyacinth, two cluster committees (6 River 
Section Management Committees) met in 2003 and the villagers decided to 
remove the hyacinth on a voluntary basis, and in a coordinated manner. 170 
persons (65 persons from Fatki river Kapashati section, 30 persons from Dari 
Laksmipur section, 25 persons from Bhatoail section, 30 persons from Arpara 
section, and 20 persons from Khilgati section) from the 5 villages worked for 3 
days in order to remove the water hyacinth. In terms of working days, a total 
of 510 person days were spent on this, equivalent to Tk. 51,000 at 100 taka 
per person/per day. 
 
4. Ecological management 
 
In order to manage natural resources, maintaining a closed season is very 
important. It is not helpful if different management committees maintain 
different closed seasons for each of their water-bodies, located in the same 
watershed. In order to maintain the closed season in a coordinated and 
effective manner, the cluster committees in a particular site met together and 
in consultation with the water-body management committees, fixed a common 
period for all the management bodies to observe closed season. Accordingly, 
a 2-3 month closed season has been observed in all of the project sites. 
 
5. Fish friendly sluice gate management 
 
The Bahadia sluice gate (regulator) is situated in the Bahadia CBO area of 
Pakundia site. Sluice gate management committees mainly use the sluice 
gate for draining water from the floodplain in the month of Kartik (October), for 
planting the winter rice. Moreover, farmers do not allow ingress of water 
during May-June, the peak season for natural recruitment of fish fry from river 
to floodplain. Even though the farmers used to transplant winter rice in 
December, fisheries were not considered at all in the management of the 
Sluice gate (regulator) because it was controlled by the farmers. CBOs 
formed by CBFM raised questions over the operation of the sluice gate 
pointing out that its operation had a major role in enhancing fish production, 
allowing “white fish” to migrate from the river to the floodplains. The fishers   13
recommended that water ingress should be allowed in May-June for a limited 
time period and that water could be drained out one month later. Such 
practice would contribute towards increasing fish production without 
hampering winter rice cultivation. The villages adjacent to the sluice gate are 
Kuratola, Diapara and Mirartake. After forming the cluster committee, the 
representatives of the adjacent villages discussed it and agreed about the 
advantages of later draining of the land. These villages are situated in the 
same cluster and the cluster committee had been given the responsibility to 
start a dialogue with the Regulator management committee. After a series of 
meetings, some members of Cluster Committee were included in the sluice 
management committee. 
 
After this, in the meeting of the sluice gate management committee, the 
representatives of the clusters gave their opinion about fish friendly operation 
of regulator, so that benefit would go to the farmers as well as fishermen. 
Committee members agreed and came to a decision that if the operation of 
regulator would not hamper winter rice, fish friendly operation could be 
possible. As of 2004 fish friendly sluice gate operation is ongoing. Under this 
operation, gates of the regulator have been being opened in May/June for few 
days (sometimes just for a few hours) to allow river water into the floodplain (if 
water level of the river rises up to the bed level of the link canal). This allows 
natural recruitment of carp spawn in the beel.  
 
The Fatki River is a tributary of the Padma River. Upstream, the Fatki River 
had been permanently closed under a flood control and irrigation project. 
Presently, the Fatki River feeds off rainwater and back flow from the Chitra 
River. The Fatki River faces an acute shortage of water during the dry 
season. Many sections of the river become dry. Due to jute retting, water in 
many other sections becomes polluted in the late monsoon. There is a link 
between Fatki River and Nabaganga River through a canal called the 
Alamkhali Canal (Santai Khal). There is a regulator on the canal at Alam Khali 
village point. In 2004, the Fatki River was suffering from acute water shortage 
in September. The Cluster Committee took the decision to allow some water 
to Fatki River from the Nabaganga River through the Alamkhali Khal. They 
contacted local BWDB staff and explained the situation, requesting that some 
water be allowed through to the Fatki River. They also convinced the local UP 
Chairman to speak for the committee in this regard. Finally, they succeeded in 
allowing some water to the Fatki River, saving the fish. Seven sections of the 
Fatki River benefited from the intervention.  
 
6. Donating land for Kanangabazar community centre in the Barlekha site 
 
The project has a provision for establishing CBO community centres. A pre-
condition of establishing such a community centre is that the community 
should donate the land by registering it in favour of the CBO. High land, which 
is appropriate for building a house, is scarce in haor areas. The CBOs 
suggested that they would not need a separate community centre if they got 
one community centre at Kanango Bazar. All the beneficiaries under 
CNRS/CBFM-2 in the Barlekha site visit Kanango bazar almost every day.   14
The Cluster/Apex committee took steps to construct a community centre, but 
as the market (locally known as a “bazar”) is situated in a commercial area, 
the land price is very high, making it impossible for the beneficiaries to buy or 
donate land. At least one decimal of land (40 m
2) is required for a community 
centre and the land price in Kanango Bazar was approx. Tk. 300,000/ 
decimal. CBFM-2 beneficiary members did not have any land in the Bazar. 
Landowners in the Bazar were unwilling to donate such valuable land for a 
community centre. As there was no provision for buying any kind of land, the 
members of the cluster/apex committee gathered and decided that they would 
ask for help from the government. Accordingly, they approached to local 
Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO- the chief executive of a sub-district). The UNO 
agreed to lease out one decimal of land in the Bazar, and later, with the help 
of the Union Parishad, local elites, and Union administration, the cluster/apex 
committee made a community centre through leasing of one decimal of khas 
land.  
 
7. Reducing the size of Kathas and forbidding fishing in the closed season 
 
In order to manage natural resources, maintaining a closed season is very 
important. It is not helpful if different management committees maintain 
different closed seasons. Though the management committees of the Vatoail, 
Darilakshmipur, and Borsoloi of Magura sites had taken a decision that in the 
closed season, fishing would be forbidden, the owners of the kathas had 
already arranged to ignore this. At that time, through cluster committees this 
practice was stopped. Private kathas of different sizes was handed over in 
different sections of Fatki River in Magura. While reducing the size of these 
kathas, the kathas of Chukinagar, Kapasati, Arpara sections had increased. 
As a result, a conflict arose. Later on it was decided that the size of those 
kathas would be reduced proportionately. 
 
8. Stopping the Bauth fishing in the Poshna beel of Kalihati site 
 
Bauth fishing, a form of fishing festival where many people fish intensively in a 
particular area, is harmful to wetland habitats and fish resources, but is widely 
practiced in beel areas. Before starting the project Bauth fishing was practiced 
in Kalihati site. From surveys, it was found that general people living in and 
around the beels were engaged in bauth fishing. The organisers would 
announce that on a specific day, during the dry season, while the water level 
in a beel was very low, hundreds of people should come with a specific gear 
called Polo (a type of trap) for Bauth fishing. A single village cannot protect 
against Bauth fishing by themselves, as the number of Bauth fishers is more 
than the population of a village. Posna Beel, one of the private floodplain 
beels under management of CNRS/CBFM-2 in Kalihati, Tangail site was 
affected by bauth fishing. The organizers made announcements about bauth 
fishing in local markets. Later on, in a meeting of the cluster committee, the 
issue of Bauth fishing was discussed and with the help of the Union Parishad, 
local elites, and the administration, all cluster management committees jointly 
took initiative, organized villagers, contacted the bauth fishing organizers, and 
arranged awareness programs through miking (battery operated loud hailer 
on rickshaw) and performing folk theatre against it and finally stopped the   15
Bauth fishing. It should be noted that Bauth fishing was also stopped in 
Magura and Pakundia sites.  
 
9. Stopping gang/force fishing in the Jamalgonj site 
 
Force fishing in haor basins is a common event, and usually happens 
immediately after water recession into resource-full water-bodies. Mobs in the 
haor area catch fish in the dry season by force, which is locally known as 
gang/force fishing. As a result, the fishermen cannot earn as much as they 
otherwise would and face huge losses and sometimes, cannot pay their 
leases. In 2003, one project water-body experienced force fishing. Having got 
information about the group that committed the force fishing, the cluster 
committee took the initiative to protect against force fishing in the following 
year. It was found very difficult to take any steps against gang fishers by the 
management committees individually. Later on, in order to prevent this 
problem, the members of the cluster/apex committee met and with the help of 
the Union Parishad, local elites, and the Upazila administration, stopped the 
gang/force fishing and since then, no gang/force fishing has occurred in the 
site. 
 
10. Establishing the rights of the Arpara community centre 
 
Arpara management committee, in the Magura site, is situated near the bazar 
area, where the land price is very high. It was very difficult to find land for the 
community centre. Later on, the management committee bought 5 decimal of 
land for the community centre but it transpired that nearby elite had been 
controlling the land illegally. As a result, it was found to be very difficult to 
establish the property rights of the management committee. Later on, with the 
help of the cluster committee, local chairperson, members of the executive 
committee, and respectable people, rights over this land were established. A 
community centre was later established on the site in 2005. 
 
11. Steps for stopping harmful net selling 
 
Members of five cluster committees of Fatki River met on 30 August 2004 at 
the meeting room of Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), Shalikha. The committee 
took a number of decisions regarding protection and conservation of fisheries 
resources and implementation of the Fisheries Act at the field level. Though 
using harmful net is illegal, the traders used to sell such nets in the Market. In 
the Arpara bazar of Magura site, these net used to be sold openly. In the 
meeting of the cluster committee, a decision was taken that selling these nets 
would be stopped, and as such, with the help of the UNO, Upazila Fisheries 
Officer, and the law-enforcing agency, all harmful net sellers were warned not 
to sell harmful nets in the future. After the warning on the issue of selling 
harmful nets, spot checks were carried out. From this, selling of harmful nets 
was found to have stopped and the Upazila Administration even seized 
harmful nets from the shops. Through this action, no harmful nets are now 
being sold openly in the shops of Arpara bazar. 
 
12. Conflict resolution   16
 
Recently, a cluster committee has resolved a conflict between a CBO and 
private landowner in the Borosoloi section of the Fatki River where the 
landowner was establishing arbandal in Patbhora beel- a privately owned 
floodplain that is an important fish migration route. The CBO tried several 
times to prevent the deployment of Arbandal but failed. Finally, the CBO came 
to cluster committee with the matter. The cluster committee met the arbandal 
owner and resolved the issue along with the condition of paying of Tk. 1,000 
to the CBO fund. 
 
13. Conservation measures 
 
Project water bodies in the Pakundia site are private floodplain beels. Harmful 
fishing practices were found to be one of the main causes for deteriorating 
fisheries resources in the project site. The declaration of a closed season 
during the breeding period and the establishment of fish sanctuaries have 
been accelerated in the site by the cluster committees. As local elites were 
involved in the cluster committees, it helped to speed up activities that were 
undertaken by the CBOs. This committee contributed to reducing the use of 
current and dhora jal and protected against bauth fishing in project water 
bodies for two consecutive years. 
 
14. Other benefits 
 
Cluster Committees managed to extract some benefits from different 
government agencies in Jamalganj and Barlekha sites. In Jamalganj, the 
Cluster Committee contacted the Upazila Agriculture office and received 
training and seeds from the office. In Barlekha, the Cluster Committee 
managed to extend credit support for CBO members from the Upazila 
Livestock Office for rearing goats. 
The Pakundia Cluster Committee managed to identify some land for 
establishing fish sanctuaries. Landowners provided the land to the Water-
body Management Committee. 
Small beels (below 20 acre in size, Jalmahals under leasing arrangement) 
were not handed over to the project, thus the Cluster committee of Barlekha 
site approached the Upazila Jalmahal Committee. Finally they managed to 
obtain a five year lease of the Jalmohals for project CBOs. 
The lease value of large Jalmohals in Barlekha site and Jamalganj site were 
found to be very high. With the help of project staff, the Cluster Committee 
took initiatives to reduce the lease values. Finally they succeeded in reducing 
the lease values for Padma beel and Chander beel, Chander Chepti in 
Barlekha and Goniar beel in Jamalganj. 
 
CONSTRAINTS TO CLUSTER MANAGEMENT 
 
In the flood plain areas, villages where CBOs are formed are located comparatively 
far apart, sometimes creating problems in communication between CBO members. 
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There is no direct benefit to Cluster Committee members, unlike water body 
management members, thus, to some extent some members are reluctant come to 
meetings. However, there are members committed to volunteer their time in 
achieving common benefits. 
 
KEY SUCCESSES AND LESSONS LEARNT 
 
CNRS has been practicing open-water fisheries management, as a part of 
watershed management, considering the biological characteristics of the fish, 
physical linkages among the different types of habitats, seasonal variations, 
involvement of community people with various interests in multiple–user resources, 
and sectoral approaches of different government agencies. It is a complex system, 
which demands the participation of a wide section of stakeholders for management 
purposes. It has been found that factors affecting a water body’s fisheries production 
have causes far beyond what is occurring in that particular water body. It is beyond 
the capacity of a village based water body management committee to address 
issues occurring upstream or downstream but that directly impact the water body. 
Instead, cluster management of water bodies can address the complexities of open-
water fisheries management in an ecological manner (natural recruitment, habitat 
improvement, facilitating migration route, sustainable harvesting, etc). It needs a 
comprehensive watershed/basin (or catchments area) management plan. For 
example, Charan site lies in the Pungli-Sapai river basin, so the total basin should be 
under single management to have optimum benefit. It should also include 
uninterrupted linkages with the main connecting river i.e. the Jamuna (Pungli and 
Sapai are the tributary of Jamuna river). Unfortunately, due to various reasons, 
CNRS/CBFM-2 could not have the complete basin under its management (all khas 
Jalmohals were not handed over, resource constraints, etc). However, CNRS/CBFM-
2 has been managing the water-bodies at the sub-basin level (48 water-bodies at the 
5 sites) and adopting cluster management concepts for management of these water-
bodies.  
 
The following are the key lessons of the project those CNRS learnt during the last 
four years:  
 
•   Basin level management (Apex committee in CBFM 2) can facilitate optimal 
benefit for open-water fisheries management. Usually one or two village(s) 
can manage a water-body but cannot manage a basin or intermediary. Cluster 
Committees having representatives from all concerned villages (villages 
involved in the water-body management) can manage a basin. An 
intermediary level body (Cluster Committee in CBFM-2) formed with the 
relevant water-body managing villagers can move quickly to take urgent 
actions (protection of bauth fishing). 
•   Floodplains in Bangladesh are having multiple resources involving multiple 
stakeholders (professional and subsistence fisher, farmer, leaseholder, farm 
labourers, irrigation pump owners, etc). There are conflicts in using dry 
season water for irrigation purposes (affecting fish dry season refuge), 
operation of regulators for saving the crops (hampering fish migration) and 
many others. All these issues should be taken into consideration for the better 
management of open-water fisheries resources. Involvement of all such 
stakeholders is necessary in the management regime. Cluster Committees   18
are found to be a suitable forum for all stakeholders to become involved in the 
management regime. 
•   In addition to the individual water-body level management, Basin level 
management can ensure natural recruitment of fish spawn in the floodplain 
beels. Natural recruitment can enhance production of fish and natural 
recruitment (as opposed to the stocking in the floodplain beel) can ensure 
access rights for the poor fishers to the open water-bodies. It was 
experienced that poor fisher community always oppose stocking of fish fry in 
the floodplain as local elites establish their control over the floodplain beel 
through stocking. 
•   Rural people have a clear concept of the present degradation trend of the 
open-water fisheries, and they have the knowledge of how to protect it. At the 
individual level, most of the community people are in favour of protecting 
open-water fisheries but they lack leadership, which can organize common 
people against the detrimental activities. Cluster management can open such 
avenue for the rural people in this regard. 
•   Cluster Committees (both Apex and Cluster Committee) can act as a 
networking body for the individual water-body management committee. It can 
empower the poor fishers to exercise their rights. Different government 
agency and union parishad recognize them and extend their cooperation. 
 
Overall, it can be said that in order to manage and preserve natural fisheries, using 
cluster management is essential for social, biological, and political reasons, as it 
includes people from all sectors. In order to manage people’s resources, people’s 




The CBOs managing individual water-bodies of their own within wider geographical 
areas or larger watersheds (cluster of water-bodies) are the formal local institutions 
and are key in the success of community-based fisheries management. The idea of 
cluster committees emerged from the need of the CBOs and is exclusively for the 
CBOs to share and help resolve issues among them. On the top of this the Apex 
Committee which is upazila based and more formal is usually attended by CBOs, 
DoF and other project partners.  
 
After only four years of field operation since the formation of CBOs, it is difficult to be 
certain about the sustainability of CBFM at some of the sites. However, there are 
some lessons that have been learnt:  
 
•  Individual water-based CBOs are functioning well in terms of their 
organizational functions, fisheries management and maintaining linkages; 
 
•   Apart from the 10 CBOs who received a grant of Tk. 50,000 to operate micro-
credit, now over 40 CBOs (out of 62) are operating micro-credit with their own 
funds thus the CBOs remain busy with collective activities, beyond simply 
fisheries management issues; 
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•   CBOs received letters from the district authority for paying lease for the 
wetlands and they have paid accordingly thus CBOs have direct linkages with 
the leasing authority which should help them to resolve policy related issues 
in future;  
  
•   Even after CBOs have been phased out from the project, UFOs continue to 
be invited to attend some of the CBOs monthly meetings, to help them resolve 
issues; 
 
•   CBOs are contacting different agencies to get support for expanding their 
micro-credit operations. For example, Charan Samity contacted BRDB, a 
Bank, BRAC and CNRS to get support and got some hope from the bank – 
indicating that the CBO had earned sufficient credibility for the bank to decide 
to support them.  
 
•   In two sites (Kalihati and Pakundia) all the CBOs are registered under a 
central society by the cooperative department – through this the apex 
committee got government recognition and the CBOs are now entitled to get 

















































Banchte Shekha is an NGO based in Jessore, south-west Bangladesh that has 
supported the development and empowerment of poor people, particularly 
women. In the CBFM-2 project they found it was possible to involve women in 
fisheries activities, despite initial opposition from conservative groups. Banchte 
Shekha was responsible for organizing 7 CBOs in CBFM-2 following their 





Banchte Shekha (BS) is one of the largest women and children development 
organization in Bangladesh, established in 1976 based in Jessore in the 
southeast region of Bangladesh working to improve the socio-economic status of 
women and children through poverty alleviation and empowerment programs. 
 
In Bangladesh, various beliefs and practices continue to prevent the usage of full 
potential of women for the benefit of the society. Banchte Shekha, an NGO totally 
committed to empower women and bring gender equity, was established to 
assist in changing this scenario. With the support of the WorldFish Center, DoF 
and other institutions, it seeks to remove existing beliefs and practices that hinder 
progress. Sustained efforts are yielding results in changing some of the ill 
practices, resulting in progress in various spheres. In this paper, an attempt is 
made to document the genesis of Banchte Shekha, to describe its general 
activities, and to concentrate on its contribution to empowering women through 
fisheries and aquaculture.  
 
BANCHTE SHEKHA AND CBFM 
 
Banchte Shekha started working under the CBFM Project in villages around 
Goakhola-Hatiara Beel in 1987 following a severe flood. Finding that there were 
many poor people and especially poor women who were interested to benefit 
from its activities, the area was brought under Banchte Shekha’s normal 
programme to improve the lives of destitute women. After successful completion 
of the first phase, Banchte Shekha became involved with the second phase and 
has been working with 7 beels and 1 river section since September 2001. These 
water bodies are situated in two Districts namely Jessore and Narail. Banchte 
Shekha is implementing two types of approaches under the CBFM project, 
Community managed fisheries and Women managed fisheries to make a 
comparative study. 
 
Banchte Shekha recognizes the urgent necessity of providing skill to women to 
gain economic freedom, which is essential to bring gender equity in society. As 
well as providing skills training, Banchte Shekha has helped to bring awareness  
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to the women to exercise their duties and rights which should help to change the 
existing ill practices. 
 
Beneficiaries have a great opportunity through the project to sit together with the 
NGO representatives, Papilla Fishery Officer and Union Parishad Chairman 
where they can raise their problems, obstacles, demands, and discuss probable 
solutions. Through the project they have now been enabled to exchange views 
with them.  
 
Banchte Shekha started the process by arranging meetings and workshops to 
discuss overall project objectives with the beneficiaries and then formed 
participatory management committees. Responsibilities were distributed 
according to their capability. They have a great opportunity for planning and 
implementing directly. Now women are skilled enough to carry out the project 
activities.  
 
A number of income generating activities that are appropriate to women are 
tailoring, embroidery, vegetable cultivation, fish culture, etc. and have been 
implemented successfully of several years. Although, some of these are 
traditionally recognized as activities where men are not usually involved and 
could be carried out without much difficulty, fisheries and aquaculture being new 
and normally male dominated activities were more difficult and resulted in the stiff 
opposition from society.  
 
Women of the community were only housewives before intervention of the 
project, were fully dependent on their husband’s income and made no 
contribution to their family’s maintenance. There was no opportunity to go out 
from their residence for working as day labourers or in the own cultivable lands. 
A great change has come among women in associated with the project. 
 
While technology demonstration did not prove too difficult for the women, the stiff 
opposition by the male and female members of the society at a number of stages 
could only be overcome through determination to resolve various social 
problems.  
 
Most of the women could not sign and write before the intervention of the project. 
But they can now sign and write since they became associated with project 
groups. They realized that their children need to be educated and so that they 
are sending their children to the schools. There is a great change observed in 
behaviour, attitude, and health and clothing also.  
 
The impact of fisheries and aquaculture in bringing gender equity has been very 
high. Most importantly, the visible economic benefits women were able to derive 
from various activities has gained them suitable place in the decision making 
process. Based on the experience of Banchte Shekha in introducing fisheries 
and aquaculture in the most conservative areas of Bangladesh, it is suggested  
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that similar activities should be considered favourably in the other parts of the 
world. Educational programmes on fisheries and aquaculture should employ 
examples of this nature to enlighten people on the potential of this activity and 
strategies that need to be adopted when there are social constraints. 
 
As a result of sustained efforts over several years, today there are several 
groups of women involved in fisheries and aquaculture activities who derive 
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Since 1998 the Management of Aquatic Ecosystems through Community Husbandry 
(MACH) project has established what is best described as community based co-
management of three large wetland systems covering in total about 32,000 ha (about 
4,600 ha of water in the dry season). The project is supported by USAID and the 
Government of Bangladesh and implemented by Winrock International, CNRS, 
Caritas and BCAS working closely with Department of Fisheries and Ministry of 
Fisheries and Livestock. The key elements of the MACH approach have been 
establishing community organizations and then embedding within them institutions 
for sustainable wise use of wetland resources, formally linking these with the existing 
local government system, and through this making interventions to restore wetland 
productivity and improve the livelihoods of the poor. The organizations involved 
comprise: 16 Resource Management Organizations representing all local people 
with interests in wetlands and fisheries, 13 Federations of Resource User Groups 
comprising of poor fishers and other poor wetland users, 25 Union Parishads, and 
the administrations of 5 Upazilas. Co-management is formalized through Upazila 
Fisheries Committees where representatives of all bodies sit to coordinate and 
oversee management of the systems.  
 
The results of these organizations observing closed seasons, excavating about 46 
ha of beels and 30 km of canals to expand dry season water holding, establishing 56 
sanctuaries of 173 ha area and planting 605,000 trees include increases in fish 
catches of 2-5 times over 1999 baselines of 58-171kg/ha, reaching 316-388 kg/ha 
across the whole wetland systems in 2004-05, and increases in fish consumption of 
45% over the same period which benefit the landless as much as large landowners. 
Revolving loan funds worth US$ 0.42 million (Tk.29.10 million) have been transferred 
to community organizations along with training and have helped about 5,200 poor 
households increase their supplemental incomes by about 50% while also reducing 
their dependence on fishing by about two-thirds. For sustainability the Upazila 
Fisheries Committees are being endowed with a total of US$ 0.53 million (Tk 36 
million), the interest from which will primarily be used for continued restoration of 
wetland habitat by the Resource Management Organizations. A catchment and 
wetland ecosystem approach has been vital – for example tree planting and the 
promotion of contour cultivation on hills have aimed at reducing soil erosion and 
siltation of wetlands. Ability to address threats has been enhanced, for example in 
Kaliakoir the number of textile related industries increased from 20 in 2003 to 166 in 
late 2005 and surface water is now far below national standards in the dry season. 
The communities now have their own water quality monitoring program and the 
Upazila Fisheries Committee and Department of Environment have agreed to sign 
an agreement to cooperate to enforce existing anti-pollution laws as a priority.  
 
MACH has also supported the Department of Fisheries (DoF) to take up similar 
activities in some of the Fourth Fisheries Project sites, and to assist the new inland 
capture fisheries team of the department. The MACH approach has already been 
taken up at the policy level. The Inland Capture Fisheries Strategy of the DoF 
incorporates as a key element establishing Upazila Fisheries Committees nationally 
to incorporate and work with an expanding network of community based 
organizations, and also places the spread of permanent sanctuaries and efforts to 





In Bangladesh about four million hectares of land are inundated every year in the 
monsoon (rainy) season, and over half the country is under water in an exceptional 
flood year (Ali 1997). In the dry season, the wetlands reduce in size to form a system 
of rivers, beels (depressions and lakes that hold water permanently or seasonally), 
and baors (oxbow lakes).   
 
The floodplains of Bangladesh are one of the world’s most important wetlands and 
home to hundreds of species of fish, plants, birds and other wildlife. The wetlands 
provide the habitat for over 260 fish species (Rahman, 1989) and hundreds of 
thousands of migrating birds (BirdLife International 2004), and are an important 
source of income and nutrition for millions of households in rural Bangladesh, 
particularly the poor. As many as 80% of rural households catch fish for food or to 
sell (FAP 16, 1995) and about 60% of animal protein consumption comes from fish 
(BBS, 1999). In addition, poor and marginal households catch many small fish that 
are not included in official statistics or policies, and use aquatic plants and animals 
for food or as feed for livestock.   
 
Unfortunately, the wetland resources of Bangladesh are in decline due to over 
fishing and loss of habitat and connectivity. Wetlands in the past were thought to be 
“wastelands” in Bangladesh and the Government’s goal was to drain out and 
“recover” them for agriculture production (albeit for one crop a year during the dry 
season). Even in areas that have not been converted to agriculture, wetland 
ecosystems have been threatened by other pressures:  
 
•   Flood embankments and water control structures have blocked many fish 
migration routes. 
•   Irrigation has expanded winter rice cultivation but reduced the surface water 
that aquatic life needs to survive in the six-month dry season. 
•   The government leases out fishing rights in public water bodies, but short-
term leases have encouraged maximum exploitation without giving incentives 
to protect resources for the next generation. 
•   Industrial development causes severe local pollution that kills breeding fish 
populations during the dry season, residual pesticides and agro-chemicals 
also adversely affect wetland habitat. 
•   Deforestation and poor land management cause high rates of siltation, often 
filling in dry season wetlands that serve as fish holding habitat during a crucial 
time of the year. 
•   More and more people fish destructively by dewatering or using fine mesh 
nets. 
 
The decline in wetlands has resulted in more than 40% of freshwater fish species 
being classed as threatened with national extinction (IUCN Bangladesh 2000). Since 
1985, natural carp spawn catches have declined by 75% (Ali 1997) and major carp 
and large catfish have declined by 50% in national catches. Fish consumption fell by 
11% between 1995 and 2000 (but by 38% for the poorest households), and it is 
estimated that inland capture fisheries catches had fallen by 38% between 1995 and  
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2002 (Muir 2003). Despite recent changes in national policies that call for an end on 
drainage of remaining wetlands (MWR 1999), wetlands continue to be encroached 
for agriculture, industry, brickfields and aquaculture with no sign of abatement. 
 
The Management of Aquatic Ecosystems through Community Husbandry (MACH) 
project was formulated to develop new approaches to floodplain and wetland 
resource conservation and management with the aim of ensuring the sustainable 
productivity of all wetland resources – water, fish, plants and wildlife– over an entire 
wetland ecosystem (comprising beels, seasonal wetlands, rivers and streams), not 
just a single water body and thereby to help ensure food security and increase 
biodiversity. The MACH project started in October 1998 and is due to be phased out 
between June 2007 and June 2008. The project is supported by USAID and the 
Government of Bangladesh and implemented by Winrock International, Centre for 
Natural Resource Studies (CNRS), Caritas-Bangladesh and Bangladesh Centre for 
Advanced Studies (BCAS) working closely with Department of Fisheries and Ministry 





Hail Haor is located in north-east Bangladesh and is typical of deeply flooded basins 
in that region known as haors. It lies between the Balishara and Barshijura Hills to 
the east and the Satgaon Hills to the west. Water from these hills flows through 59 
streams (once 350 were reportedly active) into the haor. The haor is located in five 
unions
1 of Srimangal Upazila and in two unions of Sadar Upazila of Moulvi Bazaar 
District. The watershed of Hail Haor covers about 600 km
2 (237 square miles). Hail 
Haor was formerly connected by Gopla River and Kamarkhali Khal with the 
Kushiyara and Manu Rivers. A series of flood control dikes along these rivers and a 
sluice gate restrict river flows and fish access to the haor. The wet season area of 
Hail Haor is approximately 14,000 ha, whereas the dry season area is typically just 
over 3,000 ha on an average. Approximately 172,000 people live in 61 villages 
around the haor. 
 
The Turag-Bangshi site is located just north of Dhaka and is typical of most low-lying 
floodplains of Bangladesh. The project site covers seven unions of Kaliakor Upazila 
under Gazipur District and one union of Mirzapur Upazila of Tangail District. The 
Turag-Bangshi River runs. At the beginning of the rainy season, water spills over the 
riverbanks through khals (canals) that connect the river to the adjacent beels. Fish 
move through these canals from the river to the beel/floodplain areas for spawning or 
nursing, and then later as water recedes after the monsoon the fish move into the 
deeper perennial portions of the beels or back into the river. Dry season water levels 
in the local rivers and beels are much reduced from their former levels due to the 
vast expansion of ground and surface water extraction for boro (dry season) rice 
irrigation. Fish remain only in the deepest portions of the beels and the river. The 26 
beels have a water surface of approximately 10,000 ha at full flood, which diminishes 
to less than 700 ha at the end of the dry season. The Turag River runs for 
                                                 
1 A Union is the lowest administrative level in Bangladesh, typically there may be about 10 unions in a sub-
district or Upazila. An elected council or Union Parishad governs each union comprising of representatives from 
the 10 or so villages within a union.  
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approximately 30 km through the site and there are another 28 km of canals. 
Approximately 225,000 people live in 226 villages that make use of the river and 
floodplains. 
  
The Kangsha-Malijhi site is located in north-central Bangladesh in Sherpur Sadar 
and Jhenaigathi Upazila of Sherpur District. The area is geographically a part of 
Garo-Tura Hills watershed and includes the catchments of the upper Kangsha and 
Malijhi river system. The hills of this area were once covered with natural Sal Shorea 
robusta forest; now only remnants of natural forest remain. The wetlands and 
floodplain have a water area of approximately 8,000 ha during the wet season, which 
diminishes to about 900 ha in the dry season. The floodplain area contains 47 beels 
or low pockets, of which 18 are perennial. The population of the area is 
approximately 279,000 in 163 villages. The area is prone to flash floods with water 
coming from the hills and damaging crops before draining away. Continued flood 
damage to the monsoon crop has forced farmers to shift to cultivating more dry 
season boro. The resulting increase in extraction of surface and ground water for 





Like several projects in Bangladesh in the past decade (Thompson et al. 2003; 
Thompson 2005), MACH has worked to establish community based management 
systems and has drawn lessons from this. In addition to community organizations for 
the sustainable use and management of fish and wetland resources, MACH has also 
worked to improve the livelihoods of poor wetland users and to empower them in 
decision making. The key differences are:  
 
•   The Resource Management Organizations (RMOs) established to protect and 
sustain wetland resources represent all stakeholders. 
•   Separate organizations of poor people – Federations of Resource User 
Groups (FRUGs) – have been formed to help diversify and enhance their 
livelihoods. 
•   These community based organizations (CBOs) have been formally linked with 
local government (both Union Parishads – elected local councils, and Upazila 
or sub-district administration) through Upazila Fisheries Committees. 
•   Separate partner NGOs have worked to support each of these types of body 
and their activities in a collaborative and coordinated way. 
 
Resource Management Organizations 
 
Resource Management Organizations (RMOs) were organized around wetland 
management areas that contained recognizable dry season water areas or systems 
(typically identifiable through a local name) but this followed a process of initial 
understanding, planning, and working in smaller parts of those areas with the 
communities. The RMO comprises of villagers – fishers, farmers, landless, local 
elites, men and women – who serve as representatives of the community, chosen 
from those living in and around the wetland management area and using its 
resources. The RMO is responsible for the management of the wetland resource  
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including identifying appropriate management interventions through participatory 
planning, and implementing them. 
 
The project approach to form local organizations and institutions adopted the 
following general sequence of steps: 
 
1. Conduct introductory meetings with the Upazila and Union Parishad to introduce 
MACH and sensitize all levels from officials to villagers about the importance of 
fisheries and other wetland wildlife and plants. 
2. Identify the communities’ wetland resource problems and possible solutions 
including management and physical interventions through the use of participatory 
approaches. 
3. Identify potential management units – these comprise the wetland areas and 
water bodies and their associated villages and resource users – that are most 
interlinked and could form a unit to be covered by one local organization. 
4. Build rapport and raise awareness in the communities within each management, 
and post community organizers employed by the project to the sites – one per 
management unit. 
5. Develop the institutions – this was done in a flexible way with important 
differences in approach between sites. It included working with the representatives 
from the area who form the general body of the RMO to select from among 
themselves their Executive Committee and discuss and agree on their constitution.  
6. Register RMOs with the Social Welfare Department, thereby giving the RMOs a 
legal entity and status as local non-government organizations. 
7. Develop the capacity of the RMOs and their members, for example how to run the 
organization, plan activities, supervise implementation, and introduce wetland 
resource management norms to their areas. 
8. Work with the RMOs to enhance representation of the poor and of women by 
revising RMO membership to ensure a majority of representatives of poorer people 
dependent on the wetland resources based on 60% of members being 
representatives of the Resource User Groups (RUGs) formed separately by the 
project, and associated changes in constitutions to strengthen and protect the 
interests of poor people. 
9. Implement an exit strategy to ensure that the RMOs are sustainable based on: 
adoption of guidelines on financial and natural resource management, annual review 
and agreement of resource management plans developed by the RMO in 
consultation with the wider community and government, and building offices for each 
RMO. 
10. Conduct twice yearly reviews of RMO performance and status to guide capacity 
building and phasing out.  
 
It was key that the project took a flexible approach in the development of local 
institutions. The project staff considered the physical characteristics of the wetlands, 
the settlement of communities around the resource, pre-existing property rights 
(such as leases) to the wetlands and the social characteristics of the users. This 
required a high level of capacity in field based staffs that facilitate the process, and 
places stresses on project management.  
  
The Turag-Bangshi (Kaliakoir) wetlands have a number of lower deeper pockets of 
water (locally known as kur or kum for rivers and doha for beels). These are the key  
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hot spots for the fishery since they become isolated water bodies in the dry season 
and hold the remaining fish stock. The rest of the area is seasonally flooded and 
comprises private crop land. Separate committees of local people from nearby 
villages were established to protect certain kums and dohas as sanctuaries, as 
agreed through participatory planning. Later RMOs were formed covering larger 
wetlands – the beel or river that is a common flooded area in the monsoon and 
contains several kums and dohas. All members of these kum and doha committees 
became general members of the RMO, resulting in relatively large organizations 
bringing together people each trying to protect their local part of a connected wetland 
resource system, and with the executive committee of the RMO coordinating and 
overseeing the activities of the constituent kum and doha committees.  
 
In the fishery of Hail Haor (Srimangal) most of the main dry season water bodies are 
larger and are jalmohals (state property where the government leases fishing rights 
to the highest bidder) and are distant from the many user villages that surround the 
haor. Here the project directly organized stakeholder representatives including local 
community leaders from those few villages covered by participatory planning into 
eight RMOs spread around the haor edges. The project then worked to have the 
leases for some of the jalmohals (one or more in each RMO area) reserved for that 
RMO without competitive tendering. The RMO then functioned as an enlightened 
leaseholder sub-contracting fishing to fishers and establishing best wetland 
management practices in these jalmohals and the neighbouring floodplain.  
 
In Kangsha-Malijhee (Sherpur) area the wetlands comprise of distinct beels that are 
separate for most of the year. Organization development started by inviting all 
households in each of the main villages using a given beel system and identified by 
the project team in its reconnaissance visits to a village meeting, there they formed 
village committees. These were short lived. Four Participatory Action Plan 
Development (PAPD) workshops were held one each for two beel complexes and 
two for the largest wetland area. These formed the basis for the four RMOs that were 
formed with representatives from the user villages invited to the PAPD and later 
forming a core group for the respective RMOs. 
 
In total, 16 RMOs have been formed, each covering from 2 to 20 villages, each with 
populations ranging from 555 to 1,580 households. Based on the choice made by 
villagers, the members of the general body of RMOs range from 40 to 173 people. 
The general members selected executive committees ranging in size from 13 to 21. 
The general body members wanted relatively large executive committees to ensure 
participation of all villages. Because of the nature of the wetland, under the four 
RMOs in Turag-Banshi site, there are 20 constituent smaller area based committees 
(responsible for a deeper pocket within the wetland – a river section or daha), and in 
Kangsha-Malijhi site there are 18 village committees. At Hail Haor there are no such 
area based committees within the RMO.  
 
Federations of Resource User Groups 
 
The project recognized from the outset that to restore wetlands and then ensure that 
they are only used at sustainable levels involves limits on access and use, for 
example closed seasons and sanctuaries prevent people from fishing as they had 
done. Moreover the remaining wetlands, even with some excavation, are a finite  
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resource that cannot provide a decent living for increasing numbers of fishers and a 
growing population.  
 
To develop alternative livelihood sources for the poor and provide access to micro-
credit, small groups were formed, called “Resource User Groups” (RUGs), of 15 -30 
men or women from poor households. Generally they own under 0.2 ha of land or 
less, labour for part of the year, have under 8 years of education, do not belong to 
any other NGO’s groups, and were involved in fishing or collecting other aquatic 
resources for income or food. Following normal NGO practice for credit and savings 
programs in Bangladesh, only one person per household could join a RUG, 
membership is based on making regular personal savings in weekly group meetings. 
On the basis of savings the members could propose income generating activities for 
receiving loans. The members also discussed wetland management in their 
meetings and were trained in business and enterprise skills that they then used after 
taking loans. Typical enterprises include raising livestock, small shops, and individual 
skilled work such as tailoring or operating a tree nursery. By late 2006, 5,203 
households had members belonging to 250 RUGs. Of the RUG members about 64% 
are men, about 75% own under 0.2 ha of land.  
 
The MACH approach to livelihood support linked with fishery and wetland 
management was unique because the RUGs are overlapping but separate from the 
RMOs. About 60% of the volunteers who belong to the RMOs come from the RUGs 
and represent the interests of their respective RUGs when they attend the RMO. 
Similarly wherever there is a RUG in the villages using one of these wetlands it has a 
representative in the respective RMO. 
 
For the RUG members, the project focused on developing skills and enterprises that 
would enable participants to reduce their fishing effort or even leave fishing 
altogether. This included providing vocational training (for example as electricians or 
drivers) and in some cases providing larger loans of up to Tk 35,000 (US$ 500). As a 
result, 153 participants started new skilled jobs or invested in enterprises that 
provide full time work (for example a power tiller or medium scale broiler chicken 
farming raising batches of 500 or more chicks).  
 
Activities to benefit the poor were linked to technical interventions such as 
establishing tree nurseries or trials of alternative crops with lower dry season water 
demand in an attempt to reduce abstraction from dry season water bodies. However, 
these initiatives have been scattered and achieving changes in agriculture on a 
larger scale that is linked up with resource management planning by RMOs for water 
and land use still has a long way to go. 
 
Federations of RUGs (FRUGs) have been formed roughly coinciding with Union 
Parishad boundaries (13 in all). These have been registered with the Social Welfare 
Department. So far the revolving loan funds provided under the project have been 
transferred to nine of these FRUGs. The FRUGs then have responsibility for 
managing the savings of their members and credit funds from which they lend to 
their members. As such they are entirely membership based organizations with 
elected office bearers from among the members. They already employ staff (paid 
from part of the interest charged on the loans) to manage the saving and loan  
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processes, reporting to the executive committee and to the general body of 
members.  
 
By late 2006 the RUG members had accumulated savings averaging Tk 
1,600/member (US$ 23/member) equivalent to a total of Tk 8.35 million or over US$ 
120,000, and had revolving loan funds of about Tk. 29.10 million (US$ 427,000). 
Revolving funds amounting to Tk.16.20 million have been handed over to nine 
FRUGs, and the remaining amount is due to be handed over to the other FRUGs 
when they can be registered. For up to one year some FRUGs have been running 
their micro-credit functions by themselves with limited external supervision and 
monitoring.  
 
According to a survey undertaken in 2002 the average household income of the 
RUG participants at that time was about Tk 35,000 (US$ 540) during the previous 
year (below the national poverty line of Tk 45,000 (US$ 690) per household per 
year). The net profit for borrowers after repaying their loans was Tk 2,150 (US$ 33) 
per loan. A sample survey in 2006 indicated that 47% of RUG member households 
had not earlier fished for an income, but of the 53% that had been professional 





Co-management has been a focus of attention in fisheries (and natural resources) 
management in the last two decades. The IUCN defines co-management as: “a 
situation in which two or more social actors negotiate, define and guarantee amongst 
themselves a fair sharing of the management functions, entitlements and 
responsibilities for a given territory, area or set of natural resources.” (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al. 2000).  
 
In the case of fisheries it has most often been taken to mean a sharing of 
responsibility between government and fishing communities. Co-management 
stretches from government dominated decisions at one end of the range with 
government instructing users, through consultations, to at the other extreme users 
advising or informing of their decisions for government endorsement (Berkes 1989; 
Pomeroy and Williams 1994; Sen and Nielson 1996).  
 
Co-management has been promoted in the belief that a shift from top-down 
management to sharing decisions and responsibility between resource users and 
government would improve the quality of decisions and local compliance with 
management plans. Therefore the intention of co-management is to empower fishers 
both as an end in itself and in the expectation of better management (Viswanathan et 
al. 2003). This requires major changes in institutions, organizations and attitudes.  
 
The MACH approach can be termed community-based co-management. It has 
focused on helping communities organize for improved management of their 
resources (RMOs) and helped the poor organize to improve their individual 
livelihoods (FRUGs). But community based management of wetland resources is 
unlikely to be sustained without recognition from and linkages with other formal 
institutions, and strong community organizations are needed if wetland users are to  
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share decision making with government. The MACH project has developed and 
demonstrated a combination which is new for Bangladesh and has proved very 
effective. Although the project has been undertaken by NGOs, and has focused on 
establishing RMOs and FRUGs, they have been formally linked with local 
government.  
 
By reserving use rights to water bodies for 10 years for community based 
organizations – RMOs – the government recognizes the right of those RMOs to 
make and implement management plans and sets of rules just as leaseholders have 
done in the past. The difference is that with long term rights and considering their 
community interest, the RMO adopts better practices that sustain and restore fish 
stocks and wetland biodiversity. In this approach wetland resource management 
decisions are taken by the RMOs, but these are endorsed, coordinated and 
overseen by a co-management body. Two tiers of local government are relevant. 
The Union Parishad is a local elected council typically covering around ten villages, 
and is the only long standing form of representational local government in 
Bangladesh. Among its responsibilities is local planning. The Upazila or sub-district 
is staffed by technical officers of various line agencies as well as administrative 
officers, and has responsibility for delivering government services.  
 
MACH established Local Government Committees (LGCs) (renamed as Upazila 
Fisheries Committee - UFC in 2007) in the four main Upazilas where it is working. 
These comprise of the relevant Upazila officers (chaired by the chief administrative 
officer – Upazila Nirbahi Officer – and the member-secretary is the Upazila Fisheries 
Officer), the chairmen of those Union Parishads where wetland management is 
being improved, and the chairpersons of the community organizations established 
through MACH – the RMOs and FRUGs. The committees meet quarterly to discuss 
the problems and potential solutions to wetland degradation, plans for habitat 
restoration by RMOs are debated and approved, and problems and issues 
encountered by the community organizations and project have been discussed and 
solutions found. Originally a mechanism for coordination of project implementation, 
these have become effective co-management bodies and have been formalised 
beyond the project end. In addition to this formal co-management body, the RMOs 
have developed informal links with the Union Parishads in whose areas they work, 
and are invited to attend the Union Parishad meetings.  
 












RMO  RMO 
   FRUG 
RUG
RU
   
  11
Fig 1. Institutional Arrangements for Community-based Co-Management under 
MACH 
 
Thus both formally and informally the networking and social capital of the community 
based organizations have been enhanced through co-management committees 
playing this supportive role. Local government has a well defined and more 
substantial role than under the previous system. Figure 1 shows the linkages 
involved. The LGC/UFC can also refer issues that are outside of its scope to resolve 
either to the appropriate line agency, such as the District Fisheries Officer, or to the 
District administration.  
 
To sustain these institutional arrangements beyond the MACH project, MACH has 
raised awareness within the Government of Bangladesh of the merits of the LGCs as 
co-management committees. The Department of Fisheries has now proposed that 
this arrangement be made permanent and extended (eventually to all Upazilas) by 
establishing Upazila Fisheries Committees with the same composition as the LGC 
and with both the responsibilities of the MACH LGCs and those of the former Upazila 
Jalmohal Management Committees (which were concerned only with leasing of 
some jalmohals). The great merit of this framework is that although it is a uniform 
prescription, it is for coordination and oversight. Within this framework community 
based organizations of any and all forms that are effective in improving wetland 
management and community participation can be supported, just as already the 





Planning and problem analysis 
 
Participatory planning took place in different forms in each site. Initially workshops 
were used to work with the communities to identify problems and develop potential 
solutions in Hail Haor and Turag-Bangshi sites. By 2001, in Sherpur the project 
made use of a more systematic approach, Participatory Action Plan Development 
(PAPD), that works separately and jointly with stakeholders (see Sultana and 
Thompson, 2004) and building on earlier methods. The main problems identified in 
all three sites were siltation and declining fish catches along with losses of other 
aquatic biodiversity (Table 1). Site specific problems included pollution in Kaliakoir, 
flooding in Sherpur, and leasing of jalmohals in Srimangal. The physical 
interventions identified through consensus typically included establishment of 
sanctuaries, habitat restoration and improvement, and connectivity restoration. 
 
Table 1 Top seven problems identified by stakeholders in participatory 
planning 
 
Problem  Hail Haor  Kaliakoir   Sherpur  Addressed by 
MACH 
Siltation  √  √  √  YES 
General decline in fish  √  √  √  YES 
Loss/catching of fish 
spawn and brood fish 
  √  √  YES  
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Pollution    √   YES 
Use of destructive 
gear 
√   √  √  YES 
Leasing system  √    YES 
Loss of water birds  √    YES 
Decline in aquatic 
resources plants/ 
animals 
√    YES 
Some fish species lost      √  YES 
Lack of employment    √   YES 
Low water in dry 
season/ irrigation 
problem 
√    YES 
Rice seed (HYV) 
quality 
  √   NO 
Fish disease      √  NO 
Flood damage      √  NO 
 
Based on the outcomes of participatory planning, each RMO developed and agreed 
upon a set of rules or norms regarding fishing within those areas where it directly 
controls access or has direct influence
2. These have been formalized into resource 
management plans with associated maps and are endorsed by the Upazila Fisheries 
Officer (UFO). The main access limits introduced by RMOs to ensure sustainable 
fisheries are: 
•  aquatic  sanctuaries, 
•   closed seasons of various lengths for all fishing in the early monsoon to 
protect fish when they are breeding, and, 
•   bans on fishing gears and activities that have been identified with the local 
communities to be most harmful to the fishery and wetland – such as 
dewatering and pumping out of deeper parts of the lakes (beels) and ditches, 
and use of fine mesh nets that target juvenile fish. 
 
In order to cover costs of water body leases, maintenance of conservation measures 
and RMO operations, they collect payments for fishing from fishers that just cover 




By agreeing to stop fishing year round in areas that retain water in the dry season, 
the community ensures that adult fish can survive the dry season to breed (and the 
RMO establishes a general closed season at that time to improve the chances of 
spawning and juvenile fish). Expected benefits include higher catches in the rest of 
the wetland system, and restoration of biodiversity including fish, plants, 
invertebrates and waterbirds. By the end of 2005, MACH had helped RMOs 
                                                 
2 By 2005 the Ministry of Land had reserved 34 jalmohals for management by the 16 RMOs for 10 years on 
condition that they pay the government a lease fee each year, a further 8 had been set aside permanently by the 
government to be sanctuaries protected by the communities. In addition the RMOs influence resource use in 
private lands that are seasonally flooded which surround these jalmohals, and also in Hail Haor they aim to 
influence the practices of the leaseholders of other jalmohals.  
  13
establish 56 functioning wetland sanctuaries at the three sites covering 427 acres 
(173 ha) (Figure 2). The sanctuaries are either locally declared or declared by the 
Ministry of Land.  
 
Locally declared sanctuaries have been set up by RMOs within part of the water 
bodies (jalmohals) where they hold the fishing rights for 5-10 years. These 
sanctuaries are part of local management plans and are designed to restore fish 
catches for the local communities represented by the RMO. Typically they are a 
small but vital part of the water body that retains water through the dry season and 
overall cover about 1.9% of the dry season water area of the MACH sites. 
 
A few sanctuaries have been declared directly by the Ministry of Land, after 
proposals made by the project. These are larger areas of national importance to 
protect wetland habitat, fish and other aquatic fauna and flora. They have been taken 
out of the leasing system permanently, and on payment of a nominal fee to 
government the respective RMO is entrusted by the government to protect the 
sanctuary. In the Turag River three deeper spots were declared as sanctuaries in 
this way and function in a similar way to those established just by the RMO. 
However, in Hail Haor a much larger sanctuary known as “Baikka Beel” that in effect 
covers a contiguous area of about 100 ha has been established to serve as a 
wilderness refuge for the whole haor to protect fish, wildlife (water birds) and restore 
haor wetland habitat. 
 



































Fig.2. Sanctuary areas in rivers and beels under the MACH project 
 
The project has adapted traditional fish aggregating practices to increase fish 
populations in sanctuaries. Traditionally local landowners use tree branches to make 
brush piles in deeper parts of a water body to provide shelter for fish. Algae, plankton 
and other organisms grow on the surface of these tree branches and become a 
source of food for fish, and the branches prevent unwanted fishing, then the owner 
contracts specialist fishing teams to encircle the shelter, remove the branches and 
catch all the fish. However, tree branches rot and have to be replaced regularly 
which contributes to loss of tree cover, so in beel sanctuaries the project has 
installed over 23,000 “hexapods” and pipes made of concrete which will last for 
many years and serve the purpose of providing shelter, surfaces for growing fish  
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food and preventing fishing without repeated investments by the RMOs or reducing 




Siltation of canals and beels is a major problem that results in a reduction in the 
volume of water stored in beels. In 1999 it was found that the largest chora (hill 
stream) feeding Hail Haor carried over 200,000 m
3 of sediment just in July. In 2001, 
silt loads of 22 choras were monitored – they carried 50,000 tons, suggesting that 
the total of 59 active choras carry over 100,000 tons of silt into Hail Haor each year. 
Moreover sediment traps showed deposition of 8-15 cm of silt in one year near the 
outfalls of the choras, which results in an average estimated raising of the haor bed 
by about 5 cm per year or 1 m in 20 years (MACH 2004). With only 2-3 m of water in 
most of the Haor in the monsoon, Hail Haor is changing rapidly, the fringes of the 
haor are rapidly filling in, and it could disappear as we know it today. This pattern is 
repeated in the other project sites and throughout the country. The connecting 
channels or khals between beels and rivers are silting up, and this has a 
disproportionate impact on the fish populations. Some species of fish breed in the 
river environment and then juveniles migrate from rivers to beels at the onset of the 
rains when water levels are rising, later adults return to the river at the end of the 
monsoon when water levels fall. Blockage of connecting canals by siltation and 
sluice gates delays or prevents migration of both adult fish and offspring.  
 
To address this adverse trend, wetland habitat has been restored by re-excavating 
canals to improve flows, and re-excavating beels (mostly within areas declared by 
the RMOs as sanctuaries) to increase the depth to maintain water year round. The 
improved habitat provides better shelter for fish, and facilitates breeding and 
regeneration of aquatic plants and animals.   
 
RMOs and local government formed Project Implementation Committees to oversee 
contractors and in some cases employ the labourers required for earthworks. 
Though the total area excavated is modest compared with the total dry season water 
area (Table 2), these deeper fish refuges and canal connections directly serve and 
link with the majority of the dry season water area in the three sites.  
 
Table 2. Re-excavation in MACH Project sites between 1999 and 2005 
Site  Canal length 
(m) 
Beel area (ha) Area of  directly 
connected water bodies 
(ha)  
Hail Haor  11,200   13.9  211.0 
Turag Bangshi  9,500   20.8  144.6 
Kangsha Malijhee  9,240   11.1  147.3 
Total  29,940   45.9  502.8  
 
Re-excavation of wetlands addresses the outcome of the siltation process but not 
the root causes. MACH introduced a watershed approach to address water 
catchment management on a pilot and demonstration basis, this has worked in 
upland areas that are outside of the wetland and RMO managed areas to address 
problems identified by the communities. Land use mapping for two chora catchments 
flowing into Hail Haor revealed that 46% is under tea estates (which are already  
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reasonably well managed to limit soil erosion), 28% is forest land under the 
responsibility of the Forest Department (some of which has poor tree cover), and 
13% is privately managed pineapple and lemon gardens. The pineapple 
disproportionately contributed to siltation because the growers habitually grew 
pineapple in rows running up and down the slope, accelerating soil erosion in this 
high rainfall area (2,200 mm pa; MACH 2004). Lemons are more typically grown at 
the base of the hills and not on the steep slopes. By bringing in expertise on 
pineapple growing and working with a few farmers to test and demonstrate it was 
found that contour cultivation was not only feasible but resulted in denser planting 
per ha, reduced fertilizer costs, and generated higher profits (an extra Tk 130,000 
(US$ 2,000) per ha), and of course reduced soil erosion. By the end of 2005, a total 
of 32 farmers had adopted the contour planting method on 72 plots covering 92 
acres (37 ha), and the Department of Agricultural Extension has agreed to promote 
this method more widely. 
 
Communities felt it was important to plant native trees to mitigate the past trend for 
loss of tree cover including swamp forest in the wetlands and riparian areas, this is 
also expected to help reduce the sediment loads in small rivers and channels flowing 
into the wetlands through bank stabilization. Notably the project has helped to 
pioneer and demonstrate nursery raising and planting out of native wetland trees - 
Hijal Barringtonia aquatangula and Koroch Pongamia glabra – that are adapted to 
being inundated by a meter or more of water for up to half of the year. This swamp 
forest is important for providing habitat for growing fish during the monsoon as well 
as habitat for other wildlife, and helps to shelter villages and provide branches for 
brush piles. Table 3 summarizes the extent of reforestation through the project. 
However, out of the trees planted about 293,000 were found to be surviving in late 
2006. 
 
Table 3  Wetland and other reforestation undertaken by MACH up to November 
2005. 










Hail Haor  72,105  52,053  59,028  183,186 
Turag Bangshi  18,057  59,692  46,304  124,053 
Kangsha Malijhee  34,803  121,543  141,780  298,126 







The management practices adopted by the communities are based on their own 
problem and solution analysis complemented by specialist biological and 
engineering expertise, but from the outset (the baseline pre-intervention year of 
1999) a rigorous monitoring program was set up to quantify impacts. Fishing catch 
and effort are recorded at 10-day intervals in 23 fixed monitoring locations covering 
1,825 ha and representing the range of wetland habitats present. Within those 
defined areas separately operating fishing units (which may be one or several  
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people) were recorded according to the equipment (gear) they used for fishing. For 
three fishing units of each gear type or 10% of units of that type (whichever was the 
higher figure) the gear type and characteristics, expected duration of fishing, and 
catch by number and weight of fish were recorded. The sample area catches are 
taken to be representative of the whole wetland system and the total catch estimate 
for the sample areas multiplied up by the fraction of the total area gives an estimate 
of total catch. 
 
Compared with the baseline years (the first year of records for each site, when there 
were no management interventions) there have been substantial increases in total 
fish catch and in catch per hectare in all three sites (Table 4). The greatest gains in 
catch per area (5 times increase) have been at the Turag-Bangshi site where the 
fishery was in a very poor condition before restoration. Although effort appears to 
have increased to a very high level there, catch per person day has also increased. 
The low levels of catch per person day in both Turag-Bangshi and Kangsha-Malijhee 
sites reflect the greater importance of subsistence fishing in floodplains in these sites 
– as this is a supplement to income more people fish for just part of a day or spend 
days fishing when they have no other work, whereas most of those fishing in Hail 
Haor do it for their daily income. A complication to interpretation of the trends is that 
2004 was a high flood year with greater availability of fish and hence effort increased 
to take advantage of this bounty. Despite this increase in effort, the catch per person 
day was higher in 2004 in all three sites than in the baseline year suggesting that the 
project has resulted in improved fisheries which may be sustained in the future. 
 
Achieving compliance with the fishing norms introduced through the resource 
management plans has not been easy, and the RMOs have tended to concentrate 
on water bodies where they hold fishing rights and have had less influence on other 
areas. Although there is generally relatively little fishing in the months when a closed 
season was introduced, there is no sign of any overall reduction in effort in that time. 
However, they do appear to have changed opinions to some extent regarding use of 
fishing gears and practices identified as particularly harmful. The percentage of effort 
using such gears has fallen, although total effort with these gears remains 
substantial. Hence it seems more likely that sanctuaries, excavation of habitat, and 
the ban on de-watering that RMOs observe may have had the greatest impacts. 
 
Table 4  Changes in fish catches in relation to wetland management activities in 
MACH sites. 








































Hail Haor             
1999-
2000*  NA 0 
6.65 
2,137 120.8  1.13 171.1  8,896  5  62,853 36 
2000-2001 12,214  5.65  10.28  2,561  93.3  1.76  205.0  12,682 9  42,447 31 
2001-2002  12,215  8.87  20.30 2,382  89.6  1.71  190.8  15,601  12 40,640 31 
2002-2003 14,926  18.11  31.94  3,588  78.1  2.95  287.3  7,979  7  32,592 28 
2003-2004  13,490  103.79 70.35 2,021  72.0  1.80  161.8  11,093  11 31,572 30 
2004-2005  15,835  103.79 70.37 4,854  138.3  2.25  388.6  21,706  11 57,128 28 
Turag Banshi             
1999-
2000*  NA 0 
0 
253 217.3  0.27  57.8  4,290  5  24,917 30 
2000-2001 NA  22.34  2.37  546  397.5  0.31  124.7  16,896 11  62,960 41  
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2001-2002 NA  44.48  4.91  458  491.7  0.21  104.8  37,856 20  31,473 17 
2002-2003  NA  44.48  6.12 613  500.4  0.28  140.1  11,855  6 36,797 19 
2003-2004  4,297 54.59  34.72 1,379  509.3  0.62  315.2  19,665  10 41,237 21 
2004-2005 NA  54.59  39.92  1,403  717.2  0.45  320.7  24,102 9  68,378 25 
Kangsha-Malijhee             
2000-
2001*  NA 5.69 
1.69 
1,233 568.6  0.23 150.2  12,838  7  20,416 12 
2001-2002 14,926  6.77  9.69  1,225  651.0  0.20  149.2  21,578 11  45,074 23 
2002-2003  NA  9.56  21.27 2,244  996.9  0.24  273.4  49,141  16 54,063 18 
2003-2004  NA  11.61  46.04 2,591  754.9  0.37  315.6  27,874  12 27,631 12 
* Baseline (no interventions to improve wetland or its management. 
** Catch per unit effort 
*** Catch per unit area 
Notes: 1. Assumes core closed season is Baishak – Ashar i.e. 17% of the year. 
2. Only banned gear considered here is current jal 
3. Maximum area inundated is calculated using GIS and a digital elevation model for 
Hail Haor each year, but has only been estimated once for each of the other two 
sites. 
4. The actual excavated areas are shown and do not include the total area of water 




It is well known that fish is the main source of dietary animal protein in Bangladesh, 
but national fish consumption declined between 1995-96 and 2000 by 14% to 11.1 
kg/person/year (Muir 2003). To assess direct impacts of improved wetland 
management on livelihoods, especially those of poorer people, fish consumption was 
monitored for a panel of 1,050 households from 29 villages. Local women were 
trained as monitors and visited each sample household once every three days (10 
days per month) to sort and weigh the species of fish being prepared for cooking and 
home consumption. 
 
Table 5. Fish consumption (g/person/ day) 
Year  Hail Haor  Turag-Bangshi  Kangsha-Malijhee 
1999 49  29  Na 
2000 52  28  Na 
2001 54*  30  24 
2002 60**  37**  28* 
2003 58**  47**  29* 
2004 65**  48**  34** 
Notes: 1. Hail Haor and Turag-Bangshi “1999” data are from September-October to 
April of following year, subsequent years are May to April of next year; Kangsha-
Malijhee data covers full calendar years.  
2. Figures are averages of each household’s average consumption in the period.  
* = significantly higher than baseline consumption, ** significantly higher than both 
baseline and 1
st impact year, t-test, p<0.05 
 
In both Hail Haor and Turag-Bangshi fish consumption has gradually increased since 
the baseline year, and in 2004-05 was respectively 33% and 66% higher than the 
baseline period (Table 5). These benefits have been shared widely across poor and 
better off households. Most of the households monitored were landless (about 60%) 
or marginal farmers (about 20%).   
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In Hail Haor these were the types of household that have enjoyed significantly higher 
fish consumption since 2002-03. The other landholding households have not 
significantly increased fish consumption and since the larger landowners had higher 
consumption at the baseline this means that the poor have caught up in their 
consumption. However, this was a more productive fishery even before MACH 
started its work compared with the other two sites and so fish consumption was 
much higher than the other sites and the national average.  
 
In Turag-Bangshi all landholding categories had similar levels of fish consumption 
before the project and all have gained significantly. The timing of increases in fish 
consumption in the three sites is indicative of a project impact since sanctuaries and 
excavation only started to be implemented in 2001 so impacts in the next year might 
be expected. 
 
Households in Kangsha-Malijhee had the lowest fish consumption levels of the three 
sites initially and this remains the case, but all landholding categories have made 
similar gains, and even after one year of project activities consumption increased 
significantly compared with 2-3 years in the other sites. Per capita fish consumption 
was 33g/day in impact year-3, up from 22 g/day during the baseline period. Per 
capita fish consumption of landless households increased by 45% and for large farm 





Fish species diversity was assessed as a simple count of species recorded from the 
sampling program, which was a constant effort between years in each site. There 
was at best a modest increase in the number of species recorded between the 
baseline years and subsequent years (Table 6). The dominant species by weight 
caught in all three sites included Jat puti Puntius sophore which is typical of open 
waters in Bangladesh. Small shrimps were the highest percentage of catch (10-19%) 
in baseline and subsequent years in Turag-Bangshi and Kangsha-Malijhee sites. 
This is a concern, as de Graff et al. (2001) have argued that a high proportion of 
shrimps in floodplain catches indicates a fishery that has been severely damaged as 
it lacks appropriate conditions for breeding and recruitment of larger and beel 
resident fishes. 
 
Table 6. Fish species diversity (number of species recorded) 
Year  Hail Haor  Turag-Bangshi  Kangsha-Malijhee 
1999 71  82  Na 
2000 71  81  Na 
2001 69  86  64 
2002 79  91  67 
2003 67  85  71 
2004 81  85  73 
Years defined as follows: Hail Haor - April to March of next year; Turag-Bangshi - 
May to April of next year; Kansha-Malijhee - August to July of next year. 
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In all three sites in the baseline year miscellaneous small fish of a number of species 
comprised a high proportion of the catch. In the less degraded fisheries (Hail Haor 
and Kangsha-Malijhee) the recovery has mainly been of other fish such as 
snakeheads and small catfish able to over winter in the sanctuaries. In Turag-
Bangshi while those species groups have recovered, small fishes have also 
increased substantially in catches. 
 
At the species level, variation in number of species recorded in the surveys reflects 
observation of some species in one year, but not the other year. However, combining 
all impact years, in Hail Haor, 96 species have been recorded and species diversity 
has been maintained or increased during the Project. The pattern is similar in Turag-
Bangshi Site where overall 97 species were observed. In Kangsha-Malijhee 88 fish 
species was recorded in the impact years, a relatively greater gain in species 
diversity which may reflect initiatives there by RMOs to reintroduce locally rare or lost 




Not only fish have been the focus of wetland management and protection. Tree 
planting has of course directly restored local plant diversity particularly where swamp 
forest had been lost. But in Hail Haor in the 100 ha wetland sanctuary of Baikka 
Beel, since 2004 the RMO has banned fishing, hunting, and collection of aquatic 
plants, except for limited grazing in part of the area. Since then 111 species of birds 
have been recorded. Both numbers and diversity have increased, reaching 7,200 
birds of 35 water bird species in January 2007 (Figure). These include large flocks of 
wintering ducks, also six globally threatened and seven near-threatened species 
have been recorded, including up to six Pallas’s Fish Eagle.  
 
 





















































Livelihoods and Human Capital 
 
Over 5,500 of the poorest wetland resource users have joined savings and credit 
groups. These have helped the fishing communities refrain from fishing in protected 
areas and during critical fish spawning periods by providing training and credit to 
take up alternative income generating activities. This has helped reduce excess 
fishing, enabling fishing households to take up new enterprises such as poultry and 
livestock, or skilled employment as mechanics and electricians. Borrowers have 
substantially reduced their fishing effort. By 2005 almost 4,000 families had 
increased average income by about 65% over their previous reported incomes 
(Figure 4). Some were able to leave fishing, while others could reduce fishing during 
conservation closure periods while still increasing their incomes.  
 
Fishers in the MACH project sites gained US$ 4.7 million in 2004 (Figure 5) from 
higher catches associated with resource management improvements, as compared 
with baseline data from 1999. In addition, by 2005, those participating in training and 
credit activities earned an extra US$ 0.8 million, mainly from new enterprises 
supported by the project, as compared with their pre-participation incomes (daily 
incomes rose from about US$1 per day in 1999 to US$1.34 per day in 2005). This 
primarily impacted the poor who are most dependent on aquatic resources. Over 
85% of households in the project areas are involved in fishing, and all of those 
supported with training and credit were low income households owning less than 0.2 
ha of land, and therefore the poor have benefited the most from the project impacts. 
 
  F  i  g  u  re   4  :     M  i  c  r  o  -  credit   support   through   MA  C  H 
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Fig.4. Micro-credit support through MACH 
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Fig.5. Increases in income in MACH sites 
 
Governance and Social Capital 
 
The formalization of community-based organizations of resource users has helped to 
sustain impact and enhanced empowerment. The leaders of both RMOs and FRUGs 
are elected by ballot, and are responsible to their general bodies through quarterly 
meetings, and more widely through village meetings. The leaders of these 
organizations now sit along with local government officials and councillors in UFCs 
that oversee wetland management. For sustainability the Upazila Fisheries 
Committees are being endowed with a total of US$ 0.53 million (Tk 36 million), the 
interest from which will primarily be used for continued restoration of wetland habitat 
by the Resource Management Organizations, as well as to cover the operations of 
the committees.  
 
This system means that there are checks and balances between community 
organizations, Union Parishad and Upazila officials over the way they function, make 
decisions and use their funds, while the long term funding arrangement will maintain 
a focus for continued improvement and restoration of wetland habitats in these large 
systems. Savings and credit groups are now federated into 13 legal entities – 
registered membership-based social welfare organizations with elected leaders who 
also sit on the co-management committees. Moreover in a landmark policy decision, 
the government has permanently set aside eight “national” sanctuaries to protect 
wetland biodiversity that are managed by the community organizations. The 
government no longer auctions out fishing rights in these sanctuaries. The 
Department of Fisheries, through its national Inland Capture Fisheries Strategy is in 
process of adopting these institutions and the sanctuary approach on a larger scale 





THREATS, SUSTAINABILITY, AND POLICY 
 
Water quality threats 
 
The experience of wetland management has not been all positive in MACH. One of 
the biggest industrial clusters in Bangladesh is located in Kaliakoir north of Dhaka, 
where there are many textile and dyeing factories. The communities reported that 
these industries use the surrounding wetlands, particularly Mokesh Beel and 
Ratanpur Khal, which flows through the beel, as a disposal ground for untreated 
waste, resulting in poor catches of bad smelling fish. Effluent from industries 
downstream in the Turag catchment also appears to be entering the river and is 
carried upstream during low river flows by tidal effect. As a result, water quality has 
deteriorated to a level which is unsuitable for certain types of aquatic life. 
 
Regular monitoring results indicated that water in the beel and khal has biological 
oxygen demands twice the national acceptable standard and chemical oxygen 
demands four times higher than acceptable standards. Water also has seasonally 
high pH levels, and sulphide concentrations that averaged 50% above the national 
acceptable standard but peaked at five times that level (Table 7). High 
concentrations of heavy metals such as chromium were also found in surface water 
close to the industries, although aquatic plants were found to absorb some of this 
pollution such that sediments were within European permissible levels, the possible 
effects of animal and human consumption of these plants is now known. The 
problems were traced to local textile related industries which were found to be 
inefficient – producing more waste water with higher biological oxygen demand than 
both Bangladesh and World Bank standards. Focus group discussion and in-depth 
interviews with community members and health practitioners revealed that the 
perception of the community is that health problems are increasing as a result of 
industrial pollution of the wetlands that they traditionally use as a source of water to 
irrigate crops, for bathing and for fishing.  
 
Table 7. Median values of 
different parameters in water in 
seven locations of Mokesh Beel 
ecosystem in 2001.  






BOD 150  407  380-500 
COD   200.0  960  350  –  1600 
DO    4.5 - 8.0  1  0.6 - 1.2 
TSS   100.0  195  115  –  427 
Sulfide    2.0  3.1  1.6 - 10.2 
Oil and grease    10.0  27  17 - 45 
 
Research in the industries themselves identified potential alternative production 
options which can increase dye fixation by up to 70% and consequently save an 
average factory about US$ 67,000 a year and significantly reduce repeat dying and 
effluent discharge. The studies also highlighted the need for more effluent treatment  
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facilities and better management of those that already exist. Effluent Treatment 
Plants are a legal requirement for factories approved after 1995, but in 2000 only two 
factories in the area had such plants and they were functioning below optimum. The 
project has worked with industries to advise on setting up treatment plants and one 
new one has been established and four more are under construction.  
 
By late 2005 there were around 166 textile related industries (all are export oriented) 
in the area, compared with about 12 that existed when MACH started working there 
in 1999, so the pollution problem is worsening overall. This means that there is an 
immediate need to increase the rate of implementation of proposed pollution 
mitigation options if there is to be any reduction in pollution. Without this the efforts of 
the communities and MACH that have seen fish yields in the greater Turag-Bangshi 
area restored from about 60 kg/ha to about 300 kg/ha by 2004 are likely to be 
irreplaceably lost. 
 
Sustainability and Policy Change 
 
Industrialization is not the only threat to the long term survival of fisheries and 
wetlands in Bangladesh. Locally and centrally those who once controlled or aspire to 
control water bodies to complement their social and political influence and to earn 
income, and who have been disempowered when community organizations have 
taken on wetland management, are a threat once project support and attention end. 
The sustainability of the resource base (the habitat), of fish catches, and of local 
institutions that have adopted good practices all remain to be observed in the long 
term. The pollution issue has demonstrated one strength of community organizations 
– in Kaliakoir the RMOs have spontaneously taken up local campaigns for cleaner 
surface water, and have linked with national advocacy groups. 
 
In the long term there is a need for administrative and policy support to these 
systems. In MACH the Local Government Committees, now regularized as Upazila 
Fisheries Committees, have been vital. To strengthen their influence over 
enforcement of water quality standards, MACH has facilitated signing of an MOU 
between the concerned UFC and Department of Environment. In general the 
community organizations have been registered as legal entities, and have access to 
funds – revolving loan funds in the case of the FRUGs. For co-management and 
continued wetland restoration endowment funds have been left to provide an annual 
income for the UFCs, most of which will be disbursed as grants to RMOs for habitat 
restoration. Government orders establishing these are a necessary step, but equally 
important has been building the capacity of the community organizations to interact 
with government and speak up for their interests, and testing the operation of this 
system in the last two years.  
 
Even so, these are only isolated examples of good practice among the more than 4 
million ha of wetlands in Bangladesh. Therefore MACH has focused for sustainability 
also on influencing the adoption of its lessons and best practices in the policies, 
strategies and precedents of government. This will serve to strengthen long term co-
management in the project sites, and enable more widespread adoption. MACH has 
focused on working with DOF as it developed its Inland Capture Fisheries Strategy, 
Action Plan and Programme. The concept and details of UFCs have been proposed 
by DOF to be established nationally for the purpose of coordinating co-management.  
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Establishing national wetland sanctuaries by taking them out of leasing has set a 
precedent for replication in other major wetlands of the country, and MACH is 
helping DOF and MOFL develop a proposal for Hail Haor to be designated as a 
“Ramsar Site” for its long term recognition and wise use. MACH is helping the newly 
established inland capture fisheries team within DOF to provide support for 
“graduated” water bodies and their community organizations. Dialogues are also 
underway with major textile manufacturer buyers and trade organizations with the 
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SUMMARY 
 
Sunamganj is a land dominated by floodplains with seasonally flooded tectonic 
depressions known locally as haors and smaller water bodies known as beels.  
People’s livelihoods and culture are largely dominated by the haor economy 
where beel fisheries play a very critical role. Although the beel has a wide range 
of resources, the people at large have not been able to benefit from them. A 
small number of people by virtue of their power and influence have been 
exploiting the resources overriding all the codes of resource management and 
maintenance.  
 
SCBRMP of Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) has a mandate 
to assist the people so they can get access to the resources. The project 
implements a process which is derived largely from a Community Based 
Resource Management (CBFM) approach. It is a demand driven approach set by 
a comprehensive discussion with a wide variety of stakeholders. Beel access is 
achieved through two steps. One is beel handover to genuine fishers on a long-
term basis, and the second is initiating beel resource development activities. 
Under a series of Memoranda of Understandings, the project has been allocated 
beels (both above and below 20 acres in size) from concerned ministries and 
who hand over the water bodies to Beel User Groups (BUG) comprising of 
mainly fishers. A set of criteria is followed to select the BUG members and BUG 
functions under a byelaw that contains some core values to form an independent 
institution of beel users. 
 
From beel selection to formation of the BUG and initiating beel resource 
development, a participatory approach is followed where local people’s 
knowledge and experts’ views are duly consulted at all stages of work.  
 
BUG members are trained to raise their skill levels on group management and 
beel resource development. The beel resource development activities comprise 
of demarcation, re-excavation, swamp tree plantation, establishing sanctuaries 
and introducing conservation measures. Some surveys and studies on fish catch 
and consumption, fish marketing and biodiversity are also included in beel 
fisheries of the project.  
 
One visible strength of the project’s approach is its partnership with other 
departments and institutions. SCBRMP is implementing its beel fisheries 
activities at the field level with cooperation from the local administration, DoF and 
the WorldFish Center.  
 
The project has a goal of access to 300 beels in Sunamganj District by June 
2014. Meanwhile 55 beels of different sizes have been accessed and handed 
over to BUGs. Out of 55, 50 have been harvested and 10 have been brought 
under development activities.  
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The project is at early stage. It is advancing through learning by doing. 
Meanwhile a good number of lessons have already been learnt. Clearly, 
sustainable beel resource management is largely a social issue rather than 
technical and people’s views are to be utilized with full potential for such natural 




The project was developed based on the Country Strategy Opportunity Paper 
(CSOP) of IFAD and its goal lies with PRSP and MDG. Understandably, poverty 
reduction therefore is the prime concern of the project, and giving priority to the 
most deprived zone, Sunamganj haor area has been chosen considering its 
numerous vulnerabilities and backwardness. 
 
The project will cover the entire 11 Upazilas of Sunamganj district and has a 
target to reach 135,000 households who are holding below 2.5 acres of farm land. 
The project will be implemented in three phases comprising a total of 12 years 
starting from January 2003 and ending in June 2014.  
 
The project comprises of five major components. These are: Labour Intensive 
Infrastructure Development; Institution Building; Microfinance Services; 
Agriculture and Livestock Development; and Fisheries Development while 
gender and environmental issues are cross-cutting. Training, both for staff and 
the people, is another activity cutting across all components of the project. 
 
The total cost estimate of the project is US$ 26.28 million, with an IFAD loan of 
US$ 22.0 million, a contribution of US$ 4.5 million from the Government of 
Bangladesh and a US$ 0.3 million contribution by the community/beneficiaries in 
labour, kind and cash.  
 
The project follows a people centred approach. The core objective of the 
approach is to mobilize the poor and inspire them to accumulate their potential to 
build a self help society with a vision of achieving prosperity and aspirations to 
secure the future. With that view, grassroots organizations were formed, both for 
males and females, at remote villages over all the Upazilas
1 of  Sunamganj 
district. In future this will build into a stronger and more effective institutional 
formation plan involving representatives from these primary groups to form a 
federation of poor communities.  
 
The members of the organizations are being trained following need-based 
assessments to raise their human and technical skills in order to enhance their 
capacity to access and manage the livelihood resources sustainably.   
Furthermore, the project aims at establishing a pool of technically skilled activists 
                                                 
1 Administrative unit of the government under the District level.   4
to continue the technical extension services and maintain close relationship with 
extension components of the project.  
 
The project also creates scope to access natural and other physical resources. 
These form capital for better investment through systematic savings 
accumulation. Access to credit for the poor is also a vital ingredient of the 
development approach of SCBRMP to assist the people in alleviating poverty. 
 
The most challenging part of the project is access into beel resources. Having 
long-term tenure of beel resources and giving those to the genuine community 
for maintaining their livelihoods and ensuring their sustainable management are 
key indicators for assessing the success of the project. 
 
SCBRMP OBJECTIVES AND FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED 
 
Beel fisheries are part of the fisheries component of the project. Under this 
component the project will take over a total 300 beels during its total 12 year 
period of operation.  
 
The core objectives of beel fisheries are:  
•   Transfer the beels to genuine fisher communities on a long-term basis 
•   Establish community based fisheries management 
•   Initiate development activities to restore the degraded resource base 
•   Initiate activities to establish conservation measures for fish habitat and 
biodiversity restoration 
•   Develop an institution of beel user groups for sustainable resource 
management 
 
In order to attain these objectives some factors have been found to be crucial: 
 
•   Clearly defined and identified group of beel users 
•   Clearly defined boundaries of the resource base 
•   A responsive and transparent management 
•   Equitable cost and benefit sharing 
•   Long term user rights on resources 
•  Cost  effectiveness 
•   Institutional, technical and legal support from concerned authorities for 
sustainable use of resources 
•   Community capacity to exclude non-user community members 




The approach includes the activities: resource mapping to understand the 
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beneficiaries, setting criteria to select accessible beels, PRA based investigation 
to understand the resource status and its development scope, and, selecting 
genuine users and interested fishers for forming beel user group (BUG).  
 
It is a process that involves the concerned Ministries along with the beel users to 
follow comprehensive guidelines conducive for promoting community based 
resource management. The guidelines ensure the roles and responsibilities of all 
concerned towards sustainable use of resources and benefiting fisher 
communities. Beels above 20 acres are transferred under a Memorandum of 
Understanding 
(MoU) to LGED 
through the Local 
Government 
Ministry, and from 
LGED to the 
community. Beels 
below 20 acres are 
transferred under 
MoUs to LGED and 
then to the 
community. The 
transfer is made for 
total 20 years in two 
10 year phases. 
The lease value of 
the beel is paid by 
the community and 
the process and 
conditionality for 
that is settled by an 
MoU which is 
mutually developed 
by the project and 
the community.   
 
Fig. 1: Institutional framework for the beel transfer process 
 
 
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF BEEL USER GROUPS 
 
The BUG is the basic structure of the beel users. It consists of fishers who live in 
the beel command villages. The users are selected from a list based on social 
mapping where all villagers are listed by occupation and their wellbeing status. 
The BUG has a governing body called a Beel Management Committee (BMC). 
The BMC comprises 7 to 9 members and they lead the BUG being guided by 
byelaws developed by the BUG members after consultation with experts.  The   6
 
Beel users Group






















Users group member + 
other pro-people 
BUG as the user of the beel has many roles and responsibilities. Of those, a few 
are regular such as group meetings, savings and maintenance of the beel and a 
few are occasional or seasonal such as depositing lease value, re-excavation of 






















Fig. 2: The institutional structure of community based fisheries management 
 
The most focused responsibilities of the BUG are to maintain the beel with 
sustainability and all actions in relation to beel management are carefully 
resigned to attain that.  
 
In addition to the BMC there is a structure called the Advisory Committee. This is 
a structure formed consisting of local people with a view to assisting the BUG 
when there is crisis or conflict. The committee has no share in the beel resource 
or any voting rights in the formation of the BMC, but their role and support are 
counted as highly vital to the BUG to solve many local problems related to beel 
management.  
 
Fishing rules and responsibilities 
Fishing is done in accordance with the Fish Conservation Act and some 
customary rules supportive to sustainable fisheries resource management. There 
is provision for three categories of fishing; individual, subsistence and group 
based seasonal major fishing. However the project is yet to formulate a concrete 
policy for subsistence and individual fishing, and therefore only group fishing is in 
practice. During the major fishing season, a group of fishers undertakes beel 
fishing which is usually completed in three or four rounds of fishing.    7
 
Income distribution 
Income from beel resources is distributed equally to all members of the BUG 
irrespective of gender and class of fisher. However, if anyone from the BUG 
gives any labour in beel management that is treated separately and 
compensated accordingly as decided by BUG.  
 
Beel development 
Beel development is an important part of the beel fisheries. The focus of the 
activity is basically on fish habitat restoration and restoring the beel environment. 
The initiative comprises two kinds of activities one is compensating and other is 
remedial. Planting swamp trees and re-introducing scarce fish species come 
under the compensating measure and re-excavation of beels to remove silt and 
restore the connectivity of beel with the mainstream haor system falls under the 
remedial measure.  
 
Development is undertaken based on a master plan developed with the 
participation of beel users, other villagers, representatives of DoF and DAE, 
administrative people and beel resource development experts. However the 
master plan is revised every year to fit it with the context and to make it more 
practical.  
 
Monitoring and impact study 
BUG performance is monitored under the mainstream M&E system of the project 
on a monthly basis. Besides, fish catches and consumption, and benefit 
distribution records are maintained and registered at the BUG level and 
necessary reports are prepared at regular intervals.  
  
Apart from this, some impact level studies on biodiversity, fisher livelihoods and 
marketing and value chain have been included in the fisheries component.  
 
Conflicts and constraints to access  
Conflict in resource access particularly in haor areas is very common. In our 
experience the major reasons behind this are: 
 
•   Conflict of interest between vested interest group and genuine fisher 
•   Existing laws often favour the vested interest group and hamper the   
access process 
•   Lease values are sometimes not commensurate with beel productive 
capacity and the income it generates 
•   Excessive pressure from the authorities to transfer the lease immediately 
after it has been surrendered by the previous leasee before the BUG has 
been formed and is ready 
 
It has been difficult to establish access to beels for fishers against the interests of 
vested classes even after they have legal rights to them. There are many legal   8
loopholes and through exploiting them, the vested interests create obstacles to 
legal access of fisher to beel resources. In some cases the lease value was not 
set at reasonable levels, when compared to the potential for production. This 
may be a result of irrational bidding by the vested groups in earlier bidding, 
thereby outplaying the poor fishers. Despite this, the high lease rate exists and 
therefore fisher communities may not be interested in those beels. Sudden 
surrender of the beel by previous leasee, thereafter forcing the authority to 
receive the beel before a community organization has been formed has been 
another major problem. These issues demand that there are amendments made 
to the leasing process. The leasing authority needs to think about the overall 




The project is still at an early stage of beel access and development. Meanwhile 
the concerned Ministry has handed over 93 beels to the project, 22 above 20 
acres and 71 below 20 acres (Table 1).  Out of the 55 Beels have been given to 
BUG and the rest are in process. Out of 55 beels which have been given to 
BUGs, 50 have been harvested, and 10 have undergone development activities. 
Through all those activities the project has had many learning experiences some 
of which are bitter and some are interesting, but all are important.  
 
Table 1: Beel transfer and activities 
Activities Target  Achieved 
Transfer status from MoL 
and MoYS to CBRMP 
93 93 
Transferred  to 
community 
  
>    20 acre  13  10 
<    20 acre  54  45 
BMC formed     
>    20 acre  13  10 
<    20 acre  54  45 
Harvested    
>    20 acre  10  10 




1.  Access to beels might not be a major problem, but holding on to control of 
beels is often a big problem. If the process of beel selection and access is 
done through cooperation and consultation with the local community and 
through mobilising the users prior to handover of the beel, then access as 
well as retaining control over the resources becomes easier. However, 
conflict between vested interest groups and fisher communities is common 
because it is against the interests of the influential people in the   9
community often known as the ‘elite’. Therefore establishing poor fisher’s 
rights on beels is always difficult. It needs organised efforts with constant 
institutional support.  
 
2.  A comprehensive training scheme for beel users is required to build their 
capacity in social, technical and institutional areas to attain sustained 
management of the beel fisheries. 
 
3.  An effective advisory board is a critical need to assist the BUGs to deal 
with conflicts related to beel access and management. For that it is 
necessary to mobilize local champions and other people in favour of the 
approach to support and assist the BUGs through an Advisory Board. 
 
4. Value based rules and laws developed by BUG with the assistance of 
community based fisheries management experts members should be in 
place for good governance of beel management with the focus on 
establishing a rights-based stewardship approach, and thereafter to 
achieve sustainable management of beel fisheries. 
 
5.  Beel demarcation is an essential part of beel fisheries management. A 
well coordinated and cooperative approach by concerned Departments 
with active participation of the community is necessary to implement it 
successfully. Successful demarcation is an indicator of community’s 
strength and interest to get access to the beel.   
 
6. Beel resource development should be integrated with the overall haor 
system development as beels are an integral part of the wider system. A 
haor based total approach is required for beel development. 
 
7.  Arranging for fisher communities to pay for leases is not a problem if their 
rights to exploit the resources in the long-term are guaranteed and in all 
aspects of beel management and development their participation and 




Community based beel resource management is getting increased attention from all 
concerned with establishing better natural resource management. Its contribution to 
increased production, restoring natural diversity and benefiting genuine fishing 
communities are highly appreciated. The success of such management basically lies in 
its values and the interest of the community and support from the concerned institutions. 
It gives the community rights and responsibilities to take care of their resource base and 
make their livelihood on it by a process under their control. The ultimate success of it 
largely depends on better coordination and cooperation among the concerned policy 
institutions, administrations, intermediary organizations and the community. People’s 
capacity and access in decision of natural resource management is crucial to attain a 
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In recent years a number of floodplain aquaculture projects have sprung up in 
the Daudkandi area of Comilla District. Key to this development are a number 
of unique organisational and financing arrangements which facilitate the 
development of necessary infrastructure through issuing shares to farmers 
who have land in the targeted floodplain area.  
 
In February 2007, a short review was carried out to better understand how 
floodplain aquaculture was affecting a range of local social, economic and 
environmental issues. The production and economic performance of 
floodplain aquaculture projects was impressive; and they were obviously 
having a positive effect on local economies, general security, people’s 
nutritional status and employment and service opportunities. However, this 
approach, productive though it is, effectively changes a seasonal, open, 
common property water resource, into a closed, privately owned one and it 
was found the opportunity for some traditional livelihood foraging activities 
had been reduced or lost.  In general, poorer people in the area were unable 
to benefit directly from the project share offer. 
 
The review concluded that the newly created embankments were probably 
restricting the movement of wild fish stocks onto the floodplain, and the 
internal refuges created were probably not having a significant impact on the 
dry season survival of wild fish stocks, except in cases where rarer species 
had been deliberately targeted for conservation and induced propagation. The 
review recommended that Government funds would be best spent on carrying 
out a comprehensive zoning exercise to enable the effective, planning, 
monitoring and regulation of floodplain aquaculture and to avoid potential 
conflict situations developing between traditional fisher communities and 





Floodplain fisheries are crucial in providing food, income and employment for 
millions of people in Bangladesh. Inland open waters total more than 4 million 
hectares in area and are thought to be producing more than 500,000 metric 
tonnes of fish, annually. Typical yields from these flooded areas are between 
150 – 350 kg /ha. However, pressures on these resources are increasing. 
These pressures include; the construction of flood control, drainage and 
irrigation projects; over fishing; the indiscriminate capture of brood fish and 
juveniles; revenue-based management of jamohals; the removal of water from 
fish habitats for crop cultivation; the discharge of municipal and industrial 
wastes; the use of insecticides and chemical fertilizers; and the reduction in 
floodplain area due to siltation and encroachment. 
 
In Bangladesh, aquaculture continues to diversify and develop rapidly and is 
seen by many as the most realistic way to secure the nation’s future fish 
supply needs. Basic fish production techniques are well understood by many  
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farmers, inputs such as seed and feed are widely available and thriving 
service provision and marketing networks exist.  
 
The stocking of large water bodies is now well established in Bangladesh and 
recent initiatives have shown that large floodplain areas if controlled and 
managed, can generate significant fish production. Yields from these 
floodplain aquaculture systems are usually in the range of 1 – 3 t/ha, i.e.10 
times that normally possible from naturally occurring fish production. It is this 
dramatic increase in productivity that has been driving the development 
forward. 
 
In February 2007, a short review was carried out in Daudkandi Upazila, 
Comilla District, Bangladesh, to better understand how recent developments 
in floodplain aquaculture in the area, spearheaded by the local NGO, 
SHISUK, were affecting a range of local social, economic and environmental 
issues. This paper summarises the main findings from this work. 
 
A BACKGROUND TO DEVELOPMENTS IN DAUDKANDI. 
 
Daudkandi Upazila had long been recognized as a food deficit area. In the 
lowest lying areas, the long seasonal inundation prevents many farmers from 
growing more than one crop a year. In slightly higher areas an Aman rice crop 
can also be produced, and in the highest areas, Aus, Aman and Boro 
sequential cropping is possible. Irrigation coverage, through deep tubewells, 
shallow tubewells and low lift pumps is around 42% of the cultivated area, 
(BWDB 1994). 
 
Until recently, unemployment and underemployment was common and 
seasonal out-migration to urban areas occurred during the wet season. 
September to November was recognized as famine months, when great 
hardship was experienced by many farming households. At that time of year, 
fish caught from the floodplain, albeit in small amounts, contributed greatly to 
maintaining nutrition standards and health, and even provided a modest 
income if a surplus is caught.  As the area was extensively flooded throughout 
the wet season, the main mode of transport at this time of the year was in 
country boats, limiting the free movement of goods and people.  
 
In 1992, the area was transformed through the construction of a 45.5 km long 
embankment that protected an area of about 327 km
2, (including Daudkandi 
Upazila) from flash flooding from the Gumti River, and allowed more 
consistent crop production and settlements to become established. It was this 
development that created the conditions for floodplain aquaculture to emerge 
in the area. The possibility of utilizing seasonally flooded private lands for 
aquaculture had first been considered by a group of landowners in 
Dhanuakhola Adarsha Matshya Prakalpa, Charipara in 1987. It is understood 
that their first attempts were unsuccessful. However, after the Gumti 
embankment had been constructed, others were encouraged to try. In 1996, 
there were a number of new attempts to establish floodplain aquaculture in 
the Daudkandi area but without NGO support. The introduction of a 
mechanism of issuing shares to landholders and a formal way of conducting  
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fund transactions through local banks were also unsuccessful. However, in 
1996, the Pankowri Fisheries Project was created and this was to become the 
first successful floodplain cooperative aquaculture project involving local 
landowners, outside investors, and an NGO.  
 
The NGO SHISUK has been involved since Pankowri’s inception and still 
holds a 20% share in the venture. Production and profitability has increased 
over the years and records for 2005 show fish production to be around 232 
metric tonnes
1. In 1997, the Project was registered as a company, under the 
Joint Stock Company Act. For its outstanding contribution development, 
SHISUK was awarded the National Gold Medal in 1999. (CIRDAP 2002) 
 
News of the successes of the Pankowri Project spread rapidly around the 
surrounding area and by 2004 more than 90 similar projects, covering an 
estimated 5,000 ha, had been established in Daudkandi and neighbouring 
Upazilas, (PPRCD 2005). These floodplain aquaculture projects have 
transformed the local landscape. SHISUK expanded its programme during 
2003 and 2004 and developed partnerships with four other floodplain projects 
in Daudkandi. In these new projects, SHISUK has attempted to develop a 
more inclusive community approach and has experimented with ways to 
achieve greater equity and the more significant involvement of women.  
 
The Pankowri Project continues to develop, now guided by their Board of 
Directors, with SHISUK playing a less active role. The recent purchase of a 
truck by the Project, to assist with fish marketing, and plans for the 
establishment of a feed mill and hatchery, suggest that the project is looking 
to vertically integrate its activities. From the large number of private ponds 
observed being excavated, there also appears to be some management 
fragmentation of the cooperative enterprise.  
 
SHISUK continues to modify its approaches, using Pankowri as ‘its 
laboratory’. Aware of some of their limitations, they have recently invited 
BARC, DOF and the WorldFish Center to help them carry out research on a 
number of socio-economic, management and technical aspects of their 
floodplain aquaculture model.  
 
ORGANISATIONAL AND FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
The success of floodplain aquaculture in the area is at least partially due to 
the unique organizational and financial arrangements facilitated by SHISUK.  
Following community mobilization efforts, the capital required for the 
necessary embankment work to make floodplain aquaculture possible, is 
accumulated through floating shares to landholders in the area, so that they 
can invest jointly in the enterprise, thereby eliminating the need for 
development project support.  
 
SHISUK supported projects adhere to a number of core principles including 
good governance, transparency and accountability. The NGO maintains a 
                                                 
1  Production for 2006 is estimated in excess of 400 mt.  
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20% shareholding in the operation and there is a 1% cap on individual share 
holdings. In some projects a small number of shares, (4-10%) are held in 
reserve for the landless. The distribution of net profits amongst the members 
of SHISUK projects is organised as follows; 50% is paid as a dividend to the 
owner of project shares; 27% is paid out as land rent to the owners of land, 
and water bodies inside of the project; 20% is kept as reserve (for investment 
in the following year and contingencies; 3% is spent on social welfare, such 
as donations to mosques or temples.  SHISUK is now planning to test this 
approach in a number of new areas, including  Netrakona, Kurigram, 
Gaibandha and the Chalan Beel area. 
 
WINNERS & LOSERS 
 
There is no doubt that floodplain aquaculture has a profound effect on the 
local economy; the Poor; livelihoods; women and the environment. These are 
now examined in turn. 
 
The Local Economy 
 
A new resource system is created through the process of land enclosure and 
floodplain aquaculture projects contribute significantly to local economies. 
Fish production in terms of unit area, has increased by many times. The 
creation and maintenance of the embankments has created work 
opportunities and facilitated the rapid expansion and movement of people and 
goods.  
 
The production and profit figures from Shisuk projects have been impressive. 
In 2006, the five SHISUK projects produced more than 800 tonnes of fish from 
344 ha, (an average fish production of 2.3 tonnes/ha). It is estimated that 
around 7,500 tonnes of fish are now produced from floodplain aquaculture 
from an area that traditionally produced around 750 tonnes through 
conventional capture fisheries. This floodplain aquaculture production would 
have a value of around 450 million taka, (6.4m US$).  
 
The local economy can now employ more people and out-migration has been 
reduced
2. Incomes earned from the aquaculture projects have boosted the 
local economy through both backward and forward linkages. The local 
economy therefore gains from both the direct benefits of the projects 
(increased production, profits, incomes etc.) and from the indirect benefits that 
are transmitted through backward linkages (mainly from the supplier of inputs 
for the fish production). Near to the Pankowri Project Offices, a growth centre, 
featuring a range of small shops and businesses has sprung up.  
 
It was reported from a number of sources that floodplain aquaculture projects 
have a calming effect on the local communities. Perhaps because previous 
desperate measures are no longer necessary, the general law and order 
                                                 
2  A number of local people reported that seasonal in migration has replaced the out 




situation is said to have improved in many areas following floodplain 




Despite the efforts of SHISUK to achieve equity in their share distribution, it 
appears that the poor are not benefiting equally. Table 1 details the findings 
from a PRA exercise conducted in 2 project villages and shows share 
distribution trends suggesting that poor people can only receive direct benefits 
in a small number of cases. 
 















Rich 15%  85%  80%  70% 
Middle 55%  15%  10%  22% 
Khillalpar 
Poor 30%  0  10%  8% 
Rich 13%  50%  43%  40% 
Middle 66%  50%  43%  40% 
Minardia 
Poor 21%  0  15%  20% 
 
The overall picture may be bleaker than this, as it is by no means clear 
whether the genuine poor will be able to retain shares over time, even if they 
are allocated to them at the start of a new floodplain aquaculture project.  It 
seems all too likely that the majority of shares in profitable projects, will end 




The collection of fish and other aquatic produce from inundated private land 
has always been considered ‘open access’ in Bangladesh. However, 
floodplain aquaculture is a privatisation of the commons and changes a 
seasonal, open access, common property resource to a year round, closed, 
private property resource. As a result there are a number of lost livelihoods 
opportunities. These include floodplain fishing (and access), duck raising, fuel 
material collection, fodder material collection and jute retting. In addition there 
are a number of forced changes to traditional agriculture cropping patterns. 
However, there are many new service provision opportunities that landless 
and poor people can engage in that result from floodplain aquaculture. Table 
2 lists some of these. 
 





Fingerling nursery operators  Ice plant operators 
Fish Hatchery operators    Ice supplier / middlemen  
Fingerling traders  Ice carriers (transport)  
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Fish feed sellers  Fish Aratder  
Lime traders  Middlemen in fish Arats 
Fertiliser dealers  Fish transport truck /  trolley owners 
Bamboo fencing makers   Bamboo made fish basket makers 
Bamboo fencing sellers  Bamboo made fish basket sellers  
Rickshaw / Van owners  Rickshaw / Van owners 
Rickshaw / Van puller  Rickshaw / Van puller 




A PRA exercise carried out in Baronager Project suggested that around 330 
man days/ha of employment and direct service provision work were being 
generated by the aquaculture project. Other livelihood benefits exist including 




There were only a few examples found of women being directly involved in 
floodplain aquaculture activities. These included women nursery producers, 
cast net fishers and fish processors. SHISUK have facilitated their 
representation on several project boards and provide micro-credit for a range 
income generating activities. Women interviewed reported that the projects 
had greatly enhanced their mobility and the degree of respect they could earn 




SHISUK and other floodplain aquaculture projects claim their activities are 
having a number of positive effects on the wild fish stocks and the 
environment. Dry season sanctuaries have been excavated in a number of 
areas and the free movement of wild fish is encouraged through using large 
mesh screens on the embankment culverts. Wild fish of between 8-10 
species, make up between 5-15% of the total harvest biomass. Their 
contribution is inversely proportional to cultured fish production. It is likely that 
wild fish stocks are benefiting from the feed and fertiliser applied; the 
extended inundation period and the absence of fishing pressure during the 
grow out period.  
 
In reality though it is likely that water flows and fish migrations are restricted 
through the embankments established for floodplain aquaculture and 
increased fishing pressure probably exists outside of the cultured area. The 
pond-like conditions created for culture mean that many ecological niches no 
longer exist on the floodplain and the eutrophication of the water body may 
suit some species, better than others. Overall, it is likely that wild fish and 
other aquatic animal biodiversity is reduced within floodplain aquaculture, The 
targeted protection of certain high value fish such as Chital, (Notopterus 
chital) and Aye, (Mystus aor) in dry season sanctuaries may however be 
making a significant contribution to the availability of these species on the 




The predominance of between 8 and10 species of exotic fish species used by 
most projects may also pose a threat to the environment. Figure 3 clearly 



















Fig.3. Biomass contributions of indigenous wild, stocked & exotic fish 
species 
 
Positive environmental benefits were also claimed through the effects of the 
floodplain aquaculture management on agriculture. There appears to be an 
increased level of environmental awareness amongst shareholders, many 
who are adopting IPM principles in their Boro Rice production, in an attempt to 
protect adjacent dry season fish stocks. 
 
Many farmers are reporting increased rice production of between 10-15% and 
a corresponding reduction in ploughing, irrigation, weeding, fertilizer and 
pesticide costs, making rice farming more profitable. These gains, together 
with the additional income through fish culture may maintain the viability of 
extremely small landholdings and help reduce pressures on farming families 




This paper has attempted to present a balanced view of the issues facing 
floodplain aquaculture development and to highlight some the winners and 
losers that emerge as the development occurs. Positive aspects include the 
high production and economic performance levels of floodplain aquaculture 
and its capacity to spread to new areas without a concerted extension effort 
from a development organization.  
  
The systems of raising funds through share offerings, in order to amass the 
capital to build the enabling infrastructure appears is inspired and may be key 
to achieving stakeholder ownership of the projects. Indeed, public funds need 




Floodplain aquaculture cannot be labelled an inclusive community approach, 
as landholding is the key issue in determining participation. Attempts by 
NGOs to directly involve the landless and women look token, superficial and 
unlikely to be sustainable in the long term.  
 
In addition, a number of traditional livelihood opportunities are lost as areas 
come under floodplain aquaculture, although these should be offset against 
the significant employment and service opportunities for economic 
involvement created for a wide range of players. NGOs can play a useful role 
in aligning their pro-poor and pro women development programmes to the 
significant service provision opportunities that result.  
 
Floodplain aquaculture cannot really be said to be considered to be 
enhancing natural floodplain fisheries production or biodiversity except in the 
cases where selected species are deliberately targeted for protection and 
propagation. There is a basic incompatibility between floodplain aquaculture 
and the more conventional community based fisheries management 
approaches used in Bangladesh and future conflicts between traditional 
fishing communities and farmers wishing to establish floodplain aquaculture 
seem likely. To counter this it is suggested that Government carry out a 
comprehensive zoning exercise to identify priority aquaculture and fisheries 
areas on the floodplains.  
 
There are a significant number of knowledge gaps which prevent a more 
complete understanding of floodplain aquaculture development and these 
include the extent and severity of lost livelihood opportunities, the social, 
economic and organisational aspects of projects and the design, effectiveness 
and contribution of dry season refuges to wet season floodplain fish 
production. Until these and other research issues are better understood, it is 
recommended that Government adopt a precautionary approach to the 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Over recent decades co-management has become an increasingly popular 
form of governance reform in many developing countries. Viewed as a means 
of promoting sustainable and equitable management of natural resources, it 
has seen wide application in small-scale inland fisheries. However, perhaps 
because of its worthy credentials, there has been insufficient critical 
assessment of the results. This paper commences with a review of underlying 
theory which is then used to explore the reasons for failure of a co-
management initiative in Sri Lankan reservoir fisheries between 2001 and 
2002. 
 
Co-management thinking arose from an earlier body of common property 
theory (CPT) which posited private or public ownership of the commons as 
the only rational response to increasing resource pressure. By contrast the 
co-management view states that under certain conditions, management is 
best left to local users, with support from the state, civil society or market 
sector where necessary. In turn, critics of co-management’s rationalistic 
underpinnings point to a lack of cultural or political embeddedness which 
limits understanding of how power and accountability is distributed and 
shapes collective behaviour. Others suggest that the contentiousness of the 
CPT / co-management debate has resulted in neglect of key empirical 
features of fisheries commons – most critically the complex causes and 
consequences of change in fishing effort. 
 
In the Sri Lankan case-study, emphasis is on understanding the 
environmental, technical and socio-economic drivers of effort change. The co-
management initiatives took place in two small-medium size reservoirs (788ha 
and 1546ha) in Northwest province. These support artisanal gill-net fisheries, 
predominantly for exotic tilapias marketed on a highly local basis. The co-
management strategy which involved local fisheries officers and fishing co-
operatives, centred on fishing restrictions designed to sustain yields and 
increase mean catch size. Despite initial enthusiasm, the restrictions 
collapsed after 4-5 months with the onset of opportunistic free-riding. This was 
due to; lack of enforcement capacity, disproportionate hardship faced by the 
least economically mobile fisher groups and political patronage relations. 
Also, as compliant partners, the co-operatives had weak leverage in the 
decision making process. 
 
Despite the short duration of effective restrictions, simultaneous analysis of 
local market trends demonstrated a remarkable rebound in yields pointing to 
the resilient regenerative capacity of the tilapia fishery. Furthermore historic 
commodity price data reveal long-term tilapia price stability and a close match 
between demand and supply even as fishing pressure has increased. Despite 
negative impacts on indigenous biodiversity, these features suggest fears of 
over-exploitation are unfounded and question the underlying premise for the 
co-management interventions. 
 
Finally, results are used to highlight contextual differences with floodplain 
fisheries in Bangladesh, where declining wild harvests and the emergence of 
a vibrant aquaculture industry present very different challenges. Results 
caution against over-reliance on co-management as a blue print approach.   3
There is instead a need for detailed contextual analyses which move beyond 





Common property resources such as fisheries, forests, rangelands, ground 
water resources and wildlife present formidable challenges to resource 
managers. Yet inland fisheries, the focus of this paper, are of disproportionate 
importance to the poor, relative to their volume and extent. Most are small-
scale with over 90% of recorded inland fisheries catch; 8.2 million tonnes in 
1998 (FAO 1999) coming from developing countries. Actual production is 
likely to be much higher due to uncertainty associated with micro-dispersed 
landings and high levels of localised subsistence consumption. Consequently 
inland fisheries have often been under-valued by policy makers. 
 
Co-management can be defined as a partnership between the community of 
local resources users, other primary stakeholders (e.g. fish traders, service 
providers etc.), government and NGO’s who together share responsibility and 
authority for resource management (Macfadyen et al 2005). The co-
management approach also serves to shift emphasis from a fish-production to 
a people centric focus within the more holistic context of rural communities 
(ODI 2002). Its popularity amongst policy makers has been driven by 
recognition of a need to formalise existing community management practices 
within the wider legalistic and governance frameworks as a response to 
resource depletion and conflicts associated with rising fishing pressure. 
Decentralisation policies being pursued in many developing countries have 
also contributed to an enabling policy environment (Macfadyen et al ibid). 
 
These factors, perhaps together with the ‘participatory’ merit implicit in the 
notion of co-management have resulted in widespread donor support for pilot 
programmes. However, there has been little rigorous evaluation of the 
anticipated impacts on target beneficiaries or with regard to the likely 
sustainability of these institutional forms.  
Such assessments are essential if co-management is to be validated against 
alternative modes of governance reform. This paper is concerned with 
evaluating the potential of co-management strategies in small-scale inland 
fisheries as a means of empowering the poorest groups dependent on these 
resources to benefit from, and manage them sustainably.  
 
The paper commences with a brief chronological review of theory relating to 
the management of the commons highlighting major policy impacts over 
recent decades. This is followed by a case study of co-management in two 
artisanal reservoir fisheries of the lowland Dry-Zone, Sri Lanka. The failure of 
these interventions is assessed in the context of the preceding theory. Finally, 
the relevance of the findings is used to highlight the comparative advantages 
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CHALLENGING THE CONSENSUS – A REVIEW OF COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT THEORY 
 
Over recent years the debate over how to best manage natural resources 
traditionally used by many individuals under shared access arrangements has 
revolved around two broad notions of (1) top-down management and (2) 
community or co-management (Fig. 1). The fisheries NR sector has been 
particularly instrumental in the development of both schools of thought. 
 
The top-down management approach is associated with common property 
theory (CPT) which arose from a body of quantitative equilibrium models 
propounded by economists and natural scientists from the 1940’s onwards 
(e.g. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Schaefer 1954, Gordon 1954 and 
1944, Hardin 1968). Ecological and economic concepts such as maximum 
sustainable yield, carrying capacity, resource rent etc. were incorporated in 
strategic game play models which assumed rational self-interest as the basis 
of decision making behaviour. The now familiar end point of Hardin’s game 
play in his seminal Tragedy of the Commons (1968) was that due to 
opportunistic ‘free-riding’ behaviour, common property resources will 
ultimately be over-exploited and depleted without some degree of private 
enclosure or government access regulation. 
 
This view has since been challenged by the community/ co-management 
proponents advocating decentralisation and local level management reforms 
for much of the commons. Rather than being a discrete theory, this view 
arose from a ‘reactionary’ body of inter-disciplinary research initiated by 
human ecologists and anthropologists in the 1970’s (e.g. Acheson 1981, 
Berkes, 1977). These researchers used empirical case studies from natural 
resource settings around the world to challenge some of the basic 
assumptions underlying CPT.  
 
A key premise of the ‘top-down’ management view is that resource users are 
unable to self-regulate due to the open access nature of the resource. 
Community management protagonists responded to the reductionism of this 
view by differentiating between two key features of shared resources; 
subtractibility - the degree to which one person's use will subtract from 
another and excludability the ability to control the number of resource users in 
the production system (Ostrom et al 1999, Berkes 2006). They went on to 
show under certain ecological and institutional forms, these features were 
sufficiently low/ high respectively to predispose local level NR management as 
the most sustainable and cost effective management forms. Communities, 
they observed, do in fact frequently develop sensible precautions against 
resource depletion based on a range of legally pluralistic social institutions 
including unwritten or customary local laws. Their conclusion is that ‘open 
access’ and ‘common property resources (CPR)’ are in fact two sub-sets of a 
wider ‘common pool resource’ where locally managed CPR could be 
considered as a viable fourth property estate (i.e. together with private, public 
and open access regimes). 
 
In the 1980’s the earlier critique of CPT was extended by political scientists 
influenced by the ‘new institutional economics’ (Ostrom 1990, Platteau 1989, 
Pinkerton 1989, Jentoft 1989). The ‘neo-institutionalists’ argued that economic   5
outcomes in the commons could be closely correlated with institutional 
arrangements and their associated transaction costs (literally the costs of co-
operation). Here, institutions are narrowly viewed as ‘systems of rights and 
rules providing incentives and disincentives for individuals to minimise 
transaction costs’ (Ostrom 1990), emphasising the distinction between local/ 
customary and external / modern institutions. This resulted in the earlier 
anthropological emphasis on local community involvement in management 
progressively giving ground to a broader ‘co-management’ view operating in 
the ‘interface between the state, civil society and the market’ (Ostrom ibid). 
Ostrom’s approach to the problem of the commons involved the design of 
durable cooperative institutions organized and governed by the resource 
users themselves (i.e. rather than public or private control). Her eight ‘design 
principles for durable common property resource institutions’ expounded in 
her landmark work ‘Governing the Commons’ (ibid) was to have a major 
influence on other researchers, policy makers and NR managers. The 
principles include clearly defined resource boundaries, user dominated 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts and alter rules, monitors who are resource 
users or accountable to them, graduated sanctions and support / recognition 
of self-organisation rights by external authorities. 
The emergence of the co-management view coincided with the liberalisation 
of centrally planned economies in many developing countries. It was 
consistent with over-lapping policy goals of governmental and non-
governmental sectors by fulfilling a need for fiscal prudence by states coming 
to realise that abundant micro-dispersed natural resources traditionally under 
common ownership were frequently beyond their ability to manage and 
coincided with the emergence of the participatory development paradigm in 
the NGO sector.  
 
McCay and Berkes (1994) framed this co-management position within the 
wider management context (Fig 1) proposing a continuum of seven co-
management ‘partnership arrangements’, distinguished by degrees of power 
sharing and integration of local and centralised management systems. This 
framework will be returned to below within the context of a more recent 
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Fig 1. Biopolar co-management framework proposed by McCay and Berkes 
1994 (modified from Bene and Neiland 2006) 
 
More recently Jul-Larsen et al (2003) critique both sides of the management 
debate i.e. the model-based management and neo-institutionalist co-
management schools. They propose a possible third ‘no-management’ option 
as an alternative to classical management theory’s emphasis on limiting 
numbers of fishermen and co-management strategies. Their research 
focussed on biological, institutional and economic characteristics of small and 
medium sized lake fisheries of the South Africa Development Community 
(SADC) region (Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe). They illustrate their contention by pointing to the fact that static or 
slow change in fishing effort in some of the African lakes they studied does 
not correspond with any effective form of management, either at the state or 
local level. 
 
The point of departure for their critique is the lack of socio-cultural or political 
embeddedness in CPT. Such context is critical to understanding how power 
and responsibility is distributed amongst different interest groups in society. 
Mosse (2006) makes a similar point, arguing that ‘equilibrium outcomes based 
on autonomous rational self-interest do not adequately represent the social 
and political forces acting on traditional systems and behaviour’. Bene and 
Neiland (2003) characterise such forces as the drivers of de facto 
governance, distinguishable from a concept of management as the 
technocratic implementation of collective actions in accordance with de jure 
rules arising from governance decisions at a higher ‘constitutional’ level 
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
 
A recent body of anthropological work has also challenged the ‘neo- 
institutionalist’ clear-cut dichotomy of modern and local institutions  - 
corresponding with formal and traditional rules of the game often framed in 
opposition, as a-historical and over simplistic. Instead the rules governing 
local management systems emerge as ‘a result of negotiation and 
accommodation in long term power struggles with different actors, local and 
external basing their claims on ‘different logics and values’ that emerge over 
time (legal pluralism). Ambiguity and contradiction rather the internal 
coherence is often the norm. This ‘constructivist’ view implies that access 
regulation is a consequence of many overlapping sets of norms rather than 
just the consequence of a tension between external formal and traditional 
local rules frequently cited in the co-management literature. 
 
Bene and Neiland (2006) point to the ‘tyranny of participation’ that can be 
fostered by uncritical application of the McKay-Berkes co-management 
framework (Fig 1). As a descriptive framework it has been used extensively 
for comparative purposes – but unlike CPT offers no analytical basis for 
assessing mechanisms underlying management reforms. The mono-
dimensional concept of a gradient of power sharing at the core of model has, 
they suggest, mislead many users to over-rely on a lack of devolution/ local 
participation as an explanation for the failure of co-management approaches. 
Although participatory theorists emphasise the role of participation as the 
main or only source of empowerment, it is in fact but one of at least three 
pillars frequently cited as a requisite for decentralisation to be an effective   7
governance reform; the other two being transparency and accountability 
(Power 1997). Bene and Neiland (ibid) suggest that accountability – 
particularly when operating in a downward direction (i.e. towards the 
consumers of management decisions) – plays a more critical but frequently 
undervalued role. Indeed, without strong accountability all participatory 
approaches are likely to fail.  
 
Furthermore, whether downward accountability is best served by weak 
participation (i.e. consultation or communication) or strong/ direct participation 
(i.e. joint action – Fig 1.) is likely to be highly context specific. From a review 
of 50 fisheries in developing countries they conclude ‘each fishery in each 
society has its own balance point’ on the scale of management intervention 
from state to local level. The inappropriate imposition of strong participation 
can have negative consequences such as local elite capture in 
heterogeneous communities with marked pre-existing power differentials, 
while the imposition of ‘pseudo-participation’ amounts to manipulation of 
beneficiaries by development professionals (Deshler and Sock 1985) 
potentially resulting in increased dependency. Conversely, uncritically citing 
weak participation/ power sharing for the failure of management reforms may 
incorrectly lay the blame on the implementing agency rather than the 
community. The authors conclude that greater attention should be paid to 
how, rather than how much, power is shared. 
 
Jul-Larsen et al (ibid) also critique what they see as the management theorists 
over-emphasis on ‘who’ rather than ‘what’ should be managed, which they 
term ‘the management-belief problem’. Firstly they point to a body of work 
during the 1990’s termed the ‘new ecology’ derived mainly from empirical 
studies on forestry, pastoralism and other land use (e.g. Ellis 1988). These 
researchers challenge the traditional view of closed ecosystems free of 
human interference attaining or moving toward an equilibrium state. Instead 
they view ‘ever-changing non-equilibrium’ states as the norm due to the 
influence of key variables outside the system boundary i.e. climatic factors. 
This has major implications for CPT; an equilibrium approach which considers 
human intervention as the most significant external variable. In the new 
ecology view the correlation between fishing effort and the re-generative 
capacity of the ecosystem – and therefore the predictive value of CPT - is less 
clear due to the uncertain impact of abiotic variables. This in turn reduces the 
role for detailed fisheries regulation in certain systems i.e. especially those 
with a chaotic, seasonal or inter-annual variation. Further more such variability 
is likely to be much more characteristic of tropical (e.g. flood plain ‘pulse’ 
fisheries, seasonal reservoirs, lakes) than the temperate fisheries for which 
most of the models were developed.  
 
Nevertheless the short-comings of CPT cited by the co-management school 
overlook the fact that it is an analytical model with empirical relevance only 
when/ if its underlying assumptions are correct. Although its utility as an 
analytical tool is well demonstrated, the fact that both schools often continue 
to treat it as an empirical model has often confused and limited the wider 
scope of the debate.  
 
Jul-Larsen et al (ibid) contend that such distraction has resulted in the neglect 
of key ‘real-life’ empirical features of fisheries commons – most critically the 
complex causes and consequences of changes in fishing effort. They suggest   8
where fisheries are viewed as closed systems; increased fishing effort is often 
over-simplistically correlated with economic or demographic growth. Broader 
livelihood based perspectives indicate that effort changes are likely to be 
more dynamic than visions of a Malthusian ‘last resort’ would suggest (Pauly 
1994). Small-scale artisanal fisheries instead frequently act as economic 
buffer zones with a constant flux out as well as into the sector as opportunities 
arise in other sectors of the formal or informal economy. Furthermore fisheries 
often exist as part of a package of diversified livelihood options, concurrent or 
simultaneous, which the poor constantly juggle to manage risk. Such 
‘pluriactivity’ is especially characteristic of those living in marginal, resource 
poor or other vulnerable environments for example, fisherman and farmers 
living on flood plains. Only such a broad context allows us to appreciate the 
degree of dependency and therefore the extent to which the poor are likely to 
prioritise fishing as a livelihood activity. 
 
CO-MANAGEMENT OR NO-MANAGEMENT IN SRI LANKA? 
 
In the second section of this paper, some of the ideas developed above are 
used to address the case for co-management of commercial reservoir 
fisheries in the Dry-Zone of Sri Lanka. Findings are based on market research 
conducted in N.W Province by the author during a 21 month period from 2000 
and 2001 (Murray et al 2001).  
 
Following their introduction in the early 1950’s, tilapias rapidly colonised most 
of the country’s fresh and brackish water resources, stimulating the growth of 
what has essentially become a single-species, single-gear (gill-net) artisanal 
fishery. Today commercial production of tilapias from perennial reservoirs 
typically amounts to 80-95% of total volume. Most of this production is locally 
marketed in fresh form by diffuse networks of two-wheeler vendors, while 
urban demand is predominantly catered for with marine fish supplied by a cold 
chain. Cheaper small marine varieties such as sardines also augment rural 
consumption during seasonal periods of lean inland production. Nationally, 
fresh and dried fish constitutes 65-70% of total animal protein intake rising to 
as much as 85% in rural areas (NARA 1999, Nathaniel & Silva 1998). Given 
the economic geography of this production base, it is reasonable to assume 
that the rise of the tilapia fishery, which accompanied large-scale reservoir 
rehabilitation, was a key factor facilitating repopulation of the Dry-Zone in the 
post-independence era. 
 
Fig 2 shows the distribution of small and medium size perennial reservoirs 
supporting commercial fisheries (>200 – 2,858ha) in the research area. The 
high storage density combined with a relatively high rural population density 
(>290 persons/ km
2) means that most production is marketed fresh, within a 
30-40 mile radius around multiple landing points (Plate 1) reaching even the 
most remote settlements.  
   9
 
Figure 2. Location of reservoirs with commercial fisheries in the research 
area, N.W Province Sri Lanka (Murray 2004) 
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Plate 1 Bicycle vendors purchase tilapia from a landing site on Rajangana 
reservoir at first light (note wire mesh keep cage (R) and single outsize carp 
(C) in catch) 
 
Detailed longitudinal market research focussed on fresh fish sales in 
Galgamuwa town, a small administrative and agrarian service centre 
(Population 14,680 – GOSL 2000) located close to Usgala 
Siyambalangamuwa (788ha) and Rajangana (1646ha) reservoirs (Fig 1). 
Most of its inland fish supply originates from these two sources. Volume and 
price information for inland fish and its principle substitutes was collected on 
weekly basis between January 2000 and September 2001. Main outlets were 
a busy junction for inland fish (Fig 2) and periodic roadside stalls for marine 
and occasionally inland fish. 
 
 
Plate 2. Cartel of 2-wheeler vendors selling inland fish at Galgamuwa junction 
 
Purely by chance, this research period coincided with attempts by the Ministry 
of Fisheries and Aquaculture Resource Development (MOFARD) to re-  11
establish functional fishing co-operatives through co-management 
interventions. Most of these institutions had effectively collapsed after a 
politically motivated selective withdrawal of Government financial support to 
the inland fisheries and freshwater aquaculture sectors from 1989 to 1994.  
 
No reliable official statistics were collected during this period (here-after 
referred to as the ‘ban’), however anecdotal evidence points to increased 
effort resulting from rising numbers of unregulated casual entrants ‘down-
fishing’ with progressively smaller mesh sizes and intensive methods. The 
great majority of participants could be characterised as fisherman-farmers, 
relatively recently diversified into fishing. Only in Rajangane was there a 
group of specialised fishermen; low-caste (kawara), encroached / landless 
Christians – of coastal origin. Most observers contend that the inland ‘ban’ 
was politically influenced by a desire to deter this low status group from 
settling permanently in the ‘Buddhist hinterland’. As professional marine 
fishers, they were the first to recognise the commercial potential of the 
emergent tilapia fishery. At the same time the clear economic imperative 
presented by the new fishery encouraged the higher-caste farmer group to 
accommodate and ultimately normalise the practice of commercial gill-net 
fishing. Even as they retained a traditional taboo on subsistence level fishing 
using hook and line gears in smaller seasonal tanks (village reservoirs) as low 
status ‘pity work’ (Murray 2004).  
 
This trend reflects a frequent occurrence whereby non-traditional fishers move 
into established fishing grounds of professional artisanal fishers as effort 
intensifies. The distinctive feature here was the weak informal access rights 
associated with transhumance livelihood strategies of the ‘coastal-inland’ 
fishermen’s, as well as their lack of political patronage. Consequently, for the 
most part they were easily displaced by landed riparian new-comers. The few 
communities that remained can often be found in semi-permanent settlements 
illegally encroached in ‘protected’ forested watershed areas.  
 
Fishing restrictions form the main plank of most co-management strategies 
and here too the main commitment of MOFARD was to support their 
implementation and enforcement. The management goal of the restrictions 
was to sustain or increase yields while adding value through increased mean 
catch size. Their precise design was based on lengthy consultations between 
government fisheries officers and the memberships of registered fishermen’s 
co-operatives; 3 in the larger Rajangana and 1 in Usgala reservoir. This 
included meetings with the entire co-operative memberships and in the case 
of Rajangana follow-up meetings to broker consensus between the 3 different 
societies.  
 
In both reservoirs it was agreed to restrict the use of undersize nets (<7.6cm 
stretched mesh size) as well as highly efficient gears (beach seines, mono-
filament and sandwich ‘trammel’ gill nets) and intensive active-fishing 
practices know as ‘beating’. In Usgala a majority of members requested the 
imposition of an additional ban on night fishing in order to reduce poaching 
from gears set to fish passively overnight. This resulted in wastage of fish 
which perished in the gears early in the night and more seriously conflicts 
associated with the practice of poaching and damage to competitors’ nets 
under cover of darkness. This was implemented by locking boats up between 
sunset and sunrise. The consultations demonstrated that the majority of   12
fishermen were highly supportive of the need for reforms but felt that fishing 
restrictions would only be effective with external support to help enforce them.  
 
The consequences of the fishing restrictions which commenced in December 
2000 could be clearly observed in market trends for inland fish and its 
substitutes recorded in Galgamuwa Town. 
 
For the first 12 months, similar volumes of fresh inland and marine species 
were available in Galgamuwa (Fig. 3) with relatively modest and predictable 
seasonal fluctuations in supply and price.  This changed dramatically after the 
imposition of restrictions.  An immediate and sharp fall in yields of medium 
and small size tilapia (<175g) was the first consequence (Fig. 4). These lower 
cost, size classes had hitherto constituted the bulk of product reaching remote 
villages and a smaller but significant component of the town’s retail turnover. 
The deficit was compounded during February and March when priority for the 
remaining catch was given to feeding agricultural labourers harvesting the 
main paddy crop cultivated under the same reservoirs. Inland fish prices 
reached their maximum levels during this period of deficit which lasted from 
January to May 2001.  
 
This prompted opportunistic marine traders to substantially increase the 
amount of marine fish coming to market with three new stalls commencing 
daily operation to cope with the demand. This catered for retail demand in the 
town, but the greatest volumes were for wholesale distribution through bicycle 
networks supplying surrounding villages, now with negligible access to their 
primary source of inland supply. Most of this volume consisted of sardines 
(72.3% of entire marine sales) which were fortuitously in plentiful seasonal 
supply during the period of restriction. The low prices of these varieties made 
them almost perfect substitutes for small tilapias (Fig. 3 - their high cross-
elasticity of demand is only impeded by inferior quality perceptions associated 



















































































































































































Marine fish (kg)     Inland fish (kg)        Sardines (Rs/ kg)     Small tilapia (Rs/ Kg)     Large tilapia (Rs/ Kg)  
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Figure 3 Mean daily volumes of fresh inland and marine fish and mean 
monthly retail prices for selected varieties in Galgamuwa town NWP 2000-































































































Small tilapia (kg)    Medium tilapia (kg)    Large tilapia (kg)    Green chromide Snakehead
Common Carp (kg)    Green chromide Snakehead Common carp (Rs/ kg)  
Figure 5. Mean total daily volumes for principle fresh inland fish varieties and 
mean monthly retail prices for selected varieties in Galgamuwa town NWP 
2000-2001 (price standard deviations indicated) 
 
After a period of rigorous compliance the restrictions began to break down 
and once free-riding commenced the complete break-down of rules ensued 
rapidly; first in Rajangana reservoir and subsequently and more progressively 
in Usgala. In the first instance conflicts between the different co-operatives 
occurred when the gears of the kawara group who had extended their 
informally accepted fishing range (for want of alternative income activities), 
were damaged by a second group. In Usgala the breakdown was internal to 
the single group and commenced with the resumption of night fishing by a 
small number of individuals. The incentive to free-ride was enhanced by 
dramatic yield reductions in the short-term, indicating that a more progressive 
system of restrictions may have been more sustainable. In this respect, the 
uniform adoption of a ban on small-mesh gillnets <7.6cm, (the prevailing 
though rarely observed legal limit), suggests that the outcomes of the 
consultation process were to some extent pre-determined by MOFARD to 
comply with national statutes. 
 
Attempts by the co-operatives to resolve the conflicts failed as no effective 
external enforcement mechanism was available. This was despite the good 
intentions of local fisheries officers who were few in number and lacked 
resources (e.g. officers frequently relied on public transport to visit reservoir 
sites). There was also a lack of co-operation between different government 
agencies and political patronage was offered to influential free-riders. 
 
By June 2001 intensive fishing practices had resumed in both locations with 
production levels rebounding to the highest levels and lowest prices observed 
during the survey period. Total volume reached over 330kg per day consisting   14
mainly of smaller tilapias whose price fell to Rs30/ kg during August 2001. 
Marine supplies immediately fell as a consequence – with the same 
stallholders moving to trade surplus tilapia while the glut lasted. This surge in 
productivity, which was well above the usual seasonal dry-season increase in 
CPUE can be attributed to the protection given to younger cohorts during the 
effective period of fishing restriction.  
 
The intensive gillnet fishery has undoubtedly had negative secondary impacts 
on indigenous biodiversity; once commercially significant minor cyprinids such 
as Labeo porcellus, L. dussumieri and Puntius sarana are now at the edge of 
consumer memory. However the rapid total yield recovery demonstrates the 
outstanding resilience of tilapia stocks to the same pressure and explains their 
increasing contribution to total catches. This is attributable to tilapia’s r-
selected ecological traits which include: high fecundity; small size; short 
generation time; and the ability to disperse offspring widely. Such traits confer 
advantages in unstable or unpredictable environments, exemplified in this 
instance by wide hydrological fluctuations associated with periods of intense 
fishing effort. The ability to reproduce quickly at small size is especially crucial 
in this context. Tilapias can breed at sizes well below 20g, will reach sexual 
maturity after only 6 months and breed much more evenly throughout the year 
than other indigenous and exotic carps whose reproductive behaviour is tied 
more closely to the monsoonal cycle. Therefore even in an intensive open 
access fishery, a highly responsive dynamic equilibrium is likely to operate as 
participants move in and out of the fishery in response to yield variations. 
Although CPUE levels were not evaluated in these commercial fisheries, 
subsistence fishermen harvesting seasonal tanks in the same area rarely 
extended fishing activity at levels below 0.5kg/hr (Murray 2004). 
 
It would be instructive to test the generality of this thesis against official inland 
catch statistics. Unfortunately, such statistics are extremely sensitive to 
monitoring capacity which was all but absent during the ‘ban’ and remains 
weak. Yet they are still an important basis for formulation of fisheries 
management policy so will be considered briefly. The period of the ‘ban’ is of 
particular interest – as it was effectively a reverse of the current case study – 
deregulation followed by an attempt to restore management systems. 
Available statistics (Fig. 5) suggest a dramatic crash (1989) followed by a 
steep rebound in freshwater yields after withdrawal of the ‘ban’ (1994) 
whereas an immediate surge in production would be a much more likely 
consequence of de-regulation. This is supported by results from a scientific 
case-study of 5 reservoirs (Amerasinghe 1999) which detected a decrease in 
mean landing sizes for the two dominant species of tilapia in the fishery 
shortly after the ‘ban’. 
 
Regardless of provenance, the official figures have been used to support 
resumption of some ‘pre-ban’ (1980’s) intervention strategies which attract 
sizeable bilateral grant or loan support e.g. culture based-stocking 
enhancements. Low recovery rates of stocked fish, particularly in larger 
perennial water (>700ha Amarasinghe 1988) have resulted in a shift of focus 
to smaller perennial and semi-seasonal water bodies. However, here too, little 
evidence exists to suggest sustained community involvement or incentive for 
private sector seed provision (Murray 2001). 
   15
The largest surge in reported production during the late 1980’s correlates 
more closely with state rather than private sector investment. Heavily 
subsidised gears (fibre-glass out-rigger canoes and gill-nets) were provided 
by the government from 1979 onwards (Amarasinghe 1999). This also had 
institutional consequences. Funds were to be channelled exclusively through 
newly established fisheries co-operative societies providing an incentive for 
almost all fishermen operating in the country’s perennial reservoirs to register 
for membership (Amarasinghe ibid). MOFARD then implemented 
management policies through these institutions. This client-focused 
arrangement suggests that local resource users had negligible institutional 
leverage to demand downward accountability and decentralisation of 
decision-making processes from MOFARD. Even where real political will to 
decentralised governance exists – such institutional leverage is a key feature 






































































































Inland production ( ' 000s mt)       % of total marine and inland production        
Figure 5. Inland fish production in Sri Lanka 1970-1997 (source NARA 
Fisheries Year Book 1998) 
 
Commodity price indices offer a more reliable means of evaluating the 
balance between population-driven increases in demand and available supply 
(Fig 6). Between 1992 and 1998, the retail price of tilapia rose almost in parity 
with inflation which averaged 12.2% per annum equivalent to a compound 
rate of 103% over the same 7 years (Central Bank 1998). This historic stability 
also points to the resilient regenerative capacity of the fishery and suggests 
fears of over-exploitation are unfounded despite anecdotal reports of 
decreases in individual fisher yields. Such resilience together with the highly 
segmented demand for inland fish (i.e. predominantly rural) is also the main 
reason for the lack of an economically viable inland food-fish aquaculture 
sector in Sri Lanka – yet kick-starting this sector also remains a key tenet 
underlying technical assistance grants solicited by the state.   16
 
Figure 6. Historic trends in fresh fish and meat substitute retail prices, 
Colombo 1989-1999 (Data Source ARTI 1988). Note: round bars = total % 
increase in retail price over the 7 year period. 
 
 
Findings from this research bear some striking parallels with those of Jul-
Larsen et al (ibid) on SADC small and medium-scale lake fisheries; 
particularly with regard to their caution against over-reliance on classical 
management theory emphasis on limiting numbers of fishermen and uncritical 
application of co-management strategies. 
 
In both studies fishing intensification resulted mainly from increasing numbers 
of fishers over and above investment or technology driven change (e.g. more 
efficient gears). Furthermore, environmental rather than economic factors 
appear to be the predominant causal factors underlying this change. The 
regenerative resilience of the tilapia fishery, the principle environmental driver 
was considered above. The economic drivers of intensification are assessed 
in the remaining part of the text. 
 
The incentive for external investment driven growth is limited due to the fact 
that the market already equates closely to the elusive assumptions of ‘perfect 
competition’ underlying micro-economic demand and supply theory i.e. there 
exists (1) a highly homogeneous quality fresh product, (2) free access to 
market information associated with localised demand (3) all actors are price-
takers (4) only ‘normal’ profits are available resulting in highly equitable value 
chain margins and (5) low trading overheads in dispersed rural markets for 
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These factors also help explain the persistence of low-tech production and 
distribution networks (canoes, gill-nets and bicycles) with low reliance on 
external inputs e.g. fuel or refrigeration costs. This is in marked contrast to the 
marine and other agricultural sectors where availability of scale-economies 
(e.g. bulking-opportunities) and provision of costly external inputs are closely 
associated with tied-marketing contracts and long-term credit and other 
service provision by a relatively small number of external agents with access 
to investment capital. In the inland sector, such transactions are for the most 
part highly localised, small-scale and take place mainly on an informal 
relational basis directly between producers and one or more vendors.  
 
Such features effectively insulate the inland fishery from external ‘shocks’ 
experienced in the wider liberalizing economy e.g. policy fluctuations on state 
market interventions, input/ output subsidies, volatile energy and 
agrochemical prices etc. For example, technology driven intensification in the 
marine sector followed by increasing fuel prices drove many artisanal 
motorised day-boats from the inshore sector prior to the tsunami (Kelegama 
1999). Viewed in this ‘vulnerability context’ – the resilience (see below) and 
distributive equitability of the inland sector clearly makes it directly and 
indirectly, a vital safety-net to large numbers of the rural poor: producers, 
market intermediaries and consumers. From a policy perspective in this sector 
at least, a precautionary approach should be taken to promotion of external 
investment driven growth; for example through attempts to promote urban 
consumption of inland fish to promote an aquaculture sector. Such attempts 
are anyway unlikely to have much realistic chance of success given the 
current configuration of robust fishery and segmented consumer demand.  
 
Social differentiation between resource users was a further key-feature of the 
current study. Only the full-time low-caste (kawara) fishermen could be 
considered users of the last resort and consequently, it was they who were 
the first to be driven to significant levels of opportunistic free-riding behaviour. 
By contrast the great majority of landed fishermen-farmers with more 
diversified livelihood portfolios relied on fishing more as an economic-buffer 
than a sole-income provider. This relative economic mobility undoubtedly 
enhanced their propensity to comply with sanctions, added to which the main 
period of the sanctions also coincided with the busiest season in the 
agricultural calendar. 
 
The current case study not only demonstrates a failure of the planned co-
management strategy – but also raises serious questions regarding its wider 
applicability as a governance reform in the specific environmental and socio-
economic context of the Dry-Zone reservoir fishery. Firstly there is a lack of 
clear evidence that productivity gains would justify the additional institutional 
transaction costs given the highly regenerative capacity of the tilapia fishery. 
Secondly in the absence of effective enforcement, restrictions on smaller 
sized catches are likely to have disproportionately adverse effects on the 
poorest groups in the market chain including remote consumers. Furthermore 
significant private-sector investment driven growth is unlikely given the current 
market configuration whereby simple fishing methods with lower CPUE are 
likely to prevail over more capital intensive technologies. In this context it 
seems evident that the bipolar management framework (Fig 1) should be 
expanded to incorporate a more laissez-faire or ‘no-management’ approach.  
   18
 
RELEVANCE OF FINDINGS TO BANGLADESH FLOODPLAIN 
FISHERIES 
 
These findings also point to useful comparative lessons with other resource 
settings – especially where there is comparable reliance on inland fish as a 
provider of high-quality dietary protein. For example, population-driven 
intensification in Bangladesh floodplain fisheries has also resulted in catch 
composition moving towards small and fast maturing species low in the food 
chain. Self-recruiting r-selected exotics such as tilapia (first introduced here 
too in the 1950’s) are likely to become more significant in wild catches though 
environmental conditions are far less favourable for tilapia than in Sri Lankan 
reservoirs. Inland fishery yields have declined dramatically over recent 
decades contributing to the emergence of a rapidly growing and diversifying 
aquaculture sector which today constitutes some 30% of a total annual 
fisheries yield of 1,400,000 mt (De Graaf and Latif 2006). This trend seems 
set to continue and seems to be the most realistic means of securing the 
country’s future fish needs (Gregory et al 2007). Yet such intensification 
inevitably demands higher investment security including secure property 
rights, which, in turn is likely to drive increased privatisation and enclosure of 
seasonal floodplain commons. Given the traditional reliance of large numbers 
of functionally land-less farmers and fishermen on such shared aquatic 
resources, there appears to be a compelling role for co-management 
approaches within development policy. These approaches may have potential 
for application within the stagnating fishery and emergent aquaculture sectors 
(see below). 
 
Co-management enabling factors include the wide availability of NGO 
sponsored micro-credit and improving access to relatively un-segmented 
(compared to Sri Lanka) local and regional markets and a favourable policy 
environment. Constraints to community-based fisheries management (CBFM) 
include: complex social relations, weak public-sector capacity for longer-term 
institutional support, insecure and overlapping access rights, to floodplain 
resources, rent seeking by local elites, competing land-uses, competing off-
farm employment opportunities (including aquaculture!) and uncertain returns 
to effort. 
 
In terms of economic sustainability at least, aquaculture based co-
management systems appear to have demonstrated greater promise than 
CBFM models, most of which remain pilot initiatives strongly supported by 
donor projects. Two recent examples of the former approach are predicated 
on the pooling and enclosure of private lands under seasonal floodplains for 
semi-intensive aquaculture. The first, developed by Worldfish and the local 
NGO, Proshika (Dey and Prein 2005) relies on temporary enclosure (fencing 
which also permits ingress of small wild fish) culture-based stocking and 
feeding. The so-called Daudkandi model, named after its area of origin near 
Comilla and originated by the NGO SHISUK, is a more intensive model 
requiring higher investment in earthen dykes which extend the inundation 
period.  
 
The models also have markedly different institutional frameworks with 
consequences for poverty-impact (this is highly significant since both models   19
exclude traditional fishers from their communal fishing grounds). The first 
relies on traditional NGO advocacy to support inclusion of the landless-poor 
as labourers. Unfortunately such transaction costs are rarely acknowledged or 
fully-costed, raising serious doubts over their sustained inclusion once 
external support is withdrawn. The Daudkandi model is a more novel joint-
venture co-operative model incorporating low-cost micro-credit share options 
for poorer community members. The NGO also engages as an active share-
holding partner committing them to a longer term presence and there is clear 
evidence of sustained positive impacts on local economies including 
employment and service opportunities for the poor, nutritional benefits and 
higher interim rice yields. 
Nevertheless, here too questions remain regarding potential for longer-term 
elite capture (Gregory et al 2007). SHISUK are currently testing the model in 
perennial beels (shallow floodplain lakes - with fisheries under public 
ownership) where many CBFM models have been applied with limited 
evidence of sustainable adoption. 
 
In conclusion co-management projects are likely to fail if they ignore 
contextual issues which influence the propensity of the individual to participate 
in mutually beneficial collective actions. Despite claims to the contrary, no 
effective blueprint approaches exist. Instead adaptive approaches are 
required. The observations presented here underscore the importance of 
moving beyond the view of a closed system to placement of fisheries within 
their wider environmental, social and economic context. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the late 1980’s various forms of fisheries co-management initiatives 
have been implemented in some of the major fisheries in Zambia.  The 
reasons for instituting co-management arrangements have been varied and 
have ranged from the need to control the influx of immigrant fishermen to the 
desire to encourage the use of legal fishing gear. This paper looks at the 
manner that co-management has evolved in three fisheries namely Lake 
Kariba, Lake Bangweulu and the Mweru-Luapula fisheries. It shows that after 
more than 10 years of co-management the results are still mixed. On one lake 
there is some form of co-management while on the other two these initiatives 




For more than fifteen years now Zambia has instituted policies that seek to 
decentralise the management of natural resources from the centre to the 
users in various Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) 
initiatives. In the face of increased poverty especially in the rural areas, these 
policies seek to place priority on the utilisation of resources to previously 
marginalised communities so as to achieve sustainability and improve 
livelihoods.  
 
In Zambia, the National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) of 1994 sets the 
broad framework for CBNRM in the country. The NEAP was founded on the 
principle that local communities and the private sector should participate in 
natural resources management (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 
1994). This was intended to consolidate the gains made in the management 
of resources especially wildlife in a context of declining government 
expenditure.  
 
The Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas 
(ADMADE) in the wildlife sector is premised on the transferring of 
responsibilities and benefits of managing wildlife to rural communities. In 1999 
the Wildlife Act was amended making local communities have legal rights 
over wildlife resources (Mwenya et al. 1990). The purpose of this paper is to 
explore how the decentralisation of management roles to users has fared 
within the fisheries sector. The paper will use examples from three fisheries 
namely Lake Mweru/Luapula, Lake Bangweulu and Lake Kariba to show how 
co-management was instituted and the current status of these efforts. 
 
FISHERIES SECTOR IN ZAMBIA 
 
About 7% or 53,700 km
2 of Zambia’s surface area is covered by water setting 
the stage for a thriving fishing industry in the country. These water bodies 
produce between 65,000 to 70,000 tonnes of fish annually. These figures do 
not, however, include production for subsistence purposes which is quite 
substantial. The fisheries sector in the country accounts for about 3% of the 
Gross Domestic Product and the industry is the third largest employer.   3
Despite these production figures the per capita supply of fish has declined 
from 12 kg/year in 1985 to 7kg/year in 2000 (MACO, 2002). The decrease in 
consumption rates has been attributed to the increasing population which has 
put pressure on fish stocks leading to unsustainable fishing habits and 
subsequent declines in catches.  
 
The fish production figures account for about 3% of the country’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Given that fish products are among the lowest-
priced source of animal proteins consumption has tended to increase with 
declining incomes. According to a 1998 survey the proportion of fish to 
household food expenditure increased from a low of 5.5% in 1993 to a high of 
7% in 1998. The highest level was however reached in 1996 when fish 
accounted for 12% of household purchases of food (MACO, 2002). The 
survey further shows that fish consumption increased considerably in rural 
areas where there are significant water-bodies such as Luapula, Northern, 
and Western Provinces. This can be attributed to the increase in the number 
of people taking up fishing as the formal economy contracted during the 
period (Jul-Larsen et al, 2003). The 12% figure of animal protein obtained 
from fish in Zambia is low when compared to other land-locked Sub-Saharan 
countries such as Malawi and Uganda where fish contributes about 38% and 
30% respectively towards the protein needs of households (Bẻnẻ and Heck, 
2005).  
 
The low fish production figures in Zambia belie the existing potential that 
exists in the fisheries and aquaculture sector. The potential of making this 
sector one of the main weapons in poverty-alleviation and improved nutrition 
is immense. The country has three major basins where most of the country’s 
fisheries are located. These are the Zambezi, Luapula and Tanganyika 
Basins. They support fisheries in Lakes Mweru, Bangweulu, and Luapula. The 
Zambezi catchment supports the Luangwa, Lukanga, Kafue and Zambezi 
River fisheries. These fisheries are exploited by mostly small-scale fishermen 
rather than commercial and highly organised units. Most of the craft used are 
canoes propelled by hand with a few having mechanised vessels. There are 
also seasonal streams and rivers which provide fish for subsistence for many 
people especially in the rural areas.  
 
While total demand for fish is estimated to be in the range of 100,000 metric 
tonnes per annum, production from capture fisheries has fluctuated between 
65,000 and 70,000 tonnes for a variety of reasons. The difference could easily 
be accounted for through improved aquaculture. However, aquaculture is still 
a long way off in meeting the balance from capture fisheries. It is estimated 
that there are currently about 5, 000 aquaculture farmers in the country. Less 
than ten of these farmers can be classified as being commercial (MACO, 
2002). Production in the aquaculture sector rose from 88.5 metric tonnes in 
1967 to about 700 metric tonnes by 1982. 2002 estimates put the figure at 
10,000 tonnes (MACO, 2002). Most of the fish farmers are concentrated in the 
Eastern, Northern and North Western Provinces. Production is constrained by 
a number of factors such as the non-availability of a legal framework in which 
to operate; poor institutional arrangements; lack of quality fingerlings and 
feeds and shortage of experienced extension staff.    4
MANAGEMENT OF THE FISHERIES SECTOR 
 
By law the Department of Fisheries (DoF) in the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives is responsible for the management of the country’s fisheries. 
This mandate is contained in the Fisheries Act of 1974. Owing to inadequate 
resources and lack of attention at policy level, the DoF offers only a token 
presence in most of the fisheries. However, one of its most visible presences 
is the enforcement of the annual closed season which takes place December 
and March. During this period DoF staffs undertake joint operations with other 
law-enforcement agencies to confiscate gear and apprehend fishers who are 
found to be found fishing during the closed season.  
 
Another layer of management over the country’s fisheries is that of traditional 
authorities. During colonial rule local administrative structures known as 
Native Authorities (NA) were funded through natural resources. Through the 
NA’s the chiefs were allowed to impose levies and licences for the harvesting 
of natural resources such as fish. These levies became an important source 
of revenue for running these local areas. Although Native Authorities were 
abolished after the country’s independence in 1964 Traditional Authorities 
have maintained some leverage over the management of fisheries resources. 
In the process this has led to conflicts with other users of the resources 
(Wilson et al, 2004). 
 
Most of the management roles that were given to Traditional Authorities 
during the colonial era were transferred to Local Authorities in the post-
independence period. Consequently, today the Local Authorities obtain part of 
their revenue from fish. This is normally calculated on the amount of fish that 
a trader is carrying out of a given fishery. Apart from collecting the levy the 
Local Authorities do not play any other part in fisheries management. 
 
EMERGENCE OF CO-MANAGEMENT ON LAKE MWERU/LUAPULA 
 
The Mweru-Luapula fishery is in the northern part of Zambia in Luapula 
Province on the border between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. It is divided into two Systems. Lake Mweru proper starting from the 
Luapula River mouth to Luvua River in the north and is approximately 110 km 
long and 40-50km wide. Its depth varies from 2 m. in the south to 27m in the 
north. Its total area is about 4580 km
2 of which 58% belongs to Zambia. The 
Luapula River system stretches from Mambilima Falls to the mouth of Luapula 
River. Below Mambilima Falls, the River forms an extensive swampy flood 
plain of about 160 km and 5-18 km wide. This swamp system with its 
numerous oxbows and lagoons is interlinked with the open waters of lake 
Mweru. Both systems make up Mweru-Luapula Fishery. 
 
Some form of co-management in the fishery was initiated in 1985 and was a 
reaction to gear thefts. Fishing Associations (FA’s) were formed with the main 
objective of stopping gear thefts but later on they started incorporating fish 
conservation issues in their agenda. Another objective of FA’s was to offer 
assistance to members in times of hardship such as bereavements.   5
Membership was only open to fishers although other community members 
were free to join if they so wished. Interestingly, the FA’s were created by 
fishers who felt a need for them and the DoF did not initially take an active 
part in their operations.  
 
By 1990 FA’s began to experience a number of problems. First, they were 
poorly funded and could thus not operate effectively. Their main sources of 
funds were subscriptions from members and sometime this was given on a 
voluntary basis. Secondly, they did not receive the required support from the 
government in general and the DoF in particular. The police for instance, 
considered them to be a vigilante outfit which was operating outside the 
country’s laws. Thirdly, they were also resisted by the Traditional Authorities 
who felt threatened by their presence. Fourthly, most of the members of the 
FA’s were also farmers such that at certain times of the year they would 
abandon their fishing activities to go into farming. During such periods they 
FA’s would remain inactive leading to frustrations for those who remained in 
the fisheries. 
 
In 1992 the DoF instituted what they called the Conservation and 
Management Action Programme (CAMAP) with funding from a donor agency. 
The objective of CAMAP was to promote ‘conservation dialogue’ in the 
fishery. By 1994 CAMAP had managed to convince most of the fishers to 
protect the breeding areas of fish. However, realising the potential of CAMAP 
in solving their grievances the fishers began to question the role of local 
authorities in the fishery. In particular, they questioned the collection of fish-
levies which were not ploughed back into the activities of CAMAP but were 
instead used for other purposes such as paying wages for local authority staff. 
The local authorities resisted these attempts on the grounds that they were 
mandated by law to enact by-laws which empowered them to collect fish-
levies. 
 
By 2000 the CAMAP concept began to face problems. As the lake is shared 
by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) conservation measures that 
were being instituted on the Zambian side were not being observed on the 
other shore line. This began to breed resentment by Zambian fishers who did 
not see the point of embarking on conservation measures which their DRC 
counterparts did not respect. Secondly, the Traditional Authorities still felt 
threatened by these institutions that were not under their control. To this end, 
they frustrated their operations. In a social survey conducted in 2004 it was 
revealed that these co-management institutions were still in place in the 
fishery. The survey further revealed that there was disagreement among 
fishers on the appropriate role of Traditional Authorities in the management of 
the fishery but most were agreed that DoF was the appropriate vehicle 
through which to institute co-management (Wilson et al 2004). 
 
CO-MANAGEMENT ON LAKE BANGWEULU 
 
Lake Bangweulu is actually a swampy area with few lakes. The fishery 
contributes about 20% towards the country’s total fish production (Til and 
Banda, nd). Although most of the actual fishing is done by men, there is large   6
number of women involved in fishing for subsistence, processing and fish-
trade.   
 
The DoF introduced the concept of co-management in the fishery in 1996 
through a donor-funded project. This was initially done by conducting a 
Participatory Rapid Appraisal to generate dialogue among the diverse actors 
and create a platform through which to manage the fishery. Later Fish 
Conservation Committees (FCC’s) were formed.  However, some of the major 
actors in the fishery refused to join in the initiative. In particular, the Local 
Authorities refused to allow the FCC’s to collect the levy which was supposed 
to be used to support co-management at the local level. The co-management 
process in Lake Bangweulu made a deliberate decision not to involve the 
Traditional Authorities in their operations.  
 
One major problem, however, was that there was very little capacity within the 
DoF to carry out co-management activities. The concept was very new in a 
department whose major role had, hitherto, been that of enforcing fishing 
regulations. In the end, co-management did not succeed in Lake Bangweulu. 
Apart from the above the other reasons were that the FCC’s were perceived 
to be male-dominated organs as they did not involve fish processors and 
traders the majority of whom were women. Secondly, the scattered nature of 
fishing settlements coupled with rapid migration of people to and from the 
fishery was a hindrance to the smooth operations of the FCC. Today, the 
FCC’s are no longer in place in Bangweulu and there is no co-management 
taking place. 
 
CO-MANAGEMENT ON LAKE KARIBA 
 
The introduction of co-management on Lake Kariba came about due to a 
combination of several factors and dynamics in the fishery. Like in Lakes 
Mweru/Luapula and Bangweulu the concept was introduced by DoF through a 
donor-funded project. While the role of Traditional Authorities in the two other 
fisheries was rather ambiguous, on Lake Kariba co-management was initiated 
partly to make these institutions more active. It was noted that there were 
post-colonial changes that had reduced the role of traditional authorities in 
management. In turn, this had engendered the unrestricted entry of 
immigrants from other regions of the country into the fishery. Concomitantly, 
this had led to an increase in the use of illegal fishing methods and the 
setting-up of settlements anywhere along the lake shore and on islands 
(Chipungu and Moinnudin, 1994). Furthermore, scattered fishing camps in the 
fishery made it difficult for DoF not only to collect accurate statistics on yields 
but also to monitor the violations of fishing regulations.  
 
The new co-management arrangements led to the setting-up of designated 
fishing settlements on the lake shore and to delegate to the artisanal fishers 
responsibilities and authority to control and manage particular fishing grounds. 
In this manner the artisanal fishermen would then control access and enforce 
fishing regulations in those fishing grounds. Another secondary benefit of this 
co-management arrangement was that other actors in the fishery such as the   7
local authority would find it easier to provide the necessary social services to 
fishermen’s households such as schools and health facilities.  
 
For management purposes the shore line was divided into 4 zones. These 
zones were to be an area of the lake and the mainland falling under the 
jurisdiction of a local Traditional Authority. These zones are  administered by 
Zonal Management Committee’s (ZMC’s) which comprise of a Traditional 
Authority in that particular zone, a local authority representative, a DoF 
official, four fishers a representative of NGO’s operating in that zone and two 
businessmen ‘with well established businesses’ (Chipungu and Moinnudin, 
1994: 5). The roles of the ZMC’s are to co-ordinate the activities of fishing 
camps under their zones. They are also responsible for monitoring fishing 
regulations. In each fishing camp and below the ZMC’s there are Integrated 
Village Management Committees (IVMC’s). The IVMC’s comprise of an 
elected chairman from among the artisanal fishers in that camp, three elected 
ordinary members, a village headman, a Fisheries Assistant and a Village 
Scout appointed by the DoF. The IVMC's have the task of controlling access 
to the fishery by vetting new entrants. Fishermen from other fisheries or from 
other fishing camps within Lake Kariba have to be vetted by an IVMC before 
they can start fishing. In addition, the committees are also going to be 
responsible for enforcing and monitoring fishing regulations. The Fisheries 
Assistants and the Village Scouts in the committees were to be primarily 
responsible for the enforcement of fishing regulations.  
 
Initially, these new arrangements led to a number of conflicts among the 
various actors involved. There were conflicts between the largely immigrants 
fishers and local people. Due to fluctuations in catches it is imperative that 
fisher have access to land for agricultural purposes. The local people resisted 
the idea of sharing their agricultural land with immigrants whom they 
considered to be ‘foreigners.’ Secondly, the local authority refused to 
surrender the revenue from fish levies to the ZMC’s on the grounds that these 
institutions did not have a legal backing. Indeed, the Fisheries Act does not 
recognise the institutions that have been created to promote co-management. 
Efforts have been made since 1994 to have the act amended but these have 
stalled. As a compromise the ZMC’s were registered as associations and are 
still operational. The ZMC’s have become so self-reliant that they even able to 
fund DoF officials to their annual meetings (Malasha, 2003). 
 
ISSUES FOR CO-MANAGEMENT IN ZAMBIA 
 
As the above examples have shown, co-management in Zambia has to 
contend with a lot of factors. First, there are overlapping layers of 
management in the country’s fisheries, and each layer has its own source of 
legitimacy and relevance. While the DoF is legally in charge of management, 
the traditional and local Authorities all have a claim in one way or another on 
these fisheries. In the Lake Mweru/Luapula fisheries the local chiefs have 
their personal lagoons which are not subject to the Fisheries Act such as the 
closed season.  
   8
Secondly, there is currently a legal vacuum in the country in terms of co-
management. While CBNRM arrangements in other natural resources such 
as forests, water and wildlife are backed by legal provisions, this is not the 
case within the fisheries sector. Efforts to revise the Fisheries Act of 1974 to 
recognise co-management arrangements have not succeeded to date. 
Thirdly, there is institutional weakness at the DoF level. The department is 
located in a ministry whose main focus is crop production.  
 
Consequently, policy matters related to the industry are not given the priority 
that they require not withstanding the fact that the sector is the fourth largest 
employer in the country. Fourthly, the migration of people from the fishery into 
agriculture and vice versa has an effect on the management of the fishery. 
Data has shown that most people will be engaged in fishing and other 
livelihood activities at the same or at different times (Jul-Larsen et al, 2003).  
This fact of life among fishers needs to receive recognition when 
implementing co-management activities. 
 
ROLE OF THE WORLDFISH CENTER IN ZAMBIA 
 
The Zambian WorldFish Center office was opened in June 2006 has now 
become fully operational.  It will be one of the offices mandate to address the 
issues that have been highlighted in this paper. Already, the office has been 
invited to provide advice on the strengthening of co-management in Lake 
Mweru/Luapula fishery. It is anticipated that the use of a model developed by 
some of the Center staff will greatly assist in designing a management plan 
that takes into account the various factors that are peculiar to this fishery. 
Secondly, the Center has also engaged DoF with a view of revising the 
Fisheries Policy to make it relevant to the current times. In its current form the 
Fisheries Act still reflects the times when the DoF was seen as the sole 
manager of the country’s fisheries.  It is also the Center’s objective to increase 
aquaculture production in the light of stagnating production from most of the 
country’s capture fisheries. Aquaculture would not only increase fish 
production making it readily available but would also solve some of the current 
contentious management tools such as the ‘closed season.’ Already the 
Center has carried out studies which indicate that aquaculture can be a 




Fisheries co-management in Zambia has had mixed results. While it has not 
been so successful in some of the fisheries there is some hope that it will 
succeed in others such as Lake Kariba. A major hindrance has been lack of a 
legal framework through which co-management can occur. Currently, the 
institutions for co-management operate in a legal vacuum and are recognised 
as such at the discretion of other actors and institutions and not because the 
law requires them to do so. Secondly, fisheries co-management in Zambia 
has to operate within a context of competing and sometimes conflicting layers 
of management. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The importance of inland fisheries resources to the East Africa Community 
Partner States of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is highlighted. Efforts and 
achievements to improve utilisation and management of fisheries resources 
for lasting social and economic benefits in the region are examined. 
Experiences from two projects, the Integrated Lake Management project in 
Uganda and the on-going implementation of a Fisheries Management Plan 
project on Lake Victoria are examined. Key achievements are examined and 
lessons learned for within and beyond the region are identified.   
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The inland fisheries of the East Africa Community (EAC) Partner States of 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are based predominantly on its major 
freshwater lakes, the most notable being Lake Victoria, the world’s second 
largest freshwater lake with an area of 68,800 km
2. Inland fisheries contribute 
between 2-12% of the GDP in each country and produce fish for domestic and 
export markets. The value of the catch from Lake Victoria alone is estimated 
at $350 at landing sites with a further $250 million generated by the export of 
Nile perch. Other dominant fish species include Nile tilapia, a small 
indigenous cyprinid (Rastrineobola argentea) and various types of catfish. 
These lake fisheries support the livelihoods of over 3 million people in directly 
dependent households by providing employment and income and provide 
high quality food in the form of nutrients and animal protein for millions of 
consumers in the region.    
 
Rapid increases in human populations have placed increasing pressure on 
natural resources. In fisheries, this is seen in the considerable increase in the 
number of people involved in fishing, putting fish stocks under increasing 
pressure with evidence, in some cases, of stock decline. Additionally, lake 
waters are subjected to increasing environmental threats from catchment 
modification such as deforestation, increasing urbanisation, industrialisation, 
and agricultural expansion. The core problems of increasing human 
populations and increasingly intensive land-use in lake catchments and 
shorelines threaten the sustainability of fisheries resources.  
 
Fisheries management institutions in the EAC accept that the traditional 
centralised, control-and-command approach to fisheries management has 
failed to safeguard fish resources and the livelihoods of millions of people 
dependent upon these resources. They therefore adopted a fisheries co-
management approach, involving the establishment of legally empowered 
community organizations called Beach Management Units (BMUs) for 
planning and management of fisheries resources in partnership with national 
and local governments. BMUs now provide an opportunity for poor,   3
marginalised groups such as fishing crew and women to engage in decision-
making processes that affect the management of resources upon which their 
livelihoods are based.  
 
In addition to environmental threats, there is mounting concern over the 
increasing health threats to fisheries communities caused by HIV/AIDS. 
Fisheries communities are a major hotspot for HIV/AIDS due to their male-
dominated, migratory nature with cash available on a daily basis, limited 
savings culture, weakening of the normal social norms of a home village, 
limited recreational opportunities and risky lifestyle. Although there have been 
recent interventions to increase awareness of communities and promote 
preventative behaviour, very little assistance has been specifically directed 
towards fisheries communities in the EAC.  
 
The transition from a centralised to participatory management approach has 
involved many different initiatives in East Africa in recent years, most of which 
have been small-scale and a few large-scale. This paper, whilst providing a 
general description and analysis of the development of inland fisheries co-
management in East Africa, draws particular experience from two of the most 
recent and influential initiatives, the DFID-funded Integrated Lake 
Management Project (ILM) on Lakes George and Kyoga in Uganda which 
ended in 2004, and the on-going Implementation of a Fisheries Management 
Plan project (IFMP) on Lake Victoria, funded by the European Union. 
 
The ILM project ran from 2000 to 2004 and aimed to sustain and improve the 
livelihoods of poor lake dependent communities through the integrated 
management of lake resources. The project operated on Lake George (area: 
290 km2) and Lake Kyoga (area: 2,800 km2). The project received annual 
reviews of progress by the donor and a final independent review. Despite 
being regarded as a successful flagship project, a request by the project to 
extend donor support to consolidate the co-management approach and 
translate institutional achievements into resource based improvements was 
rejected largely due to the growing donor interest in providing direct budget 
support. The absence of external donor support to this co-management 
initiative from 2004 to date, provides an opportunity for valuable lesson 
learning.  
 
The IFMP project started in April 2003 and is due to end in August 2008 with 
the possibility of a no-cost extension of up to two years. The aim of the project 
is to support the LVFO Partner States of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in 
implementing management measures in line with the Lake Victoria Fisheries 
Management Plan and LVFO Strategic Vision. Lake Victoria being the world’s 
second largest freshwater body, provides an opportunity to examine issues 
relating to the geographical scale. The project started slowly with an extended 
start-up phase of 18 months. Its progress accelerated rapidly from October 
2004 onwards with support from a newly recruited team of Technical 
Advisors. The project has received two independent annual reviews and a 
mid-term review of progress.  
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The unpinning rationale of the aims of both ILM and IFMP is that improved 
management of threatened lake resources will lead to a reduction in these 
threats, a halt in the decline of the resource base, an increase in resource 
productivity leading to increased benefits for resource dependent people, 




The implementation of a system of co-management for inland fisheries in the 
EAC has clear poverty reduction aims with direct beneficiaries such as men 
and women fisheries resource users and their families who are dependent on 
fisheries for their livelihoods. Of these, the most clearly disadvantaged and 
poorer groups within communities are the fishing crews and women. These 
therefore constitute primary targets for poverty reduction and empowerment 
efforts and make up the large majority (>75%) of the total number of people 
directly involved in fisheries activities.  
 
Women play a very important role in the post harvest sector through 
processing and trading but they also have the potential to become more 
closely associated with fish capture if their role as future boat owners is 
promoted. There is strong evidence that women must be included as primary 
beneficiaries if there is to be a positive impact on reducing intra-household 
poverty.  
 
Since the livelihoods of people in fisheries communities are heavily dependent 
on the state of fish stocks, these communities have a clear, direct stake in the 
sustainability of fisheries based on these stocks. The co-management 
approach has therefore focused on the development of institutional and legal 
mechanisms to improve fisheries governance through the formation of BMUs 
to ensure that these stakeholders, particularly the marginalised poor, are able 
to engage in, and influence decision-making processes relating to fisheries 
management.  
 
A number of other groups are dependent on fishing and related activities, 
including boat owners, traders, processors, gear producers and boat builders. 
These, together with a wider population of fish consumers, are all target 
beneficiaries who will gain from a more secure resource base and improved 
facilities and services at fish landings and in associated fisheries 
communities. There are also other beneficiaries who provide various services 
to fisheries stakeholders; these include credit providers, shop-keepers and 
government services involved in the sector.  
 
Principal institutional stakeholders include fisheries departments and research 
institutes, training institutes and NGOs. These will benefit through either 
improved physical capacities or enhanced human resource skills, or in some 
cases through both.  
 
Private industry associated with fish processing and export is also a major 
stakeholder, including its employees, and one which benefits greatly not only 
from improved fisheries resources management, fish quality and market   5
efficiencies but also by being integrated into decision-making management 
structures. 
 
ENABLING ENVIRONMENT  
 
Several key factors, ranging from geographical, institutional and political to 
environmental, social and economic, have positively influenced the 
development and implementation of a major policy shift towards adopting a 
fisheries co-management approach in the EAC. These factors are 
summarised below.  
  
Geographical 
Geographically, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are direct neighbours 
encircling the shared Lake Victoria where the three borders meet at a single 
point (Fig 1). The lake itself is increasingly becoming a symbol of unity and 
strong cooperation between the three Partner States. The region also 
contains other internationally shared lakes with countries bordering the EAC, 
including lakes Albert and Edward between Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Lake Tanganyika between Tanzania, DRC, 
Zambia, Burundi, Lake Nyasa between Tanzania, Malawi and Mozambique 
and Lake Turkana between Kenya and Ethiopia. These shared lakes offer the 
potential for the possible future establishment of regional lake management 
institutions and geographically wider harmonisation of fisheries co-
management approaches and structures. In addition, the coastal States of 
Kenya and Tanzania provide an opportunity for the spread of co-management 
structures to marine fisheries. 
 
 
Fig 1  Map showing Partner States of the East African Community 
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Institutional  
The Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Uganda and the United Republic of 
Tanzania signed a Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community in 1999. The formal institutional linkage of these three Partner 
States of the EAC and the presence of a major shared water body, Lake 
Victoria, have played a key role in harmonising fisheries policy and legislation 
both within and beyond the boundary of the lake basin. In November 2006, 
the Republics of Burundi and Rwanda were admitted to join the EAC. The 
long-term aim of the EAC is to achieve political, economic social and cultural 
integration in order to improve the quality of life for people in East Africa 
through increased competitiveness, value-added production, trade and 
investments.  
 
On Lake Victoria, the Lake Victoria Basin Commission was recently 
established to coordinate broad areas of development within the lake basin. 
Prior to this, the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO) was formed 
through a Convention signed in 1994 by the three EAC Partner States out of 
the need to manage fisheries resources of Lake Victoria in a coordinated 
manner. The LVFO Convention sets out the structure and functions of the 
Organisation. The LVFO brings together Heads of national fisheries 
institutions (management and research) to consult, share ideas and develop 
harmonised policies, plans and laws not only for Lake Victoria but quite often, 
nationally. Consequently, a fishery is one of the most closely harmonised of 
all sectors in EAC and the LVFO is recognised for bringing harmony and 
efficiency to the very competitive sector of capture fisheries. 
 
The LVFO is the largest and most well known lake management organisation 
in the EAC. There are, however, other smaller organisations established in 
different forms in recent years but all basically following an ecosystem 
management approach. Such organisations are also being considered as 
possible institutional development options on lakes shared with countries 
outside the EAC, for example, on lakes Edward, Albert and Tanganyika. 
 
Political  
The socialist approach adopted by the national political system in Tanzania 
provided a broader enabling context for community participation in fisheries 
management, particularly on Lake Victoria. It is here that the first community 
fisheries groups known as Beach Management Units were formed. The BMU 
concept served as a catalyst in developing a fisheries co-management 
approach in the other Partner States of Kenya and Uganda.  
 
The broad democratic principles of participation, social responsibility, fairness, 
transparency, accountability and selflessness have been increasingly 
articulated in national development frameworks, especially in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers produced in recent years by each Partner State. 
The idea of democracy as being not only about political systems, particularly 
at election times, but also about routine daily life practices, has had a major 
influence in shaping fisheries institutional development of the grassroots 
BMUs. During their recent formation or reformation, key fisheries governance 
concerns about sharing responsibility and powers and setting up decision-  7
making processes were at the fore of people’s attention. In addition, each 
Partner State was fortunate in having charismatic individuals who served as 
positive forces for political and policy change at national and local levels.  
 
Environmental  
Over recent decades, increasing environmental threats have resulted in both 
real and perceived negative impacts on fisheries resources and dependent 
livelihoods. Fishing effort increased dramatically on most lakes, but 
particularly on Lake Victoria, seen by many as the greatest source of quick 
revenue generation. With few exceptions, most fisheries are formally open-
access with no legal controls in place to prevent entry to fisheries. In addition, 
harmful, illegal fishing and fish trading practices are widespread putting further 
pressure of fish stocks. This combination of environmental threats and 
growing evidence of their negative impacts convinced national authorities that 
it was time to adopt a new management approach involving communities as 




In the late nineties, the EU bans on the Nile perch exports from Lake Victoria 
had immediate, major adverse impacts on fisheries livelihoods and response 
to the ban emerged as a significant change event in relation to future 
community involvement in fisheries management. The marketing bans caused 
a widespread decline in fish production and a dramatic decrease in many 
associated businesses at fish landing sites in all three Partner States. In 
response, the Governments encouraged fishing communities to organise 
themselves to deter and prevent illegal activities associated with the bans. 
The communities immediately recognised the need to take action themselves 
and readily responded to work with Government. Eventually the bans were 
lifted leaving behind the beginnings of what were to become the Beach 




Without the wish and willingness of communities to engage in a fisheries 
management partnership with Government, the adoption and spread of the 
co-management approach would have been impossible. On most lakes, 
threats were similar and stakeholders expressed concerns for the future fish 
stocks and their dependent fisheries. The co-management approach offered 
new hope to effectively address increasing threats.    
 
Development Partner Support 
There is clear evidence that the co-management approach would not have 
been adopted on such a scale and in such a time scale had it not been for 
support from projects funded largely by development partners. This was, and 
still is, at a time when the role and future of projects are seriously being 
questioned and reduced by many development partners and recipient States. 
The preferred approach to providing developmental assistance now involves 
centralised budget support, often involving donor basket funding aligned to a   8
sector wide approach (SWAp) to reduce administration costs and theoretically 
improve capacity building.  
 
In reality, projects of national and/or regional strategic relevance such as ILM 
and IFMP provide a very effective and efficient mode of delivery of 
development assistance with acceptable administrative costs and proven 
track records of building capacities of both Government and the private sector 
at many levels. In the case of ILM, this point was clearly highlighted by DFID 
Advisors in the DFID Annual Review report of ILM, 2003 which stated that 
"…without the project it is unlikely that advances in policy related to complex 
issues around common property resource management in relation to the poor, 
would have been made".  
 
KEY ACHIEVEMENTS  
 
National Fisheries Policies 
In Kenya, a draft National Fisheries Policy has been developed and is 
awaiting submission for Parliamentary approval. In Tanzania, a National 
Fisheries Policy was prepared in 1997 but the DoF intends to update and 
expand it possibly with technical support from the IFMP project. In Uganda, 
the Department of Fisheries Resources developed a National Fisheries 
Policy, with technical and financial support from the ILM project. The policy 
was subsequently approved by Cabinet in 2004. These policies promote, 
guide and support a co-management approach, setting out roles and 
responsibilities of key stakeholders including Government, civil society, the 
private sector and NGOs. 
 
PRSPs 
The fisheries sector in each EAC Partner State operates under the wider 
umbrella of national development frameworks. In all three Partner States, 
significant developments have taken place through revision and updating of 
their national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). The PRSPs 
provide the strategic frameworks which guide national development through 
Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEF) and national sector plans and 
budgets. All three States are striving to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).  Sector plans, and national and regional projects within these 
plans, must be closely aligned to the wider development objectives and 
strategies set out in the PRSPs and must clearly demonstrate their 
contributions to poverty reduction and economic growth.  
 
In Kenya, a new 3-year development framework is set out in the “Economic 
Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, 2003-2006”. This 
Strategy aims to build a modern, prosperous nation through pro-poor growth 
supported by improved democracy, empowerment of people, institutional 
reform and good governance. With regard to capture fisheries, priority actions 
planned within the Economic Recovery Strategy, include formulating a 
comprehensive Fisheries Policy, institutional capacity building, close regional 
cooperation and promotion of bilateral negotiations with the EU and other fish 
importers. Efficient institutions, secure export markets, increased fish catches   9
and increased incomes for fisher families are key expected outcomes of the 
Strategy.  
 
In Tanzania, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty 
(NSGRP), 2005-2010 focuses on poverty reduction and stresses that 
economic growth is necessary but not sufficient for poverty reduction. To 
achieve this equity issues must be addressed under an enabling environment 
of good governance. The NSGRP recognises the significant contribution that 
natural resources play in economic growth and poverty reduction and 
highlights the need to address unsustainable exploitation of these resources 
and to introduce improved co-management of resources by involving 
communities. One of the key aims of the NSGRP is to diversify rural 
livelihoods to relieve increasing pressure on common property resources. An 
issue of direct relevance to capture fisheries is the need to promote improved 
utilisation of nutrient rich foods (e.g. fish), particularly in rural areas. This is 
viewed as being even more urgent given the increased prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS amongst vulnerable groups such as fisheries communities.  
 
The use of child labour in the agricultural sector is identified as a major 
concern, again this is of particular relevance to fisheries. The NSGRP is 
committed to deepening decentralisation, strengthening the capacity of local 
governments and establishing effective participation of civil society in decision 
making, equitable representation in institutions, and fair and accountable 
systems at all levels within and outside Government.  All sectors are expected 
to revisit their respective sector development plans to ensure close alignment 
and coherence of these plans to national prioritised development goals. 
  
In Uganda, the government has prepared its second PRSP, known as the 
“Poverty Eradication Action Plan” (PEAP). The Department of Fisheries 
resources, supported strongly by the ILM project, succeeded in securing the 
recognition that the fisheries sector is a major contributor to poverty reduction 
and economic growth and were able to get fisheries priorities incorporated for 
the first into the PEAP.  Areas of key importance requiring priority support 
included the need to support fisheries co-management, community Beach 
Management Units (BMUs) and Lake Management Organisations; the 
establishment and capacity-building of BMUs to co-manage beaches and 
lakes and improved monitoring and control of illegal practices. 
 
Building and Strengthening Civil Society Organisations 
BMUs were first established in Tanzania on Lake Victoria with the support of 
the Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (LVEMP) which built on 
landing site committees established as a result of the EU bans on Nile perch 
exports in the late nineties. The way that BMUs were set up varied between 
landing sites and there were no clear guidelines or regulations for their 
establishment, structure or operation. As a result, BMUs were not socially 
inclusive, comprised only a small number of people and were not founded 
upon democratic elections or principles.   
 
In Uganda, the DFR, in partnership with the ILM project, recognised the 
opportunity that the concept of BMUs in Tanzania and Kenya offered and   10
began a systematic process to establish fisheries co-management in Uganda 
based on BMUs. This involved the participatory development of national BMU 
guidelines and law over a two-year period. As part of the ILM project, over 
205 BMUs were formed on lakes Kyoga, George and Edward in accordance 
with the national BMU Guidelines and BMU legislation. All BMUs received 
systematic training in how to operate as a BMU and in financial management 
and fisheries management. Through NGO involvement and donor support, a 
small number of BMUs were also established at landing sites on lakes Albert 
and Victoria in accordance with the national guidelines and law. 
 
The experience gained by DFR and ILM in building BMUs in Uganda was 
later systematically applied by the LVFO, with support from the IFMP project, 
on Lake Victoria. In 2004, the LVFO agreed to develop harmonised guidelines 
for the establishment and operation of BMUs on Lake Victoria. The guidelines 
were supported by the development of national BMU legislation in each 
Partner State. The Ugandan national BMU guidelines provided a solid starting 
point for developing the Lake Victoria Guidelines and national BMU 
regulations in Kenya and Tanzania. The IFMP project went on to support 
LVFO in reforming BMUs on Lake Victoria in Kenya and Tanzania and 
forming BMUs for the first time on the lake in Uganda. By the end of 2006, the 
establishment process was complete and a total of 1,087 BMUs were 
established on Lake Victoria. This was an historic moment for the lake which 
paved the way for fisheries co-management. All BMUs were then trained in 
operating as a BMU and in financial management. BMU training continues 
under the IFMP project. 
 
Reshaping and Strengthening Government Fisheries Institutions 
In Uganda, the DFR and ILM project collaborated closely in developing 
strategies to strengthen fisheries institutions at all levels and to ensure that 
they were well-linked at macro-meso-mico levels. It was agreed that at local 
level, the most effective way to strengthen the public-private partnership 
between BMUs and Government was to build the capacity of local 
government fisheries officers in parallel to BMUs and to use them as agents 
of change in establishing the BMUs. This was undertaken and completed 
successfully on lakes George, Kyoga and Edward. The same process was 
adopted two years later at regional level by the LVFO and the IFMP project on 
Lake Victoria. The process involved training of fisheries officers to serve as 
change agents as part of an extensive awareness creation programme so that 
each landing site was reached by a trained officer, usually a fisheries officer, 
but sometimes officers from other sectors, such as community development. 
 
At a lake wide level (meso-level), DFR and ILM worked with Local 
Governments in fisheries and other sectors (e.g. wetlands, wildlife, forestry, 
NEMA) over a two year period to create the first Ugandan lake management 
organization (LMO) on Lake George called the Lake George Basin Integrated 
Management Organization (LAGBIMO). This new institution was based on 
existing institutional mechanisms which allowed district governments to form 
associations. It went further by incorporating BMUs in all its structures.  
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Although the process of forming LAGBIMO was supported financially and 
technically by the ILM project, the resultant structure was decided by its 
stakeholders. The project cautioned against building a structure too large that 
it becomes unaffordable but the warning was not heeded (see Section 5.3). 
The funding of LAGBIMO was agreed to be from contributions by its 
members, i.e. local governments and BMUs.  
 
The process was later repeated on Lake Kyoga where the Lake Kyoga 
Integrated Management Organisation (LAKIMO) was formed in 2003. Here, 
despite being a much larger lake, the institutional building process took less 
time because of lessons learned from Lake George. A major difference 
between the lakes was in the number of BMUs, on George there were only 8, 
whereas on Kyoga there were 192. This meant that BMUs had to form 
associations at higher levels to enable democratic representation at the 
highest lake wide level in LAKIMO. These LMOs provide institutional linkages 
between central and grassroots fisheries management institutions and bring 
together national institutions, local governments and communities who have a 
stake in lake resources.  
 
In all three Partner States, there are intentions to reform fisheries 
management structures at a national level to improve efficiencies in service 
delivery, retain direct control of revenues raised from the fisheries sector and 
broaden stakeholder representation in decision-making bodies on how these 
funds are utilized for management and development. In Tanzania, this 
process covers only marine fisheries whilst in Kenya and Uganda, it covers 
inland fisheries.  
 
The ILM project provided technical support to DFR in developing the 
proposed structure, functions and financing of the Uganda Fisheries Authority 
(UFA). Technical support was also provided by the IFMP to promote UFA and 
to help the Department of Fisheries design the Kenya Fisheries Development 
Authority (KFDA). These new Authorities, when established, will link closely 
with the LVFO and other lake management organizations. Approval has been 
given by Government for the establishment of UFA but its legal establishment 
is dependent on Parliamentary approval of the new Fisheries Bill. The national 
elections in Uganda slowed progress in presenting the Fisheries Bill to 
Parliament but this is expected to take place during the coming year 
(2006/07). There still remain questions on transitional funding of UFA in its 
first years of operation. In Kenya, The KFDA policy and legislation, developed 
with IFMP technical support, have not yet been submitted for Parliamentary 
approval.      
 
Developing and Harmonising Enabling Laws 
The development of supportive legislation providing legal identity and power 
to fisheries institutions at micro-meso-macro levels was regarded by national 
fisheries institutions, ILM and IFMP as being essential for the establishment of 
a functional fisheries co-management system. This involved the development 
of BMU regulations in each partner State, the updating of national Fisheries 
Acts, developing legal recognition for regional lake management 
organisations e.g. LVFO through its Convention and, in Uganda, LAGBIMO   12
and LAKIMO through their Constitutions; legal empowerment of new Fisheries 
Authorities e.g. UFA and KFDA. With regard to national Fish Acts, Tanzania 
has developed and recently updated Act in 2003, Uganda is awaiting 
submission of its Fisheries Bill to Parliament and Kenya is in the process of 
finalising an updated Fisheries bill for submission to Parliament. ILM and 
IFMP provided technical support in drafting Bills in Uganda and Kenya 
respectively. 
 
Legislation empowering community BMUs in Uganda was enacted in 2003, 
BMU regulations were approved in Tanzania in 2005 and Kenya has 
developed a very detailed set of highly supportive BMU regulations awaiting 
submission for approval. The ILM project supported Uganda whilst the IFMP 
supported Kenya and Tanzania in these legislative developments. 
 
On Lake Victoria, the IFMP project is supporting LVFO harmonise a variety 
national laws relating to fishing gears, fishing methods, licensing procedures, 
gazetting landing sites, control of fishing effort in order to improve 
management.  
 
Developing Linked Planning Systems and Plans 
In Uganda, the draft Fisheries Bill sets out the mechanisms for a well-linked 
fisheries planning system. In this system the national Fisheries Sector 
Strategic Plan (FSSP) is generally aligned to the PEAP (Uganda PRSP) and 
provides the umbrella framework for lake management plans e.g. by 
LAGBIMO and LAKIMO, District Fisheries Plans and BMU plans. Apart from 
the fact that a national plan is essential for putting policy and legislation into 
practice, added stimulus to develop such plans came from the new way of 
acquiring donor support through central budget support and basket funding 
using a sector wide approach (SWAp). The national strategic plan appears to 
have become the required entry point for receiving such support. ILM devoted 
considerable effort and resources in not only helping DFR develop a draft 
FSSP but also the lake management plans of LAGBIMO and LAKIMO. These 
plans were incorporated logical frameworks with indicators relating directly to 
key governance issues. This was a key way to ensure that improvements in 
fisheries governance were explicitly measured and monitored as part of 
government planning systems.   
 
Also in the area of local government development planning, ILM was 
influential in ensuring improved integration of ENR concerns into the final draft 
of the national Harmonised Participatory Planning Guide for Parishes and in 
promoting the need for better integration of ENR in development policies and 
plans within local government. ILM also made important contributions to the 
national poverty studies by providing clearer poverty environment linkages.  
 
On Lake Victoria, the IFMP project modified its design indicators during the 
Inception Phase to introduce a set that more closely related to making 
improvements on fisheries governance issues relating to representation, 
power sharing and more equitable share of access to and benefits from 
fisheries. The project focused its support in planning at regional level by   13
helping LVFO to develop planning structures and systems which have 
produced many significant outputs in the last two years.  
 
These have included regionally harmonised guidelines for setting up and 
operating BMUs. The guidelines contain an agreed BMU performance 
monitoring system with process indicators related to governance issues of 
participation of marginalised groups in decision-making, and to the 
transparency and accountability of BMU operations. Other key regional 
planning documents include MCS guidelines which are particularly important 
for directing patrol operations; LVFO Standard Operating Procedures for 
collecting and analysing fisheries and socio-economic information; regional 
strategies for Communication, HRD and HIV/Aids in fisheries; Regional Plans 
of Action for IUU and Managing Fishing Capacity. The latter is the first of its 
kind globally for inland fisheries.  All of these regionally harmonised plans and 
guidelines are being used to guide extensive field activities on the lake in the 
three Partner States.  
 
Collection and Analysis of Information for Planning and Management 
Regular collection of monitoring information to assess the state of fish stocks 
and understand the environmental, social and economic impacts of 
management measures is an essential component of any fisheries 
management plan. The means of collecting such information can vary greatly 
depending on many factors but size of the system is one of the key 
influencing factors. On the relatively small Lake George, the ILM project 
established a fisheries information collection and analysis system which 
closely involved the communities themselves.  
 
On the very much larger Lake Victoria, a wider range of fisheries surveys 
were established using regional Standard Operating Procedures for trawl, 
hydro-acoustic, gill-net, light-fishing and periodic census surveys. 
Communities were involved in catch assessment surveys but not as closely 
as on the smaller lake. Lake Victoria also provided a more reliable time series 
of data upon which to base fish stock assessment. The IFMP project provided 
technical assistance to develop an innovative Fisheries Management Decision 
Support Tool (FMDST) to help managers take important management 
decisions secure in the knowledge that data upon which the decision was 
based, were collected and analysed in manner agreed across the three 
Partner States. This was viewed as particularly important by the LVFO given a 
history, prior to IFMP, of disputed data and conflicting views on stock status.      
 
Participatory Control of Access to Fisheries 
With increasing human populations, the open access nature of fisheries has 
attracted many newcomers to lake fisheries resulting in at least a doubling of 
fishing effort on many lakes over the past decade. Since the mid-1990s, there 
have been signs of decline in many of the dominant fisheries, with classic 
indications such as declining catch per unit effort, a reduction in age/length at 
maturity, higher mortality, and an increased proportion of immature fish in the 
catches. The ILM project worked on two very different lakes with regard to 
access control. Lake George was a “controlled” lake with a limit on the 
number of fishing boats and nets allowed on it by central government. This   14
system had been in place since the fifties and there widespread 
dissatisfaction with the way it operated. In contrast, on the larger, Lake Kyoga 
there was no limit on boat or gear numbers.  
 
As part of deepening decentralisation, the DFR delegated responsibility for 
fisheries licensing to local governments and ILM seized the opportunity to 
help DFR go further by involving BMUs in the licensing process and to use 
licensing as a local management tool. A system was established that vetted 
all applicants, provided allocations to women and crew as well as the 
traditionally dominant boat owners and spread access by allowing only one 
boat license per household and favoured locally resident households rather 
than outsiders. The new system had massive impact on peoples’ attitudes 
and perception, and for many people this was the first time that they realized 
the potential power of the new co-management system on their livelihoods. 
The new participatory system of licensing positively addressed key 
governance, poverty and gender issues.      
 
Unfortunately, the project did not have time to establish the same system on 
Lake Kyoga but the IFMP project and LVFO have realized that a similar 
approach might provide major benefits on Lake Victoria especially for the 
more threatened species such as Nile perch. Consequently, the draft RPOA-
Capacity document for Lake Victoria included options of using fisheries 
licensing in a participatory manner as a means of controlling effort and 
access.  
 
Sustainable Financing of Co-Management Institutions  
Sustainable financing of fisheries institutions at all levels is essential for their 
functioning and survival. Funding by Government is seriously inadequate in 
Kenya and Uganda, highlighting the urgent need for fiscal reforms within the 
fisheries sector. In Tanzania, the Fisheries Division established a Fisheries 
Retention Scheme deriving funds from levies and royalties on fish exports 
from Lake Victoria (Nile perch) and marine waters. It uses these funds to 
support priority fisheries programmes.  
 
More recently, a Deep Sea Fisheries Authority has been established in 
Tanzania which will retain revenue from the marine fisheries EEZ to be used 
for management and development purposes. In Uganda and Kenya, the 
national fisheries institutions are intending to establish more autonomous 
national Fisheries Authorities with powers to directly retain revenue generated 
by fisheries and use it to fund fisheries activities.  
 
All sources of revenue for fisheries management which are, or will be, 
generated directly from fisheries will be based on a “User Pays Principle”. 
This principle is being applied to the fish export industry in the three Partner 
States. Studies on establishing a Fish Levy Trust by levying a fee on the 
export of Nile perch from Lake Victoria were undertaken with support from 
LVEMP and a regional synthesis report made recommendations for regional 
harmonisation. In July 2006, a levy on the export of fish and fish products was 
agreed for the first time in Uganda but has yet to be implemented. Once 
implemented, the next step will be to agree on how funds are distributed   15
between institutions and programmes and who will take decisions on these 
funding allocations.   
 
The User Pays principle also applies to the revenue generating powers 
bestowed upon BMUs through regional and national BMU guidelines and 
national legislation. In two countries, Uganda and Tanzania, in addition to 
revenue raised by BMUs through charging user fees, the District Local 
Governments operate fisheries tax collection systems that are tendered out to 
private individuals as a means of raising local tax revenue. The funds raised 
in this way are not normally reinvested in fisheries management or 
development but diverted to other priority development programmes such as 
health and education.     
 
In Uganda, the DFR and ILM documented many harmful and exploitative 
impacts of the fisheries tendering system and developed ways to avoid these 
through legislation in the draft Fisheries Bill. Through the Bill, the fisheries 
tendering system will be replaced by a BMU-operated Landing Site User Fee 
(LSUF) which will generate considerable funds not only for the BMU and its 
higher committees for local fisheries management, but also for Local 
Governments, and for the emerging Uganda Fisheries Authority. At the same 
time, it will reduce the tax burden on poor fishermen and traders. IFMP is 
currently supporting LVFO in examining options for sustainable financing of 
BMUs and all other LVFO structures. 
 
Promoting a Savings Culture in Fisheries Communities 
While fishing has become much more important economically over the past 
three decades, the benefits have not been equally distributed so that poverty 
remains high within fishing communities and there is little sign of a savings 
culture to accumulate any wealth earned from fisheries. The ILM and IFMP 
projects therefore focused effort on promoting and guiding BMUs in opening 
and running BMU bank accounts as part of a training module on financial 
management given to almost 1,300 BMUs. Many BMUs established under 
ILM subsequently went on to open and run bank accounts supported and 
guided by local government fisheries officers. The same is currently 
happening on Lake Victoria under the IFMP project. This is viewed as the first 
step towards attracting more banking facilities closer to landing sites and the 
opening of accounts by individuals of BMUs as well as the BMU as an 
organization. 
 
Participatory Enforcement of Fisheries Rules and Laws 
As fishing effort increases and catches per fishermen decline, fishermen often 
resort to illegal methods and gears to maintain their catches and incomes, 
inevitably catching smaller, often immature and less valuable fish. Actions to 
address this issue were similar under ILM and IFMP involving the 
establishment of transparent, accountable patrol operations undertaken at 
inter-district level and involving BMU representatives in patrols. On Lake 
Victoria, given its size and international boundaries, patrol activities were also 
undertaken at national level. It was, however, realized by the IFMP project 
that even this participatory approach may not be enough to significantly 
reduce widespread illegal activities. The project is therefore currently adopting   16
a “carrot and stick” approach. In addition to the punitive patrol approach, the 
project is introducing incentives and rewards for achieving local reductions in 
illegal activities by BMUs and Local Governments. It is also exploring practical 
and cost effective ways to transform illegal fishing operations into profitable 
legal enterprises. 
 
Securing Fish Resources  
The numerous institutional, social and legislative achievements made as part 
of developing a co-management approach in the EAC are expected to secure 
or improve the fish resource base. Monitored fish resources by the ILM project 
on Lake George revealed no clear evidence of healthier fish stocks or 
increased abundance. On Lake Victoria, there is also no clear evidence that 
improved management has resulted in increased fish productivity. It is, 
however, a little early to expect such major improvements in such a short time 
on large lakes such as Victoria. What is more clear is that many of the 
institutional, social and legislative processes are fitting into place to induce 
improvements in the fish resources. 
 
Improving Infrastructure and Services at Landing Sites 
There are few support services available for fisheries communities living at 
landing sites and associated villages. As a result, education levels are 
generally low and there are very poor health, water, sanitation services and 
feeder roads. There is also inadequate fisheries infrastructure for fish handling 
processing and storage. In response, the IFMP project has directed a 
considerable proportion of its resources to improving working and living 
conditions of fisheries communities through improved infrastructures. 
 
Reducing HIV/AIDS in Fisheries Communities 
There is an on-going human disaster within the fisheries communities of the 
EAC caused by HIV/AIDS and the effects are far more prevalent than in most 
other places in the region. Not only does the disease cause immense 
suffering to infected individuals and their dependents but also has major 
harmful impacts on the fisheries labour force as a whole. Sadly, insufficient 
attention is still being paid to this crucial issue. The ILM and IFMP projects 
therefore took upon themselves the tasks of highlighting this issue.  
 
Since the design and budgets of both projects did not provide resources to 
directly tackle the HIV/AIDS problem, the projects actively engaged with 
agencies to attract interventions and support to fisheries communities. The 
ILM project attracted a DFID-funded research project on HIV/AIDS in fisheries 
communities on the major lakes of Uganda. In collaboration with DFR, this 
later led to the development of a national Strategy and Action Plan to address 
HIV/AIDS in fisheries communities in Uganda.  
 
Similarly, IFMP supported LVFO in bringing together various organizations to 
establish a network of institutions which had expertise to address HIV/AIDS in 
Lake Victoria fisheries communities and a Strategy and Action Plan was 
developed specifically to address HIV/AIDS in fisheries communities on the 
lake. This has been followed by a regional initiative under the Lake Victoria 
Basin Commission funded by SIDA and implemented through a regional   17
NGO, African Medical Research Foundation (AMREF). As legally recognized 
civil society organizations, BMUs provide particularly useful institutional entry 




Resistance to Improved Governance 
Good governance provides the general conditions within which economic 
growth, well-being and poverty reduction take place. One of the greatest 
challenges facing the sustainability of a co-management approach is to 
ensure that policies are actually put into practice in accordance with laws and 
guidelines, and that they are not “hijacked” by more powerful members in rural 
society, political leaders or domineering government officials or private 
individuals whose self interests may overrule sustainable and equitable use of 
fisheries resources. These are governance issues facing all sectors not just in 
natural resources management.  
 
A recent assessment of BMU performance on lakes George and Kyoga 
commissioned by the IFMP project, two years after ILM project assistance 
ended, found that BMUs have successfully been able to perform most of their 
functions to one degree or another. It was found that BMUs can effectively: 
•   Continue to organise themselves, hold meetings, improve social 
harmony within the fishing communities and act as fora for collective 
prioritisation of beach development, and conflict resolution between 
multiple stakeholders.   
•   Collect some revenues, account for them transparently, and utilise 
funds raised for effective Beach development and social programmes. 
•   Ensure some reasonable degree of social inclusion for poorer 
members, including fishing crew and women, and provide occasional 
support to poorer members of the community, in times of need, and 
•   Contribute to the control of illegal fishing gears and methods. 
 
However, there were very few BMUs that had effectively achieved all of the 
above, whereas quite a number had successfully performed some, but not all 
of these responsibilities.  
 
The study confirmed that governance needs to be improved, and can only be 
improved by gradual, determined and concerted local effort, and by making 
decision-making systems and processes as transparent and accountable as 
possible. This, in turn, requires the following: 
 
•   Expect resistance to change by those who wielded influence and 
power prior to the change process. These are likely to be from within 
communities themselves as well as in government and politics; 
•  Use new legal powers, especially by poor and marginalised 
stakeholders, to counter any resistance to improved governance and 
management;  
•   Keep information of all kinds flowing to relevant stakeholders to allow 
them to be aware of decisions and events that affect their livelihoods;   18
•   Ensure that the democratic power of the BMU Assembly is not eroded 
and taken over by a minority in the BMU committee; 
•   Using information flows, it is imperative to monitor the performance of 
local leaders in BMUs or government and, when necessary, bring them 
to account so that any abuse of office or power can no longer be done 
with impunity. This means tackling malpractice and corruption with 
more forceful disciplinary measures, paying particular attention to 
financial processes within communities and government.  
•   Build strategic alliances to counter resistance to change by informing, 
engaging and influencing key political leaders from the outset, 
especially in programmes involving the need for legislative change.  
 
Mentoring & monitoring  
The IFMP project learned from ILM experience by setting up extensive BMU 
mentoring and monitoring programmes. These were considered vitally 
important to steer and guide the newly emerging civil society BMUs and 
ensure that improved governance and management were not undermined by 
illegal activities of local or central elite. 
 
Government decentralisation  
With the exit of the ILM project from Uganda, the new lake management 
organisations (LAGBIMO and LAKIMO) struggled to operate and even 
survive. This was due mainly to the failure of Local Governments to meet their 
financial commitments to maintain small secretariats of these organisations 
and provide support to lake wide activities. Little support to these LMOs was 
also provided by national government. The evidence indicates that 
decentralisation does not automatically lead to improved natural resources 
management and the potential benefits of decentralisation are not always 
easily attained.   
 
Certainly during the life of ILM, limited capacity in many areas of local 
government and the slow release of funds and their accountability delayed the 
implementation activities. In many cases, Local Governments, clearly needed 
effective guidance from central government on developing and implementing 
systems, for example, for monitoring and evaluation, community-based 
planning and financial management. However, ILM did work well with all the 
local governments on George and Kyoga and would not have been able to 
implement the approach without their co-operation and dedication.  
 
In light of ILM experience, the LVFO and IFMP are currently considering the 
potential roles of Local Governments and BMU associations in meso-level 
structures of LVFO.  
 
PRSPs as Financial Drivers of Development  
In Uganda, the explicit intention of incorporating fisheries into the PEAP was 
to gain the acknowledgement from central budget controllers of the 
importance of fisheries to the country and to obtain justified increases in 
budget allocations directed towards prioritized, decentralized, programmes 
through the conditional grant system adopted by other programmes such as 
health, education, roads etc. Despite detailed evidence provided in the PEAP   19
of the significant contributions made by capture fisheries to national poverty 
reduction and economic growth, there was no subsequent increase in funding 
to fisheries sector. On the contrary, budget support decreased in the following 
year. This in turn meant that the DFR could not undertake its duties to 
adequately promote, guide and support the emerging and vulnerable lake 
management institutions and BMUs. This experience highlights that 
continually lobbying is needed to obtain adequate budget allocations even 
when fisheries priorities are explicitly incorporated in PRSPs. 
 
Importance of Projects as Effective Donor Support  
Experiences and outcomes from ILM and IFMP projects clearly demonstrate 
the effectiveness and efficiencies of the delivery of donor assistance to 
developing countries. The role of a well designed project, with clear strategic 
relevance to national or regional policy and development frameworks is 
currently being downplayed or ignored by many donors and recipients. The 
abilities of ILM and IFMP to work at all institutional levels – micro, meso and 
macro – and to ensure linkages were formed and strengthened between all 
levels with feedback loops to inform further policy and legislative 
development, are achievements that cannot normally be attained by the 
preferred donor budget support mechanism. 
 
Continued donor support is crucially important at this transitional stage in 
shifting from centralised to participatory fisheries management, when 
institutional development and capacity building costs are high. The pace of 
change is also not always easy to predict, especially where political reform 
processes and legislative changes are involved, but clearly a longer than 
normal time horizon is needed to assure continuity in co-management 
development, capacity building and implementation.  
 
Scale of Co-Management Initiatives  
The approach to BMU formation taken on lakes Kyoga and Victoria was 
necessarily top-down, based on overarching and supportive policies and laws. 
It was an approach based not on small-scale management crises but one 
which required effective and extensive outreach to reach numerous, scattered 
communities. This is not to say that important lessons were not learned when 
scaling up the implementation of ILM on Lake George to Lake Kyoga and then 
to Victoria. On the contrary, many institutional and legislative lessons were 
transferred resulting in substantial savings in costs and time. ILM experience 
also proved invaluable in designing and implementing the outreach 
programme on Lake Victoria. This showed that there was sufficient flexibility 
in the system to allow appropriate tailoring to suit the needs of lakes of any 
size.   
 
Legal Empowerment of Communities 
A key lesson was the crucial importance in acquiring legal empowerment of 
community organisations, which, in the EAC are BMUs. Without legal identity 
and power, these new groups are very vulnerable to local leaders who may 
not wish to see improvements in local governance and management. Legal 
identity is also crucial to demonstrating clearly the mandate of BMUs within 
local government systems. The development of BMU legislation provides a   20
vehicle for addressing explicitly issues of governance, gender and social 
poverty through, for example, the legal allocation of places on decision 
making BMU committees for women and boat crew.  
 
Valuation of Fisheries Benefits 
In order to attract Government and development partner investments, and to 
get priorities embedded in PRSPs, reliable economic evaluations are needed 
of the contributions made by fisheries to poverty reduction and economic 
growth and to show how these are shared between different stakeholders.  
 
Sustainable Fisheries Financing  
The sustainable financing of fisheries management institutions is a rather 
obvious lesson but nevertheless a very important one. It is also one that is 
sometimes ignored during the initial process of developing new institutions or 
modifying existing ones. It can be a process that often takes longer than 
expected, especially when legislative amendments are needed, so it is wise to 
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ABSTRACT  
 
This paper discusses fisheries management reforms through involving local level 
institutions (LLFI). It is based on studies which were undertaken on Tanzania’s Lake 
Victoria fishery where LLFIs were established through the formation of Local 
enforcement Units, later named Beach Management Units (BMU), between 1998 
and 2002.  The paper takes the view that the overfishing problems that confront 
Tanzania’s fisheries management authorities are best understood from a social 
science perspective.  The argument is that most communities’ values and institutions 
are embedded in their societies.  The same is however, not true for externally 
originated management tools and systems as is the case with BMUs.  This paper 
shows that the BMUs established between 1998 and 2002, were not sufficiently 
grounded in their socio-cultural environment and this led them to be unsustainable 
and ineffective.  The paper demonstrates that this mismatch by examining the 
different historical and social contexts in which livelihoods such as fishing emerged 
and was carried out.  These social contexts generated social values that explain the 
individual behaviour of community members.  It is such values that communities 
always strive to maintain in any activity including fishing.  Thus, when confronted 
with situations that threaten these values, communities strategize or negotiate ways 
to cope. The coping strategies of two communities riparian to the lake are discussed. 
The paper therefore proposes a framework for making these units ‘fit’ local 
conditions in order to make them effective and sustainable so as to reform fisheries 
management. 
 
Key Words: Fisheries Management, Co-management, Institutions, Lake Victoria, 




In their quest to address the problem of overfishing world wide (Pauly et al. 1998), 
social scientists have argued strongly for the inclusion of fishers in the management 
process (c.f. Kooiman et al 2005; Wilson et al. 2003).  Social scientists view fishers 
as social beings whose behaviour is embedded within a set of socio-cultural values, 
norms and knowledge defined by the community in which they belong and where 
they attain their identities, beliefs and actions (Granovetter 1985; Kurien 2001).  
These values define their power structures and guide their actions as they relate to 
natural resources such as fish.  Capturing these values by involving the fishers in the 
management of their own resource leads them to take more responsibility for 
sustainable fisheries exploitation. Central to the participation of fishers in fisheries 
management is the issue of institutions
1.  It is through institutions that behaviour is 
defined and order is achieved.  
 
One strategy of trying to address the issue of social forces in management structures 
has been the development of co-managerial strategies.  That means incorporating 
the ‘civil society’ (Jentoft and McCay 2003) in fisheries management.  But it is not 
just a matter of bringing the civil society into the management process per se, but a 
proper design of such participation is required to enable effective community-based 
                                                 
1 In this paper, institutions are defined as regularized pattern of behaviour that emerges from underlying 
structures   3
fisheries management.  The design has, among other things, to deal with issues of 
legitimacy (Jentoft, 1999) and property rights. Share out of management 
responsibilities among stakeholders is essential here which requires an 
understanding of institutions operating within the stakeholder community.  These 
include institutional histories and social context (Jentoft and Mikalsen 2003).  This is 
to say that institutions operate within a particular socio-cultural context. Whether they 
are created or built on old ones, institutions must correspond with their local 
environment.  The argument is that institutions if they are made to operate within a 
given social and cultural context, they will work well.  Fisheries cooperatives are 
given as an example of such institutions that have often been unable to adjust to the 
institutional forms at the community level (Jentoft 1986).   
 
This paper discusses the formulation of a co-management regime in the Lake 
Victoria fishing (Tanzania) communities.  The paper examines the set up of the 
regime which occurred during the period 1998 – 2002 by forming Beach 
Management Units (BMU). These BMUs are here referred to as local level fisheries 
institution (LLFI).  The premise is that the principles of co-management are not 
necessarily new to local communities but have been operative as of the local 
institutional fabric.  However, co-management was set up with very minimal 
recognition of the institutional forms that exist at the community level and this led to 
their poor performance that warranted their reformation.  The challenge for 
advocates of co-management therefore is to design it in a way that its structure is 
sensitive to the local cultures.   
 
The paper begins by a theoretical perspective of understanding communities.  This is 
then followed by a discussion on community values and how these values were 
studied. A discussion on how these values originated and are used in community 
activities is then presented, this is then discussed in the light of the established 
BMUs, we discuss the pitfalls of the BMU regime based on the use of the community 
values.  We finally draw a conclusion and lessons for co-management. 
 
EMBEDDED INSTITUTIONS: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
The notion of embeddedness (Polanyi, 1957 Granovetter, 1992) is used here to 
understand the local social set-up.  Embeddedness has been presented as the 
contextualization of economic activity in on-going patterns of social relations 
(Granovetter  1985).  This notion seeks to show that economic exchange is 
embedded in and defined by complex social processes. Thus, from this perspective 
economic behaviour such as fishing is embedded in wider social relations.  In fact 
Coser and Rosenberg (1957) argued that the maximization of favourable attitudes 
from others would thus be the counterpart in sociological theory to the maximization 
of profit in economic theory.  When relating to others or the environment, individuals 
will not act to safeguard their individual interests but to safeguard their social 
standing, claims and assets, which the individual acquires through his/her 
membership of a community or group. It is this group or community that defines his 
or her social standing, claims and assets.  The community or group has designed a 
behaviour pattern and so by living in the community or group the individual acquires 
the pattern or way of doing things of the community and this is internalized 
(Durkheim 1974) and becomes an individual’s behaviour.  So, the way an individual   4
actually behaves and what others see in his/her behaviour is in essence the 
community in him/her (Ibid).   
 
More generally Berger and Luckmann (1972: 72)., when discussing the origins of 
institutions, argue the same with regard to institutions: “Institutions …by the very fact 
of their existence control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of 
conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that 
would theoretically be possible.”   
 
This argument does not negate or oppose the idea of an individual being responsible 
for what he/she does, in fact what happens is that as an individual socializes in the 
community or group to which he/she belongs, the individual becomes conscious of 
the ‘me’ in him/her through expressions and appraisals of his/her community or 
group members (Mead 1934).  He/she is motivated to achieve a positive image of 
him/herself by winning the acceptance and status of the group or community.  
 
People are profoundly sensitive to the expectations of others so all actions are 
inevitably guided by these expectations (Coser and Rosenberg 1957).  It is further 
argued that this is a constant component of personality (Ibid).  For this reason, an 
individual will internalize behaviour patterns that make his/her group or community 
appraise him/her favourably.  But he/she can also choose to internalize behaviour 
that causes him/her to be appraised negatively and in this case the community or 
group will exercise negative sanctions such as blame and punishment.  In this case, 
an individual is considered un-socialized, and or a deviant.  For fisheries this means 
that the individual becomes a fisher from primary groups -in this case the ethnic 
community.  Fishing activities practiced are a reflection of what the community has 
defined for fishers.  The type of fishing gear, seasons, areas and types are a 
reflection of the community to which an individual belongs.  When out fishing he/she 
is in another group, the ‘fisher’s group’, in this group he/she acquires the 
characteristics and behaviour that depict the fishers group.   
 
This means that the behaviour of fishers is based on internalized values and norms 
of their community that guides them on how to respond to various situations.  To 
individual community members who are exposed to a proto-realistic world in which 
they can afford the luxury of at least a modicum doubt (Berger and Luckmann 1972), 
the demands of community behaviour are of a higher priority than any other 
demands on behaviour (for instance fisheries authorities behaviour demands). 
Therefore fisheries regulations will in essence be complied with in as far as they do 
not interfere with the “voice” of the community.  Compliance to government fisheries 
laws and regulations is based on how a community perceives them to be legitimate 
(Gezelius 2004).  In addition to this, the community will view participation in a co-
management regime as a means of perpetuating the way a community does things 
rather than introducing new patterns.  As a consequence, if the fisheries regulations 
imposed from the outside are contrary to the way a community do things, the 
community will try to diffuse it by designing a method of presenting their efficiency in 
executing the government fisheries regulations to the fisheries authorities in a 
manner that the latter wants to hear while in reality the opposite is true. 
 
Thus, in order to understand how LLFI’s work as management institutions, it is 
important to understand the traditional and cultural environment in which they   5
operate.  Local communities have different histories on what their existence 
depends.  The manipulation of the natural resources and systems to provide for such 
needs generated varied meanings and the value communities place on them.  Such 
meanings and values have been reflected in the way communities have interacted 
with the environment, with each other and with others external to their community.  
Communities have enacted rules and regulations through which they have interacted 
with the environment (Bromley, 1991). Bromley argues that these rules present 
property rights regimes and include rights and rules.  These rules and regulations 
are nested within a larger unit (Hanna and Jentoft, 1996, Kurien, 2001).  Individual 
behaviour, also those of communities, is therefore well understood from a larger unit 




In order to understand the values of these communities, a study was undertaken in 
2003 to 2004.  The fishing communities studied were the Wakerewe and Kakseru.  
The Wakiseru and Wakerewe are Bantu speaking communities.  The Wakerewe 
currently live in the Ukerewe Island
2 on the lake whereas the Wakiseru presently live 
on the eastern side.  Qualitative methods were used to study these communities. 
The specific study tools used included: Observation, In-depth interview, Historical 
analysis, Kinesics, Focus group discussion, Semi-structured interviews, Venn 
diagrams, Wealth ranking.  Data was generated in two phases.  The first phase 
involved gathering as much information as possible on the social set up of the 
selected communities, patterns of behaviour and the meanings of such behaviour.  
During this phase, information was generated in understanding traditional institutions 
and how they operate within the cultural milieux of these communities. The second 
phase involved generating information on the current LLFI’s.  This involved 
interviews with the members of the communities, leaders of the LLFI’s as well as 
other members of the communities, especially opinion leaders. 
 
The history of these communities reveals that there was a value placed on land and 
cultural and social relations.  The value of land led the members of these 
communities to migrate from several places to where they are presently settled.   
Land was very important because it was mainly used for agriculture to produce food 
and for settlement.  Cattle were yet another capital which became valuable 
especially for the Wakiseru during their migration.  One possible reason could be 
that as they migrated they met the Nilots who were pastoralists and in order to create 
harmony with them, cattle played an important role as giveaway resource in 
exchange for ending hostility and violence.  Cattle were also used for marriage 
between them and the Nilots.  Just like land, cattle were very valuable because it 
guaranteed that there was food from its meat, milk for children, and blood for the 
youth and skin for clothing for the adults. 
 
On cultural and social
3 values, community members adopted distinctive experiences 
while they migrated and mingled with people from other communities and these 
experiences gave them a unique status or reputation.  Such experiences created 
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values which have been deeply rooted in the community or clan institutions.  Their 
life’s perspective tended to be channelled into a limited number of alternative 
patterns.   
 
Each alternative was embedded in local institutions which channel behaviour into 
predictable alternatives.  Some consistence of the value choices can thus be 
detected by observing institutionalized practices.  For instance each of these 
communities is a location of several social institutions and hierarchies.  Each 
institutional setting of importance has a tendency to create a cultural totality with 
distinctive aims and values and each cultural and social sphere has its own capital
4 
(Seppällä 1998).  Such values would for instance include holiness for a religious 
hierarchy which is acquired through a command of memory and interpretation of 
verses from the Bible or Koran and an appropriate behaviour.  The social capitals 
are those that are vested in social relations and enable people to correlate.  Such 
capitals include trust and respect which are expected to be reciprocal in social 
relations.  It is this level of values that have created a socio-cultural environment 
through which community members live and all institutions (economic and natural) 
rooted. In this paper we concentrate on this level of values. 
 
The two communities therefore present themselves as relatively stable locations 
where continuous interaction moulds members in similar direction.  Thus members of 
the community are not directly seen or categorized as a homogeneous mass but this 
is the impression one gets with individual members exhibiting shared norms, values 
and behaviour.  Within the Wakerewe and the Wakiseru, what comes out is a 
complex value system based on a mixture of their past diffused with values brought 
by colonialists.  This value complex is further influenced by the values of the present 
brought by the state and the global community within the realm of sustainable 
development.   
 
In the following we locate seven of these values from the past namely co-operation, 
respect, wisdom, traditional authority, order, continuity of lineage/kinship and trust.  
The values brought by the colonialists state and global community include education, 
competition and religion.  The coming of the colonialists gave a new meaning to the 
past values and is slowly changing the values placed in them.  These values are 
briefly discussed below.   
 
Co-operation 
Holding of this value implied agreeing to work together with the others. This was 
evident in marriages, families, and agricultural practices and in fishing.  It was 
considered a moral value where everybody was expected to exercise without being 
forced into.  In fact it was desirable because as these communities and clans 
migrated and settled in a place, they realized that holding on to one another was 
necessary especially during deaths, wars and farming.  These are also some of the 
ways in which co-operation has been maintained to date.  This value was also seen 
to provide direct benefits to community members for instance in agriculture; - the 
weeding and harvesting together ensured that each family in the clan got food when 
it was ready.  Co-operation during the fishing trip ensure that members of the group 
came home alive and happy.  During arrival from fishing trip, the welcome offered to 
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those who went fishing was an indication of a joyous community or clan to receive 
back their sons. 
 
Traditional authority 
This was universally recognized as a value base.  It was exercised by elders who 
possessed knowledge of history on the community, wisdom (busara), age, elders 
coming from the chiefs clan, family heads (mostly considered to be men), the chief 
and clan leaders.  Historically, influence by individuals with this value was limited by 
the scope of belonging to the community. It demanded respect and the holders were 
expected to exhibit behaviour of a role model in the community where the young 
members of the community could learn how to exercise all other values.   
 
It was a desirable value to hold.  It was also a required value to enable one to be 
appointed, selected or elected to position of leadership. This value has been 
maintained through behaviour where young people consult those possessing this 
value on a variety of issues such as marriage (including counselling), land, family 
relations, and community conflict resolution mechanism and even by those aspiring 
to be politicians consulting to receive approval.    
 
A new meaning has been given to this value, for instance in Ukerewe where the 
District Commissioner is considered to hold this value, community members can 
listen to him.  Any member of the community who exercises calmness, self respect 
and a champion of community interests is also seen to hold it.  Elders are still highly 
seen to hold it regardless of whether they exercise the above-mentioned factors.  
Within the Wakiseru, generosity, which was an important factor for being recognized 
as leader in their clan, plays an important factor for one to be considered to hold this 
value.  A generous person is considered to be one who is able to feed, give free help 
to people and is hospitable.  
 
Respect 
This was a state of being regarded with high honour or esteem.  In the traditional set 
up, to posses this value one had to be able to relate to others in a way that did not 
create anger, animosity, hatred and disunity in the society.  It is a value that had no 
boundary of age, group, sex or clan in possessing it.   
 
There was however a difference among various clans.  Within the Wakerewe, 
individuals who came from the chief’s clan enjoyed a higher level of respect than 
individuals from other clans.   For instance an individual from the former clan was 
received with full attention if he visited any family within the clan.  Activities that were 
being undertaken on that day in the family would temporarily come to a standstill as 
they pay attention to the visitor.  He could be offered a chair to sit and fed extremely 
well, entertained and seen off honourably.  But an individual from a clan other than 
the chief’s would be welcomed when he visits, offered a chair to sit.  Other activities 
would continue as usual, he would be fed if he found those he visited eating.  But to 
both communities, all members of the family had a right to be respected regardless 
of one’s possession of other values.  This was a value that to a great extent 
controlled people’s behaviour, it was highly cherished and nobody wished to be 
termed disrespectful.  It was a value that if one lacked, then he/she would be 
negatively sanctioned through blame, punishment and at times end up in a perpetual 
curse.  Behaviour expected to show respect was exercised differently to different   8
categories of groups, for instance behaviour to elders, youth and strangers was 
clearly distinct.  One could joke, play or argue with peers but not elders. 
 
Wisdom 
Considered as calmness, clear mindedness, being able to give good advice and 
exercising self-restraint.  This is slightly different from other types of values because 
it does not form its own type of hierarchies.  In the traditional society it was a 
privilege for the elders and the aged family heads regardless of their possession of 
other values.  But slowly it degenerated to only being a privilege for a certain group 
of people such as the wealthy or men only.   
 
The wealthy were a source of help to many people and the fact that they could 
understand their needs and offer the needed help showed that they possessed it. It 
could be shown to all people, even the poor who were carefully listened to when they 
expressed their opinion.  In other words, wisdom was and is still being considered as 
having knowledge of the past and being able to use it to confront the present 
challenges and make good judgments and decisions.  Today knowledge is not only 
considered a preserve of the old but also to those who go to school who are able to 
use the school knowledge to confront today’s problems.  Nevertheless, a difference 
still exists between the school knowledge and the old knowledge.  The former is 
considered not to be deeply rooted in the latter but only to an external authority.  
Those who possess school knowledge and are able to integrate it with the latter 
have been considered to be wiser. 
 
Order 
This is a value which is twofold.  Order exists both at the individual and community or 
clan level.  At the individual level, it was considered as the ability to avoid violence 
and cherish peace, and harmony and being able to reach agreement with others.  At 
the community level, it was considered as a state in which community regularized 
pattern of behaviour that was a moral obligation for all members.  In fact it was the 
value in which all other values were directed to, it was like the ultimate goal of the 
community or clan.   
 
Being able to keep a promise as in marriage, exhibiting behaviour as is required of 
one and carrying out activities as has been the practice of the community or clan 
were all considered as being in possession of this value.  But with time, interests 
have not remained static, there have been different interest groups emerging due to 
in and out migration to these communities in the wake of globalization and 
nationalization.  Thus this value is now perceived to be the ability to hold to your 
group interest and remain united with other groups holding different interests. 
 
Continuity of lineage/kinship 
This was and still remains a very important but silent value.  It simply meant ability to 
reproduce.  Women were disadvantaged because they were easily exposed in case 
one did not have this ability because it was easy to note they were not able to 
conceive and give birth.  Men on the other hand although they suffered from this 
inability, they were always covered by having another man with this ability to father 
children with his wife in his name, this was made very secret.    
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This value is still held with high esteem and it is seen during funerals when an old 
man or woman dies all his/her offspring would be counted and publicly announced 
with pride during the funeral.  This is taken as a consolation that although he/she is 
gone, he/she has left a ‘big’ community to carry his name forward.  In addition to this 
there is also extreme joy when a woman gives birth; this has escalated to even births 
outside wedlock involving schoolgirls which was considered as a disgrace during 
those days.  Although in principle birth outside wedlock is not encouraged, when it 
occurs it is never condemned but received very positively.  Some young men who 
are intending to marry would prefer to marry a girl he knows will bear children and 
the only way they confirm this is whether the girl has a baby or not. 
 
Education  
This is a new value brought by the colonialists.  In the traditional society, it was 
considered in terms of knowledge acquired through having lived for a long time and 
gone through different experiences.  Such experiences included clan or community 
migrations, conflicts with other communities, negotiations during marriage periods 
and identification and decision making on best areas to feed animals, fish and hunt.  
But now it is acquired through going to school and receiving a certificate which is 
believed to show that you possess it.   
 
In Ukerewe, this value was not a major influence except when the holder uses it in 
the village context.  In fact many of those who posses this value and come from the 
island are not residing here, some have moved out completely and others only come 
for short visits.  The group which is visible are the teachers in several schools, both 
primary, secondary and one teacher training college, some of these teachers are 
actually from outside the district and they have been posted here by the government.  
They do not have any significant leadership in the community.   
 
There are also other government officers working at the Village level such as the 
Village Executive Officers and Ward Executive Officers.  Their responsibilities are 
vital but salaries are so meagre that they face the same livelihood conditions as the 
rest in the community.  At the District level however, there are more educated people 
some with university degrees and others with college certificates.   
 
This is also true within the Wakiseru but the difference here is that, possessing this 
value yields some extra status; elders who are opinion leaders in the community lend 
a listening ear when a holder of this value speaks.  However, when such a person 
uses this value in a way not to support local prevailing ideas, then the locals isolate 
him and gossip is used as a social control mechanism to alienate him.  Gossip is 
silently prominent in these communities such that it can be considered as an 
important value to marshal support for activities. 
 
Trust 
This was a value assumed to be possessed by all members of the community.  It 
was considered to be the ability to have complete confidence in and believe in the 
honesty and reliability of other community members.  This value was assumed to be 
cultivated through interactions within the community.  It was so crucial that one could 
consider it as the basic value that held the community together.  It is this value that 
has kept the Wakerewe unique and cohesive to date.  The idea of keeping secrets   10
and factors considered in being elected to BMU membership by the local community 
are good examples of holding this value.   
 
Within the Wakiseru, this value was compromised for other values such as land 
when they decided to give their daughters for marriage. They could never keep their 
secrets such as war weapons, traditional charms to overpower opponents among 
others to themselves.  This was because their daughters would reveal them to their 
husbands where they got married.  Within the community this has further been 
compromised by school education which advocates academic objectivity, openness 
and honesty.  In Ukerewe those with education have found it very difficult to 
compromise their new way of life and have responded by keeping away from the 
community and only paying short visits.  
 
Competition  
This can be considered as a completely new value introduced by the colonialists and 
global community.  In fact it can be traced as far back as the time of the Arab traders 
who used ivory to win the support of the chiefs.  It is a value in which the holder 
expresses by acting in a way to outdo another, or take advantage of the inability of 
the other person to get something more than him.   
 
It is evident in the society by people building better houses than others, having more 
certificates than others, and having a control of more people and more land.  It has 
created divisions of people in the community.  This value is considered as an 
impediment to social cohesion but is it highly cherished.  It is a value which is 
considered as useful in an economic sense but it is disembedding the society. 
 
Religion 
Religion is not very recent to these communities although in their history the concept 
existed totally in a different form, for instance Kalungu who was a fishing god was 
only useful during fishing time.  Going to him happened only during times of need 
and not a regularized weekly or daily practice.  The coming of colonialists gave a 
new meaning to this value, holiness which is interpreted as being able to memorize 
verses in the Bible or Koran and an accompanying appropriate behaviour was an 
evidence of possessing this value.   
 
There are two religions within these communities, Islam and Christianity.  Christianity 
is the dominating religion whereas Islam comprises of a small minority. The Christian 
churches have relaxed their rules to accommodate even those considered to be 
Biblically not appropriate to qualify as full members.  For instance the churches 
except preach against polygamy but accept polygamists to attend their services.  In 
both communities this value can be easily used to acquire other values such as 
political authority.  
 
 
Based on these factors, when individuals met for discussion or activity, one ensured 
that these values were upheld.  This was so crucial when talking or doing anything.  
To these communities, it is not only the activity being talked about that was 
perceived to be important but to ensure that these values were not diluted and that 
the activity being undertaken was not given opportunity to erode these values.  This   11
required that all behaviour towards each other should reflect possession of these 
values.   
 
Social relations were considered to be important above all other things.  This is why 
the youth had to carry an elders’ luggage when the latter came across the former, 
the decision of the Chief Mkuru had to be complied with at all times in the 
community.  Possession of natural value such as land and being able to control a big 
labour force was of no consequence if one did not uphold the community values.  
Each one therefore strived to show behaviour that ensured he/she maintained 
his/her social standing in the community.  Fishing, hunting and agriculture were all 
penetrated and customized by social relations, which dictated any outcomes from 
them. 
 
THE MAKING OF INSTITUTIONS  
 
The values discussed above created a perception on what these communities 
considered to be morally right and on this basis rules were formulated reflecting their 
subjectivity (cognitive) on the rules.   Thus the morals of these communities were 
founded on their social relations.  To these communities harmony, unity and peace 
were the primary goals for social relations and constituted what was moral.  Thus 
when rules were formulated, they considered whether such rules would promote 
harmony, peace and unity, or in other words social cohesion.  
 
Elders, who were in most cases the rule makers, would observe during various 
occasions what activities and behaviour promoted social cohesion and when they 
identified one, they would approve of it and promote it in all possible ways to be 
regularized as the way of doing things.  In this way institutions were created.  In 
fishing, the gears used were not necessarily designed with the purpose of 
dependence on fish as the only way to live, but what could be seen from the use of 
such gears was that the community could get food, fish together and maintain the 
morals (harmony, peace and unity).   
 
The rules which were enacted such as avoiding sex by both partners during the 
fishing period, sharing responsibilities while out fishing were all a reflection on 
upholding the community’s values other focusing on the fish.  One may argue that 
this was so because getting fish was not a problem and fish trade had not become 
so important.   
 
However this cannot be true when for instance the Wakerewe took two full moons to 
be out fishing.  Moreover interpersonal relations and networks have been found to be 
more important in trade than just prices and costs (Westerdahl 2001).  Thus all 
institutions had a history and a reason for it.  In most cases the history was linked to 
an occasion or event that the community went through.  During this period, there was 
only one way of perceiving things, the elders’ way. 
 
Institutions were created based on a socio-cultural environment in which the society 
sought to be socially cohesive.  But to maintain this cohesiveness, the various 
cultural practices which gave birth to these institutions had to proceed, these were 
the marriages, the family, the festivities such burial practices and harvest among 
others.     12
 
However, when outsiders such as the Arabs and colonialists came, a different 
environment was created.  Local communities were compelled by the fear of the gun 
to succumb to the whims of the colonialists and as a consequence lost their freedom 
to practice their life the way they had created it.  This loss of freedom was fought 
vigorously.  This fight extended to these communities and had great impact on them.   
 
To these communities, freedom meant that they could not continue enjoying the 
harmony, peace and unity that they had already created and so they had to fight to 
regain it.  This fight enabled the late Mwalimu Julias Nyerere
5 to rally all ethnic 
communities in Tanganyika to fight.  This rallying also implied dismantling the 
individual community strength and forming a bigger unit comprising all.  But they also 
realized that in order to fight the white colonialists, they had to acquire literacy 
(reading and writing).  Initially the colonialists had used literacy as a way to win the 
support of the locals, but now it was a useful tool in the fight for freedom.  Through 
this, education was introduced and the value of knowledge to account for wisdom 
given a new meaning. 
 
The fight for independence gave a new meaning to the values discussed above.   
Their new meanings did not differ so much from their original meaning except that if 
put on a scale, they were applied to a larger group beyond the clan or community 
level.  The different communities in Tanganyika became a community where these 
values were exercised.  But given that they were being used to fight for 
independence, the gaining of the independence in 1961 did not allow for the 
independence of the ethnic communities but for the whole country and so the 
communities remained under one big community.   
 
Nyerere tried to suppress the local communities by trying to copy what was a 
practice in these communities especially on authority structure.  He created villages 
under the Ujamaa socialism system.  The head of the village was to assume the role 
of the chief (Mkuru), and he was to govern by a council of elders elected by the 
village members.  Thus the culture which was already prevailing on the authority of 
the elders did not die but given a new meaning. 
 
The transfer was made easy because a social cultural environment was already 
created based on these values.  These communities still sought harmony, unity and 
peace not only among themselves but also with all others in the whole country.  And 
because they coincidentally found that they shared these values it became much 
easier to adjust to one another.  But there were factors affecting the values as 
institutions were being transferred, these were globalization and nationalization 
processes.   
 
The industrialization and the accompanying technology, the fast changing 
information technology, and bureaucracy all brought in a new society which is the 
bureaucratic society.  This society had to be introduced in the traditional society.  As 
the two societies co-existed, a completely new society has emerged.  A society 
which is here referred to as Tradi-rocratic society.  This word is coined from 
traditional (Tradi) and Bureaucratic (-rocratic) making Tradi-rocratic.  The meaning of 
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it is that this is a society in which the local people have accepted bureaucratic 
authority brought by the globalization.  But at the same time traditional society has 
not been done a way with.  It is within this Tradi-rocratic society that the two 
communities studied were found to be living.  But local individuals still hold on to 
what their community demands from them. 
 
Existence of Tradiro-cratic society is crucial for the survival of the local communities.  
Local people have been relegated to either being crew members in fishing camps 
owned by people who have connections with the Fish Processing Plants or by those 
who are able to invest heavily in the industry.  Because these locals cannot invest to 
this level, they have to find a means of surviving and one such way is to become 
crewmembers.  This implies that they have lost control of the fisheries resource as it 
used to be.  Therefore their clinging to the Traditional society guarantees that they 
can continue to trust and co-operate with their fellow community members to gain 
access to the fish although through illegal means.   
 
To them they believe that they have free access to the fish but they are being driven 
out by the technological changes which they cannot cope up with both in the 
catching and marketing sectors.  They also accept that the traditional fishing 
organization in which they confined themselves to either traditional gears or beaches 
or fishing periods as no longer valid.  They however, do not have any alternative 
through which they can improve their traditional practice except to cling to the 
traditional values.  Their traditional leaders remain very useful and important but they 
have been ignored when the Fisheries Division introduces new institutions.  This has 
left them to negotiate silently with these new institutions. 
  
THE PITFALLS OF BEACH MANAGEMENT UNIT 
 
In  1998, the FD organized one-day meetings with local fishers living in selected 
beaches in the Mwanza Gulf of Lake Victoria.  These meetings sought to involve 
local fishers in fisheries management.  Several Local Enforcement Units (LEUs) 
were formed in the gulf as a result of these meetings.  The LEU format reflected the 
FD perception of what and how co-management should operate in Tanzania.   
 
The successful establishment of these LEU’s in the Mwanza gulf encouraged the FD 
to establish them in the whole Tanzanian part of the lake.  The LEUs were later 
renamed Beach Management Units (BMU).  In 2000 the FD formed 57 of these units 
in Ukerewe island and 32 in Tarime districts among other districts. The BMU regime 
was formulated and implemented under such an unclear understanding of the 
operations of the Tradi-rocratic society.   
 
The formulators assumed that having been working with these communities as a 
government gave them an automatic knowledge on how to implement a co-
management regime with the variations it has acquired.  The concept of legitimacy 
and compliance was understood from the angle of enacting laws in parliament and 
enforcing them.  This was a complete contrast to what legitimacy and compliance 
was in the traditional society.  In this traditional society, anything approved by elders 
and regularized, as ‘our way of doing things’ was considered legitimate.   
   14
Although parliament could be considered as the ultimate ‘elders’, its members are 
seen to be town dwellers who are detached from the reality of community conditions 
or have taken a different position once they have been elected.  It is therefore here 
that the mismatch originates and the BMU regime ended up being an external model 
brought without much considerations of the local institutional fabric.  That is to say, 
the BMUs were brought in on an understanding of a bureaucratic society principles 
developed and defined by a western culture of democracy, empowerment, legitimacy 
and equality.  These principles have different meanings, understanding and value in 
a different culture like the Wakerewe and Wakiseru.   
 
The BMU regime as established exhibited the following drawbacks: 
 
The BMU are established with an emphasis on economic capital 
In its interpretation, the Tanzania Fisheries Policy seeks to maximize income from 
the sale of fish, maximize foreign currency earning, maximize employment and 
maximize food supply.  These to a great extent are emphasising economic capital.  
The major reason for this emphasis is the Nile perch fisheries which have earned the 
country a substantial amount of money (URT 1999, Kulindwa 2001) and so the FD 
wishes to sustain this income.  This therefore means that the policy must address 
those issues which will not jeopardize it.  When increases in the use of illegal fishing 
gears were noted, community participation was thought to be a good way to address 
this.  These illegal gears were a threat to the incomes which were being generated.  
Thus by introducing the BMUs the whole idea was simply to improve conditions 
necessary for the earnings from the fishery.  This has left out the community 
institutional fabric. 
  
Conflict resolution mechanisms followed the court system which has a 
number of weaknesses as opposed to local resolution of conflict which could 
be more effective 
The fisheries of the lake face a number of conflicts (Medard and Okeyo-Owuor 
2002), among them are conflicts between gillnet owners and long liners in the lake.  
Normally the gillnet fishers allows their nets to drift (Tembea) and while drifting, they 
collect long- lines along their way, this causes a lot of problems between them.   
Those who can afford the Tembea fishery are the ones who have connections to the 
FPP.  When such conflicts are taken to the courts they take a long time and in 
addition Tembea fishers manoeuvre their ways to win the case and even come out 
unrepentant.   
 
Whereas this paper does not question the functions of the court system, it is 
however appropriate to point out that it is faced with a lot of challenges in its efforts 
to administer justice and it is a place that some people go to for winning rather than 
to reconcile.  A reform is needed for this system.  But an inherent problem which will 
have to be dealt with is that so long as there are multiple sources of authorities in the 
BMU regime where the BMUs, Village Government, District Government and the 
Fisheries Division are involved, conflict will always arise.  It is therefore necessary to 
think of other means that can compliment the court system.  One possible way could 
be the traditional authority which has been quicker in conflict resolution 
(Viswanathan 2003). 
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The structure of the BMU fails to assign specific duties to individual BMU 
members.   
Each BMU was formed with a membership of twenty members.  This was further 
subdivided into an executive committee (5 members) and other members who could 
be called when there is some work or visitors to attend to.  Among the other 
members themselves, there was no specific responsibility assigned to each one and 
so no one could be held individually responsible when things were observed to be 
going wrong.   
 
BMUs are an extension of the FD 
The FD still has the authority to make all decisions and the BMUs are there to 
enforce the decisions made by the FD.  This therefore makes them an extension of 
the FD.  In fact a demand for payment has been made by members of these units for 
them to work effectively.  The FD also started these groups on a wrong foot by 
issuing them with items that in principle were part of what they used to see Fisheries 
staff at the beaches use when they are on patrol.  It therefore appeared from the 
start that they were going to be such an extension. 
 
BMUs hijacked by Fish Processing Plants once given the mandate by law 
When BMUs were formed in 2000, there was no clear Act that recognized them as 
being part of the Monitoring and Control and Surveillance (MCS) system of the FD.  
The latter therefore started preparing such an Act, and it was likely to be taken to 
Parliament in late 2003.  Such an Act would empower BMUs to undertake the MCS 
with the full authority of the law. Once the process of the law is complete, it has been 
even said that the BMUs will assume the responsibility of inspecting vehicles 
collecting fish from the beaches to the Plants to ensure that some level of quality is 
achieved.   
 
These vehicles are owned by FPP’s and have been loaned to Agents, some of 
whom have fishing camps.  While efforts to legalise BMUs is going on, the catching 
sector is slowly drifting into the hands of the Fish Processing Sector through 
advancing loans in form or gears, boats and engines.  But the operators of the 
vehicles are actually the owners of the fishing camps employing local fishermen.  
Given their influence over the local fishermen, they will change the BMUs by either 
becoming members or sponsoring their candidates for elections to become members 
and thereby take control of the BMUs.  Through this way the FPP that are in the 
hands of foreigners (Abila and Jansen 1997) will eventually be controlling this sector. 
 
Potential of BMUs curtailing access rights to the resource by the local 
fisheries 
Since late 1990s a new privatization process was introduced in Tanzania where 
even beaches were tendered to those who are able to collect taxes for the Local 
Authorities (local district governments).  What happens in this process is that local 
government authorities have authority to design ways and means through which they 
can generate incomes from their local district resources for their operations.  
 
This authority has led to the identification of several sources among them is 
fisheries.  Incomes include taxes levied on traders who use local markets to sell their 
goods, fishers who use beaches to land their fish.  In this system, beaches have 
been very lucrative because they have attracted so many business people.  In most   16
beaches, there are several businesses going on.  The Local Authorities therefore 
thought that these beaches could give them good money and so they started to 
privatize them.   
 
Individuals and even BMUs were free to tender for them.  Each beach has a price 
tag per month.  When one wins the tender, what the local authority requires is that 
one pays the Local Authority the monthly price.  How one gets this amount is by 
one’s own design.  This has seen those who have won such tenders charge literally 
everyone who does anything at the beach. A few local fishers who have gears and 
use loaned boats have been charged the same as the big fishing camps.  But as 
these fishing camps are also growing bigger and bigger there is a potential that they 
will soon declare beaches their territories where if one wants to use then one has to 
belong to the camp or pay dearly.  In this way local fishers loose access rights.  In 
addition to this, if BMUs get into the hands of the fishing camp owners and they 
implement the regulations as required, then access rights will be greatly curtailed.  
 
At BMU formation, inadequate time was spent in socially preparing the local 
committees 
One of the greatest outcries on the BMUs by those who were concerned about their 
effectiveness was the short time spent on their formation.  As pointed out in chapter 
five, a one-day meeting with local communities was thought to be enough according 
to the FD.  There were no proper preparations as to what implementing this regime 
should comprise besides just going straight in forming them at the beaches.  The 
idea of pre-implementation, implementation and post implementation process 
proposed by Pomeroy and Harkes (2000) never found any consideration.  This 
therefore led to incorporating people who were less socially ready for such a task.  
The result of it has been poor performance.  
 
The push of this regime is one sided 
The FD first thought up the whole idea of the BMU system.  They sat and planned for 
what should be done in order to have it established.  They sought for funds and 
mobilized themselves to talk to the fishers.  Once it was established, FD personnel 
have been leading the process.  One notable thing has been the fact that this move 
is one sided.  The fishers themselves have not come up to make their input felt, they 
have fallen to the move already created by the FD.   
 
They wait until the FD instructs them on what to do.  In fact during this study it was 
reported that one of the BMUs visited in Ukerewe had just been called to participate 
in an MCS organized by the FD in the Island.  The one sided push on this regime 
creates a question on their support by the other side and therefore their 
sustainability.  Could it be that the fishers are not in support of them despite having 
agreed to form the BMU?   Could it be that these units did not address the fishers’ 
expectations and therefore fishers’ developed less interest in them?  These are 
some few questions among many others that should be of concern. 
 
Unclear structure and unequal distribution of incentives  
When these units were formed, there was unclear definition of incentives to the 
members.  Later on they were asked to come up with byelaws, which could help 
them in introducing fines on certain petty offences such as taking a bath in the lake.  
Incomes generated from fines initially seemed welcome but in actuality it became   17
very difficult to implement such regulations let alone people caught being able to pay 
the fines.  Thus generating incomes through fines presented a great challenge.  In 
response to this challenge, the FD started campaigning for these units to get tenders 
to collect taxes at the beaches, the campaign still continues.  While the campaign 
continues, the incentive structure still remains unclear. 
 
 BMUs are socio-culturally insensitive  
As already argued, the institutions which were created for fisheries had a social 
relations bearing, but the BMUs are directed more towards economic and natural 
resources.  Based on this bearing, the local communities whose life is based on 
social relations had to negotiate their way on how to make these BMUs address their 
morals.   
 
This is why they accept their formation but they choose members to these units who 
will promote community cultural values.  This points to the fact that socio-cultural 
sensitive institutions have a high performance probability and can lead to successful 
natural resources management.  This is where the fisheries management reform 
should zero in.  The reasons for this are numerous, such institutions are useful in: 
facilitating flow of information among the communities; exert influence on those who 
make critical decisions in the fisheries; certifying an individual’s social credentials by 
creating social networks and relations to enable community members to access the 
fish; and finally, they are able to reinforce identity and recognition. That is to say that 
they have not been able to recognize one’s worthiness as an individual and a 
member of these communities sharing of resources, which is crucial in providing 
emotional support and public acknowledgement to claim the resources (Lin 2001). 
 
A miscalculated entry point to the communities. 
At formation, the FD planned for the establishment of these BMUs and then asked 
the District Fisheries Officers of Local District Governments to identify people who 
could be called for a meeting to discuss issues already prepared by the FD.  In other 
words the FD entry point was through the District Councils (here referred to as 
organization entry point).  Other options such as village elders, opinion leaders, 
churches and Non-governmental Organizations could have been explored.  This 
organization entry point only sent a message of government authority to the local 
communities.   
 
While they filtered how this would affect their lives, disapproval was already in the 
offing when they demanded working equipment, a physical office to operate from 
and an incentive package.  However one other option could have been to enter 
through community activities or festivities (here referred to as local Institution entry 
point).  Here they could have used fishers to identify problems of the fisheries and 
ask them to suggest on solutions.  Such an entry point has been useful and very 
successful in Babati Forest management in Tanzania (Alden-Wily 2001)  
 
 
With these drawbacks, the only outcome for the BMUs is poor performance.  In fact 
an evaluation of these units three to four years later found out that less than half 
were actually performing as expected (Onyango, Medard and Mahatane, 2002; 
Abila, Odongkara and Onyango-in press). In a similar manner some studies using 
the argument have also raised similar concerns.  Westerdahl (2001) in his study on   18
Jämtland and twenty European co-operatives discovered that small organizations 
with local roots were becoming more prominent at a time when values such as size, 
capital returns and global presence were dominant.  
 
The pitfalls do not imply that models or regimes which are implemented with 
consideration of socio-cultural conditions will not experience any challenges.  The 
challenges will be there but at a different scale and type.  Nevertheless studies 
elsewhere reveal that in most cases such models or regimes are successful.  A few 
successful examples include Japanese human resources development. Robinson 
(2003) documents that American firms have been forced to adapt themselves to the 
Japanese recruitment process which is so firmly embedded in Japanese social 
structure and norms.  Powerful American firms have had no success in bringing 
about change to this job market and they are only forced to conform.  Those that 
have conformed have had good success.   
 
Westerdahl (2001) quoting Ylva Hasselberg Swedish article Den Sociala ekonomin 
of 1998 where the latter writes about the Swedish Ironworks notes that ironworks 
survived the 19th century threats to the iron manufacturers of international 
competition and insufficient cost controls.  This survival was because the owner of 
the Furudal used social capital especially his extensive network of contacts he had 
developed over time to increase value to the products.  Therefore, BMUs would 
probably have experienced success if they had adopted the socio-cultural conditions 
of the local communities.  
 
DISCUSSION:  LESSONS FOR CO-MANAGEMENT 
 
To make BMUs fit local socio-cultural environment, there is a need to work towards a 
combination of embeddedness and autonomy of social ties both at the fishing 
community and government levels.  At the fishing community level, embeddedness 
translates into integration implying bonds that are upheld within a certain community.  
Autonomy translates into linkage; that is up keeping of bonds with non-community 
members.  At the government level, embeddedness translates into synergy meaning 
official representatives are connected to other actors in society such as FPP (State – 
Civil society linkage).   
 
State-civil society relations need to be clear and dynamic for BMUs to make any 
economic impact.  Autonomy translates into integrity meaning that government 
representatives and civil servants are governed by a professional ethos committing 
them to negotiate and pursue collective goals as opposed to narrow group interests.  
 
For the design of co-management this implies: 
 
•   The concept co-management focuses on building relationships among 
stakeholders. Sharing responsibilities which is key issue in co-management is 
more inclined to building social relations. It is therefore important that co-
managers understand this perception and build a regime that promotes it. 
•   A co-management regime requires a pro-target group perspective.  Co-
management regimes normally target fishers who are faced with difficult 
challenges ranging from poverty to livelihood related issues such as social 
services and welfare.  Such challenges require socially oriented policies. It is   19
therefore important that co-management regimes be established on pro-target 
group concerns.  In addition to this, co-management must encompass 
empowerment and improve the voice of the target group.  If the voice of the 
group is not heard then they will unlikely not comply with what is decided.  
•   Co-management requires a socio-cultural fit.  For co-management to be 
successful, it needs to be part of the fabric of community and way of doing 
things in the lives of individual community members. Towards this end, 
fisheries authorities should direct their efforts to understanding socio-cultural 
aspects of communities such as Tradiro-cratic society and how co-
management can fit in it. 
•   Co-management should bridge the gap between traditional and bureaucratic 
systems.  The dilemma that faces co-management is that it has to be 
implemented in such a way that it empowers the local fishers and not the 
power elites who already have a domineering character in the fisheries.  But 
at the same time, these power elites must not be left out otherwise they will 
fight co-management and not allow it to operate.   
•   Co-management should not be perceived as an entirely new regime.  The 
problem with co-management has been on implementation.  The way it has 
been implemented has made it look like a new regime which is being 
introduced to these communities and therefore needing new techniques.  This 
perception is erroneous and may only lead to unsuccessful implementation.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper focuses on property rights and collective action in the Mekong region of 
Cambodia. Institutional arrangements in water management for community-based 
aquaculture in two villages in the Mekong area of Cambodia are described. 
 
The region is characterized through various forms of institutions. Various groups 
have access to the resources and use them in various ways at different times, which 
give the water resource system a multiple use character.  
 
This paper presents a situation analysis of water management in Cambodia and 
starts with a general introduction into the Cambodian history of land tenure and water 
management. Furthermore, institutions for water management in two villages, 
including rules and regulation as well as water distribution patterns will be described. 
 
Conclusions summarize the findings and show challenges for future interventions of 
the “CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food: Community-Based Fish Culture 





In 2005, the WorldFish Center initiated the "CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and 
Food: Community-Based Fish Culture in Irrigation Systems and Seasonal 
Floodplains" in three water basins, namely the Indus-Ganges (Bangladesh and 
India), Niger River basin (Mali) as well as the Mekong Delta (Cambodia and 
Vietnam). In Cambodia, the project is managed through the Inland Fisheries 
Research and Development Institute (IFReDI)/ Fisheries Administration (FiA). In this 
context, research on institutional arrangements and technical options for community-
based aquaculture is conducted in the Lower Mekong area of Cambodia. One 
expected output of the project is the identification of locally rooted institutional options 
for sharing benefits of integrating fish and other living aquatic resources (the 
WorldFish Center 2005).  
 
Cambodian history evidently strongly influenced land and water tenure issues and 
thus collective action. In order to understand people’s perceptions about water 
management and underlying conditions it is thus useful to consider the historical 
development of water and land management in Cambodia.  
 
After independence in 1953, a general degradation of land access for Cambodians 
followed the initial colonial effort to privatise the traditional collective domains. 
Traditionally, an individual or household took what was needed for subsistence 
without hurting the collective rights of the community (Van Acker 1999), while the 
land belonged to the sovereign. During the French protectorate (1863-1953) the 
Cambodian Civil Code of 1920 aimed at a general registration and a national 
cadastre system. Thus, in contradiction to the traditional system "Kram", all 
unoccupied areas are considered as "free" and became available for sale. 
With the launching of "Buddhist Socialism" in the mid-1960s a period of non-aligned 
state socialism and monopoly started. During this time, lowland Khmer were resettled 
and land was forcibly redistributed. Then, with the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979), 
all private property was abolished and all property records were systematically   3
destroyed. The entire population was marched out of cities and villages and reduced 
to slave labour in programs of public works and collective work-brigades (Van Acker 
1999).  
 
With the Vietnamese Invasion in early 1979, the system of the "Krom Samaki" 
continued with the collectivisation of property, albeit in a less forbidding format and 
allowing different levels of private property. In 1989, the government abolished 
collectivisation and reintroduced the private ownership (Van Acker 1999) and today, 
the decentralisation efforts of government aim at give power to lower level 
institutions.  
 
Today, people are still uncertain whether their claims on property are secure, 
because the conflict settlement is still an ongoing process and different sources of 
land law are in force. Additionally, the social base in Cambodia is still fragile and 
makes collective action a serious challenge. Institutional structure is still 
underdeveloped due to the extent era of military regime and corruption and power 
structures characterize the people's life instead of the legal system. National policy 
aims at registering land titles in the near future. However, until now only a few 
villages in the south-western part of Cambodia hold private land titles. 
 
SITUATION ANALYSIS IN TWO CAMBODIAN VILLAGES 
 
The project, CPWF PN35 is conducting research in four villages in Cambodia. Thnal 
Kaeng and Potamoun are located west of Phnom Penh in Prey Veng province. Pom 
Eith and Chrouy Poan are located in the south-western part of Cambodia in Takeo 
province, close to the Vietnamese border. This chapter will focus on institutions in 
Thnal Kaeng and Pom Eith village.  
 
Water management in Thnal Kaeng 
 
Thnal Kaeng village in Prey Veng is located next to Boeng Khei Reservoir. Thnal 
Kaeng consists of 98 households and was part of an earlier CARE Cambodia rural 
development project which supported the establishment of a Water User Group 
(WUG) as well as pond culture. 
 
The Boeng Khei reservoir in Thnal Kaeng was built during the Pol Pot Regime in 
1975. In 2006, CARE Cambodia offered a Food for Work Program for the renovation 
of the canals as well as for the road leading south to the national road. Within this 
program, there were two sluices built as well.  
 
The reservoir is an important water source for irrigation as well as for all other 
household activities (cooking, washing, drinking, bathing, soaking, etc.) in the village. 
The reservoir is 900 m wide and 2800 m long. Three sluices are connecting the 
reservoir with downstream canals. Two upstream canals allow water flow in for 
further storage. All land south of the reservoir is fed by the two canals heading south. 
Since 2006, two newly built sluices regulate the water flow for Thnal Kaeng and thus 
also influence water levels in the downstream Potamoun reservoir.  
   4
 
Fig. 1. Boeng Khei reservoir, Thnal Kaeng village 
 
The reservoir is accessed by nine different villages from Pean Reang and Svay 
Chrum communes for irrigation purposes. However, about six different communes 
and more than 700 households have access to the reservoir and use it as a fishing 
ground. Thnal Kaeng village can be considered as the main user, while the village 
builds a strip settlement along the reservoir.  
 
In Thnal Kaeng no cadastral survey was undertaken until now and people have no 
secure property rights for their land holdings. Legally, all agricultural land in the 
reservoir is state property and belongs to the Cambodian government and only 
paddy fields outside the dyke are privately owned (without land titles). People have 
held use rights on agricultural land in the reservoir for a long time already, but are 
aware of the fact that the government can claim the land back. As the reservoir 
usually holds water for the whole year, it is recognised as a public good, where 
everybody can have access during the whole year. In fact, it is an open access 
situation as rules and regulations concerning the resource use are not legally 
enforced. 
 
In Cambodia the government established Water User Committees (WUC) on a 
commune level, which are responsible for water management issues in their 
communes. The villages in the commune are represented in the WUC through two to 
four village members, which were selected by the villagers. The WUC in Svay Chrum 
commune thus represents approximately 770 HH. In Thnal Kaeng the village head as 
well as another villager are the representatives in the commune-wide WUC, which 
has only operated since 2006. The WUC is lead by the commune head. On a village 
level the village head leads the Water User Group on the village level (WUG) 
established by CARE Cambodia. There are six Kroms
1 in Thnal Kaeng, with each 
Krom leader being represented in the WUG.  
                                                 
1 A Krom is an administrative entity underneath the village level. All villages in Cambodia are further divided 
into several Kroms with each having his own Krom leader   5
 
Water is used according to needs. Villagers must request that the sluice is opened 
(or closed) to the WUC, the WUC will inform the village chief of Thnal Kaeng village 
and he will then operate the sluices according to the order of the WUC. This 
procedure is the same for all villagers further downstream as well. When the 
southern Potamoun reservoir is not having enough water for irrigation, the villagers 
will ask that the Thnal Kaeng village chief is informed, who will then open the sluice 
and let water flow into the downstream reservoir. This is usually requested twice a 
week. 
 
There are rules and regulations concerning the use of the water resource according 
to national policy. Thus, there are restrictions on the type of fishing gear, whereby 
electrical fishing gears as well as fine mesh nets are not allowed to be used. 
Furthermore, there is a restriction on the size of gill nets, seine nets and arrow 
shaped trap nets. There are no rules concerning the amount of fish that can be taken 
out as well as no time or fishing area restrictions.  
 
People are informed about new rules through the Commune Fisheries Office and the 
police. There are no written rules and regulations, but there are village meetings, 
where the advantages of rules and the penalties are explained to the villagers. 
During these meetings the use of legal fishing gears is also explained. These 
meetings are once or twice a month.  
 
The Commune Fishery Office and the police are responsible for monitoring, exposing 
and fining the use of illegal fishing gears. Thus, the village head does not have the 
legal right to fine the offenders, but he reports his observations to the commune head 
and the police. Because of the size of the water resource, offenders are seldom 
caught.  
 
Water management in Pom Eith 
 
Pom Eith today consists of 133 households. In 1973, the villagers were forced, by the 
Khmer Rouge, to move away from the village and they had to live next to the 
mountains nearby. In 1975, the villagers moved back to the village. The village has 
access to Tunloub reservoir, which is southern-west part of a larger system of a total 
four reservoirs north of the village. All together there are five communes using the 
water from the reservoir, and there are nine villages alone in Prey Ampok commune.  
 
On the eastern side the reservoir is bordering the national road No.2; built in 1976-
1978 heading from Phnom Penh southwards to Vietnam. The road thus separates 
the paddy fields lying west of the road from the direct use of the reservoir, but 
farmers owning these fields are connected to the reservoir through a sluice. There 
are five sluices and one culvert, which were renovated in 2004.  
 
The reservoir is used for rice cropping as well as for fishing and other household 
activities like bathing, draining animals, drinking water, washing, etc. It is fed through 
rain water as well as through the Mekong River which starts swelling soon after the 
rainy season started. All agricultural land lies in the reservoir. On average people in 
Pom Eith have five different plots.  
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After the Pol Pot regime, when land was collectivized, the village experienced 
another expropriation in 1983/84, where land became public property again. In 1989, 
government then abolished collectivization and redistributed land to private owners. 
In 2006, a cadastral service was undertaken in Pom Eith, thus it is one of the first 
villages that were able to officially register their private land titles.  
 
 
Fig.2. Tunloub reservoir Pom Eith, village 
 
However, the water resource faces an open access situation during wet season, 
which starts in June. Everybody, including non-community members is allowed to 
use the reservoir for their own purposes and come for fishing. There is no restriction 
on the amount of fish caught; however the use of illegal fishing gears such as electric 
fishing gears or fine mesh nets is prohibited. The Kiri Vong District police officer is in 
theory responsible for monitoring of and imposing fines on people using illegal fishing 
gears. However in practice, the monitoring of illegal fishing in this area stopped in 
1996.  
 
Similar to Thnal Kaeng, there are also meetings in Pom Eith organised by the 
commune head and the fisheries officer in order to introduce new rules and 
regulations to the villagers. Villagers are not involved in any decision making about 
rules and regulations, they are only informed by the fisheries officer.  
 
There is a Water User Committee (WUC) in the Prey Ampok commune as well as a 
Water Resource Office (WRO) on district level. It is the WRO who decides about the 
management of the sluices. When villagers want sluices to be opened or closed they 
have to ask the WUC, which then will ask for permission from the WRO to open and 
close it. 
 
In the reservoir there is no regular monitoring of water quality, fish abundance or the 
use of illegal fishing gears. The village head himself has no legal authority, but is 
supposed to report to the commune head, when he observes someone breaking the 
rules. Only the fishery officer and the police are allowed to sanction and are   7
supposed to coordinate their activities. However, villagers report that the use of 




Cambodia has a wide variety of water rights systems and a wide variety of water 
allocation systems in local areas. Property rights change according to the season 
and land is considered to be private land during dry season and public land/open 
access during wet season. The two reservoirs do not possess clearly defined 
boundaries.  
 
Although the Cambodian government established Water User Committees, not all 
water users of the water resource are represented in the same institution. Thus, inter-
commune coordination becomes a serious challenge, although the water resources 
in Cambodia are most often shared between communes. In Thnal Kaeng, two 
communes share the same reservoir, but they are not represented in the same 
committee and there are not meetings in order to coordinate water management 
between the two communes. Similarly, not all downstream user villages are 
represented in the committee. They are again represented in another WUC and there 
are no meetings held for super-coordination between these committees.  
 
There are no formal or informal institutions concerning the coordination of fishing 
activities and the access to fishing grounds on a local level. Although, there are 
restrictions on the type of fishing gears, the amount of fish and time spent fishing is 
not restricted. Furthermore, there are no rules protecting breeding areas. The 
existing rules and regulations are not written down and the information of villagers 
about new rules seems to be very informal and spreads through mouth-to-mouth 
propaganda. Villagers in Pom Eith reported that they feel confused about and even 
threatened through the penalties they are informed about. 
 
The monitoring, exposing and fining of the use of illegal fishing gears through the 
Commune Fishery Office and the police must be considered as ineffective as 
villagers report regular illegal fishing practices. Usually, people are aware of the 
number and people who use illegal fishing gear, but face difficulties to convict the 
offenders due to a lack of presence of responsible staff as well as due to a fear of 
revenge. 
 
The CPWF PN35 faces several challenges in future project implementation. An in-
depth analysis of local level institutions in fishing and water management is 
necessary in order to better understand the different local water user schemes. 
Broad based analyses will be necessary to understand by whom and how the 
resources in rural areas are used and more applied research is advisable to better 
understand the complex livelihood strategies of the poor and the key role of land 
(Kirk 2004). 
 
Collective action can be considered as a new model for Cambodia fish culture and 
thus small-scale approaches might be appropriate in order to avoid more complex 
coordination problems within the groups. During the Khmer Rouge regime, 
Cambodians were forced to work collectively, but never appropriate a benefit from 
this collective work. Thus, “real incentives” for investments in a common good and 
collective action must be created.    8
 
However, most important will be the facilitation of community-based aquaculture on a 
local level as well as a long-term support through several institutions. Rules and 
regulations as well as monitoring/sanctions systems must be established by the 
resource users. Furthermore, conflict resolution mechanisms will be necessary and 
must be developed over time. Adaptive learning should be the main component in 
project implementation as experiences in collective action are low at a local level in 
Cambodia and the possibility to learn and develop community-based action should 
be encouraged and facilitated on a long-term basis. 
 
It will also be essential to create linkages to other (higher level) institutions, 
embedding local institutions in a framework of governance, in order to ensure high 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The extensive wetland ecosystems intersected with the main river systems of the 
Ganges, Brahmaputa, Padma, Mahanadi, Mahananda, Rupnarayan their tributaries 
and associated water bodies like oxbow lakes (mauns, chaurs, jheels, beels, baors and 
nayanjali) are immensely valuable for a wide range of fish species, nutrient-rich aquatic 
food crops and offer possibilities for integrated fish-crops. 
 
This paper deals with a number of case studies that were undertaken during the last 8-
10 years in utilizing divergent ‘Tal’ wetland ecosystems (deep, semi-deep, temporary in 
a range of agro-ecological zones like NAZ, OAZ and Coastal Zone of the region) for the 
development of integrated management programmes using a range of approaches. 
These included (i) system approach (excavation & renovation, methodological 
approach), (ii) management (fish-crop management, inter & post-harvest care & 
processing, marketing), (iii) integrated natural resource management utilizing organic 
as well inorganic sources, and (iv) low-cost fish-feeds, based on  fish-crop 
diversification.  
 
This paper also deals with some endangered indigenous fish species. The unique 
approach of watershed plans (bherri system), which were formulated for upright 
production systems, was economically successful. Economic indicators reveal there 
were comparative advantages of mixed farming systems compared to monoculture, 




Vast wetland ecosystems, especially in the north-eastern part of India are immensely 
valuable for the production of aquatic crops, fish and integrated aquatic crops as well as 
many other beneficial aquatic flora and fauna. Wetlands are environments that are 
subject to permanent or periodic inundation or prolonged soil saturation sufficient for 
the establishment of hydrophytes and/or the development of hydric soils or substrates. 
They are the transitional phase between dry terrestrial and permanently aquatic 
ecosystems, where the soil is frequently waterlogged, and the water table is at or near 
the surface. The land is often covered by shallow water, which exists either 
permanently, semi-permanently or temporarily. Some common wetland types include 
marsh, fen, wet meadow, swamp, bog, muskeg, wet tundra, tidal flat, river bottom, 
lowland, mangrove forest, tropical rainforest and floodplain swamp (Tiner, 1993). 
 
Land which is subject to prolonged flooding during the rainy season, is known in West 
Bengal as ‘Tal’ lands. These are low-lying flood plains including back water swamps 
and are mainly comprised of flat alluvial plains intersected with the main river systems 
(Ganges, Brahmaputra, Padma, Mahanad, Mahanadi, Rupnarayan etc.) and its many 
tributaries and canals covering around 300,000 ha. 
 
The Ramsar Convention held in Iran in 1971, brought the subject of wetlands to the 
International arena, and highlighted and accepted a treaty on ‘Conservation and Wise 
Use of Wetlands’ (Navid, 1988). Wetlands comprise 6.4 per cent (855.8 million ha) of 
the world total area (Maltby and Turner, 1983) of which 23.5 million ha are in India, 
mostly in north-eastern and coastal parts of the country (Anonymous, 1986). The 
survival of human civilization has also been inextricably linked with wetlands.  
 
Wetlands are continuously enriched by the addition of large quantities of biomass and 
the soil is enriched in consequence (Matsuo et. al, 1979, Seki et. al, 1979, Tsuchiya   3
and Iwaki, 1979 and Yamamoto and Seki, 1979). These are mucky in nature, grey to 
blackish-grey in colour, sometimes partially decomposed due to anaerobic condition. 
The soil status may further be improved if a period is allowed for quick decaying during 
post-wet months under aerobic condition. In this region, one of the most conventional 
practices by the farmers is to utilize this resource-rich humus soil for production of 
succeeding arable crops. This practice not only saves a substantial amount of fertilizer 
including other important essential elements but also improves the physical condition of 
the soil (Puste and Das, 2001).  
 
Wetlands are highly exploited. The development and management of wetlands should 
form an important part of integrated watershed management plans. Swampy, fertile, 
productive wetlands are continuously used by the rural farmers for production of fish, 
aquatic food crops (deep water rice, water chestnut, makhana, water lily, Royal water-
lily,  Colocasia spp. etc.) and non-food crops (Cyperus spp., Typha spp., Clinogyne 
dichotoma,  Aeschynomene aspera,  Brachiaria mutica,  Coix spp. etc.), as well as 
ornamental and beneficial medicinal plants. 
 
To meet the challenge of sustaining food security and economic returns for the poor 
and marginal farmers, it is necessary to develop improved farming systems with 
diversified production systems. This can ensure higher and more stable farm 
productivity, income and year-round employment opportunity without degrading the 
environment. This can generate up to 2-3 fold income gains compared to current 
systems and has the following advantages:  
•   There is a synergistic effect of fish on aquatic food crop production. 
•   The control of aquatic weeds and associated insects by fish. 
•   Increased efficiency of resource utilization, reduced investment risk through crop 
diversification and additional sources of food and income. 
•   More frequent visits to the field particularly for fish by the farmers, resulting in 
better crop management. 
•   Low risk for poor water chestnut and makhana growers with modest capital 
investment. 
•   Year round employment opportunity for the farming family. 
•   Improvements in farm family income and nutrition levels. 
 
THE INTEGRATED APPROACH: FISH-CROP DIVERSITY 
 
Indigenous, energy rich, air-breathing live fish like Shoil, Channa striatus; Taki, C. 
punctatus; Gajar, C. marulius; Magur, Clarias batrachus; Singi, Heteropnuestes fossilis 
and Koi, Anabus testudineus are most important. Besides, Chanda ranga,  Chanda 
nama, Punctius ticto,  Punctius sophore,  Punctius sarana,  Colisa pectoralis,  Colisa 
fasciata including Indian major fresh water carps like Rohu (Labeo rohita), Katla (Catla 
catla) and Mrigal (Cirrhina mrigala) are also important. These were used successfully 
under integrated systems as they can fetch higher market prices because they are 
preferred by most of the common people, particularly in village and urban areas. The 
introduction of fish along with deep water rice in waste wetland ecosystems is common 
for the utilization of food and total productivity (Grist, 1975, Ghosh, and Saha, 1980, 
Dutta et. al, 1984, Jhingran, 1991 and Puste and Bandyopadhyay, 2000) as well as for 
improving soil fertility by grazing on aquatic biomass and contributing through their 
faeces to nitrogen accumulation in soils (Brahmanand and Mohanty, 1999 and 
Bandyopadhyay and Puste, 2001). 
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There appears to be very limited or no information available on the evaluation of 
integrated systems involving fish and aquatic food crops such as water chestnut and 
makhana. To address this, a number of farmer level case studies were undertaken 
through Government sponsored research projects in pond systems during, before and 
after the monsoon period. [I.C.A.R., Indian Council of Agricultural Research; NWDPRA, 
National Watershed Development Project for Rainfed Areas; TDEP, Technology 
Development and Extension Project of Department of Land Resources (DoLR); FPIH, 
Food Processing Industries and Horticulture etc.]  
 
Importance of aquatic food crops other than rice  
Makhana or fox nut (Euryale ferox Salisb.), family - Nymphaceae and water chestnut 
(Trapa bispinosa Roxb.), family Trapaceae or Onagraceae are annual floating-leaved 
herbs. They are important, familiar and nutritious aquatic food crops grown in diverse 
areas from the tropics to sub-tropics. The fresh immature kernels of water chestnut 
fruits are used as a popular and nutritious food in raw or cooked form. Similarly, mature 
makhana kernels possess a high nutritive value and are rich in carbohydrate (76.9%), 
protein (9.7%), minerals (1.3%) and fat (0.1%). They are used in milk puddings, 
sweetmeat dishes, vegetable curry and are also sold in a costly popped form, which is 




The present study had been conducted under in a range of different ecosystems 
including new alluvial soils, old alluvial soils as well as coastal zones with the objectives 
of disseminating the results of research on aquatic crop-cum-fish culture production 
systems. The pilot studies used an extensive system approach in wetland ecosystems 
in trials carried out at research stations to choose best one. This involved some 
excavation to create suitable water bodies called the Bherri system (Fig.1 & 2), 
because of their divergence as well as their production potential.  
 
The objective was to find suitable zone-specific techniques for large-scale 
implementation at the farmer level as ‘On farm demonstrations’. 
The main research areas were: 
•   Suitable planting varieties of aquatic crops adjusted with fish genotypes in 
integrated system, 
•   Integrated nutrient management systems (low-cost plant as well as improved 
fish-feed) sustainable for optimum production, and 
•  General management (fish-crop management, post-harvest care and 
processing, marketing etc.). 
   5
Fig.1 Different types of pond-
refuges/bherrii system 
Fig.2 Field diagrams of combined fish-cum-
rice/other crop culture 
 
 
The work involved the NGOs, WATER, Sarvodaya, Taldi Netaji Sangha. Before on-farm 
demonstration trials, information was collected on background characteristics of the 
respondents and their socio-economic status in each of the zones. The field project 
trials were launched through an extension programme in each zone.  
 
The main farming systems tested were: 
•   Major aquatic food crops – monoculture of water chestnut and makhana 
•  Rice-cum-fish  culture 
•   Aquatic food crops (water chestnut and makhana)-cum-fish variables, and  
•   Aquatic food and non-food crops (mat-sedges)-cum-fish in a 3-tier system.  
 
The trials were undertaken mainly during pre to post-monsoon season. In the 
monocultures both water chestnut and makhana were transplanted with spacings of 1.5 
m x 1.5 m row to row and plant to plant apart, and fish fingerlings were stocked at 6,000 
fingerlings/ha. In integrated systems, plants were spaced at 2.0 m x 2.0 m row to row 
and plant to plant apart, fish were allowed to occupy 75% of the main plot and were 
stocked at 4,500 fingerlings/ha. Makhana was transplanted during the first week of April 
(in 50 cm of water depth), while, water chestnut was transplanted in the first week of 
July (70 cm of water depth due to accumulation of rainwater).  
All fishes were stocked during the second week of July after initial establishment of both 
crops. Seedlings of both the crops were transplanted with 2-3 plants/stool. For 
fertilization, crops received N, P2O5 and K2O @ 20 : 30 : 20 kg/ha, as a basal 
application. A foliar application of a zinc based micronutrient (Chelamin) was also used 
and NPK was applied at 20 day intervals from 30 days after transplanting up to mid-
November.  
 
Fish fingerlings were stocked at 6 g at the time of release. They were fed powdered 
mustard oilcake and rice husk (1:1 ratio) at a rate of 6 times the estimated body weight 
of the fish at weekly intervals in monoculture systems, reduced to 75% of this amount in 
combined crop-fish treatments. Occasionally animal protein (e.g. fish-meal, silk-worm 
cocoons when available) was added to the fish feed. In all cases an extra 15% of 
fingerlings were stocked to allow for mortalities. A borderline area of 0.75 - 1.00 m of   6
each individual plot was maintained as free water surface for easy movement of fishes 
as well as for feeding.  
 
Water chestnut is consumed as immature fresh fruit with picking starting from 
September and continuing up to the first fortnight of December. Makhana seed kernels 
and fish were harvested at the end of December and April to May (at least 2 times) 
depending on the depth of submergence. 
 
For ease of comparison among the different types of fish and crops, all the variables 
were converted to makhana yield equivalent (MYE) in terms of production (t/ha), 
according to the following formula: 
 
                                                              Market  price  of  the  crop/fish  to  be  compared 
(Rs.) 
Makhana yield equivalent (t ha
–1) =  -------------------------------------------------------------         
                                                                             Price of the makhana t
–1  (Rs.) 
 
For calculation of MYE, Gross Monetary Return, Net Profit and Benefit-Cost ratio, the 
following market prices in table 1 were used. 
 
Table 1. Market price of water chestnut, makhana and different type of fishes 


























The treatments applied included: 
FG1: Fish species stocked - Magur, Singi, Shoil, and Gajar and  
FG2: Fish species stocked - Rohu, Katla, Mrigal and Silver carp 
F1: powered mustard oilcake + rice husk in 1:1 ratio,  
F2: neem oilcake,  
F3: poultry droppings + cowdung (1:1)  
F4: without fish-feed (although very small amounts applied when available to the 
farmers as in local practice. 
 
These were applied in 4 village based clusters with the aim of developing centres for 
further dissemination of new technologies on fish production as well as quality of 
produce (Puste and Basu, 2004). Initial soil samples were collected at every set of 




Individual fish yields 
 
Individual fish yields in clusters I & II in both groups performed comparatively less well 
compared to clusters III & IV, perhaps because of water quality and the depth of 
submergence of the respective ponds. It is more contrasting and comparable enough   7
with the local practice. The magnitude of yield increases in all the individuals were 
around 46 to 78 per cent, with the highest rises in production of Magur, Singi, Mrigal 
and Silver carp (Table 2). A significant price difference was noted between local 
markets and zonal trade centres. In most cases, fish farmers sell their output directly to 
the middlemen in the trade centres, with reasonable profit margins.  
 
Table 2. Individual fish yield and their price 
Av. yield (t ha








































































































































































Av., average; Cl., cluster; Parenthesis indicates US$ (1US $ = INR 46.00) 
 
Group fish yield 
 
Application of fish feed (powdered mustard/groundnut oilcake + rice bran) had a strong 
influence on fish yields, as practiced in farmers’ fish ponds in different villages of the 
zones. Almost all the feed items were more or less equally effective for such increment 
of fish yield and it significantly differed from control pond, where no food was applied 
(Table 3). The increase in production was 82.2 to 116.4% in FG1 and 98.5 to 131.0%, 
in FG2. However, among the 3 fish-feed materials the highest results were obtained 
with F1 (powered mustard oilcake + rice husk in 1:1 ratio @ 6 times body weight of fish 
at weekly interval), although the difference was not statistically significant. The practice 
of fish feeding was quite effective in increasing fish yields irrespective of fish type in the 
4 different clusters of the zones (Puste and Basu, 2004).  
 
Table 3. Fish yield in groups as influenced by fish-feeds 
Cl. I  Cl. II  Cl. III  Cl. IV  Av.  of 
clusters 
Variables 












































1.21   8






India is endowed with vast and varied inland water resources. The share of total fish 
catch caught in inland waters has increased over the years from 29 per cent in 1950-’51 
to over 49 per cent in 2001 (Ayyapan and Venkateshwarlu, 2002). Carps in freshwater 
aquaculture and shrimps in brackish water aquaculture have mainly contributed to the 
increased quantity as well as value of the inland aquaculture sector.   
 
The vast wetland ecosystem may effectively be utilized through the cultivation of so 
many aquatic crops and fish which are not only valued by human beings but are also 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations provided funding 
in support of the development of micro-enterprises in Banate Bay, Iloilo and 
Southern Iloilo. This project was implemented by the University of the 
Philippines in the Visayas in coordination with the Banate Bay Resource 
Management Council, Inc. and the Southern Iloilo Coastal Resource 
Management Council.  
 
The following micro-enterprises were developed in the various municipalities 
of Banate Bay and Southern Iloilo: Anilao –fish balls production; Banate – fish 
vending; Barotac Nuevo –shrimp paste production; Barotac Viejo – oyster and 
mussel culture; Guimbal – fish vending; Miagao – salt iodization; Oton – fish 
vending; San Joaquin – fish sauce production; Tigbauan- shrimp paste 
production.  
 
Training programs were conducted for the beneficiaries to improve the 
operation of their micro-enterprises, on product development and marketing of 
their products. Coordination with local government units, active participation of 
the stakeholders and conduct of appropriate training were considered 




The coastal zone plays a very significant role in the Philippine economy and 
the lives of Filipinos. It is a source of food, shelter and livelihood of numerous 
inhabitants residing in the coastal area. The importance of the coastal zone in 
the Philippines can be seen in the following facts; more than 50% of animal 
protein intake of Filipinos is derived from marine fisheries, 62% of the 
population lives in the coastal zone, almost all major cities and 54% of the 
1,541 municipalities in the country are coastal (DENR et al, 2001a). 
 
The Philippine coastal zone, however, is confronted with numerous 
challenges like overexploitation of resources, degradation of coastal habitats 
and poverty of the fisherfolk. With regard to the production from marine 
capture fisheries, empirical studies have shown evidence of biological and 
economic overfishing in both pelagic and demersal fish stocks (Dalzell et al, 
1987; Trinidad et al, 1993; Barut et al, 2003; Barut et al, 2004). The 
degradation of coastal habitats has been documented for coral reefs where 
more than 70% of the reefs have been subjected to damage (Gomez et al, 
1994) while the forested mangrove area has decreased from 450,000 ha in 
1918 to 120,000 ha in the late 1990s (DENR, 1988; 1998 as cited in DENR et 
al, 2001a). The deteriorating resource base has caused a decline in the 
economic condition of small-scale fishers in which an estimated 80% of 
fisherfolk households are living below poverty threshold (PRIMEX, 1996 as 
cited in Cruz-Trinidad, 2003). 
 
Integrated coastal management (ICM) has been recommended to address the 
many problems in the coastal zone (Cicin-Sain and Knecht, 1998; Courtney   3
and White, 2000; DENR et al, 2001b). ICM is a comprehensive and integrated 
approach involving multi-sectoral collaboration and community participation 
for the sustainable use, development and protection of coastal and marine 
areas and resources. The overall goal of ICM is to improve the quality of life of 
human communities who depend on coastal resources while maintaining the 
biological diversity and productivity of coastal ecosystems. An important 
component of ICM is the provision of supplemental/alternative livelihoods or 
the diversification of the sources of income through development of micro-
enterprises in order to alleviate the poverty of small-scale fishers (IIRR, 1995; 
Luna et al, 2004). Supplemental or alternative livelihoods could lessen the 
pressure on coastal resources and improve the economic condition of the 
fisherfolk 
 
In the Philippines, micro-enterprises and small enterprises play an important 
role in creating jobs and providing income to the majority of Filipinos. Micro-
enterprises are businesses that have assets below Php3 million employing 
less than 10 people while small enterprises have assets between Php3 to 15 
million employing 10 to 99 people.  In 2004, there are about 820,960 
operating business establishments in the Philippines generating 6 million jobs; 
91 percent of these businesses are classified as micro-enterprises and small 
enterprises and employing 62.5 percent of the total labour force (DTI, 2004). 
 
The Philippine government believes that micro- and small enterprises could 
be an effective tool for providing employment, alleviating poverty in the rural 
areas as well as in advancing the country’s economic development (NEDA, 
2004). Micro-enterprise development has been found to work well with people 
having no or very little access to the traditional banking sector such as 
farmers and fishers. Having no means to access large amounts of start-up 
capital, these marginalized people have to work with a meagre resource 
coming from their personal savings or from an alternative creditor. This 
process teaches them to save and become self-sufficient while earning 
additional income at the same time.        
 
THE MICRO-ENTERPRISE PROJECT 
 
Technical Project RA 233A2 of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) aims to promote the contribution of small-scale fisheries 
to poverty alleviation and food security. FAO has been assisting selected 
coastal resource management councils in the Philippines in the development 
and use of demographic indicators for the identification of crucial socio-
economic issues in the coastal areas and monitoring the impact of 
management measures on the social and economic status of the fisherfolk. 
One crucial issue identified with the help of these indicators is the need for 
promotion of sustainable micro-enterprises and the introduction of related 
extension services and microfinance support.  This livelihood project 
addresses this crucial issue through the development of micro-enterprises for 
selected groups of fishers. 
 
FAO provided funds to Banate Bay Resource Management Council Inc. 
(BBRMCI) and Southern Iloilo Coastal Resource Management Council   4
(SICRMC), in close cooperation with the College of Fisheries and Ocean 
Sciences of the University of the Philippines in the Visayas (UPV), to support 
activities on livelihood opportunities and related microfinance needs. 
Specifically, the project implemented the following activities: 
a) Identification of livelihood and micro-enterprise opportunities for fishers 
within the jurisdiction of BBRMCI and SICRMC in the province of Iloilo;  
b) Conduct of on-the job training of fishers in micro-enterprise development in 
aquaculture, fish processing and fish marketing; the preparation of business 
plans; the proper use of credit and microfinance facilities; as well as provision 
of extension services in support of these micro-enterprises. 
 
It is hoped that outputs from this project will be used in the development of 
micro-enterprises in other parts of the Philippines and in areas where 
integrated coastal management is being implemented. 
 
COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COUNCILS 
 
Coastal Resource Management Councils (CRMC) have been established by 
local government units in the Philippines to improve the protection and 
management of coastal resources.  The institution of CRMCs has legal 
support and is encouraged in Philippine laws such as the Local Government 
Code of 1991 and the Fisheries Code of 1998.  The CRMC has been 
established by several municipalities to better manage large bodies of water 
in which these municipalities have jurisdiction or in areas with long contiguous 
coastline.  There is an advantage in having a CRMC because several 
municipalities can pool their meagre funds in protecting their fishery 
resources.  The CRMC can eliminate boundary disputes among municipalities 
because their municipal waters are combined together and treated as a single 
management unit.  Two CRMCs, the Banate Bay Resource Management 
Council Inc. (BBRMCI) and the Southern Iloilo Coastal Resource 
Management Council (SICRMC) were selected to participate in the micro-
enterprise project. These two CRMCs have been active in implementing 
projects that are beneficial to the fisherfolk within their jurisdiction.        
 
Banate Bay Resource Management Council, Inc.  
The Banate Bay Resource Management Council, Inc. (BBRMCI) was initiated 
by Mr. Ramon Antiojo, who was then mayor of the municipality of Anilao in the 
Province of Iloilo. The municipality, similar to most coastal areas in the 
Philippines, is confronted with problems of overexploitation of fishery 
resources, destruction of coastal habitats, illegal fishing activities and poverty 
of small-scale fishers. Mayor Antiojo’s awareness of the need for coastal 
resource management and the passage of the Local Government Code of 
1991, which provided more powers and authority to the local government, 
encouraged him to form a coastal resource management council together with 
the nearby municipalities of Barotac Nuevo and Banate. A series of 
consultations and dialogues started in November 1995 which culminated in 
the signing of a memorandum of agreement in February 1996 in which the 
Banate Bay Resource Management Council, Inc. (BBRMCI) was established 
(Fig.1). The municipality of Barotac Viejo later joined BBRMCI. 
   5
BBRMCI has a Board of Trustees (BOT) composed of the three mayors, an 
executive director, heads of operational units, representatives of municipal 
offices such as the municipal legislative body, municipal planning office, 
municipal fishery office and other representatives from the provincial 
legislative body, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), and 
non-government organizations (NGOs) in the participating municipalities. The 
Board is the policy-making body of the Council and has been tasked to 
prepare an integrated management plan of the bay, and promulgate rules and 
regulations for the preservation and utilization of the fisheries and marine 
resources of the bay. The Chairman heads the BOT and presides over its 
meetings. The Executive Director executes the policies and rules of BBRMCI 
and is responsible for its day to day affairs. BBRMCI has six operational units 
that facilitate the implementation of the programs and projects of the Council. 
Each participating municipality appropriates funds for the operation of the 
BBRMCI.   
 
BBRMCI has been responsible for conducting a series of information 
campaigns on better management of the bay and organizing the fisherfolk into 
associations and cooperatives. It was also able to implement an integrated 
zoning plan for Banate Bay and organized the Bantay-Dagat, a community-
based law enforcement unit, which implemented the unified fishery ordinance 
for the bay. BBRMCI also coordinated with different government agencies for 
the establishment of livelihood programs. In 1998, BBRMCI won the Galing 
Pook Award, a project of the national government and private sector, for its 
excellence and innovation in local governance. 
 
 
Fig.1 Location of the BBRMCI 
 
Southern Iloilo Coastal Resource Management Council  
The Southern Iloilo Coastal Resource Management Council (SICRMC) was 
started when the University of the Philippines in the Visayas (UPV) and the 
mayors of five coastal municipalities, namely; Guimbal, Miagao, Oton, San   6
Joaquin and Tigbauan, signed a Memorandum of Understanding in April 2001 
to cooperate towards the sustainable development of coastal resources in 
Southern Iloilo.  UPV, through the College of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences - 
Institute of Fisheries Policy and Development Studies (CFOS-IFPDS), 
assisted the local government units (LGUs) in the establishment of baseline 
data on resources and users of the coastal area.  The CFOS-IFPDS also 
assisted in the formation of a technical working group from the LGUs in 
preparation for the establishment of a coastal resource management council.   
 
UPV also provided technical assistance in the formulation of a coastal 
resource management plan for Southern Iloilo. It also pledged to coordinate 
with LGUs, government and non-government agencies in the planning, 
implementation and monitoring of the coastal resource management plan of 
Southern Iloilo.  On the other hand, each LGU assigned two personnel for the 
technical working group and gave full support for the planning and 
implementation of a coastal resource management council and a coastal 
resource management plan. 
 
On February 10, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was signed by the 
mayors of the municipalities of Guimbal, Miagao, Oton, San Joaquin and 
Tigbauan creating the Southern Iloilo Coastal Resource Management Council 
(SICRMC) (Fig.2).  The objectives of the Council are; to help in the restoration 
of the productivity of the coastal waters of Southern Iloilo, strengthen the 
capabilities of the local government units in the management of their coastal 
resources, educate the fisherfolk in the sustainable utilization of their coastal 




Fig.2 Location of SICRMC 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF MICRO-ENTERPRISES 
 
The project was started through consultation with the officials of BBRMCI, 
SICRMC and local government units to determine the barangay (village) and 
beneficiaries which will be involved in the micro-enterprise development. The   7
approach is to develop at least one micro-enterprise for an organized group 
which will serve as a model in the municipality. The beneficiaries that were 
identified as participants are shown in table 1. This was followed by a series 
of meetings with the beneficiaries on what kind of micro-enterprise they want 




Table 1. Beneficiaries and micro-enterprises in each Municipality 
Municipality Participants/Beneficiaries  Micro-enterprises 
Anilao Anilao  Fish  Processors 
Association 
Fish Balls Production 





Lamintao  Fisherfolk Association  Shrimp Paste Production 
Barotac  Viejo  San Francisco Small Fishermen 
Association 
Oyster and Mussel 
Culture 
Guimbal  Cabasi Fisherfolk Association  Fish Vending 
Miagao  Miagao Salt Producers 
Association 
Salt  Iodization 
Oton  Alegre Fish Vendors Association  Fish Vending 
San Joaquin  Sumakwelan  Fisherfolk 
Association 
Fish Sauce Production 
Tigbauan  Barangay Council of Bgy. 
Atabayan 
Shrimp Paste Production 
 
The choices of micro-enterprises were influenced partly by their respective 
LGU development plans that focus on the utilization of the municipality’s 
major products or harvests.  The major factor for their choice, however, was 
the low level of risk, because most of the identified micro-enterprises already 
existed and the beneficiaries were familiar with the activities associated with 
them.   The task for the beneficiaries was to enhance or innovate and look for 
new markets for their improved products.   
 
TRAINING PROGRAMMES FOR PROJECT BENEFICIARIES 
 
The training sessions focused on building the capacity of the beneficiaries in 
starting and operating their micro-enterprises, developing skills in product 
development and training in expanding markets for their products. The 
training sessions were based on the needs of the beneficiaries which were 
expressed during the consultation meetings, as well as from the 
recommendations of the technical consultants assigned to each micro-
enterprise. A pool of consultants and resource persons from the University of 
the Philippines in the Visayas (UPV) and from the local government units 
were used for these training courses. The training program can be grouped 
into; a) Operation of Micro-enterprises, and b) Product Development, although 
not all beneficiaries were able to avail of these training courses due to 
limitation of time and resources.   8
 
Training on the Operation of Micro-enterprises 
 
Starting a Small Business 
A one day training-workshop on starting a small business enterprise was 
conducted by Prof. Benmar Panaguiton, Assistant Professor of UPV College 
of Management and Director of UPV Office of Extension and Pahinungod for 
the Anilao Fish Processors Association. The workshop tackled the different 
aspects of a business – marketing, production, management and financial 
aspects – with a simple business plan as the final output. One of the 
objectives of the workshop was to introduce the beneficiaries to the rewards 
and risks of being an entrepreneur.  To make them aware of what it takes to 
become an entrepreneur, the beneficiaries were subjected to two sets of 
personal assessments. The training also included a discussion on what kind 
of business is right for the beneficiaries. The topics also touched on the types 
of business, choosing business location, the different sources of capital and 
how to obtain it, and the process of registering a business. 
 
Cooperative Formation 
The salt producers of Miagao signified their intention to transform their 
association into a cooperative. As a requirement for the registration of their 
cooperative, the members of the association must undergo a pre-membership 
education seminar for cooperatives. All concerned salt producers then 
participated in a comprehensive three-day seminar conducted by Mr. Federico 
Monsale, Jr., the Cooperative Development Officer of Miagao. The seminar 
discussed the definition of cooperative, how it is formed and who can become 
its members.  It also covered the duties and rights of the cooperative member, 
the functions of its officers, the organizational structure of the cooperative, 
and the various services that the cooperative can offer, as well as its 
management and source of capitalization.  
 
In the town of Oton, Mrs. Ma. Eden Borbon and Mrs. Maria Rosena Jaspe of 
the Municipal Agriculture Office conducted a seminar on cooperativism and 
basic business management. The resource persons described the nature and 
aims of cooperatives; the cooperative philosophy, principles and practices. 
 
Accounting for Non-Accountants  
The beneficiaries from the towns of Anilao, Banate and Barotac Viejo, all from 
Banate Bay area, attended a training session on accounting for non-
accountants. This was conducted for one day at the BBRMCI Training Center 
by Prof. Ma. Piedad A. Palacios and Prof. Mary Rose Rebueno, faculty 
members from the UPV College of Management.  The training exposed the 
participants to the basics of accounting, the analysis of transactions and its 
proper recording.  They also had a hands-on training on journalizing of 
accounts and proper accounting of income as well as the preparation of the 
basic financial statements.  As part of the training, the basics of how to cost a 
product and how much should be its selling price was also taken up.  With the 
financial statements they have prepared, the participants were made to 
undergo financial statement analysis by computing ratios for the different 
financial indicators like profitability, solvency and liquidity. The objective of the   9
financial statement analysis was to aid the beneficiaries in making sound 
management decisions based on the results of their operations as reflected in 
their financial statements. 
 
Sales and Salesmanship 
Prof. Jose Neil Hortillo from the UPV College of Management conducted a 
seminar on sales and salesmanship for the beneficiaries from Anilao, Banate 
and Barotac Viejo. Prof. Hortillo described ways on how to conduct sales calls 
and close transactions. He talked on the selling concept as a part of a 
decision-making process, the different ways on how to reach the customers 
and some steps to successful selling.  The talk also included topics on how to 
motivate the sales force, preparing the sales plan and the sales interview. 
  
Training on Product Development 
 
Fish Balls Production 
The Anilao Fish Processors Association came up with the idea of producing 
fish balls during the training on How to Start a Business. The members 
considered it a product that is affordable and would ensure a quick return on 
investment. The association conducted a production and marketing run of fish 
balls during their town fiesta using their own formula for fish ball making. The 
group made a small profit from the three-day sale, however, the members 
admitted that they need to improve the quality of their fish balls. The FAO-
supported Project then tapped the expertise of Mrs. Ernestina Peralta, a 
Researcher from the UPV Institute of Fish Processing Technology (IFPT). 
Mrs. Peralta recommended a new formula for the fish balls and introduced a 
variation of this product, which is the bola-bola. Mrs. Peralta also gave a 
lecture on product labelling which showed what must be placed in the label as 
mandated by the Nutrition Labelling Act. The members of the association then 
made a test production of the improved fish balls and fish bola-bola. The 
association also expanded their market to the cooperative store of the Anilao 
High School, which they now supply on a regular basis. 
 
Shrimp Paste Production 
The fisherfolk from the towns of Tigbauan and Barotac Nuevo chose to 
improve their existing shrimp products through value addition and better 
packaging. For the shrimp paste micro-enterprise in Tigbauan, the Technical 
Consultants were Dr. Erlinda Panggat and Mrs. Mercy Quilantang – Professor 
and Researcher, respectively of UPV IFPT. Dr. Panggat conducted a half-day 
seminar on value adding, appropriate processing and packaging technologies 
for fermented fish products. The beneficiaries were briefed on the definition of 
fermentation, raw materials that can be used other than small shrimps, 
appropriate processing and packaging techniques, principles of value adding 
and other techniques in obtaining high quality fermented products. The 
beneficiaries also visited the IFPT laboratories to observe the facilities and 
actual set-up in shrimp paste making using the standard method used at 
IFPT. Dr. Panggat also gave a lecture on Good Manufacturing Practices and 
Standard Sanitary Operating Procedures for one half day at the Barangay 
Multipurpose Hall. She discussed health hazards associated with 
contamination of shrimp paste, sanitary practices for the workers outside and   10
inside the processing area. Hands-on demonstration for the processors was 
also given by the resource persons on the standard shrimp paste processing 
method, value adding like the spicy adobo shrimp paste, product packaging 
and labelling.  
 
For the shrimp paste micro-enterprise in Barotac Nuevo, the Technical 
Consultant was Mrs. Ernestina Peralta, a Researcher of UPV – IFPT. Mrs. 
Peralta observed the procedure for shrimp paste processing by the 
beneficiaries and made recommendations to improve or come up with a better 
quality product. She also introduced an alternative process that would do 
away with grinding and drying which is their current practice. This alternative 
process would introduce ease in shrimp paste production during the rainy 
season when shrimp catch is high in the area. Mrs. Peralta also demonstrated 
the production of flavoured shrimp paste and gave a lecture on good 
manufacturing practices and personal hygiene for the processors. 
 
Fish Sauce Production 
The Sumakwelan Fisherfolk Association of San Joaquin decided to undertake 
fish sauce production because during the peak fishing season, the abundant 
fish catch results in a very low price for their fish. The production of fish sauce 
will give higher value to their fish catch and increase their income. The FAO-
supported project provided the materials whereas the members of the 
association provided labour for the construction of a village- type processing 
facility. The Technical Consultant of the fish sauce micro-enterprise was Mrs. 
Rose Mueda, a Researcher of UPV – IFPT. Mrs. Mueda conducted training 
and hands-on demonstrations on the processing of fish sauce with emphasis 
on the hygienic process to produce a clean and safe product. The first 
training, which lasted for one half-day, was on a laboratory scale using 5 kg of 
fish. The second training, conducted for one whole day, was on a pilot scale 
using 50 kg of fish which were fermented in the concrete tank of the fish 
processing facility. Additional training was also conducted on Record Keeping, 
Cost and Pricing Strategy, and Packaging and Labelling to improve the 
operation and increase the profitability of the fish sauce micro-enterprise.  
 
Salt Iodization  
Salt making is one of the livelihood projects supported by the municipal 
government of Miagao. Aside from providing additional income for the fishers, 
the municipal government wants to preserve their traditional salt making 
method for tourism purposes. During the consultation with the Miagao Salt 
Producers Association, the members expressed the need for training on the 
iodization of the salt they produce. Salt iodization is a requirement of Republic 
Act No.8172 which mandates that all table salt sold in the market must be 
iodized and all establishments in the manufacture and preparation of food 
must use iodized salt. In the salt iodization micro-enterprise, the Technical 
Consultant was Dr. Aklani Rose Hidalgo, Associate Professor of UPV – IFPT. 
Dr. Hidalgo gave a lecture on “Iodized Salt: Its Importance and Proper 
Handling” to the salt producers and other members of the community. A 
lecture-demonstration on salt iodization was given by Dr. Hidalgo with the 
FAO-supported project providing the basic materials for this activity. This was 
followed by a hands-on training on salt iodization for all members of the   11
association. Each salt producer was able to iodize 10 kg of salt which was 
packed and labelled in ¼, ½ and 1 kg plastic bags. Dr. Hidalgo also gave 
recommendations on improving the quality of their salt, packaging and 
marketing of their iodized salt.  
 
Mussel and Oyster Culture 
The San Francisco Fisherfolk Association of Barotac Viejo signified their 
intention to culture mussels and oysters because the shellfish sold in their 
town are coming from the nearby province of Capiz. The fisherfolk of San 
Francisco observed spat of oysters and mussels clinging onto various 
substrates in their coastal area and believed shellfish culture could be a 
profitable micro-enterprise. Dr. Carlos Baylon, a Professor of UPV Institute of 
Aquaculture and Technical Consultant of the micro-enterprise, gave a lecture 
on the different methods of culturing mussels and oysters. The raft culture 
method was preferred by the association because of its high yield and this 
would not contribute to the shallowing of the culture site due to increased 
siltation. Dr. Baylon also gave a lecture on the raft culture method and the 
procedure for its construction. The FAO-supported project provided materials 
whereas the members of the association provided labour for the construction 
of the first culture raft.  Dr. Uwe Tietze, during his visit to the culture site, 
recommended to the members of the association to focus on culturing 
individual oysters since these would command a high price in the market. 
With assistance from the FAO-supported project, two additional culture rafts 
were constructed owing to the high potential of the micro-enterprise as 
observed in the high attachment rate of oysters and mussels in the first raft. 
 
Assessment of the Training Sessions 
An assessment was made after the conduct of the training sessions to 
determine the relevance of the topics discussed and the ability of the resource 
persons to impart knowledge and skills to the beneficiaries. The assessment 
was made by Mr. Arcsel Gerard Sagge, Research Assistant of the FAO-
supported project, through interviews of selected participants of the training 
sessions and workshops. The interviewed participants mentioned that the 
resource persons were very patient in explaining the topics and were able to 
answer satisfactorily the questions asked by the trainees. The participants 
also said that they were able to understand the subject matter because of the 
lecture-demonstrations and the hands-on training given to them. The following 
activities implemented by the beneficiaries are proof that the training sessions 
were effective and put to good use: 
•   the Miagao Salt Producers Association were able to complete their 
registration with the Cooperatives Development Authority;  
•   members of the San Francisco Small Fishermen Association have 
started harvesting their mussels and oysters;  
•   shrimp paste producers of Barotac Nuevo and Tigbauan are now 
employing the hygienic preparation of their basic ingredients as 
recommended by the resource persons and have done a production 
run of their flavoured shrimp paste;  
•   fish vendors of Banate and Oton have fully paid their loans;  and   12
•   Anilao fish processors are now producing fish balls and fish bola-bola 
on a regular basis and now saving capital to buy a heavy duty blender 
to expand production. 
 
STEPS NEEDED TO BECOME A FULL-FLEDGED MICRO-
ENTERPRISE 
 
The initial step for becoming a full-fledged micro-enterprise is compliance with 
all the registration and certification requirements of the government.  The 
different micro-enterprises in Banate Bay and Southern Iloilo must comply 
with the following requirements to have a legitimate business existence and to 
have an operational organization: 
 
Activity  Ano Bte BNo BVj Gum Mgo Otn SJn Tig
Registration of 
business name with 
DTI. (P300) 
                 
Registration to 
legitimize existence as 
a cooperative with 
CDA. (P1,000) 
                 
Securing of tax 
identification number 
and registration of the 
books of accounts as 
well as printing of 
business documents 
like official receipts 
with BIR. (P600) 





                 
Registration as an 
employer with the 
government’s social 
security program, SSS. 
                 
Securing membership 
in the government 
health care benefits 
system with PHIC. 
                 
Registration with 
DOLE for the 
monitoring of 
compliance with labour 
laws. 
                 
Registration with BFAD 
as a licensed food 
manufacturer. (P500) 
  NA   NA NA    NA       13
Application with GS1 
for use of bar codes. 
(P1,300) 
  NA   NA NA    NA     
Secure electric service 
connection. (P5,000) 
OP OP OP OP OP  OP OP OP OP
Secure water services 
connection. (P3,360) 
OP NA NA  NA NA  NA  NA NA NA
Secure communication 
facilities connection.   
(P5,000) 
OP OP OP OP OP  OP OP OP OP
 
Legend: Ano - Anilao; Bte - Banate; BNo - Barotac Nuevo; BVj - Barotac 
Viejo; Gum -  Guimbal;   Mgo - Miag-ao;   Otn - Oton;     SJn - San Joaquin; 
Tig – Tigbauan; OP – optional.; NA – not applicable. 
 
 
A minimum of Php 2,900.00 is needed for basic business registration of 
micro-enterprises. For a food processor or manufacturer, an additional 
expense of Php500 is needed for registration with BFAD.  Another Php 1,300 
will be needed for application to use bar codes with GS1 and an additional 
Php100 for each product to be registered for bar coding. Bar coding is 
required for items that will be retailed in big grocery stores such as SM 
Supermarket, Gaisano Supermaket  and Iloilo Supermart.  To avail of utility 
services, the micro-enterprise has to advance Php 13,360 for water, electricity 
and communication. Electrical connection maybe prioritized over water and 
communication because water supply is abundant and communication can be 
facilitated by personal mobile phone units.  
 
In addition to complying with the above requirements, a lot of work must be 
done particularly in production, marketing and human resource support or 
management of these micro-enterprises to be viable and sustainable. The 
beneficiaries should find ways to improve the quality of their products and the 
production processes to minimize costs and eventually maximize profits. 
Further, enough quantities of their products should be generated to meet 
market demands created by their marketing efforts. On marketing, efforts 
must be exerted to identify potential markets and develop strategies on how to 
reach them. Prices should be reviewed to be more competitive and 
promotional tools should be considered like advertising and sales promotions.  
With regard to management and operation of the micro-enterprise, there 
should be a suitable organizational structure with appropriate management 
policies and operational guidelines. The organizational structure must show 
the lines of authority and staffing pattern while the operational guidelines 
should contain a suitable internal control system. 
 
Becoming a full-fledged micro-enterprise requires hard work over a period of 
time – at least five years.  There is also the equivalent monetary resource that 
should be considered.  The members of the fisherfolk association should have 
the fortitude and firmness to make their micro-enterprise viable and 
sustainable.  On the other hand, the other stakeholders like funding agencies, 
the academe and other government agencies should continue offering the   14
necessary support for the growing micro-enterprise in the form of additional 
grants and appropriate extension services. 
 
ADDITIONAL TRAINING NEEDS  
 
The beneficiaries of the FAO-supported project have attested that the training 
sessions they have undergone were very important in starting their micro-
enterprises. However, not all members of the fisherfolk associations were able 
to avail of the training programs that were conducted owing to funding and 
time constraints. The beneficiaries will have to be trained on the following 
specific areas for the long-term profitability and sustainability of their micro-
enterprises:   
 
Management Skills Development and Enhancement 
The most critical skill that should be learned by the micro-enterprise 
beneficiaries is the ability to manage their operations. The beneficiaries 
should be trained further in planning, organizing, implementing and controlling 
the various micro-enterprise activities. The management should be able to 
strategize their operations, out source and utilize resources, execute 
strategies and direct actions. As all of these require a lot of interaction, the 
management should also be adept in both intra and inter-personal skills. 
 
Values Re-orientation 
The beneficiaries also need to undergo a values re-orientation seminar.  Most 
micro-enterprises fail because their capital is sometimes used for personal 
purposes. They should be made aware that, for their micro-enterprise to 
succeed, enterprise transactions should be separate from personal 
transactions and the capitalization provided for the enterprise should be used 
primarily for its operations.  Only a portion of the income derived from 
operations can be for personal use and the beneficiaries should be prompted 
to keep their priorities straight. 
 
Marketing Skills on Sales, Packaging and Product Promotion  
The beneficiaries would also have to build on their marketing skills. In Anilao, 
for example, the beneficiaries stated that they lack the skill of selling. They 
mentioned that they need help in improving their self-confidence to be able to 
push their products to customers and to create distribution linkages. This is 
also true for the other micro-enterprises. 
 
Further, they should also be immersed in the proper packaging of their 
products as well as learn strategies in effective promotion and distribution. For 
them to be able to deliver their products in other geographical locations, they 
should also acquire knowledge on logistics operations. 
 
Good Manufacturing Practices, Hygiene and Food Safety   
The production aspect of the micro-enterprise has to be improved. The 
beneficiaries have to learn about the different factors that contribute towards 
the making of top quality products. For the   producers, they must employ 
good personal hygiene practices and must maintain cleanliness of their 
utensils and working areas to ensure good quality and safety of their products.   15
Good sanitation inside and outside the processing plants must also be 
observed by the food producers and manufacturers. 
 
In the case of Anilao, they still have to improve on the taste of their products.  
Shelf life of their fish bola-bola has to be established and they have to find 
ways to lower the cost while maintaining the quality of their products. For the 
micro-enterprises of Barotac Nuevo and Tigbauan, the producers should be 
exposed to good manufacturing practices.  Hygienic preparation of shrimps 
has to be observed to achieve quality produce.  Innovation on the current 
shrimp paste has to be introduced for it to be differentiated from shrimp paste 
products of other companies already introduced in the market. 
 
Barotac Viejo has to acquire technology on raising oysters to produce bigger-
sized individual oysters and ensure a good harvest. The producers have to 
ascertain that the water where the oysters grow is of good quality and is 
maintained that way all year round. All of these should be done to guarantee 
that they would be able to produce the best oysters and get a good price for 
their produce. In Miagao, the beneficiaries have to find ways to purify the 
seawater that serves as raw material in making salt.  The drying facilities and 
methods should also be evaluated for sanitary considerations. This is to 
achieve a certain quality that would make the Miagao salt the preferred salt in 
the market. 
 
Financial Management Skills 
Financial information is very crucial in making sound decisions. Most of the 
beneficiaries were not exposed to recording their financial transactions and 
keeping their books of accounts, they should then be given training on basic 
accounting and bookkeeping. In addition to the preparation of financial 
reports, they should also be guided on how to use these reports in making 
sound decisions through a seminar on proper financial and credit 
management. 
 
To further inspire them to proceed with their micro-enterprises, an educational 
tour to some successful micro-enterprises may be arranged.  Through this, 
the beneficiaries can have first-hand information on a similar endeavour that 
is progressing – enabling them to validate the learning they acquired from the 
various seminars conducted. Once exposed to an actual enterprise scenario, 
their resolve to commit themselves to the micro-enterprise endeavour will be 
intensified. 
 
LESSONS FROM THE FAO-SUPPORTED PROJECT 
 
After a year of implementing the project, important lessons were learned 
which can be used as a guide for similar and future endeavours. These are: 
 
1. Stakeholder participation is essential to the sustainability of micro-
enterprises. When the FAO-supported project was started, a primary 
consideration was how to sustain the micro-enterprises after the end of the 
project where funds will no longer be available. An important factor in 
sustainability is the active participation of officials of the LGUs and CRMCs in   16
the planning and implementation of the micro-enterprises. Officials from these 
municipalities recommended the fisherfolk organization with a good track 
record that should be involved in the micro-enterprise project. In this way, the 
micro-enterprise that will be established will have a greater chance of 
success. For the beneficiaries, they had a direct say on what micro-
enterprises they want to establish and what training programs and other 
support that should be extended to them. Through the active participation of 
the stakeholders, a sense of ownership is developed and these stakeholders 
will continue to be involved and will support their micro-enterprise even if 
external funding has ended. 
 
2. To transform a fisher into an entrepreneur is a long process which may not 
be achieved within a one-year project duration. There should be values 
orientation for the beneficiaries for them to develop a certain entrepreneurial 
character. The beneficiaries should be able to adopt the proper attitude and 
must have a firm commitment for their micro-enterprise to become successful. 
 
3. Different strategies may have to be utilized for the different micro-
enterprises to attain early success. There is an advantage in implementing the 
livelihood project through the fishers’ association because this fosters 
cooperation among community members. However, in one micro-enterprise in 
Banate Bay, some members of the association were not fully committed, thus 
slowing down the progress of the micro-enterprise. In a case like this, it may 
be a good strategy to just fully support a few hardworking and enterprising 
members, and when the micro-enterprise becomes profitable, they could just 
hire the other members of the association. 
 
4. Capacity building is vital to the success of micro-enterprises. Through the 
various training sessions conducted, the beneficiaries were able to make the 
operation of their organization more efficient which led to the improvement of 




The development of micro-enterprises is an important strategy to augment the 
income of small fishers, alleviate poverty and at the same time reduce fishing 
pressure in the coastal area. For a micro-enterprise to become sustainable 
will require a long process and will need the implementation of the following 
recommendations: 
 
1. The LGUs and CRMCs must continue to support and monitor the progress 
of the micro-enterprises that were established. The concerned municipal 
official e.g. fishery officer should follow-up the status and encourage the 
beneficiaries to continue working for their enterprise until it becomes fully 
viable. 
 
2. There should be active collaboration among the municipalities, the 
academe and other government institutions to respond to the needs and 
provide solutions to problems encountered by beneficiaries operating the 
micro-enterprises.   17
 
3. Financing institutions should provide special access to loans and capital for 
micro-enterprises established by fisherfolk associations. The long process 
and many requirements of the financing institutions have discouraged the 
fisherfolk from availing of these loans to start their micro-enterprises. 
 
4. There should be a basic set of training program suitable for micro-
enterprise development, consisting of, but not limited to the following: values 
orientation; organizational strengthening; product development and marketing. 
The members of a fisherfolk association must undergo this training program 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The depletion and degradation of the State marine and aquatic resources due to 
uncontrolled exploitation are the primary reasons for the enactment of fisheries laws.  
There are two approaches to the enforcement of these laws. Traditional law 
enforcement involves the intervention or actual performance by government through 
its designated and deputized agents.  However, government activities are directed 
mainly at preventing further resource depletion.  This is a shortcoming that prompted 
the conduct of alternative law enforcement strategies aimed at resource 
development. 
 
Paralegalism is a concept that pursues developmental legal aid, which is provided for 
the poor and marginalized sectors of society, such as a fishing community. This aid is 
provided by paralegals who are non-lawyers but with sufficient understanding of the 
law after having undertaken paralegal training.  In coordination with the local 
government unit, non-governmental organizations conduct paralegal activities in the 
community.  The residents undergo paralegal training, which includes education on 
the substantive and procedural aspects of the fisheries laws.  The empowerment of 
community residents prompts them to initiate or participate in the apprehension and 
litigation of fisheries law offenders.  The community involvement manifests the social 
acceptability of paralegal work.  On the other hand, financial and/or logistical support 
is provided by the local government unit.  This expresses its political acceptability to 
paralegal work in the community.  The acceptability of both the community and the 
local government unit are indicators for determining effectiveness of paralegal work 





There is important national legislation designed to protect the marine environment, 
develop the fisheries resources, and manage resource users’ conflicts.  However, the 
enforcement of these laws is slow and inadequate.  Illegal fishing and habitat 
destruction continuously proliferate with the existence, or lack of, enforcement plans 
and programs of Local Government Units (LGU).   This condition prompted the 
pursuit of non-governmental undertakings that empower residents in coastal 
communities to participate in the enforcement of fisheries laws. One of these 
undertakings is pursued by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) in which 
paralegals initiate and develop the capacities of local fishing communities in fisheries 
law enforcement. The success of the community law enforcement effort depends 
upon the nature of paralegal work, which is determined in terms of NGO capability, 
the levels of community acceptability and participation, and the degree or extent of 
local government support.   
 
Except for some success stories narrated by NGOs engaged in paralegal work, there 
is limited research and literature on the subject matter.  Available information 
generally describes the qualifications of paralegals and the nature of their work, 3 
which are mainly providing assistance to lawyers and individuals needing legal 
assistance.  Thus, there is the need to look into the nature of paralegal work as an 
independent and empowering initiative and how paralegal activities are geared 
towards achieving the goal of increasing community participation in fisheries law 
enforcement.   
 
FISHERIES LAW ENFORCEMENT: BASIS, ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 
 
The Philippines is an archipelago comprised of more than 7,100 interrelated islands 
that are interconnected by bodies of water and forming one single geographical, 
economic and political entity.
2  The bodies of water that form part of the national 
internal waters and territorial sea are rich with marine and aquatic resources.  These 
resources are vital in at least three ways:  as food to a population that depends on 
fish and fish products as a major sources of protein,
3 as  alternatives to expensive 
common animal meat sources (cow, chicken), and as significant sources of income 
needed to buy other needs. 
 
The Need for Fisheries Law Enforcement 
The abundance of marine and aquatic resources surrounding the Philippine 
archipelago during the 1930s is the primary reason for the government to pursue a 
framework of development that is based not on availability but on access to the 
resource employing certain technologies.
4  However, this kind of development 
resulted in depletion of fish stocks and destruction of marine habitats.  In response to 
this resource condition, legislation has been enacted to promote resource protection 
along with resource exploitation.  Unfortunately, this response is inadequate as 
resource exploitation continues to be uncontrolled.
5  
 
In 1998, Republic Act 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code is enacted to address 
the continuing critical problems of resource depletion and degradation. Chapter VI of 
the Code provides for certain prohibitions (and corresponding penalties) in fishery
6 
practices and the use of fishery technologies that have adverse effects on fish and 
aquatic resources.
7    These prohibitions apply to both Municipal and Commercial 
fishers who are engaged in fishing activities.
8  
                                                 
2 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, Part V, Article 46. 
3 IBON Databank and Research Center, The Philippine Fisheries (Manila: IBON Foundation, Inc., 1997) p. 11.  
60% of national protein consumption is from fish. 
4 Asuncion Siam and Alan T. White, “Evolution and continuing challenges of coastal management in the 
Philippines,” Over Seas  7, no. 7 (July 2005) <http://www.oceocean.org/overseas/200507/evolution.html> 15 
February 2005. 
5 Ibid. 
6 By fisheries, the Code includes those activities that relate to the act or business of fishing, culturing, preserving, 
processing, marketing, developing, conserving and managing aquatic resources and the fishery areas (such as 
bays, gulfs, and lakes). 
7 The Code defines aquatic resources as including fish and all living resources in the aquatic environment such as 
salt and corals.  Fish and/or fishery products under the Code include finfish, mollusks, crustaceans, echinoderms, 
and other marine mammals. 
8 Municipal fishers are those engaged in fishing within the Municipal waters.  The Fisheries Code prohibits 
commercial fishing within the 15-kilometer Municipal waters, unless the municipal government permits them 4 
 
The Fisheries Code devolves a broad range of powers and responsibilities to the 
local government unit, specifically the municipality and city, in order to empower them 
to directly manage the fisheries resources within their jurisdiction.
9  Section 16 grants 
the Municipality (and City) with authority and jurisdiction over fishery resources within 
their maritime boundaries or Municipal waters.  In pursuit of this devolution, the Code 
requires every LGU to enact appropriate ordinances that are consistent with the 
fisheries law.  Two types of ordinances are required to be enacted under the 
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Fisheries Code.  One, the Basic 
Municipal Fisheries Ordinance (Rule 16.1) delineates the boundaries of municipal 
waters and provides for rules and regulations on licensing and permits and other 
fisheries activities. Two, the Special Municipal Fisheries Ordinance (Rule 16.3) 
declares special demarcated fisheries areas, closed season and environmentally 
critical areas and sanctuaries.  A Unified Fisheries may be enacted by LGUs that 
border bays, lakes and gulfs for an integrated management of the marine areas.   
 
Moreover, the Fisheries Code does not only recognize and enhance the inherent 
legislative power of local governments but also directs the latter to exercise its 
executive power.  In the exercise of this executive power, the LGUs are obligated to 
enforce not only the ordinances it enacted but also the entire Fisheries Code and 
other fishery rules and regulations.   
 
Models, Approaches and Obstacles to Law Enforcement 
Generally, law enforcement refers to the involvement of individual entities in providing 
for measures that will accomplish the objectives of the law.  In the Philippines, there 
are two models of law enforcement, which are herein referred to as the “traditional” 
and “alternative.”   
 
The “traditional” model is context-specific as law enforcement is identified to include 
solely the interventions by government that are aimed at achieving compliance with 
the requirements of the law.
10  These interventions follow a “continuum of activities 
ranging from ‘soft’ preventive measures such as public education to ‘hard’ sanctions 
imposed by apprehension, prosecution, and conviction.”
11  “Soft” law enforcement 
essentially is intervention that utilizes non-judicial measures in order to promote 
voluntary compliance.  Such compliance includes restraints from illegal activities due 
to the continued presence of enforcement authorities (e.g., police) and acceptance of 
                                                                                                                                                          
within the 10.1 to 15 kilometer area (Article I, Section 18).  Further, the Code defines fishing as those activities 
that involve the taking of fishery species from their wild state or habitat, with or without the use of fishing 
vessels. 
9 This is a reinforcement of the role of the local governments that is first stipulated in the 1991 Local 
Government Code, which implements the Constitutional provision on decentralization and democratization of 
governmental powers. 
10 Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the 
Department of Agriculture, and Department of Interior and Local Government, Philippine Coastal Management 
Guidebook  No. 8:  Coastal Law Enforcement (Cebu City, Philippines:  Coastal Resource Management Project 
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, 2001) p. 22.  
11 Ibid. 5 
the law due to adequate knowledge and proper attitude.  On the other hand, “hard” 
law enforcement utilizes legal sanctions in order to impose involuntary compliance.  
Fines and/or imprisonment are penalties imposed in order to achieve some level of 
deterrence. 
 
There are two approaches in the “traditional” model.  One approach involves the 
government directly performing law enforcement.  This includes the law enforcement 
agents (government authorized public employees) actually conducting arrests and 
seizures, public attorneys prosecuting, or government employees conducting public 
lectures.  Another approach is when government initiates the conduct of an activity 
through a commissioned private entity (individual consultants, business group, NGO, 
or people’s organization).  In this model, the government is a distinct actor with 
distinct goal and value system, that is, as the regulator.  A vertical hierarchy of power 
exists with the government at the helm. 
 
The weakness of the “traditional” model is its perennial shortcomings that mainly 
address the issue of resource depletion:  the ambiguity and lack of clarity in policy 
objectives, the participation of too many actors and overlapping authorities, the lack 
of motivation from enforcers, and the inefficiencies of the judicial system.  These can 
be further understood in terms of specific obstacles as follows
12: 
•   Conflicting policies and laws and implementation programs 
•   Lack of political will to implement laws and enforcement programs 
•   Padrino or incentive system that promotes illegal activities 
•   Lack of patrol boats and other basic equipment to conduct monitoring and 
patrols 
•   Lack of trained law enforcement units 
•   Weak coordination between and among law enforcement agencies 
•   Lack of clear “lead” agency in coastal law enforcement 
•   Slow justice system with judiciary and prosecutors unfamiliar with fisheries and 
other laws 
•   Lack of public awareness of laws and consequences of illegal activities 
•  Slow economic development in coastal areas and lack of livelihood 
alternatives for fishers and those dependent directly on coastal resources 
 
The advent of new information technology providing easy access to more liberal 
ideas and the adoption of measures that decentralize government powers to local 
governments are the significant sources of the “alternative” model.  In this, the 
concept of enforcement is understood to be non-static, context-free,
13 and takes into 
account changing social patterns and development.   This model is geared more 
towards the establishment of social equity (the empowerment of stakeholders to 
participate in the entire law enforcement continuum) rather than mere resource 
                                                 
12 Ibid., p. 20. 
13 Christoph Demmke, “Towards Effective Environmental Regulation:  Innovative Approaches in Implementing 
and Enforcing European Environmental Law and Policy,”  Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/01 of the Jean Monnet 
Program, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA., 2001 
<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/apapers/01/010501-02.html> August 04, 2004.  6 
depletion.  It is more adaptive to the transformations in society brought about by 
increasing public awareness to the dangers of environmental degradation and to the 
support for environmental protection. 
 
Just like the traditional model, the alternative model also employs “soft” and “hard” 
preventive measures.  However, the latter model broadens law enforcement as other 
actors, apart from government, are taking significant participative roles.  Government 
no longer remains the regulator as the private sector shares with the former the same 
goals and value systems.
14  Thus, no hierarchy of power exists as both the regulator 
and regulatee aid each other in achieving compliance to the requirements of the law. 
  
The alternative model is approached in two ways.  One is when the private sector 
(essentially the civil society organizations or CSO, though sometimes the business 
entity) initiates an activity and the government merely performing coordinating 
functions.  The government role is necessary to acquire legitimacy and authority for 
the activity.  Another approach is when the private sector solely conducts law 
enforcement (such as the academe pursuing “soft” law enforcement or individuals 
performing citizen’s arrest).   
 
Community-Based Approach to Fisheries Law Enforcement 
The local government political structure in the Philippines is subdivided into the 
province, municipality/city, and barangay.  The community in this study is confined 
mainly to the barangay, which is the basic political subdivision.  Consequently, the 
coastal community is confined mainly to the barangay situated in the coastal area.
15 
 
The coastal community is an essential element that can contribute significantly to 
effective enforcement of the fisheries laws.  This is because the marine resource 
users mainly come from the coastal areas which offer opportunities to them in terms 
of food and livelihood.  Coastal environmental degradation adversely affects the 
access of the users to the marine resource.  Thus, as the direct beneficiaries of the 
marine resources, community participation in efforts towards resource protection and 
preservation is vital. 
 
The community is incapable by itself to initiate the enforcement due to a number of 
factors.  First, it lacks the organization necessary to mobilize and pursue concerted 
efforts.  The absence of organization, coupled with the inefficiencies of law 
enforcement agents, prompt the proliferation of illegal activities committed by 
residents as well as outsiders.  The second factor is the prevailing ignorance or lack 
of understanding of the law among the residents due to economic and social 
priorities.  Since knowledge of the law is not determined in terms of financial or 
economic returns, as such it does not directly put food on the table, so is considered 
as a lesser priority.  This priority manifests the prevailing poverty conditions in the 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 The Fisheries Code defines the geographic extent of the coastal area as the landmark limit of one (1) kilometer 
from the shoreline at high tide, and seaward limit of 200 meters isobath. 7 
coastal areas
16  and the culture that inhibits motivation to engage in political 
undertakings.  Finally, the absence of organization and motivation preclude 
opportunities for the development of skills and resources.  Without the social 
infrastructure that will arrange priorities and directions, the community does not 
possess the collective initiative to participate in fisheries protection. 
 
Given the above conditions, the representatives of government and NGOs bring to 
the community tools and methods that will involve the latter in the fisheries law 
enforcement.  This is the community-based approach, which is intended primarily to 
address the inadequacies of the coastal community and thereby empowering 
individual stakeholder therein to participate, collectively or individually, in law 
enforcement and realize the objective of resource and environmental preservation. 
 
PARALEGALISM, PARALEGAL WORK AND COMMUNITY-BASED LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
 
Lawyers provide legal services to private clients for an equivalent fee.  However, 
when the clients are the poor and marginalized sectors of society, lawyers provide 
legal aid, where monetary payments are a secondary consideration.  There are two 
types of legal aid in the Philippines:  traditional legal aid and developmental legal aid.  
Traditional legal aid focuses on the protection of the rights of the poor through the 
law.  It works on the assumption that injustice is the result of human “greed and 
weaknesses”
17 and their ignorance of the law rather than the weaknesses inherent in 
the law.  Thus, injustice can be redressed through the litigation process whereby the 
rights of the poor can be protected against the forces that undermine them.  These 
forces include the political and economic elites who either use the state to advance 
their private interests or who profit from the inaction and inefficiency of the state.  
Public interest lawyering is an example of traditional legal aid. 
18 
 
The second type of legal aid is not a distinction of the first but a complement since 
litigation is also a necessary means to provide for social justice.  However, 
developmental legal aid goes beyond the provision of legal assistance in court.  It 
further aims to change the social and legal systems that deprive the poor of their right 
to decide for themselves.  Alternative lawyering is a particular legal practice that 
provides for developmental legal aid.  In this practice, the law is treated not just a 
given but a critical tool to promote the democratic and just distribution of power, 
wealth and other related values.  This can be done by resolving social issues, 
changing society through the law or changing the unjust law itself, and changing 
people and communities.
19   Alternative lawyering involves the community being 
served not only in law reform but in law enforcement as well.  The empowerment of 
                                                 
16 IBON Databank and Research Center, supra note 2., p. 23. 
17 Jose W. Diokno, “Developmental Legal Aid in Rural ASEAN: Problems and Prospects,”  working paper, 
International Commission of Jurists, Penang, Malaysia, 1981. 
18 Marlon J. Manuel, “Lawyering with the poor,” From the Grassroots: The Justice Reform Agenda of the Poor 
and Marginalized (n.p., n.d.). 
19 Ibid. 8 
the people in the community is an essential objective that will lead to the goal of 
development. 
 
Paralegals and Paralegalism  
Generally, it is the lawyer who performs legal aid. When the lawyer is not available, 
certain legal work not acknowledged as part of the practice of law is done by either 
the legal assistants or paralegals.  But unlike legal assistants who simply perform 
clerical service for the lawyer, a paralegal is a person who: 
•   is not a lawyer and, therefore, not accredited to practice law; 
•   possesses basic knowledge of the law and the legal and conflict resolution 
procedures; 
•   is either a resident of the community or works with an organization; and, 
•   is committed to do developmental legal aid. 
Paralegals work in any of the areas of law, such as criminal law, labour law, patent 
and copy right, real estate, etc.  They work in either private (corporations, law firms, 
NGOs) or public organizations. 
 
From the NGO concept,
20  a paralegal has finished paralegal training (PLT) that 
provides the basic knowledge and experience for paralegal work.  Paralegal training 
is distinguished from training about the law.
21  The latter is only limited to the specific 
provisions of the law or the law itself.  On the other hand, PLT follows a module that 
includes components on substantive aspects (the content and interpretation of the 
law), on procedural aspects (search and seizure, evidence, affidavit making, process 
of prosecution), and on paralegalism. 
 
Paralegalism is a concept in pursuit of developmental legal aid.
22  Specifically, 
paralegals participate in alternative lawyering by performing specific duties, which 
include organizing and mobilization of people, establishing people and lawyer 
partnerships, providing support for legal assistance, and advocating for social change 
and law reform.  These activities are based on realities that promote social and 
economic inequities, uphold unjust laws, and prevent the marginalized sectors from 
access to social justice.  Paralegalism is strengthened by its exclusivity in achieving 
developmental objectives.  This is because paralegals cannot engage in the practice 
of law and the provision of legal assistance that are the exclusive work of lawyers.  
This inability directs paralegals to engage predominantly in developmental legal aid, 
and engage, partially, in purely traditional legal aid. Moreover, while the lack of time 
and opportunities for financial or monetary returns make lawyers least attracted to 
engage in alternative lawyering, paralegals are exception from these attractions.   
Instead, the latter are directed to be more focused on developmental work. 
 
While paralegals pursue developmental legal aid, they are engaged in either 
traditional or alternative law enforcement.  Thus, public servants are also engaged in 
                                                 
20 Atty. Cecile Sabig, interview by the author, 05 November 2004. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panlegal (SALIGAN), “Philosophy of Paralegalism,”  Manual for Paralegals:  
Violence Against Women, 1999, p. 17-20. 9 
paralegal work.  It is when the government is inadequate to pursue the work (due 
invariably to the inherent weakness of traditional law enforcement) that CSOs, NGOs 
and private individuals pursuing advocacy work acquires prominent roles in pursuing 
alternative law enforcement. 
 
Community-Based Paralegal Work 
One of the activities of alternative lawyers is the provision and enhancement of legal 
literacy at the grassroots level.  The purpose is to develop the legal capacity of 
identified stakeholders (such as farmers, fisherfolk, women, youth) so they can freely 
express their rights and fully participate in community development.  These lawyers 
usually are engaged in the conduct of the activities of NGOs to which they belong or 
they, as individuals, participate in NGO activities.  
 
When the lawyers are not available, legal work is delegated to the paralegals.  The 
legal services provided are usually free and involve a wide range of work including 
the giving of basic legal advice, community education, and referral service (which 
may include conduct of research and investigation, referral to a lawyer, and 
assistance in the disposition of cases). 
 
Paralegal work is community based because of the conduct of paralegal activities in 
the barangay, the participation of barangay residents (more particularly those who 
have stakes in the utilization and management of the marine environment), and with 
the activities geared primarily at empowering these residents so they can fully 
participate in the effective enforcement of fisheries laws. It is vital that the residents 
are educated about the law and its ramifications so they can perform their obligations 
and enjoy their rights.  Furthermore, an empowered community can provide 
government with practical inputs for decision-making and facility for the 
implementation of plans and programs.    
 
 
PARALEGAL WORK IN NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, PHILIPPINES 
 
The following discussion is the result of a study that seeks to describe the paralegal 
work conducted by NGOs in the coastal community, the community response, and 
the contributions of the undertaking to effective enforcement of fisheries laws.  NGOs 
in this study are engaged in either traditional or alternative law enforcement in the 
pursuit of paralegal activities. 
 
Framework of Analysis 
Figure 1 below presents the framework of analysis.  NGOs conduct paralegal work in 
a particular community or barangay in a city or municipality. The conduct of paralegal 
work is done in two approaches.  One is when the NGO directly involve themselves 
in the community and mobilize the people to organize and act on identified issues.  
The second approach is when the NGO cooperates with the local government by way 
of either facilitating or actually implementing the latter’s program and project. 
Paralegals are either regular employees of the NGO or are contracted to conduct the 10 
facilitation or implementation of the LGU program and project.  In the implementation 
of these programs, certain strategies are employed.  Lastly, the duration of paralegal 
work contributes to the over all content of the NGO undertaking.  
 
































Paralegal work conducted by NGOs generates positive or negative reactions from the 
local government unit, particularly from the local executive officials (of the city, 
municipality, or barangay), the police force, and the deputized fish wardens (or 
Bantay Dagat). Regardless of which entity initiates a paralegal activity, the reaction is 
both on the manner by which the NGO facilitates and implements an LGU program 
and project and the conduct of the program and project of the concerned NGO.  The 
reaction, classified as political acceptability, is determined in terms of certain criteria 
for acceptability: the knowledge about fisheries laws, the extent of participation in the 
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On the other hand, the beneficiaries of paralegal work, the community, may either 
accept or reject the undertaking.  The social acceptability of the NGO paralegal work 
by the relevant civil society sectors (fisherfolk, women, and youth) in the community 
is determined in terms of certain criteria for acceptability:  their knowledge of fisheries 
laws, the levels of participation in the paralegal activities, the identified benefits to the 
civil society, and the number of sectors participating. 
 
Social acceptability determines the effectiveness of paralegal work in the community 
in the enforcement of fisheries law.  However, effectiveness is not cited as a 
conclusion.  Rather, it describes the prospects.  This means that the level of 
community participation will contribute to the success of the endeavor to enforce the 
fisheries laws.  
 
Participants 
The participants in this research include local government units in the selected cities 
and municipalities in the Province of Negros Occidental, NGOs that are conducting 
paralegal work in the Province, and civil society sectoral organizations (fisherfolk, 
women, and youth) in identified coastal barangays of the concerned LGUs where 
paralegal work is done. 
 
Negros Occidental is one of the two provinces in Negros Island located in central 
Philippines.  It has thirteen (13) cities, twelve (12) of which are coastal.  It also has 
nineteen (19) municipalities and thirteen (13) of which are coastal.  Two coastal cities 
(Victorias and Talisay) and two (2) coastal municipalities (Hinigaran and Cauayan) 
are randomly selected to comprise the local government institutions. The selection is 
done after identifying those cities and municipalities where NGOs do paralegal work.  
The cities and municipalities are distinguished from each other for the purpose of 
describing the paralegal work therein.   
 
Political acceptability is determined from the responses from interviews with 
concerned local government officials who serve as key informants.  These include 
the City/Municipal Agriculturist, the Barangay Captain (village head), the officer-in-
charge on maritime affairs in the Philippine National Police (PNP) of the LGU, and 
representatives from the deputized fish warden (Bantay Dagat) of the LGU.   
 
On the other hand, one coastal barangay from each of the local government 
institutions is purposely selected as study area for determining social acceptability.  
The basis for the barangay selection is the concentration of paralegal work done by 
the NGO.  The respondents from the barangays include ten (10) active members, 
randomly selected from a list, from each of the sectoral organizations 
abovementioned.  An active member is one who regularly attends meetings and 
participates in the group activities.   The sectors, classified into organizations, are 
distinguished as follows in order to avoid duplication in respondent selection: 
•   Fisherfolks are males engaged in the actual extraction of fish and fisheries 
resources on sea and who are eighteen (18) years old or older; 12 
•   Women are females who are eighteen years old or older and who are 
engaged in any other occupation except the extraction of fish and fisheries 
resources on sea; 
•   Youth are males or females who are fifteen (15) years old but below eighteen 
(18) years old. 
 
There are presently 145 NGOs that operate all over the province.  Ten (10) of these 
are engaged in paralegal work in the coastal communities of a particular city or 
municipality.  NGOs conducting community paralegal work with the selected LGUs 
are purposely selected for the study.  These are the World Wildlife Fund (with Talisay 
City and Victorias City), the University of St. La Salle (USLS) Balayan (with Cauayan) 
and the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (with Hinigaran).  The officers of 
the NGOs are interviewed about their paralegal activities in the selected 
communities. 
 
Sources of Data 
Research data are taken from the following: 
Official documents (NGO programs, strategies, transcripts of dialogues, 
consultations, discussion with local communities, LGU executive enactments) 
Interview (key informant) of NGO officials, LGU Executive Officials, PNP, Bantay 
Dagat and Deputies 
Interview of purposely selected residents in the community who are either officers or 
members of Peoples Organizations (POs) classified under fisherfolk, women, and 
youth sectors 
Interview of experts (lawyers, community workers) 
 
NGO Profiles and Paralegal Activities 
There are particular NGOs conducting paralegal work in the purposely identified 
coastal communities.  These are the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) that operates in 
Talisay City and Victorias City, the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement 
(PRRM) in the Municipality of Hinigaran, and the Balayan in the Municipality of 
Cauayan.  Generally, the paralegal activities of these NGOs are similar:  the conduct 
of PLTs in both substantive and procedural components, informal dialogues and 
discussions on issues and problems relating to the fisheries law and its enforcement, 
facilitating or actually engaging in the building of people’s organization (PO), 
assistance to the LGU Bantay Dagat in the conduct of legal procedures, assistance 
to the barangay in the prevention and resolution of conflicts (intra and inter), bridging 
the community and the law enforcement agents (wardens, lawyers). 
 
Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement
23 
Founded in 1952, PRRM is a national NGO with 20 branches and chapters.  It is 
funded by national and international agencies to engage in development work, which 
are pursued mainly from four approaches:  education, health, livelihood, and self-
government.  Paralegal work is concentrated on pursuing policy reforms and 
                                                 
23 Edwin Balajadia, interview by the author, 10 April 2005. 13 
strengthening voluntary action in order to enhance community capacity to participate 
in the planning, advocacy and implementation of sustainable development. 
  
In the Municipality of Hinigaran, PRRM involves itself directly with the selected 
barangays upon prior permission from the LGU.  In particular instances, the 
“convergence approach” is utilized by PRRM with both the Municipality and the 
Barangay.  This approach refers to the coordination of NGO and LGU activities in 
“converging” areas such as the formation of the Fisheries and Aquatic Resource 
Management Council (FARMC),
24 Bantay Dagat operations, development of Coastal 
Resource Management (CRM) Plan, consultation on livelihood programs, and 
enactment of fisheries ordinances in conformity with the Fisheries Code.   
 
PRRM does not have a particular PLT program.  Rather, it integrates the education of 
community residents on the marine environment and self-governance in the 
implementation of the program on Environmental Protection and Resource Base 
Management.  This program builds on the capacity of the community to organize and 
address technical matters.  As a result, existing POs are initiating the implementation 
of LGU programs and activities, which include those that pertain to fisheries law 
enforcement.  Moreover, financial and logistical supports are provided by the NGO 
related to the implementation of the Fisheries Code.   
 
“Balayan”25 
Balayan is the community development and volunteer formation office of the 
University of St. La Salle (USLS)
26 in Bacolod City.  Founded in 1987, it is the arm for 
the university’s direct involvement in community development efforts.  While USLS 
provides support to LGU activities, Balayan initiates and implements its two major 
extension programs that are mainly implemented by volunteers.  One program is the 
university-based “in-reach” that includes volunteer formation, social awareness and 
advocacy, institutional community extension, and the Christian values learning and 
formation.  On the other hand, the community-based “out-reach” programs cater to 
street children, fisherfolk, and solid waste management.   
 
Balayan generally operates separately from the LGU.  It establishes a direct 
partnership with the fisherfolk organizations in the ten coastal barangays in the 
Municipality of Cauayan.  Community education on the fisheries laws is provided to 
these POs in collaboration with NGO partner associations.  In order to protect the 
rights of the fisherfolks, support to law enforcement agents is given, with the 
assistance of partner associations, particularly in the conduct of apprehensions and 
prosecution of fisheries violators.   
 
                                                 
24 The Philippine Fisheries Code directs the formation of FARMC in the local government to function as a 
consultative body to the LGU in the determination of fishing activities. 
25 Dexter Ian Tabujara, interview by the author, 11 April 2005. 
26 USLS is a private university located in Bacolod City, the capital of Negros Occidental Province. 14 
World Wildlife Fund
27 
WWF in Negros Occidental is one of the offices of WWF-Philippines.  As a national 
NGO, it is engaged in various environmental activities aiming at conservation and 
community empowerment.  One of its active involvements is on education, 
information and communication.  In Negros Occidental, WWF is involved in 
researches and extension such as, among others, sources of energy (including 
ocean waves) and fishery production and protection (particularly blue crab which is a 
significant fishery export).  
 
In the conduct of paralegal work in the cities of Talisay and Victorias, WWF does not 
involve itself in the community directly.  Rather, it engages in a cooperative effort with 
the LGU and the Department of Agriculture (a national government agency).  It 
cooperates with the LGU in the planning of seminars and trainings on the fisheries 
laws and, in partnership, they engage with the residents of the community in carrying 
out information dissemination and trainings either in the form of structured lectures or 




Negros Occidental is one of the six provinces in Western Visayas or Region VI. It is 
bounded on the north by the Visayan Sea, on the south by the Sulu Sea, on the 
southeast by the Guimaras Strait that separates it from Panay Island, and on the east 
by the Tanon Strait and the Province of Negros Oriental.
28  Its long stretch of land 
has a total area of 7,926.07 square kilometers or 792,607 hectares.   
 
The province is populated by 2.6 million Negrenses, and their annual growth rate 
continues at 1.13%.  The labour force population of fifteen years old and over is 
1.875 million.  Though basically an agricultural province, only 51.7% (571,000) are 
working on agriculture, while 39.8% (439,000) and 8.5% (94,000) are in the service 
and industry sectors, respectively.  Of those working in agriculture, 78.6 (449,000) 
are situated in the urban areas and 21.3% in the rural areas.  The large agricultural 
labour force in the urban areas is due to the congestion of population in the thirteen 
cities that covers a land area of 52.69% (417,602) of the provincial total.  Agricultural 
products are primarily sugarcane and rice.  However, fisheries are a major source of 
food and livelihood in the province.  The supply comes from fishing in the surrounding 
municipal and national waters as well as from production of cultured species such as 
tilapia, milkfish, oyster and prawn.   
 
                                                 
27 Based on interviews with the fishery officers, police officers and fish wardens in the cities of Victorias and 
Talisay. 
28 All technical data are taken from Province of Negros Occidental EDP Division, “Province of Negros 
Occidental,” <http://www.negros-occ.gov.ph> 07 August 2004.  Also in National Statistics and Coordinating 
Board, “Philippine Standard Geographic Code:  Negros occidental Province,”  <http://www.ncsb.gov.ph> 15 
January 2005.  15 
Table A.  Community Information 
 





Classification  5th class  5th class  2nd class  1st class 
No. of Coastal 
Barangays  5  4 5 13 
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29 “An Act Providing for the Development, Management and Conservation of the Fisheries and Aquatic 
Resources and Regulating Fishing and/or  Fisheries Activities in the City of Talisay, Province of Negros 
Occidental.” 
30 Municipal ordinances that are still in force:  Municipal Ordinance 95-01 (An Ordinance Regulating Fishing 
and/or fisheries in the Municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental and For other Purposes) and  Municipal 
Ordinance 95-02 (An Ordinance Creating the Municipal Bantay Dagat Council for Purpose of Fully 
Implementing and Enforcing All Existing Laws, and Regulations Relative to the Preservation, Conservation and 
Protection of Aquatic Life and Marine Resources, and Eradicate and Prosecute Fishing Practices Within the 
Municipality of Victorias).  
31 “An Ordinance Regulating Fishing and/or Fisheries in the Municipality of Hinigaran, Province of Negros 
Occidental.” 
32 An Ordinance Amending and Consolidating All Fishery and Aquatic Ordinances of the Municipality of 
Cauayan, Negros Occidental.” 




Talisay is a 5th class city and the site of fast growing residential and industrial 
complex developments that are largely situated contiguous to the coastal area.  The 
City of Victorias earns a large part of its income from the Victorias Milling Company, a 
sugar refinery that is the source of milling discharges that threaten the city’s limited 
municipal waters from major marine pollution.  The Municipality of Hinigaran is a 
growing community with sugarcane production as one of its major sources of income.  
The Panay Gulf provides the stretch of coastal communities in Hinigaran and 
Cauayan with a variety of fishery resources.  This is one of the vital sources of 
income for Cauayan on top of the tourism potentials of its lengthy coastal area. 
 
Each of the four LGU has enacted its fishery laws with specific prohibitions and 
penalties against destructive fishing and fishing practices.  The ordinances of Talisay 
City and Cauayan implement the 1998 Fisheries Code.  Victorias City and Hinigaran, 
on the other hand, are yet to amend their ordinances to conform with the Code.   
 
There is only one PO that exists in each of the purposely-selected barangay.  These 
POs involve the (male) fisherfolk and women, except in Barangay 6A due to the 
understanding that both men and women are involved in fishing and related activities 
such as marketing (which the women traditionally do).  In the case of Barangay 6A, 
the Barangay FARMC serves the purpose of PO in addition to its functions as 
provided for in the Fisheries Code.  From observation, the POs in Hinigaran and 
Cauayan are well organized due to the active involvement of the PRRM and Balayan, 
respectively, in community organizing.  Whereas in Talisay and Victorias, WWF 
operates more often in cooperation with the LGU in order to implement the latter’s 
programs.  
 
Acceptability of Paralegal Work 
Acceptability provides value to NGO paralegal work.  There are two providers of 
acceptability:  the local government officials and deputies providing political 
acceptability; and, the community residents, classified according to sectors, providing 
social acceptability.  Generally, there are three (3) criteria that establish acceptability: 
•   Knowledge and understanding of the law.  Awareness of the existence of the 
law, objective knowledge about the relevant provisions of the law, and 
appreciation of the importance of the law are vital to compliance, 
empowerment and mobilization.  
•   Participation in the propagation of the law and in the judicial process.  The 
community residents, along with their individual interests and social values, 
inform, educate and communicate the law to the entire community.  They 
involve themselves in community organizing, conflict resolution, and the 
process of apprehension and prosecution. 
•   Knowledge of the benefit of paralegal work to the community.  Identification of 
the benefit of participation in paralegal work is identifies the social value the 
participant attaches to the approach. 17 
 
The above criteria of acceptability are drawn from the four (4) principles of effective 
law enforcement identified by Antonio A. Oposa.
34  These principles are: 
•   Law is an agreement of minds or a “social product” that must be deemed 
desirable and supported by mental and emotional agreement by individuals 
and society at large. 
•   Legal marketing or selling the law is necessary to promote voluntary 
compliance. 
•   Socio-cultural sensitivities and pressure points must be considered in the 
manner used for implementing the law. 
•   Swift, painful, and public punishment must be carried out in order to modify 
behaviour and serve as a deterrent. 
 
When the acceptability criteria are articulated by the providers, paralegal work is 
acceptable.  This acceptability of paralegal work becomes instrumental in contributing 
to the effectiveness of law enforcement.  However, it is not the political acceptability 
but the social acceptability of paralegal work (as a community based approach) that 
can contribute to effective fisheries law enforcement.  This is because the civil society 
contribution to fisheries law enforcement is vital given its non-political nature and the 
inadequacies of the political organization of the local government unit.  Political 
acceptability mainly provides collaboration so the NGO can commence and pursue 
their programs or those that the LGU initiate. 
 
Political Acceptability 
Selected key informants were interviewed to determine the political acceptability of 
NGO paralegal work in the selected coastal communities in Negros Occidental.   
Three (3) operationally established criteria
35 were used. 
 
Knowledge of the existence and importance of the Philippine Fisheries Code and the   
Municipal/City Fisheries Ordinance and its relevant provisions. 
All the key informants are knowledgeable of the national law and the local 
government ordinance.  The knowledge of the laws is important for it serves a 
number of important purposes: 
•   it serves to remind them of the source of their functions and existence as 
fisheries law enforcers; 
•   it identifies the particular tasks that need to be performed; 
•   it is directly related to the complete performance of the functions; 
•   it provides for the human rights that need to be protected through the effective 
enforcement of the law; 
•   it identifies the activities necessary to protect the marine environment in 
coordination with the other stakeholders and agencies of government; 
                                                 
34 A.A. Oposa, “Legal marketing of environmental law,” Journal of Comparative and International Law 6 
(1996) 273-291.  In Department of Environment and Natural Resources, supra note 9, p. 5. 
35 Atty. Cecile Sabig, interview by the author, 05 November 2004.    18 
•   it provides specific rules on how to address issues and problems (including 
complaints); and, 
•   it serves as a basis for liability for failure to enforce the law. 
 
While the respondents have no full mastery of the law, they possess basic 
understanding of the provisions related to enforcement.  This includes the provisions 
on the municipal waters, prohibited fishing, and the processes of apprehension and 
prosecution.  Their knowledge of the laws are sourced form attendance in seminars 
and trainings conducted by the NGO, the LGU and the national government agencies 
such as the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (of the Department of 
Agriculture) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.  The mass 
media, particularly the radio, is a critical source of information as well. It is from radio 
that analyses of the law and its application can be gained.  Failures from personal 
experiences also enhance the understanding of the law.  This understanding is 
further enhanced during the sharing of the experiences within the particular group 
that the respondent belongs to and with the community at large.   
 
Extent of Participation in Paralegal Work. 
There are three (3) forms by which local government officials participate in NGO 
paralegal work (see Figure 2 below).  Participation in each of these forms vary and, 
thus, distinguishing the extent.  Facilitation involves the provision of material 
(financial and logistics such as equipments and manpower) and technological (know-
how) support.  In the implementation of programs, facilitation is the most common 
and basic participation since there is no employment of authority except the provision 
of the needed assistance.  The public official need not be present at any time in the 
implementation of the program.  Facilitation is the least extensive form of 
participation. 
 
Figure 2.  Extend of Participation in Paralegal Work 
 






Political authority becomes expressed when the extent of participation involves 
Supervision.  Supervision includes facilitation and the effort to ensure the execution 
of the program.  It requires the presence of the public official in the implementation of 
the activities at such instance when there is need to check on the progress.  This will 
also require the personal contact of the public official with the NGO personnel 
involved in the program implementation.  Some requirements are imposed on the 
NGO to quantify the progress of implementation.  Supervision requires a more 








The most extensive form of participation is Control.  On top of facilitation and 
supervision, control involves the acts of modifying, altering, and/or nullifying the 
program and its implementation.  Modifying results in a change that is not totally 
different form the existing condition.  When the change becomes different, there is an 
alteration of the existing condition.  Nullifying results to total rejection of the existing 
condition.  Control requires the application of heavier authority in order to effect the 
changes. 
 
The Municipal/City Agriculture Office is tasked with addressing matters related to 
coastal and fisheries management.  Per the interview with the Agricultural Officers of 
each of the four selected municipalities and cities, they participate in the 
implementation of the program.  However, the extent of participation varies 
depending on whose program is being implemented.  If the program is the NGO’s, 
the participation is at the extent of Facilitation.  This includes the provision of support 
by way of money, food, supplies, motorboats, and manpower.  Expertise and 
information data are also provided, such as during the conduct of seminars and 
trainings.  On the other hand, there is Supervision if the program is that of the LGU.  
Meetings with, and regular updating of performance by, the NGO are conducted and 
required, respectively.  Control is always exercised by the Municipal/City Mayor, and 
the Agriculture Officer advises the former whenever necessary. 
 
The participation of the agents of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the 
Bantay Dagat is at the extent only of facilitation, that is, the provision of manpower, 
logistic and technological (expertise) support.  They point to the Agriculture Officer 
when it comes to Supervision.  However, they have coordinating relations with the 
Office of the Municipal/City Agriculture.  Procedurally, their main function is the 
execution of orders coming from authority.  Their power to decide is limited only to 
carrying out the orders given to them.   
 
Understanding of the benefits of participation in paralegal work. 
Participation in paralegal work generally
36 does not entail any form of monetary 
compensation to LGU personnel.  However, the respondents identify their 
participation as both responsibility and obligation due to either or both of the 
following:  it is the implementation of the programs of the LGU from which hierarchy 
they belong (a “call for duty”), and it is a source of essential information and 
experience.  As a result of this participation, the respondents gain satisfaction for 
performance of a function, self worth as leaders in the community and appreciation 
and respect from the LGU and the community residents 
 
Social Acceptability 
The social acceptability of paralegal work in the selected local government units in 
Negros Occidental was determined in terms of knowledge of the existence and 
importance of the Philippine Fisheries Code and the Municipal/City Fisheries 
Ordinance and its relevant provisions. 
                                                 
36 In some instances, monetary rewards are given as incentives for performance in apprehension of fisheries law 
violators. 20 
 
Knowledge of the Philippine Fisheries Code and the corresponding local government 
ordinances is manifested by the actual identification of its existence.  In support of 
this, there is also actual identification and description of the prominent provisions.  
Such knowledge is acquired through various means.  Trainings and seminars about 
the laws conducted by NGO and LGU are formal or semi formal and structured 
sources of such knowledge.  There are also the informal sources such as discussions 
with peers, family members, barangay and/or municipal officials, national government 
agents, and NGO personnel.  The mass media (television, radio and newspaper), 
which are available in the subject coastal communities, are also effective tools in 
disseminating information about the existence of the laws.  Knowledge of the laws 
can be acquired and enhanced by the importance the individual community resident 
attaches to it. 
 
In the studied barangays, there is a higher frequency of knowledge among the 
selected respondents about the Philippine Fisheries Code. The knowledge about the 
national law is mainly sourced from informal discussions with friends and neighbours 
within the community.  The NGO is also a source of information either through the 
formal and structured processes in trainings and seminars or through the informal 
discussions with NGO personnel.  Moreover, the radio is an effective medium in 
making the national law known to the respondents.   
 
There is a comparatively lower knowledge by the respondents of the local 
government fisheries ordinances.  As in the knowledge on the national law, sources 
of information are basically similar.  However, since radio and mass media 
broadcasts include mainly the national conditions rather than the municipal or city, 
the sources of information are limited to informal discussions with barangay residents 
and local government officials. 
 
There is higher frequency of knowledge among the respondents of the prominent 
provisions of the national and local government legislation.  These include the 
designation of the municipal waters, the different prohibited fishing gears and 
practices, the fishing rights, the apprehension and prosecution processes, and the 
creation and functions of FARMC.   
 
The knowledge of the law is deemed important by the respondents as a motivation 
for their participation in paralegal activities and in the general management of the 
fisheries resources.  There is a general concern that the availability of the resources 
is dependent upon the regulation and control imposed upon the exploitation of the 
resources.  Both the national and local government legislations are effective tools for 
regulation and control.  Thus, enforcement is most vital and necessary. 
 
Levels of participation in paralegal work 
 
Figure 3 presents the three (3) levels in which the community residents participate in 
paralegal work.  Participation is basic with the community and becomes more 21 
advanced with the lawyer and the court.  Participation is basic because it is easier to 
do.  It involves the performance of common tasks of organizing, educating, assisting 
and mobilizing residents of the community.  The participant and the community 
residents are more or less related and familiar with each other.  On the other hand, 
participation becomes advanced when the task performed becomes uncommon since 
it requires objective knowledge of a particular expertise and involves people and 
experts from outside the community.  These conditions render the task more difficult 
to perform. 
 
Knowledge of the NGO paralegal work is necessary for participation.  While the 
fisherfolk and the women have this knowledge, only those youths who are engaged 
in fishing possess it.  The majority of youths are in school, and this deters them from 
being informed about NGO activities related to fisheries management.  
 
Figure 3.   Levels of Participation in Paralegal Work 
 















In the barangay, paralegal work involves the following specific activities:  help build 
and develop POs, disseminate information about the law, educate barangay 
residents on the law, engage them in value formation on resource preservation, 
provide legal advice, help in the conduct of law training, and help resolve conflicts.  
Respondent participation is more prominent on value formation, which is reinforced 
during training and gatherings when the fisheries laws are discussed and their 
essence analyzed. There are also trainings and seminars where the state of the 
environment is discussed which leads to attention towards the value of the laws.  The 
non-formal forms of information, education and communication are essential in 
directing the respondents’ concern towards the environment.  Small group 
discussions, whether impromptu or habitually done (such as the afternoon gatherings 
where discussions are done over glasses of coconut wine), are means by which 






At the level of the lawyer, the following are the paralegal activities that involve 
respondent participation:  help in getting access to the lawyer, help in getting expert 
legal advice, and help in getting close relationship.  Research data shows that there 
is a gap between the respondents and the lawyer.  There are four identified reasons 
for this.  First, when the NGOs conduct paralegal work in the subject communities, 
they bring with them lawyers who are non-residents and who involve themselves for 
the most part on the provision of information about the fisheries laws.  Second, there 
is no regular conduct of seminars and trainings where the lawyers are usually present 
to lecture on the law.  Third, most often, the lawyers involved are practicing criminal 
or civil law rather than environmental law, and, thus, there are separate interests.  
Fourth, there are no regular lawyers brought by the NGO in the community due to the 
availability of the former.   
 
Lawyers practice law either in the capital of the city or the poblacion (centre) of the 
municipality, and thus, outside of the respondents’ barangays.  Availability, distance 
and costs are the common reasons for the lack of effort to bring the community closer 
to the lawyer.  With regard to costs, NGOs are not regularly present in the community 
and the financially handicapped respondents could not take action.  Usually, it is the 
officers of POs that act on the matter using the organization’s limited funds. 
 
The demand for lawyers for litigation purposes is limited primarily because most 
fisheries violations are settled in the local government by payment of fines.   
Imprisonment is seldom, if not at all, an option due to the factors of time and cost.  
While time can be sustained with the support of NGOs the financial costs are least 
attractive compared to the revenues collected from fines by the local government 
unit. 
 
At the level of the Court, participation is identified in the extension of the following:  
gathering of evidence, interview of witnesses, making witnesses available, and 
following up pending cases in court.  The assistance given by the respondents are 
mainly those that involve evidences and witnesses that are situated only in the 
community.  This is so since most fisheries violations are committed in the municipal 
waters adjacent to the coastal barangay and the witnesses to the violations are 
barangay residents. 
 
The respondents do not assist in the following up of cases pending in court due to 
lack of expertise, time and money.  The following up of cases is determined as the 
work of the NGO or the lawyer, and the respondents are not involved by the former in 
this activity.  Moreover, pursuing such assistance individually by the respondents, or 
collectively through their organizations, will entail time prejudicial to their occupations 
as well as expense prejudicial to their financial needs. 
 
Understanding of the benefits of participation in paralegal work. 
Paralegal work can generate participation if there is a conscious understanding of its 
purpose and benefits.  The purpose is not only the ultimate protection of the marine 
environment.  Rather, this protection can be effected if the participants in the 23 
community identify that such protection is both a responsibility and an obligation.  On 
the other hand, participation can also effect benefits since the protection of the 
resources can bring about the needed security of the community. 
 
From the interviews, there is high frequency of responses that indicate participation is 
both a responsibility and obligation.  For the respondents, they see participation as 
essential to resource protection.  However, the benefits are not outrightly available.  
The respondents identify politics as a foremost constraint to protection.  For instance, 
violators caught for illegal fishing are just meted very cheap fines instead of 
imprisonment.  The fines imposed are those within the authority of the local 
government unit.  Yet these are cheap compared to the value of catch from illegal 
fishing in case the violation is not caught.  The imposition of fines is most convenient 
but this does not deter the commission of illegal fishing.  From this, it is identified by 
the respondents that while paralegal work may be important, there are serious 
constraints to achieve the objective. 
 
Sectoral participation including the fisherfolk, women and youth sectors. 
Sectoral participation is also vital to determining social acceptability.  Occupation, 
gender and age are factors that determine individual interests or stakes in the 
management of marine resources.  Also, direct and indirect relations with fisheries 
resources can affect commitment to resource protection and preservation.  Thus, 
multi sectoral participation in marine resource management can contribute to a 
stronger community collective effort. 
 
A significant number of the respondents in the three sectors have knowledge about 
the Philippine Fisheries Code as explained earlier.  The provisions most common to 
them are those that involve about the municipal waters, which are identified as 
belonging to the municipality or city, as the case may be.  There is also a high 
frequency of knowledge about prohibited fishing, fishing rights, apprehension and 
prosecution of fisheries law violations, and the FARMC. 
  
On the other hand, knowledge about the Municipal/City Fisheries Ordinance is higher 
among the fisherfolk respondents.  This is an expected outcome since by their 
occupation they are provided certain privileges in terms of rights over resources in 
the municipality of their residence.  Since the local government fisheries laws are 
localized versions of the national law, then the knowledge as to the relevant 
provisions in the former law is basically the same as in the latter law.  
 
The importance of knowing about the existence of the fisheries laws are considered 
more by the fisherfolk and women sectors and less by the youth sector.  This is 
because the former are directly involved with fishing activities while the latter are 
indirectly involved.  Fifty percent (50%) of the youth respondents are studying, which 
limit them from actually doing fishing activities.  Although the respondents are helping 
in the hauling of fish catch early in the morning or in the marketing of the catch during 
weekends, there is limited opportunity for them to learn about the fisheries laws.   
 24 
That there is a higher frequency of knowledge about the Fisheries Code among the 
respondents is explained by their attendance in seminars conducted by their 
organization and the NGO, by the broadcast in the radio, and by discussion within 
the family.  The mass media, more prominently by radio, is an effective means of 
information dissemination.  Moreover, while the local government ordinances are 
basically restatements of the national law, it is usually the latter law that are subject 
of family discussions or those that are heard from informal discussions by the elders 
in the community. 
 
Frequency of knowledge and participation in NGO paralegal work is higher among 
the fisherfolk and women respondents and lesser among the youth.  Again, this is 
explained by the direct involvement of the fisherfolks and women in almost all 
aspects of fishing activities (that is, from catching/gathering to marketing).  The youth 
respondents who participate more often are those who are engaged full time in 
fishing activities and are not studying, as well as those who are engaged in part time 
fishing activities (such as during week ends, holidays, and occasionally when there is 
need to earn money during weekdays) and are studying. 
 
Sectoral participation is more concentrated at the barangay level.  There is more 
prominent participation by each sector in the information and education of Barangay 
residents about the fisheries laws and the formation of values necessary for marine 
environmental protection.  At the level of the Lawyer, the fisherfolk respondents are 
more involved since this is regarded by the women respondents as primarily a male 
activity, and by the youth respondents as primarily an elder (not necessarily male) 
activity.  Finally, at the level of the Court, there were a number of respondents 
participating by sector mainly because of the activities being barangay based. 
 
The fisherfolk respondents have indicated agreement as to the responsibility and 
benefit from participation in paralegal work.  But there are more women respondents 
who indicated the same agreement not because all of them are participating.  Rather, 
their agreement is a proposal for more intense campaign and effort to conduct 
paralegal work and involve more community residents in the endeavour.  This 
proposal is echoed by the youth respondents. 
 
SUMMARY and CONCLUSION 
 
Negros Occidental is an island province surrounded by rich fisheries resources that 
are open for exploitation and abuse.  While the respective local governments in the 
province are enforcing fisheries laws, these are insufficient to curtail illegal fishing, 
habitat destruction and resource depletion. 
 
Three non-governmental organizations conduct paralegal work in the particular 
municipalities and cities in Negros Occidental: the “Balayan” of the University of St. 
La Salle operating in the Municipality of Cauayan, the Philippine Rural 
Reconstruction Movement in the Municipality of Hinigaran, and the World Wildlife 
Fund in the Cities of Victorias and Talisay.  These NGOs pursue either their 25 
programs or facilitate the implementation of programs of the LGU to empower 
community residents through community organizing, information and education 
residents (more particularly the fisherfolk and women) on the national and local 
fisheries laws, and mobilization to ascertain and protect their rights over the 
resources legally guaranteed them.   
 
NGO paralegal activities receive political acceptability from the Municipal/City 
Agriculture Officers, the Philippine National Police and the deputized fish wardens or 
Bantay Dagat.  These LGU agents possess the knowledge of the national and local 
fisheries laws that are necessary for the performance of their functions as law 
enforcers.  They facilitate the accomplishment of NGO paralegal work by providing 
financial, manpower, logistics and technological support.  In the instance when the 
NGO implements the LGU program, the Agriculture Officer provides supervision.   
From this extent, the power to control the activity rests upon the local chief executive. 
 
On the other hand, NGO paralegal activities receive social acceptability from 
randomly selected community residents who are identified from three sectors, 
namely:  fisherfolk, women and youth.  Each of these sectors possesses a certain 
amount of knowledge of the national and local government fisheries laws. This 
knowledge is sourced from the NGOs in both formal and informal settings, as well as 
from the broadcast media.  This knowledge is essential for the respondents to 
participate in NGO paralegal work at the level of the community. Moreover, there is a 
high frequency of sectoral participation at the barangay level. However, participation 
is less frequent at the levels of the lawyer and the court.   
 
Community Effectiveness in Fisheries Law Enforcement 
Theoretically, paralegal work is an approach that can contribute to effective fisheries 
law enforcement given the shortcomings of government and the limitations of 
lawyers.  Since it is essentially community based, the empowerment and mobilization 
of community residents, across sector, provide further strength to enforcement.   This 
is because these residents are the direct users and beneficiaries of the resources 
and, thus, they hold a direct stake in imposing protection for the resources in order to 
enjoy the benefits. 
 
Paralegal work in the selected coastal communities in Negros Occidental is made 
possible because of the active role played by NGOs.  The LGU by itself does not 
possess the manpower and expertise to pursue the undertaking.  The LGU support 
supplements the NGO efforts.  However, there is a deficiency in the paralegal work 
because the community is not completely involved.  While there is knowledge of the 
law, the respondents participate only at the basic (barangay) level.  Paralegal work 
still has to address the economic and political reasons that inhibit the respondents 
from participating in activities at the advanced levels.  Limited participation in the 
advanced levels will weaken the community and permit the continued violations of 
the fisheries laws.  This is because the violator is able to escape with minimal penalty 
and without stringent opposition from the large mass of stakeholders in the 
community.  Further, there is also the lack of sectoral participation in paralegal work, 26 
especially with the general exclusion of the youth.  Limited sectoral participation fails 
to cause any collective effort towards compliance from the resource users.  
 
At the outset, the above mentioned deficiency of NGO paralegal work in the study 
area could restrain the community from contributing to the effectiveness of fisheries 
law enforcement.  However, the existing social acceptability shows that there are 
already efforts exerted to empower the stakeholders.  There is significant 
participation, across sectors at the barangay level, and participation is beginning at 
the levels of the lawyer and the court.  While these are significant steps, consistent 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Coastal ecosystems in the Philippines are under stress from the combined 
effects of human overexploitation and habitat destruction. In recent years, the 
concept of an integrated approach to coastal resource management has been 
adopted to address this. 
 
This new paradigm, generally described as co-management, makes use of 
the participation of the different sectors (e.g. government, community) in the 
management process.  
 
The passage of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) of the Philippines 
provided for the optimal institutional setting of fisheries co-management in the 
country. The Code provides that local government units (LGUs) may group 
themselves and coordinate their efforts for purposes beneficial to them. Thus, 
Coastal Resource Management Councils (CRMCs) were created as a formal 
partnership arrangement among LGUs.  
 
CRMCs are multi-sectoral in nature with inter-LGU partnerships and different 
resource-sharing schemes. This is based on the premise that complex 
problems in coastal areas do not respect jurisdictional boundaries and can 
only be addressed in a meaningful way through collaboration with the different 
sectors involved and empowerment of the community.  
 
This paper will present the experiences of the different CRMCs in Western 
Visayas Region, Philippines and how the different LGUs surrounding a bay 
area have joined together to responsibly manage their common resource. 
Success stories or “best practice” strategy of the CRMCs will also be 
highlighted for possible replication in other coastal communities. 
 





As a maritime nation, the Philippines’ economy is highly dependent on the 
productivity of its coastal environment. The country has 7,100 islands and 
18,000 kilometers of shoreline. More than 60% of its population lives in the 
coastal zone and almost all major cities are coastal. However, despite of its 
importance to Filipinos, coastal ecosystems in the Philippines are under 
stress. This can be attributed to the combined impacts of human 
overexploitation, physical disturbance, pollution, sedimentation and general 
neglect [1].  
 
In recent years, the concept of an integrated approach to coastal resource 
management (CRM) has been adopted by development workers to address 
the problem. This new paradigm, generally described as co-management, 
makes use of the participation of national government agencies (NGAs), non-  3
government organizations (NGOs), and people’s organizations (POs) in the 
management process [2, 3, 4].  
 
The Philippines appears to provide an optimal institutional setting for fisheries 
co-management [5] with the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 
(Republic Act 7160) decentralizing government functions to local government 
units (LGUs). Specifically, Section 33 of this Code provides that local 
government units (LGUs) may group themselves, consolidate and coordinate 
their efforts, services and resources for purposes commonly beneficial to 
them. In line with this, Section 76 of the Fisheries Code (Republic Act 8550) 
also promotes an “integrated management” concept among LGUs 
surrounding a common resource (e.g. bays, gulfs, lakes) by creating an 
Integrated Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Management Councils 
(IFARMCs). 
 
These policies gave rise to the co-management approach in the country which 
is multi-sectoral in nature, and called for inter-LGU participation and resource 
sharing-schemes. This is based on the fact that environmental problems 
transcend jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, inter- LGU alliances that seek to 
address common problems faced by neighbouring coastal communities 
created the Coastal Resource Management Councils (CRMCs).  
 
This paper will discuss the experiences of the five CRMCs in Western Visayas 
Region in the Philippines, the different institutional arrangement involved in 
managing a common resource, and the responsibility- and resource-sharing 
scheme of the member-LGUs. 
 
 
COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT COUNCILS (CRMCs) 
 
Most commonly, recognition of a resource management problem triggers co-
management. Governments have turned to co-management as a means of 
responding to a management crisis and sometimes to an opportunity [3]. In 
the case of CRMCs, conflicts on municipal water
a boundaries, difficulty in 
fisheries law enforcement, and inadequate resources for coastal resource 
management are the common factors that prompted the different 
municipalities bordering a common water resource to jointly manage it. 
Instead of making the resource as an area of conflict for these neighbouring 
LGUs, they have agreed to form a partnership. Thus a structure has been 
created that will specifically address the complex problems they share and will 
facilitate the management process. This formal structure is usually called a 
Coastal Resource Management Council or CRMCs. Mayors of each member-
municipality signs a Memorandum of Agreement thereby agreeing to share 
the responsibility of managing and developing their common fishing grounds, 
and committing their resources for the operation of the CRMC. Generally, 
these CRMCs are registered with the Philippines’ Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)
b thereby giving it a legal entity and institutionalizing it. 
 
Profile of the CRMCs     4
As of 2004, there are five (5) actively operating CRMCs in Western Visayas, a 
region in Central Philippines (Figure 1), namely: Banate Bay Resource 
Management Council, Inc. (BBRMCI); Kabankalan, Ilog, Himamaylan – 
Integrated Coastal Area Management Council, Inc. (KAHIL-ICAMCI); Libertad, 
Pandan, Sebaste and Culasi Bay Wide Management Council (LIPASECU); 
Northern Negros Aquatic Resources Management Advisory Council 










Figure 1. Existing CRMCs in Western Visayas, Philippines 
All of the five CRMCs were organized in the later part of 1990s (Table 1) after 
the passage of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) that encourages LGUs 
to enter into joint ventures and cooperative arrangements with other 
organizations. Except for LIPASECU which was organized by an NGO, the 
main initiator of creating a CRMC is usually the LGU specifically, the Local 
Chief Executive or the Mayor of the municipality. NNARMAC has the highest 
















BBRMCI Banate  Bay  1996/LGU  4  1,500 
KAHIL-
ICAMCI 
Ilog Bay  1997/LGU  3  2,700 





2000/LGU 9  17,000 
PBMC Pilar  Bay  1997/LGU 4  3,000 
 
Institutional arrangements 
Complex issues in coastal resource management can be best addressed 
through partnership and collaboration with the different stakeholders involved 
with it. All of the five CRMCs has multi-sectoral composition and brings 
together the divergent efforts of the different stakeholders. Table 2 shows the 
different sectors involved in the management and operation of the five 
CRMCs. This involvement could either be representation in the Board of 
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Operational Units. Figure 2 shows the typical organizational structure of a 
CRMC system. 
 
Table 2. Sectors involved in CRMCs 
CRMCs   
Sectors  BBRMCI KAHIL-
ICAMCI 
LIPASECU NNARMAC PBMC 
Local government 
units (LGUs) 





     












         






Figure 2. Typical organizational structure of a CRMC 
 
The degree of participation and decision-making power of these sectors 
differs among CRMCs. LGUs play the most important role in a CRMC since 
they provide the mechanism for setting up of a partnership arrangement. The 
inability or unwillingness of LGUs to engage in cooperative, multi-jurisdictional 
management is a significant drawback to effective coastal resource 
development and management [6]. It is also the LGU who provides the overall 
Board of Trustees 
 





Operational Units  Operational Units 
Advisory Body   6
facilitation and coordination for planning, implementation, and approving of 
local regulations (e.g. enactment of a comprehensive fisheries management 
ordinance). 
 
On the other hand, NGAs (e.g. Department of Agriculture, Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources) provide technical expertise to the 
CRMCs and support through issuance of needed policy reforms and agenda. 
NGOs help advocate for the community and foster participation. POs are 
community organizations that can serve as “pressure groups” to lobby for 
changes in or development of policy. In a CRMC, POs are most likely to be 
the resource users themselves who are at the same time the target 
beneficiaries of development efforts (e.g. livelihood project, capability-building 
training). 
 
Table 2 shows that BBRMCI has the greatest number of sectors participating 
in its operation and projects. The roles of these sectors were formally defined 
in the Memorandum of Agreement on Sectoral Management Committee that 
they have signed with BBRMCI.  
 
Partnership arrangements  
Member-LGUs of the CRMCs agree on certain partnership arrangements 
deemed to be beneficial to their constituents. Most CRMCs have an 
organizational structure in place to define the roles and responsibilities of 
each sector. This is to minimize possibilities of “powerplay” or leadership 
issues in the future. As a strategy on power-sharing, Mayors of each member-
LGUs take it in turn to head the CRMC as the Chairman of the Board of 
Trustees.  
 
Member-LGUs also have a cost-sharing scheme for the operation of the 
CRMC. Each municipality is required to remit their annual contribution to the 
Trust Fund of the Council. This financial counterpart usually ranges from PhP 
100,000 to PhP 200,000 (approximately US$2,000 to US$4,000). 
 
Some CRMCs (e.g BBRMCI, LIPASECU) have their own offices. Aside from 
the financial contribution of their LGUs, they also assign some of its 
employees to work full time for the Council. These employees are on detailed 
status and their salary come from their respective LGUs. 
 
Evaluating the CRMCs 
According to Pomeroy and Williams [7], there are emerging conditions that 
appear to be central to the chances of developing and sustaining successful 
co-management arrangements. When more of these key conditions exist in a 
particular situation or system, there will be a greater chance of successful co-
management. These key conditions are: clearly defined physical boundaries; 
resource users are identified; group cohesion; existing organizational 
experience; benefits exceed cost; participation by those affected; 
management rules enforced; legal rights to organize; cooperation and 
leadership at the community level; decentralization and delegation of 
authority; and coordination between government and community. 
   7
However, the conditions mentioned above generally focus on a type of co-
management wherein only two sectors have a major role to play - the 
government and the community. In this type of partnership, it is primarily the 
government and the community of local fishers that share with the 
responsibility and authority in managing a fishery resource.  To be able to give 
emphasis and evaluate a co-management institution that is multi-sectoral in 
nature, the author explored other indicative factors based on literature and 
documented researches [8, 9, 10, 11, 5], that may contribute to the success of 
the arrangement. These additional key conditions are: participation of other 
sectors; LGUs’ commitment to the cooperative effort; integrated CRM plan; 
and existence of an organizational structure. Indicators were identified under 
each key condition to determine its level of presence in a particular CRMC 
system. Table 3 shows the rating of each key condition for each of the five 
CRMCs using the scale Low, Medium, and High. 
 
 
Table 3. Rating of key conditions 
Key Conditions 
(modified from Pomeroy 
and Williams, 1994) 
BBRMCI KAHIL-
ICAMCI 
LIPASECU NNARMAC  PBMC 
1. Clearly defined 
physical boundaries 
         
2. Resource users are 
identified 
         
3. Group cohesion 
 
         
4. Existing organizational 
experience 
         
5. Benefits exceeds cost 
 
         
6. Participation by those 
affected 
         
7. Management rules 
enforced 
         
8. Legal rights to 
organize exist 
         
9. Decentralization and 
delegation of authority 
         
10. Coordination 
between government & 
community 
         
11. Participation of other 
sectors 
         
12. LGUs commitment to 
the cooperative effort 
         
13. Integrated CRM plan 
 
         
14. Existence of an 
organizational structure 
         
 Legend:             - Low 
       - Medium 
    - High 
 
Generally, BBRMCI and LIPASECU rated highly in most of the key conditions. 
These two CRMCs already have an established track record in coastal   8
resource management and local governance, as evidenced by the various 
awards they have received from different organizations. Because of their 
organizational experience, they have less difficulty accessing grants from 
external donors and funding agencies. 
 
Issues and Challenges 
Because of the multi-sectoral composition of CRMC, it is always beset with 
issues and problems especially on the conflicting interests of the groups 
involved and the “power-play” issues among them. In this type of organization, 
more often than not, there is an individual or a sector who wants to have a 
“greater role” in the Council or the “greater benefits” that can be derived from 
it.  This situation is usually aggravated by the complexity of the socio-political 
setting where the CRMC exists.  
 
The most common problem encountered by the CRMCs is the conflicting 
provisions on penalties of fisheries violations. CRMCs have already unified 
the different fishery ordinances
c of their member municipalities; however, 
stipulations for penalties differ according to LGUs discretion. This may cause 
conflict because illegal fishers will have the tendency to commit violations in a 
municipality where penalties are much lower. 
 
Constituents of KAHIL-ICAMCI and NNARMAC complain that priorities on 
development efforts of their Council are concentrated on the LGU of the 
incumbent Chairman. This uneven distribution of development projects may 
have a negative effect on the commitment of other member-LGUs who have 
not benefited from such projects.  
 
Most of the CRMCs also complain of their weak organizational structure 
wherein authorities and accountabilities are not clear. This is caused by 





CRMCs have formulated and adopted their respective strategies in order to 
attain their goals. These evolving strategies are usually influenced by the type 
of coastal ecosystem they have and their respective socio-political arena. 
These successful strategies or “best practices” are documented for possible 
replication. Some of the “best practices” of the CRMCs included in the study 
are the following: 
 
● The partnership agreement is formalized and institutionalized, and an 
organizational structure that clearly delineates the roles of each sector is in 
placed. 
● Local Chief Executives have strong political will and committed to implement 
the goals of the partnership, transcending even politics. 
● Manpower resources (full-time staff) and infrastructure (office) are available 
to facilitate the implementation of CRMCs plans and programs. This 
strengthens its identity in the community as a coastal resource management 
body.    9
● Planning is done through a participatory process integrating all the concerns 
of the different groups and bringing together their divergent effort.  
● CRMCs invest in information, education, and communication (IEC) program. 
IEC materials (e.g. comic books, leaflets, and radio plugs) play a vital role in 
reducing social conflicts and have shown effective results in increasing 
awareness of the fisherfolk and in promoting the objectives of the CRMC. 
● Alternative livelihood projects in the coastal area to reduce potential 
pressure in the coastal resource are complemented with microfinance 
projects. 
● CRMCs encourages participation and collaboration with other sectors (e.g. 




CRMCs are effective in coordinating the efforts of the LGUs in areas that do 
not follow jurisdictional boundaries (e.g. common fishing grounds). They serve 
as a venue to address the common concerns of the LGUs involved, and to 
resolve conflict associated with resource utilization. For the partnership to be 
sustainable, it should be formalized and institutionalized.  
 
Efficacy of the CRMC can be enhanced through linkages with various 
partners and related sectors (e.g. NGAs, NGOs, POs) to be able to address 
complex issues. This will result to some degree of resource sharing and 
collaborative work. 
 
Co-management is a political issue [7]. Thus, CRMCs should be able to 
transcend politics and must be shielded from short-term political pressures 
that could dilute its goals. It should have a management regime that is 
participatory. Potential benefits from its development initiatives should also be 




This paper was taken from the results of the study entitled “Co-management 
Strategies for Coastal Resource Management in Western Visayas”, which 
was made possible through a research grant from the University of the 
Philippines – Center for Integrative and Development Studies (UP-CIDS). 
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a. Municipal water is defined by the Philippine Fisheries Code (RA 8550) to 
include not only streams, lakes, inland bodies of water and tidal waters within 
the municipality which are not included within the protected areas as defined 
under Republic Act. No.7586 (The NIPAS Law), public forest, timber lands, 
forest reserves or fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between 
two (2) lines drawn perpendicular to the general coastline from points where 
the boundary lines of the municipality touch the sea at low tide and a third line 
parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) 
kilometers from such coastline. Where two (2) municipalities are situated on 
opposite shores that there is less than thirty (30) kilometers of marine waters 
between them, the third line shall be equally distant from opposite shores of 
the respective municipalities.  
 
b. CRMCs are registered with the Philippine’s Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as a non-stock, non-profit organization. 
 
c. Fishery ordinances are local laws enacted and enforced at the municipal 
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Indonesia is a maritime country, composed of about 17,500 islands. It has a 
great number of open water resources such as rivers, lakes, dams, ponds, 
swamps, etc. which are spread over the country. Many tribes and races are 
associated with these resources each with their own habits, tradition, and 
cultures. Indonesia is formed of thousands of islands and given such a large 
territory, it would be costly to set up a system for formal enforcement and 
surveillance for open-access resources like fisheries and access to water. 
Fortunately, each community has an indigenous or traditional system to manage 
the resources. For example: Ikan Larangan (in West Sumatra), Sasi (in Maluku), 
Subak (in Bali), Sedekah Laut (in Java) and so on (Susilowati, 1996; 1999). 
Rather than waiting for a complete formal resource management system (which 
would need to be set up by the government) it will be more reasonable and timely 
to revive the traditional system of resource management belonging to the 
respective communities. In short, community involvement in resource 
management is urgently encouraged, particularly in a developing country with 
limited budget like Indonesia. 
 
This paper is attempt to compile an experience of applying a co-management 
approach to manage the open water resource by Susilowati (1999, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2007). An institutional analysis based on Pomeroy and William (1994) and 
Pinkerton (1989) with necessary modifications was applied to the respective 
studies. 
 
The results indicated that there is a fairly good prospect to empower the 
competent stakeholders (community, government, private, independent parties) 
to be involved in managing the open-access resources. However, all parties 
need to be encouraged in order to achieve a high degree participation and 
commitment, and somehow to create their sense of belonging to advocate 
resource management. The chances of this being achieved are helped by the 
high degree of commitment to conservation of the resource shown by formal and 
informal leaders in Indonesia.  
 






Indonesia is basically an archipelago and an agricultural country. Nearly three 
quarters of its people live in rural areas and are involved with agricultural 
activities.  People are mostly involved in agricultural and fisheries sectors. 
 
Lately, the role and involvement of communities in development activities has 
become significant in Indonesia, especially after socio-political reforms. There is  
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a policy and paradigm shift in governing activities from top-down to decentralized 
systems. The devolvement of authority from national government towards 
provincial and local government has been gradually progressing since the 
decentralization law (law No.22 / year 1999) was promulgated in 2001. There has 
been a shift in the functions, tasks, authority and responsibility from centralized 
government to local government. Currently, most of the designed programs are 
now targeted at the grassroots level. Communities and related stakeholders are 
expected to play their roles in development requiring participation and sharing of 
responsibilities as the key to success to achieve sustainable development. River 
management in a region is also delivered to the local government with necessary 
coordination with central government. There are several examples of successes 
and failures in managing rivers in Indonesia subject to the commitment of the 
authorities and stakeholders in resource conservation. 
 
One of the severe problems currently faced by city authorities in Indonesia, 
including Semarang and its surroundings is illegal unregulated and unreported 
(IUU) resettlements with most of them located on the banks of rivers or canals 
(Susilowati, 2004; 2006). Consequently, the environmental quality of the rivers 
and canals (open water resource) are deteriorating. This situation is also taking 
place on almost all of the urban rivers like Kaligarang, Semarang, and Babon 
rivers. 
 
This paper attempts to compile several studies  that have been conducted by 
Susilowati et al. (2002); Susilowati (2004; 2006; 2007) to provide a picture of 
community involvement in resource management (river). At the same time, the 
prospect of co-management approach and the degree of stakeholders’ 




(1) Study Area:  there are four rivers were observed in this paper, namely: 
Babon; Semarang, Banjir Kanal Barat (or known as Kaligarang river) and 
Tuntang. All rivers are located in Semarang (Municipality and Regency).    
 
(2) Data and Sampling: A cross-sectional survey was designed to collect the data 
through face-to-face personal interviews by the trained enumerators. The 
respondents of each study area were varied. It depended on the characteristics 
of the community and the presence of competent key-persons in the field. The 
distribution of respondents is shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of respondents surveyed 
No Rivers  Respondents  (persons) 
1.  Babon   - Community  (n=120) 
 - Key-persons (n=30) 
2.  Semarang  - Community  (n=45) 
 - Key-persons (n=30)  
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3.  Kaligarang  - Community  (n=90) 
- Key-persons (n=30) 
4.  Tuntang  - Community  (n=90) 
 - Key-persons (n=20) 
 
Samples were selected by geographical clustered sampling. Primary data was 
considered as the main material for analysis in the each study. Training was 
given to all enumerators before they undertook the survey.  Additional secondary 
data were also collected from the a number of institutions (Impact Assessment 
Board, River and Irrigation Office, Central Bureau of Statistics, and the 
Provincial, Municipal/ regency Government Offices) and some other various 
related publications. 
 
(3) Method of Analysis: This paper aims to provide a comparison of the prospect 
of using a co-management approach in managing the open water resources in 
four rivers in Central Java-Indonesia. A research framework as outlined by 
Pomeroy dan Williams (1994) was applied to identify the prospect of co-
management level; and  the key conditions given by Ostrom (1990, 1992) and 
Pinkerton (1989) were used in this study with necessary modifications as applied 
in Susilowati (1999;2001a; 2001b) and Susilowati et al (2002) and Susilowati 
(2004; 2006; 2007). Multivariate analysis (Hair Jr. et al.,1998) has been 
employed and was complemented by descriptive statistics (see Mason et al., 
1999; SPSS, 1996).  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Resource Description  
 
(1) Babon River:  This river is considered as one of the strategic resources in 
Indonesia since it serves multiple functions especially for the inhabitants along 
the watershed. Many industries are placed along the Babon river stream. 
Because of that, the Babon river can be highly polluted. In order to achieve the 
goals of the clean river program (prokasih), thus clean-up program should be 
imposed on the business activities along the river. In order to comply with this 
requirement awareness among the stakeholders to conserve the river is highly 
recommended. 
 
The Babon river crosses over the three regions, the Semarang District in its 
upstream reaches and the Semarang Municipality and Demak District further 
downstream. The multiple use nature of the river (e.g. water source, canal 
disposal, mining, etc) means that there have been many transboundary 
environmental problems. 
 
The research was carried out along the Babon river in the stretch under the 
jurisdiction of Semarang Municipality only. Further, the study areas were divided 
into three river segments, i.e. up stream (Rowosari village), middle stream  
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(Penggaron Kidul village) and down stream (Banjardowo village). In the early 
rainy season of 1999 the water of Babon river was sampled from several intake 
points. The results indicated that the BOD, COD and DO are increasing and 
exceed the minimum standard. The BOD ranged between 18.98 – 80.28 mg/l, 
while the DO was about 2.20 – 3.80 mg/l. Water temperature was between 30-
33°C. Table 2 shows the chemical indicators of Babon river water. 
 
Table 2. Chemical Condition of Babon River 
 
Coverage  Physical Condition  Quality Standard 




BOD COD DO 
Upstream 18.98  28.98  2.2  6  10  >=6 
Middle stream  43.20  94.20  2.2  -  -  >=3 
Down stream  80.28  161.76  3.8  -  -  >=3 
Note: water sample was taken in August 1999 (morning) 
 
 (2) Semarang River: ‘Kali’
1 Semarang is the only river that flows in the heart of 
Semarang city. It was famous when Semarang was a Dutch colony. At that time 
it was used as a transport route for Chinese and Arabic traders leading to the 
establishment of China-town and Arabic settlements being located near the river. 
The river bank was also utilized by Dutch people as a place for recreation, but 
since then the river-side has been used for building business and office 
complexes now known as ‘kota-lama’ or the old town of Semarang. The course 
of the Semarang river starts from the southern part of Semarang from Kaligarang 
dam, then down to east until near Kariadi General Hospital and Flower market 
(defined as upper-stream) and passes behind Lawang Sewu building, Mayor 
Semarang Office, and Jalan Inspeksi in Thamrin (defined as middle-stream). To 
the north it goes to China town, Johar Market, Mberok Bridge and down to Java 
Sea (defined as lower-stream).  
 
Until 1970’s, Semarang river was still used by the community for washing, 
bathing and rearing fish. Even until the early 1980’s many home-based 
producers of ‘tempe-tahu’ (a famous Javanese dish made from soyabeans) used 
this river to wash their raw materials. However, all these activities have now 
stopped because the river is no longer suitable for these purposes. Today, Kali 
Semarang is utilized by the community for sewage, disposal of garbage and 
drainage. The river body is becoming shallow and narrower, and the river bank is 
being used for illegal settlements and other purposes. 
 
The up-stream section is partly covered by concrete and used for streets. 
Semarang is built on fragile alluvial soils however during city development land 
was reclaimed and there has been infiltration of sea water due to water supply 
demands. These conditions have accelerated the process of depression of the 
                                                 
1 local term for river  
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northern part of Semarang’s land below sea level resulting in flooding of this area 
during high-tides. Meanwhile, the drainage infrastructure, including the 
Semarang river, has not able to cope with water flow during the rainy season. 
Semarang is now known as the ‘flooded city’ and there is even a famous satirical 
song with the lyric “Semarang kaline banjir”. 
 
The results of water quality analysis indicate that the Semarang river is no longer 
safe for drinking water standard (class I). For the standard of class II, the DO was 
above the required standard in the middle- and down-stream sections (T3 and 
T4), while the water sampled taken in T3 showed that Nitrate (NO3-N) were 
excessive. The Sulfide (H2S), Nitrite ((NO2-N), BOD and COD were excessive 
for water quality class II at all the points sampled. 
 
(3) Kaligarang River: This is a natural river with its source being a spring located 
in the Ungaran mountain in the southern part of Semarang city.  When it became 
a Dutch colony, the down-stream section of this river was enlarged and it 
functioned as a canal for flood control. This part is called Banjir Kanal Barat.  
 
The upstream part of the Kaligarang River flows through agricultural land (forest 
and paddy field) and human settlements and is considered as the water source 
for Semarang City. The mid-stream section of the river is dominated by gravel 
and sand mining industries and human settlements. This is also where 
Semarang Municipality’s water supply company sources water for communities in 
the downtown and northern parts of Semarang.  
 
The Kaligarang River is mainly used by the community and industry to dispose of 
liquid waste, particularly in the down-stream section as it drains directly to the 
Java Sea. Agricultural irrigation and fisheries activities benefit from the river while 
all drainage infrastructures in the densely populated north-western part of 
Semarang are captured by the Kaligarang river.  
 
The Kaligarang river often overflows during heavy rains and the water quality is 
adversely affected from time to time due to deforestation in upstream sections 
and mining activities in midstream sections. High turbidity and sedimentation 
cannot be avoided in the downstream sections and particularly in the estuary. 
The local government appears to pay little attention to maintaining the river. 
Therefore, the river is becoming narrower and shallow and there is heavy 
siltation along the river in its lower reaches. There was a particularly heavy flood 
on 26 January 1990 with peak water flows of around 1.5 m3/second. It caused 
material losses of around 8.5 billion rupiah and many hundreds of people 
drowned. 
 
Along Kaligarang river, the BOD, COD and DO exceeded the quality standard. 
The water quality tended to deteriorate toward the downstream sections as 




Table 3. Water Quality of Kaligarang River 







BOD COD  DO 
1 Upper    2,886  21,65  7,03  2  10  >=6 
2  Middle  3,802  22,26  7,03         >=3 
3 Down  7,566  40,82  7,49      >=3 
Source: The Environmental Impact Management Board (Bapedalda) of   
Semarang Municipality, April 2004 
 
 
(4) Tuntang River:  This river originates in several springs from Telomoyo and 
Merbabu mountains. This water accumulates in Rawa Pening (a natural dam) 
and is used for electric power generation. The Tuntang river then flows from 
Semarang and Grobogan  regencies on its way to the Java Sea passing through 
Demak regency. 
 
During the monsoon the Tuntang water flow is significantly higher and sometimes 
overflows, particularly in downstream sections. The salinity of the Tuntang river is 
relatively high, therefore it is not suitable for agricultural irrigation. Despite this, 
communities along the river have no other options but to use its waters for their 
activities, particularly for farming, rearing the fish, etc. 
 
The BOD, COD and of Tuntang river are about 4282 mg/l and 22.39 mg/l, while 
the CO is 6.38 mg/l meaning that it is still considered safe for water supply, 
bathing and cultivation (farming and aquaculture). The physical attributes of the 
Tuntang river are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Water Quality of Tuntang River 
Sampling 





  Station  1  Station 2      BOD  COD
  BOD COD DO BOD COD DO BOD COD >6  >3 
Jun  01  2.4 6.25  6.4  1.8 4.69  5.7 6  12  6  3 
Jul  01 9 5.37  6.4  2.5  10.7  5.6 6 12  6 3 
Aug  01 10 11.1  6.3  10 13.8  5.8 6  12 6  3 
May  04  19.5  36 4.4  14 28 5 6  12 6  3 
Jun  04  8 11  4.6  21  18  6.8 6 12  6 3 
Jul04  17.5 12  4.7 17.5 3  6.4 6  12  6  3 
Aug  04 13 14 5.1  13 16 8.7 6  12 6  3 
Sept  04  18.5  22.5  5.6  14  16  7.2 6 12  6 3 
Oct  04  17  20.5  5.5  13.5  16  5.2 6 12  6 3 




Rules and regulations 
 
A river is considered as a strategic resource since it performs multiple functions 
especially for the inhabitants along its watershed. Dense housing, business 
activities and industries are placed along urban rivers like Semarang and 
Kaligarang rivers. Due to all these activities there is high potential for pollution 
and environmental damage. In order to achieve the goals of clean river program 
(prokasih), clean-production programmes need to be imposed on households, 
businesses, and industrial activities along the river (in urban and rural) and this 
has been guided by rules, formally and informally. The formal rules related to the 
river management are summarized in table 5.  
 
In order to comply with the relevant rules it is important to increase awareness 
among the stakeholders to conserve the river. In general, people in the region 
perceived that the rivers have dual functions; as a place to get resources and to 
dispose of garbage and sewage. The level of knowledge of people along the 
rivers about technology and management skill is limited, and rules not 
consistently applied. Meanwhile the capacity of the government in surveillance 
and enforcement activities is very far from complete.  Moreover, many people in 
Indonesia have an image that a river is a place to dispose the unused things, 
even dead pets, as reported by Lucas and Arief (2000). There is a need to re-
orientate the community’s attitudes on the importance of rivers. As well as proper 
enforcement of existing regulations, informal rules need to be revived and 
strengthened to provide proper guidance for the people. 
 
Table 5. Related rules and regulations for river management in Indonesia with 
special reference to Central Java Province 
 
No  Rules / Regulations  Description 
1 UU  No.11/  1974  Drainage 
2  UU No. 4/ 1982  Guideline  for  environmental 
management 
3  UU  No.27/  1997  Guideline for environmental 
management (amendment) 
4  UU No 7 / 2004  Guideline for water irrigation  
5  PP No.22/ 1982  Water management 
6 PP  No.35/  1991  River 
7  PP No. 20/ 1990  Monitoring of water pollution 
8  PP No. 51/ 1993  Environmental impact assessment 
9  PP  No.  19/  1994  Dangerous and poisonous waste 
disposal management  
10  PP No 27 Tahun 1999  Environmental  Impact  Assessment 
Analysis 
11  PP  No  82  Tahun  2001  Water quality and water pollution 
management  
12 Presidential  Decree  Conservation  area  management  
  9
No  Rules / Regulations  Description 
No.32/ 1990 
13  Minister of Public works 
Decree No. Kep.39/ 
PRT/ 1989 
Division of river area 
14  Minister of Public works 
Decree No. Kep.48/ 
PRT/ 1990 
Water resources management 
15  Minister of Public works 
Decree No. Kep.49/ 
PRT/ 1990 
Guidelines for water resource 
utilisation 
16  Minister of Public works 
Decree No. Kep.63/ 
PRT/ 1993 
Border, watershed function, and 
territorial coverage  of  river and ex-
river 
17 Minister  of  Environment 
Decree No. Kep.02/ 
MENKLH/ 1988 
Quality standard of liquid waste 
disposal of the running activities 
18  Provincial Regulation of 
Central Java No. 1/ 1990
Guideline for Environmental 
management in Central Java 
19  Provincial Regulation of 
Central Java No.660.1/ 
26/ 1990 
Water quality standard in Central 
Java Province 
20  Provincial Regulation of 
Central Java No.660.1/ 
27/ 1990 
Classification of liquid waste 
disposal in Central Java Province 
 
21  Governor of Central 
Java Instruction No. 
660.1/ 11/ 1988 
The procedure on alleviation of 
pollution and environmental 
destruction 
22  Provincial Regulation of 
Central Java No. 20 
Year 2003 
Water quality and water pollution 
management of cross boundary 
regions in Central Java 
23  Provincial Regulation of 
Central Java No 10 Year 
2004 
Sewage water standard 
 
   Note: UU = law; PP = national regulation 





(1) Resource Utilisation: Rivers in Indonesia are usually used for several 
purposes and different communities may have different motives in utilising a 
river.  As perceived by the respondents in the communities rivers are utilised for: 
human bathing, washing and sanitation; irrigation; animal bathing; to get rid of 
waste; and drinking water. However the pattern of river utilisation in the different 
river sections also vary (upper-, middle- and down-stream).  
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(2) Degree of Commercialisation:  In general, rivers in all the study areas are 
considered as an open access resource and people perceive them loosely as the 
common property. Although there are formal and informal rules and regulations 
in place, weak enforcement and surveillance, worsened by economic pressure, 
means that the rivers are exploited for many purposes by surrounding 
communities. There is no incentive for communities to comply in conserving and 
maintaining the river when they see others misusing the resource. 
Misinterpretation of the concept of decentralisation means that many of the 
natural resources (particularly in urban area) are potentially able be utilised by 
communities, government and other stakeholders for commercial purposes. 
 
Sand, gravel, stone, clay and water from the river are extracted by several 
parties, while the bank of the river is utilised for agriculture and fisheries 
activities. Many canoes are operated as ferries for moving people from one shore 
to the other. People collect fish and other creatures (e.g. worms) for commercial 
purposes.  
 
(3) Pattern of interactions:  Pomeroy et al. (1994) claimed that co-management 
involves various degrees of delegation of management responsibility and 
authority between the local level (resource users or community) and the state 
level (national, provincial, and district governments). The interaction among the 
stakeholders to perform the management functions (planning, organising, 
actuating, and controlling) in different segments of river (upper-, middle- and 
down-streams) are shown in the following figures. 
 
In the upper-stream, the role of controlling the resource is by the community 
themselves and followed by the academician and/ or NGO, while the government 
shares in planning activities. Organising activities in river management are done 
by all related parties with the government as the facilitator. Further, actuating 
activities are usually done by the community and private parties. 
 
 
Prospects for co-management  
 
Among the emerging conditions for successful co-management are that the more 
of these key conditions that exist in a particular situation or system, the greater 
the chance for successful co-management (Pomeroy et al., 1994). The key 
conditions outlined by Ostrom (1990, 1992) and Pinkerton (1989) were used with 
necessary modifications as applied in Susilowati (1999; 2001a; 2001b) and 
Susilowati et al (2003) and Susilowati (2004; 2006; 2007) to evaluate the 
likelihood of success for co-management approaches in the rivers under study. 
Key conditions were evaluated on a likert scale (1 to 5) or conventional scale (1 




Total scores for the 11 key conditions required for successful co-management in 
each river are shown in annexed tables (see Appendix). Overall the results 
indicate that prospects for co-management ranged between marginal to pretty 
good. 
 
In addition, the results indicated that the sharing in understanding and 
responsibility among the stakeholders, as perceived by the respective 
communities studied, are fairly good. There is an indication that community-
based management may help them to pursue the goal of resource (river) 
management. There is a clear need to provide empowerment for all stakeholders 





The capacity and quality of the rivers studied are deteriorating due to a range of 
causes. Deforestation is most often claimed as the main factor in up-stream 
areas, while, mining and industrial activities were found to be the main activities 
accelerating the degradation of the mid-stream sections. Pollution from industries 
and domestic waste is becoming a significant problem for all the rivers. Illegal, 
unregulated and unreported (IUU) resettlements near the rivers are also a 
problem.  
 
Based on an initial quick assessment using criteria provided (by 
www.healthywaterways.env.qld.gov.au), the Babon, Semarang and Kaligarang 
rivers  are likely to be classified as ‘poor health’ rivers. The chemical indicators 
showed that the water quality of the rivers is no longer safe for drinking water 
standard (class I) and results from several monitoring stations showed that the 
water almost no longer fulfilled the quality for recreation and gardening (class II). 
Hence, the involvement of the community might not be sufficient for improving 
the quality and capacity of the rivers. There is a need for sharing understanding, 
responsibility, sympathy and empathy as well as a requirement for good will from 
all competent stakeholders in order to build support and a sense of belonging for 
managing the rivers.  
 
It is unlikely that this recommendation will be implemented in the next few years 
however we do not have other options. So far, the government of Semarang 
Municipality and Regency are paying less attention to maintaining these 
resources. In fact, it is as if there has been no management in managing the 
rivers in the study areas (and perhaps, generally in Indonesia,) for the last five 
years. Thus, if we do not start doing something right now, it means we let the 
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Table 6. Key Conditions for Successful Co-management of  Ikan Larangan, West 
Sumatra  
No. Key-Conditions  Phenomenon in the Field  Score ** 
1 Clearly  defined 
boundaries 
There are physical boundaries, so the fishers groups can have 
accurate knowledge of them; Boundaries using natural man-
made marks  5 
2 Membership  is 
clearly defined 
Individual fishers with rights to fish in the bounded fishing area 
and participate in area management   4 
3  Group  cohesion  High degree of homogeneity in terms of kinship, ethnicity, 
religion, local ideology, customs, and belief; There is common 




The fishers have some prior experience with traditional 
community-based systems and with organization  4 
5 Benefit exceeds 
cost * 
Individuals have an expectation that the benefits to be derived 
from participation and compliance with community- based 
management is exceed the cost of investments in such 
activities 5 
6 Participation  by 
those affected 
Most individuals affected by the management arrangements 
are included in the group that makes and can change the 
arrangements 4 
7 Management  rule 
enforced 
The management rules are simple, thus easily understood by 
the community  5 
8  Legal rights to 
organize 
The fisher group or organization has no legal rights to 
organize and make arrangements related to its need. 2  
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No. Key-Conditions  Phenomenon in the Field  Score ** 
However, in practice the fisher group or village organization 
has made its arrangement; There is no legislation from the 
government defining and clarifying local responsibility and 
authority. However, informally the government provide some 
support for ikan larangan although still in low degree 
9 Cooperation  and 
leadership at 
community level 
There is an incentive and willingness on the part of fishers to 
actively participate with time, effort, and money in fisheries 
management; There is an individual or core group who takes 
leadership responsibility for the management process  5 
10 Decentralization  and 
delegation of 
authority 
The government has established formal policy and/or laws for 
decentralization of administrative functions (Regulation No. 
22/1999, amendment Regulation No. 5/1974). However, 
delegation of management responsibility and/or authority to 
local government and local group organization levels has not 





The blue-print of establishment of coordinating body of ikan 
larangan is being processed by the Fisheries Office. This body 
is aimed to monitor the local management arrangements, 
resolve conflicts and reinforce local rule enforcement.  2 
     Total score     43 
     Average score **     3.99 
 
Notes: Likert scale: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 
* Definition B/C is very subjective for each person.  In the most of study area, people interpreted 
the B/C in terms of social context. 
**The average score is close to 4. This can be interpreted that the prospect for successful co-
management for ikan larangan is good. 
***Definition: (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Doubtful; (4) Agree; and (5) Strongly agree.  
(1) Very bad; (2) Bad; (3) Neutral; (4) Good' and (5) Very good. 
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Table 7. Key-conditions for Successful Co-management of Babon River, 
Semarang 
 
No.  Conditions    Phenomenon in the Field  Evaluation ** 
     U M D 
There are physical boundaries, so the community groups can have accurate 
knowledge of them; 
2 5 3  1 Clearly defined 
boundaries 
Boundaries using natural man-made marks  2  4  3 
Individual community has rights to utilize the resource in the bounded area   4  4  4  2 Membership is 
clearly defined  Member of community are need to be involved in resource management  5  5  5 
High degree of homogeneity in terms of kinship, ethnicity, religion, local ideology, 
customs, and belief; 
4 5 4 
There is common understanding of the problem and alternative strategies and 
outcomes 
2 3 4 
3 Group  cohesion 
Community has a good adaptation with situation changes  2  3  3 
Community could understand with the existing organization   2  2  5 
The community have some prior experience with traditional Community-based 
systems and with organization 
3 2 5 
4 Existing 
organization 
Participative management has been applied by the community in their 
organisation 
3 2 3 
5 Benefit exceed 
cost * 
Individuals have an expectation that the benefits to be derived from participation 
and compliance with community- based management is exceed the cost of 
investments in such activities 
3 4 3 
6 Participation  by 
those affected 
Most individuals affected by the management arrangements are included in the 
group that makes and can change the arrangements 
3 4 4 
The management rules are simple, thus easily understood by the community  3  4  3  7 Management  rule 
enforced  Enforcement in the community with participative management in placed is more 
effective than under the centralized ones 
4 4 5 
The community group or organization has no legal rights to organize and make 
arrangements related to its need. However, in practice the community group or 
village organization has made its arrangement; 
2 4 4  8  Legal rights to 
organize 
  There is no legislation from the government defining and clarifying local 
responsibility and authority. However, informally the government provide some 
support for Babon river management although still in low degree 
4 4 3 
There is an incentive and willingness on the part of community to actively 
participate with time, effort, and money in Babon river management; 
3 2 4  9 Cooperation  and 
leadership at 
community level  There is an individual or core group who takes leadership responsibility for the 
management process 
3 5 5 
 The government has established formal policy and/or laws for decentralization 
of administrative functions (Regulation No. 22/1999, amendment Regulation No. 
5/1974). However, delegation of management responsibility and/or authority to 
local government and local group organization levels has not be given 
4 5 4  10 Decentralization 
and delegation of 
authority 
Decentralisation and devolution of authority are expected in order to support the 
participative management in the Babon river in the future 





The blue-print of establishment of coordinating body of Babon river is being 
processed by the Government of Semarang (perhaps Bapedalda). This body is 
aimed to monitor the local management arrangements, resolve conflicts and 
reinforce local rule enforcement. Participative management provides an easy 
coordination and communication between the government and community 
3 4 5 
 Total  score    70 83 87 





Notes: Likert scale: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5; U : Up stream; M : Middle stream; D: Down stream 
* Definition B/C is very subjective for each person.  In the most of study area, people interpreted the B/C in 
terms of social context. 
** The average score is close to 4. This can be interpreted that the prospect for successful Co-management 
for Babon river is good.  
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*** Definition: (1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Doubtful; (4) Agree; and (5) Strongly agree.  (1) Very 
bad; (2) Bad; (3) Neutral; (4) Good' and (5) Very good. 
Source: Susilowati (1999)  with necessary modification. 
 




No Key-Conditions  Items  Up Middle  Down 
1  Clearly defined  Boundaries  2  2.4  3.2  2.1 
2  Membership is clearly defined  2  2.0  3.7  4.7 
3 Group  cohesion  2  5.1  5.3  4.6 
4 Organisation  3  4.7  4.9  4.6 
5  Benefit exceed cost   3  6.3  6.4  5.9 
6  Participation by those affected  6  4.0  3.6  4.0 
7  Management rule enforced  2  3.6  6.6  7.2 
8  Legal rights to organize the management  3  2.3  6.9  6.8 
9 
Cooperation and  leadership at   
community level  3  2.2  6.6  6.8 
10 
Decentralisation and delegation of 
authority 2  3.7  6.7  7.1 
11 
Coordination between government and 
community 2  6.1  6.5  6.7 
   Overall  30  5.5  5.3  5.4 
   Classification     Marginal  Marginal Marginal
Source: Susilowati (1999; 2003)  with necessary modification. 
 
Table 9: The Prospect of Co-Management Approach in Managing Kaligarang   
River as Perceived by Key-persons  
 
Score (1-10) 
No Key-Conditions  Items  Up Middle  Down
1  Clearly defined  Boundaries  2  7.3  8.2  7.7 
2  Membership is clearly defined  2  7.5  8.2  7.7 
3 Group  cohesion  2  6.9  8.2  7.8 
4 Organisation  3  7.6  7.8  7.9 
5  Benefit exceed cost   3  8.5  8.2  8 
6  Participation by those affected  6  7.8  7.8  7.8 
7  Management rule enforced  2  7.2  7.5  7.7 
8  Legal rights to organize  3  7  7.6  7.3 
9 
Cooperation and  leadership at   
community level  3  7.8  8  7.8 
10 
Decentralisation and delegation of the 
authority 2  7.7  7.6  7.7 
11 
Coordination between government and 
community 2  8.2  7.6  7.6  
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   Overall  30  7.6  7.9  7.7 
   Classification     Good  Good  Good 
Source: Susilowati (1999; 2003, 2004) with necessary modification. 
 
Table 10 
The Prospect of Co-Management Approach in Managing Tuntang River as 
Perceived by Key-persons  
Evaluation (Scale: 1- 10)* 

















Clearly defined   
Boundaries  2  5.7 7.1 6.6 3.8  5,80 
2 
Membership is 
clearly defined  2  8.0  7.1  6.9  7.5  7,38 
3 Group  cohesion 2 6.7  7.0 5.9  6.8  6,60 
4 Organisation  3 5.9  6.5 6.2  5.4  6,00 
5 
Benefit exceed 
cost   3  6.5  7.2  6.4  4.0  6,03 
6 
Participation by 
those affected  6  5.1 6.0 7.1 5.2  5,85 
7 
Management rule 
enforced 2  7.2  7.8  6.8  5.3  6,78 
8 
Legal rights to 
organize 3  7.4  5.9  5.7  6.1  6,28 
9 
Cooperation and   
leadership at   
community level  3  7.1  7.1  6.2  5.0  6,35 
10 
Decentralisation 
and delegation of 





community 2  8.0  7.0  6.4  7.9  7,33 
  Overall   6,84  6,88  6,52  5,74 6,49 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In Bangladesh, experiences from good practices for a Common Property 
Resources (CPR) identified that it is necessary to choose CPR members from 
the resource users with clearly defined rights to use the resource with defined 
physical boundary. The long-term security of tenure is a precondition for 
establishment of common property resources in the water bodies by the users 
(mainly fishers and adjoining agriculturists of the water body) themselves. The 
sustainability of such CPRs depends on the equity in sharing expenses and 
income; monitoring by the users themselves; graduated sanctions for violations 





Bangladesh has a large number of government-owned water bodies (jalmohals) 
which have been the focus of a series of development projects over the last two 
decades. This paper is based on experiences from the IFAD funded Oxbow 
Lakes Project (OLP-2), Aquaculture Development Project (AqDP), and 
Sunamganj Community Based Resource Management Project (SCBRMP), but it 
also draws on lessons from other similar projects, like the Patuakhali-Barguna 
Aquaculture Development Project (PBAEP), the Fourth Fisheries Project (FFP) 
and the Community Based Fishery Management Project (CBFM-1 and 2). 
Together these projects have covered more than 200 water bodies and span a 
period of almost two decades.  
 
All khas properties come under the Ministry of Land. But MoL does not directly 
deal with or manage these properties. There are three ways in which their 
management is dealt with: 
•   Devolution refers to the transfer of management responsibility and 
authority over the use of natural resources from the government to other 
agencies, specifically to non-government agencies.  
•   Decentralization refers to the transfer of management and authority to 
lower levels of government.  
•   Co-management is the system of sharing of responsibility and authority 
between government and non-government bodies, usually some form of 
organization of resource users. 
 
There are a number of possible routes out of an open access system. One is to 
privatize the resource, make it the property of the lease-holder. Another is to turn 
it into a resource for government organizations to invest in. A third is to turn into a 
common property resource (CPR) of the fishers. Yet another is to turn it into the 
common property not of fishers, but of the community. All four methods have 
been tried in Bangladesh.  
   3
Longer-term leases and secure user rights, both necessary for the shift from 
capture fisheries to aquaculture or other forms of managed fisheries have 
become possible through a number of projects in Bangladesh. Of the various 





Before the GoB-IFAD-DANIDA-BRAC, OLP-2 (ox-bow lakes project 2) project, 
the World Bank undertook a project, OLP-1, for government management of 
some lakes. These lakes were withdrawn from the auction-lease system and 
placed under the management of the Department of Fisheries (DoF). Teams of 
fishers were appointed to carry out fishing, for which they were paid 40% of the 
value of the catch. This was a substantial improvement in fishers’ share, which 
remained at around 25% in privately-leased lakes. 
 
Budgetary constraints meant that funds for operating expenses, especially 
stocking in the government-run lakes was often inadequate, or not released on 
time.  As a result private money was also used to carry out stocking, which was 
not shown on the books. The result was that the government-run lakes were both 
making losses in official accounts, while allowing a number of officials to earn 
quite large profits. Of course, the fishers did earn their 40% share of total fishing 
income. 
 
Forms of decentralization have taken a new shape with co-management, where 
local government organizations join with the community in managing the 
resource. The involvement of local government, not as a facilitator, but as a co-
manager, has disadvantages as it increases opportunities for rent-seeking.  
 
The best example of the dangers of co-management was in the Third Fisheries 
Project. With fisheries and local government officials, and, of course, fish traders 
all involved in completely unregulated and unmonitored “stocking” paid for out of 
public funds. Unfortunately, this practice was repeated in the Fourth Fisheries 
Project. As a report pointed out, “… at Boro Beel,… it was widely believed that 
the stocking was considerably lower than officially recorded” (Aeron-Thomas, 
2005, p. 4).  
 
In co-management the resource use decisions are made not by the users, or 
even the so-called community, but by a negotiation process between the 
government (meaning its officials) and the users or community. In this 
negotiation, the balance is weighted in favour of the more powerful officials.  
 
In any case the agendas of government and users may be quite different. As 
pointed out with regard to the Fourth Fisheries Project, “… it was almost 
inevitable, given DoF priorities, that ‘growth’ in production rather than a concern 
with equity would infuse project activities,” (Saleha Begum, 2004, p. 6). Further,   4
since DoF is “driven by numerical targets the need to ‘stock’1 over-rode the need 
to take time to form strong CBOs (Community Based Organizations) 
(Rapporteur’s Report, 2005, p. 3). This is not unique to Bangladesh or to 
fisheries. It is common to government departments in other countries too. The 
experience of various co-management forestry schemes, often called Joint 
Forest Management, has shown that the agenda of the Forest Department, 
which is that of the maximization of timber growth rather than maximization of 
impact on the livelihoods of forest dwellers, invariably dominates the so-called 
Joint Forest Management committees. A study of numerous such sites in China, 
India and the Philippines, concluded, “…devolution policies in our case sites 
have reflected the conceptual frameworks and interests of foresters and, as a 
result, have disappointed local forest users with different expectations of 
devolution,” (David Edmunds, et al, 2004, p. 166). 
 
But, government departments and local government organizations have an 
important role in facilitating resource management by users. In various projects, 
government departments and officials have played key roles in facilitating 
transfer of water-bodies to fishers and in establishing their user rights. Technical 
departments, like DoF, have additionally important roles to play in disseminating 
technical knowledge. As a whole, government and other state organs, have to 
provide various kinds of public goods that are needed for the development of 
fishers and fisheries.  
 
What is needed is for a division of responsibilities between government and 
fishers. As pointed out with respect to forestry, “… convergence [of interests 
between government and forest users] was more likely to occur where local 
people and government officials divided roles and responsibilities in ways that 
enabled local people to make their own day-to-day livelihood choices with a 
maximum of discretion, while the state provided support for these choices and 
controlled the quality of public good outputs,” (David Edmunds, et al, 2004, p. 
168). What may be counter-productive is for increased state involvement in 
fisheries in new terms, i.e. the terms of poverty reduction, just as forest 
departments around Asia now justify their intervention in terms of environmental 
protection rather than timber production targets (Guha, 2001). 
 
While suggesting that the state should play an enabling (through appropriate 
legislation and decisions) and facilitating (supporting user groups to secure and 
establish user rights and medium- to long-term tenure), one should note that 
there is also a positive role for decentralization. Decentralization enables some 
types of decision-making to be brought geographically, even socially, closer to 
the affected people.  However this does not mean that decisions will be taken in 
favour of the users. Given the domination of local elites, the opposite is more 
likely to occur. But the geographical closeness does make it more possible for 
the users, the CPR, to mobilize and try to influence local administrative 
                                            
1 The DoF need to ‘stock’, also coincides with the officials’ need to maximize rent-earning 
opportunities.   5
decisions; while, when the decision are all concentrated at the district 
headquarters, or even at Dhaka, it would be very difficult for poor fishers to bring 
much influence to bear on those decisions.  
 
Before the OLP-2 project there was a situation where a few lakes were being run 
under government management, with the usual problems of losses for the 
government exchequer, while the majority of the lakes were on auction-based, 
short-term leases. Stocking levels were very low in the leased lakes and most of 
them were in a derelict condition, overgrown with water hyacinth and other 
vegetation choking the water bodies. The limited benefits of lake fishing were 
disproportionately captured by the lease-holders, while the fishers got 25% of the 
catch. 
 
The private monopoly of the lease-holder could have overcome the externality 
problem. But there was a problem of difficulty in or high-cost of securing user 
rights over all the residents of lake-shore villages. At the same time, the lake is 
not really divisible.2 But granting a private monopoly is not only difficult to 
enforce (though, it should be less so now than in the early 1990s), but would, as 
Partha Dasgupta (2005, p. 1611) points out, grant far too much power to one 
person. Further, and more important for our purpose it would have a limited effect 
on poverty reduction – as seen the fishers are likely to get 25% of the catch, 
albeit of an increased catch. This, however, does bring out the point that a 
managed resource, with investment of capital, is likely to provide some benefits 
to the fishers compared to a relatively unmanaged resource with little or no 
investment. 
 
COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES 
 
In discussing common property resources (CPRs) it is necessary to make a 
distinction from “open access” systems. In open access systems there is no 
regulation on the persons who have access to benefits and the quantities that 
they can fish from the resource. In an open access system the fishers have no 
responsibility for maintenance of the resource. Even if access is granted only to 
particular persons (e.g. fishers, or members of an indigenous community) but if 
there is no restriction on the amount that each person can draw, then there is 
likely to be a degradation of the resource – if the technology permits a rate of 
extraction that is greater than the rate of regeneration of the resource.  
 
One of the first requirements in setting up a common property resource (CPR) 
system is a specification of its members. Extraction should be restricted to a fixed 
number of users, chosen on the basis of some criteria. In choosing members of 
the user group there have been three different approaches. The first is that of 
making membership open to all those who belong to the relevant community. An 
example of this approach is the Fourth Fisheries Project (FFP). The second is 
                                            
2 That is until new, costly and risky technologies like cage culture are adopted.    6
that of restricting membership to those who participate in the relevant form of 
labour (fishing or forest products extraction); examples of which are OLP-2, 
AqDP and CBFM. The third is to combine fishers along with other users, e.g. 
agriculturists in the immediate neighbourhood of the lake who draw on its waters 
for irrigating their fields; as has been done in the SCBRMP and in MACH.  
 
The Fourth Fisheries Project (FFP) experience of allowing any person, and not 
just fishers, in the relevant community, has been analyzed in FFP papers by 
Mark Aeron-Thomas (2005) and Saleha Begum (2004). These studies provide 
useful analyses of the problems faced when no distinction is made between 
fisher and non-fisher community members.  
 
“For the first round (2000-1) of sites, no requirements were set by the project as 
to the composition of the FMCs (Fish Management Committees), except that 
they had to be made up of representatives of the VDCs (Village Development 
Committees). As the VDCs were open to all members of the community, rather 
than just professional fishers, their representatives were predominantly drawn 
from local elites. This meant that non-fishers were quickly and firmly in control,” 
(Aeron-Thomas, 2005, p.24). The project responded by changing procedures for 
the second round (2001-2) of sites, with the VDC being replaced by a Fisheries 
Sub-Committee (FSC) in each village, and with a requirement that 75-80% of 
both committees and two out of three office bearers should be genuine fishers. 
 
Non-fishers used their general dominance of local politics, and their ability to 
provide the capital required for stocking which shows is that it is important not 
only to specify the sections from whom members of the CPR will be drawn, but 
also to work out methods of providing access to capital, such that members can 
provide equal amounts, or equal shares, of capital to the CPR. This, as will be 
seen later on, is quite important for fishers to establish or retain control over the 
CPR enterprise.  
 
It is generally better to form a group of the users (e.g. irrigators, fishers, forest 
users, etc.), rather than the general population of the area.3 There are a number 
of reasons for this: 
•   There are divergent interests between users and others.  
•   User groups have a common material interest in using and managing the 
resource, even, perhaps, sustainably.  
•   User groups would be more homogenous than the general population of 
the area. 
•   Both benefits and costs would be more transparent in a user group and 
the returns are likely to make participation worthwhile. 
•   They are more likely to be able to develop pro-CPR norms of social 
functioning. 
 
                                            
3 This draws on Harry Blair (1996).   7
The inclusion of only fishers can be attempted through a condition that 
membership is conditional on participation in fishing, say, for at least 75% or so 
of fishing days, as was introduced in OLP-2, and has since been adopted in most 
other projects. But even this is not fool-proof. In a situation where the fishers, are 
weak, there could be elaborate fictions to show that all members are participating 
in fishing, when that is actually not the case. But by restricting members to 
fishers it is at least possible to reduce the incidence of open domination of CPRs 
by the elite. In India, community-based aquaculture is also organized on the 
basis of “common interest groups” (Radheshyam, 2001). 
 
At the same time, the phrase restricting members to fishers may itself need to be 
extended to include other poor or other relevant users. The first point arises 
when the number of fishers living near the lake is too few for a CPR. If it 
becomes necessary to increase the number of members, this could be done by 
including other poor, who are willing to learn and regularly participate in fishing. 
This, of course, will only be possible if the returns from fishing are somewhat 
more than the returns from the alternative, say, daily wage labour.  
 
Another manner in which it could be necessary or beneficial for the CPR to 
extend its membership beyond fishers, is, for instance, that where the silted up 
portions of the beel, though registered as khas land, have been occupied by 
agriculturists. This has been done in both SCBRMP and CBFM, in the interest of 
getting more support for the CPR. Most of these agriculturists are quite small 
holders and there is a restriction that they can only make an equal contribution to 
the Beel User Group’s (BUG’s) finances. They cannot contribute more of the 
capital and thus claim more of the profits.  
 
Establishing user rights of the fishers CPR over the resource is something that is 
difficult for CPR members to do on their own. They require support from the local 
administration and from the community around them. In one way or the other, the 
establishment and spread of a social norm that accepts the CPR on the water-
body, is necessary for setting up and running a CPR. Without this social norm, 
which itself can be brought about through a number of attempts, each perhaps 
less conflict-ridden than the last, guarding would be too expensive and might 
make the water-body itself unprofitable to manage. Social fencing, through an 
accepted social norm, can considerably reduce the need for guarding, i.e. reduce 
the transaction costs and increase the return to invested capital and labour. 
 
WOMEN IN FISHERIES 
 
Although women generally do not get involved directly in fishing in most parts of 
Bangladesh, there are many stages of chain between boat and consumption 
where women are involved.  
 
Starting with the well-known Mymensingh Aquaculture Extension Project there 
has been an increasing involvement of women in aquaculture. That project   8
showed that women, possibly because of their greater time spent in and around 
the homestead, are able to achieve higher productivity than men in household 
ponds. OLP-2 initiated a process of women acquiring user rights in ponds on 
khas lands, though it was often difficult for women to retain their control over 
these ponds, in the face of attempts of various politically stronger male groups to 
seize their ponds. AqDP successfully combined training in pond aquaculture with 
credit, to enable women to set up commercial fisheries in household ponds that 
had formerly been used for fish culture only occasionally and fitfully.  In both 
CBFM and SCBRMP women have been playing a role in sorting fish and drying 
fish as a commercial activity.  
 
Combining all these varied tasks within the fish value chain, and adapting a 
holistic view of this value chain, will enable making a policy for women’s 
involvement in fisheries. SCBRMP has, for instance, decided that women would 
form 25% of members of the Beel User Groups (BUGs) and have at least one 
member in the Beel Management Committee (BMC). 
 
Gender equality is both a goal of poverty reduction and an instrument for the 
same. Thus, when there is an attempt to link fisheries with poverty reduction and 
the PRSP, it is necessary to consider the manner in which gender concerns can 





In order to establish a CPR it is necessary to have a clear category of members 
who are entitled to participate and share in the use of the resource. It is also 
necessary to have a clear physical boundary, within which the CPR has the 
authority to manage the fishery. With lakes it is often difficult to set up such clear 
boundaries. The ox-bow lakes can be turned, with screens or embankments, into 
water-bodies that are closed for all practical purposes. But with beels in the haor 
region, such enclosure is not only difficult, but also not even desirable. The 
existence of mobile fish is essential to the productivity of these water-bodies. In 
the monsoon period, and until the lakes are more-or-less isolated from each 
other in the dry season, the whole haor is a single sheet of water. When 
management is restricted just to the beels, what usually happens is that CPR 
members guard against poaching in their own areas, and simultaneously go out 
to poach in other, possibly unguarded areas or in the open waters of the haor. 
This is especially so in the monsoon period when the fishers have no alternative 
work. This monsoon fishing is made even more destructive by the fact that this is 
the spawning period, therefore affecting the productivity of the fishery by a 
multiple of the fish caught.  
 
The strong externalities within beels in a haor region (a vast flood-plain) makes it 
necessary to try and bring the whole haor within the management system. Only 
in that way will it be possible to internalize the benefits of managing the resource,   9
as, for instance, by making effective a ban on fishing in the spawning period. 
Thus, as both the MACH and SCBRMP projects have decided, it is necessary to 
bring under management “entire ecological and hydrological units to the extent 
possible” (MACH, 2002, p. 85) 
 
ESTABLISHING USER RIGHTS 
 
There has been one important effect common to all of the various development 
interventions. As compared to the situation in the early 90s, now there is an 
acceptance of the user rights of the designated lease-holder, whether it is a 
private individual, a fishers’ group, government department or the community. 
This, however, is so only for the more-or-less closed baors (ox-bow lakes). Not 
much of active guarding is needed. Or, when there is poaching it is not a matter 
of right, but one of stealing. It is not a coincidence that this has occurred in water-
bodies where aquaculture has more or less replaced capture fisheries, and fish 
are the result of stocking and even fertilization with inorganic and organic 
fertilizers. There is labour and capital involved in all these activities, and not just 
in the catching of fish, as with capture fisheries. 
 
In the open beels, which are only isolated from the floodplains in the dry season, 
there is much more guarding required. Again, it is not a coincidence that fishing 
in the beel is mainly a matter of capture fishery and only secondarily a matter of 
stocking, i.e. of investment of capital and labour in activities other than capture of 
fish.  
 
Initially the transaction costs involved in investment in lakes were quite high and 
years were taken to establish these rights. In the early- to mid-90s OLP-2 it took 
years and a lot of labour in guarding to establish user rights. But at the time of 
the AqDP in this decade, it has neither taken as long nor required as much 
guarding to establish user rights. In a sense, the change in norms of access to 
resources, identified by Douglas North (2005) as the critical issue in development 
has, to some extent, been established with regard to leased lakes but this is not 
yet true in large parts of the flood plain, the haors, which are still regarded as 
open access. Fishers think nothing of guarding their own beels, but catching fish 
in the rest of the haor, or even in unguarded beels. Fishing in the haors or even 
beels is still often a matter of either stealth (fishing in a small boat that can pass 
unseen in the mist), or might (fishing or guarding with armed parties).  
 
The establishment of user rights of the lessee, where they are fishers, has also 
become easier because of positive changes in attitudes of various sections of the 
government. In the early 90s, despite decisions in Dhaka on the handover of 
baors to the OLP-2, it was not an easy job to actually secure those transfers. 
There were various obstacles and negotiations at all levels of administration. But 
more recently, both with the AqDP and the SCBRMP projects, such handovers 
have become somewhat easier, once decisions are secured in Dhaka. In the 
SCBRMP sections of the local administration were also willing to quickly   10
intervene to resolve disputed claims and establish boundaries. All this has 
accelerated the process of securing user rights of the lessees, where they are 
fishers. Of course, there are still at times court cases to be resolved. And there 
are instances (e.g Raisha Beel) where the controlling group stated plainly that 
they had paid a large sum to the DC’s office to secure the lease. But this is a far 
cry from the situation where there frequent obstacles at every stage4.  
 
In their struggles against former lease-holders or other local elites, and in 
establishing the user rights of the CPR, fishers necessarily have to rely on an 
overall acceptance of these user rights by those living around the baors. If large 
numbers people who are not CPR members continue to catch fish, as they used 
to before the project, then the CPR members investing in stocking fingerlings 
would not get a return on this investment. Securing acceptance of the CPR’s 
user rights is thus crucial to the success of the project.  
 
This has been done through a number of channels. The first was to give user 
rights to the fishers and other poor living around the baors. Those who used to 
be the main persons catching fish were themselves made the owners of the 
fishing rights (as CPR members).  Although the CPR could establish their user 
rights just through guarding to prevent others fishing, this would be very costly, 
whether in terms of their own time (if the CPR members act as guards 
themselves), or in terms of money (when guards are hired). In fact, any such 
change in access rights, turning what was formerly an open access system 
(either because there was no lease, or the lease was not rigorously enforced) 
into a managed CPR, depends crucially on social acceptance of the change.  
 
Besides the CPR itself, an important factor in establishing user rights is the stand 
taken by local officials. Where local government officers, like UNO, or department 
officers, as of DoF or LGED, go to support the CPRs, and where there are visits 
from higher officials, then there is a demonstration of the measure of official 
support. This support is very important in gaining social acceptance of the fishers 
using the baor as their CPR. The NGO too plays a role, not only in organizing the 
CPR but also in showing its support to the CPR and helping them to negotiate 
with the local power structure. 
 
The roads built by OLP-2 and AqDP right up to the fish landing centres at each 
baor have improved the local law and order situation. The clean environment of 
the landing centre and the lake waters make it a scenic spot. Many persons, 
such as college students, and officials and their families visit some of these baors 
on holidays. This too increases the social contacts of the CPRs and increases 
their social capital. 
 
                                            
4 There remains a problem of excessive lease charges for some water bodies.  These often bear 
no relation to the productivity of the resource, but can be bid up by influential elites who then use 
the legal system to avoid making actual payments.  In other systems wealthy individuals seem 
motivated to pay over the odds for a lease because of apparent status it confers.        11
What one can see is that empowerment, as the ability to bring about and sustain 
a change, is a combination of a number of factors. First, there is the handover of 
the baors to the CPRs. Second, there is the support for this change from officials. 
Third, is the acceptance of the general local population and their support. 
Numerous actions of the CPRs have helped bring about this general acceptance, 
even if these actions were not necessarily consciously aimed at achieving such 
acceptance. Finally, what counts in empowerment is the power of numbers, both 
in terms of the number of members and in terms of the amount of capital 




The difficulty in establishing user rights when combined with the dis-incentive 
effect of short-term leases, further reduces the return from stocking or semi-
intensive aquaculture. When lake fishing shifts from capture to semi-intensive 
(stocking, without fertilizer use) or intensive (stocking plus fertilizer use) some 
infrastructure is needed. Landing platforms are needed with connections to the 
main roads connecting to the markets, so as to be able to carry at a reasonable 
cost the high volume of fish to the market. Even if the government were to 
provide this infrastructure, with a short lease there would be no incentive to 
maintain or improve infrastructure.  
 
Along with this infrastructure investment disincentive, short term leases 
encourage destructive methods of fishing. There is an attempt to fish out the lake 
at the end of every year. In the beels this has led to the particularly destructive 
method of de-watering to catch all possible fish. This reduces the numbers of 
breeding fish for the next season, leading, over time, to a fall in fish stocks.  
 
Projects, like OLP-2, AqDP, SCBRMP, CBFM-2 and MACH have secured long-
term leases, usually of 10 years at a time, but for up to 20 or even 50 years (as in 
the case of OLP-2).  
 
CIRCUMSTANCES FOR A FUNCTIONING CPR GROUP 
 
Management of a CPR is usually governed by an agreement between the 
members to cooperate in the managing of the resource and in sharing its 
benefits. The agreement, if not indefinite, is expected to last at least as long as 
the group has the lease or access to the resource. What binds the group together 
is that they have a joint lease over the water-bodies.  
 
Under what conditions is such an agreement to equal sharing likely to last? This 
question is important given that some members could, at least for some time, 
break the agreement and corner a higher share of the benefits. Agreement can 
be kept if all parties discount the future benefits from the CPR at a low enough 
rate (Partha Dasgupta, 2005). Within this general situation of a low discounting of   12
future incomes from the CPR, there are a number of specific features that will 
promote cooperation.  
 
Agreements are less likely to be broken when members care about each other, 
or have inter-dependent utilities; or, if they have a pro-social disposition however 
the fishing groups in most of the projects under consideration do not form a 
homogenous social group. They tend to be a mixture of traditional fishers and 
other poor, combining Hindus and Muslims and do not have a history of prior 
collective action. Breaking an agreement to equal sharing of returns is not likely 
to meet much or even any social ostracism. 
 
Such a situation only reinforces the point that, where there are temptations to 
break agreements, because the returns are large, then there is a need for 
punishment for breaking the agreement. The enforcement of the agreement 
could be either through mutual enforcement by the members or through external 
enforcement. Mutual enforcement is of course the preferred alternative. If 
ordinary members could be counted upon to regularly monitor activities of the 
committee members, and make credible threats of sanctions for those breaking 
the norms, then it may be quite easy to keep CPRs functioning  
 
Self-monitoring can be taken a step further by peer monitoring. This has been 
introduced in SCBRMP, where members from one Credit Organization (CO) 
audit the accounts of another CO. But besides having the knowledge to monitor, 
the members of the CPR also need to have the power to impose sanctions on 
those breaking the rules. This is easier said than done. Removing an errant 
member, or refusing to transact with him for one or a number of years, is not so 
easy, when the target is one who as a committee member is likely to have 
developed connections with power brokers in the locality, even if he did not 
already have them at the inception of the CPR – removing such a member is 
difficult. This can then lead to a situation where a new equilibrium is reached, 
wherein some get a higher share of the benefits than others (Partha Dasgupta 
2005). 
 
Why do the ordinary members settle for an unequal share? It must be that their 
benefits are still more than they could otherwise expect. “… even though the 
agreement is to share the benefits of cooperation unequally, both parties gain 
from cooperation” (Partha Dasgupta, 2005, p. 1618) and, thus, the CPR 
continues to exist, although with unequal benefits to members. While this is 
worse than the situation of a democratically functioning CRP, it is still likely to be 
better than a situation where there has been no history of a democratically-
functioning CPR. In a sense, those trying to corner a disproportionate share of 
benefits, cannot just take their control of the CPR for granted but, instead, have 
to buy-off other members.  
 
The biggest source of uncertainty in CPR management in Bangladesh is that of 
political or bureaucratic interference in the membership of the CPR management   13
group. Another possible deterioration can take place where persons from outside 
the group (local elite or officials) free-ride on the CPR and extract a large share 
of its income. A third possible deterioration relates to the necessity of raising 
working capital and stocking and other expenses. This usually results in tied 
transactions with fish traders and fingerling suppliers which will probably affect 
prices and quality. This can also result in collusion between the traders and the 
office-bearers of the CPR resulting in the effective takeover of the financial 
transactions of the CPR, as happened in some OLP-2 baors, after the withdrawal 
of BRAC from supplying credit.  
 
The above example points to the importance of maintaining equal contributions 
of capital from each member, preferably through a formal credit mechanism. A 
CPR with unequal contributions is more likely to be taken over, by those who 
supply more or most of the capital required. This also leads to a corollary: a beel, 
where there is no or little stocking and thus capital requirements are also low, is 
less likely to be a target for takeover by financial interests, as compared to a 
baor, where stocking levels and capital requirements are both high.  
 
THE ROLE OF NGOs 
 
NGOs have played an important role in all of the CPR projects, except the 
SCBRMP. They have had two functions. One is to form and facilitate CPR 
groups. The other is to provide credit, usually as micro-credit to the members but 
meant for collective use by the CPR.  
 
Credit for stocking is a form of working capital. Finance for stocking can be 
procured in either one or a combination of three ways. It can be provided by 
MFIs, or even commercial banks. It can be provided by fingerling suppliers or fish 
traders, usually the wholesale traders, arathdars. It can also be provided through 
the CPR’s own savings.  
 
The facilitation of CPR formation and support in establishing user rights is 
another function that NGOs have often been contracted to provide. But NGOs in 
Bangladesh are basically MFIs. Micro-credit is their core business and all else 
tends to be subordinated to the goal of giving and recovering credit. 
Consequently they tend to minimize their other facilitating activities. Experience 
in the Fourth Fisheries Project, where a number of NGOs, big and small, were 
involved, showed that a number of NGOs, particularly the small, local NGOs, 
tended to side with the local elite in monopolizing returns from fishing and side-
lining fishers from any real involvement in management5.  
 
Two points come up with regard to the involvement of NGOs. First, it is better to 
involve national, or large NGOs, rather than small, local NGOs. The local NGOs 
                                            
5 See Aeron-Thomas (2005) for details of NGO functioning in the Fourth Fisheries Project, some 
of it in collusion with DoF officials.   14
tend to be more linked to local power structures, or unwilling to act in the 
interests of fishers to confront local power structures. It would then be preferable 
to involve large, national NGOs, which have a reputation to maintain. This need 
to maintain a reputation would work in favour of checking local units and even 
taking action if they collude with the local elite against the interests of the fishers. 
 
At the same time, one cannot simply presume that the interests of the NGO 
necessarily coincide with those of the project, or the CPR.  As the failure of 
BRAC to fulfil its contracted post-project responsibilities in OLP-2 shows, it is 
also necessary to devise an incentive system for NGOs, so that it is in their 




In any group activity there will always be conflicts often due to domination of the 
group by a few individuals. Ways of trying to check such domination are through 
rotating leadership, spreading knowledge, technical and marketing, and mutual 
enforcement of norms.  
 
Not all of the problems can be solved within the group meaning that some form of 
conflict resolution process becomes necessary. During the life of a project this is 
usually through project officials and NGOs. But what happens after a project 
closes and the CPR group has to manage its own affairs? An important 
consideration is that it should be local and thus available for low cost and also 
able to intervene in a timely manner.  
 
There are four ways in which the problem of a forum for conflict resolution has 
been approached:  
•   CPR groups can be part of a nested hierarchy, and higher levels, such as 
cluster-level CPR committee in a haor, could serve as the dispute 
resolution forum for individual beel CPRs, both for their own internal 
problems and in disputes between beel CPRs.  
•   Disputes could be resolved by recourse to the state, however rent-seeking 
by state officials, may make this costly.  
•   There have been attempts to develop some sort of local-level dispute 
resolution mechanisms, in the form of the village shalish. But these have 
not yet taken off. And, to the extent they exist, they are heavily biased 
against the poor, women and minorities. The problem with the shalish is 
not a matter of training to make them more responsive to those they are 
meant to serve. It is a matter of the shalish having deep roots in the 
existing socio-political structure of domination by rich men.  
•   NGOs could play the role of arbitrators (Anna Knox and Ruth Meinzen-
Dick, 2001). As experience in the OLP-2 showed, it is preferable to have 
not just the NGO but also officials of the relevant government department, 
DoF, LGED, or whichever department is connected with the CPRs. Having 
both NGO and departmental officials in a conflict resolution or appeals   15
forum, gives more scope for the weaker persons or groups within a CPR 
to find someone who will be willing to listen to their appeal, although even 
this is not fool-proof (Aeron-Thomas, 2005).  
 
POVERTY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IMPACTS 
 
Taking control of boars as common-property resources, means there is frequent 
interaction between members of the CPR. Besides working together, they have 
also build relations as social groups, often participating jointly in festivals (both 
Hindu and Muslim) and other events.  Relations between group members are 
strengthened by the practice of giving members wages for fishing days on which 
they are genuinely sick and so cannot work with the rest of the group. The 
increased interaction between group members, going beyond work requirements, 
leads to closer relationships and strengthens their internal social capital.  
 
CPR members have seen a substantial change in their economic and social 
status. In terms of income and consumption status, fishers in well-managed 
baors of OLP-2, from having been among the poorest in the villages before the 
project, had come up to a lower-middle status by the end of the project. They felt 
that they had clearly moved out of poverty. Of course, not all would have made 
such a move out of poverty, but they felt that many of them had made this move. 
One way in which this was reflected was in the common understanding that their 
children, girls and boys alike, would study as long as they could, even beyond 
high school. Insufficient income was no longer felt to be a reason to stop their 
studies.  
 
But in Talbaria (AqDP), one of the autocratically-managed baors, where fishers 
just get a wage of Tk.100 per fishing day (or 20% of the catch in other such 
baors) that the fishers, though generally very quiet, said that they were poor 
before the project and are remain poor now.  
 
The change in economic status of CPR members in well-managed baors is 
reinforced by the fact that CPRs are fairly large economic units, some with net 
annual income running into Tk.1.75 million (Sirishdia baor, AqDP), Tk.2.0 million 
(Chand Beel, AqDP), or even more than Tk.2 million (Bahadurpur and Porapara 
of OLP-2). For such medium-size enterprises, it is not difficult to make donations 
of Tk.10,000 for local social causes, something that hardly any individuals in 
these villages would be able to do. The CPRs have used their economic strength 
to support a variety of local social causes, from primary schools to hospitals and 
sports clubs.  
 
In the course of the Project the CPR committee members, in particular, have 
interacted with various government officials and many officials, both from 
Bangladesh and outside, have visited the baors to see the project. All this 
contributes to increasing the social contacts of the fishers. With this there is also 
a new dignity, typified in some leaders being addressed as, for example, “Haldar   16
Mahashay”, meaning “Mr. Haldar”, rather than the earlier “jhele”, which is a 
pejorative for the Hindu fishing caste.  
 
To establish the lease rights of the CPRs the fishers, with support from the 
LNGO and some government officials, have had to struggle against former lease 
holders and sections of the local elite. These struggles have strengthened their 
internal cohesion and success has given them a confidence which is noticeable 
in their manner of speaking and behaving. The hesitation to speak with officials, 
noticeable at the beginning of the project, is no longer there. Of course, this has 
not changed uniformly among members, with the leaders much more 
transformed than others. But over all there is a confidence and cheerfulness that 




In concluding this review, we shall sum up some of the desirable design features, 
or good practices, for a CPR, as they have emerged from the review. Many of 
these desirable design features correspond to those which in the literature have 
also been identified as being necessary for a successful CPR (for example, 
Ostrom, 1990 and 1999).  
 
•   CPR members chosen from the users (fishers and/or agriculturists 
adjoining the beel); 
•   Clearly defined social boundaries: A set of individuals with rights to use 
the resource and its physical boundary itself being defined; 
•   Secure and medium- to long-term lease at an affordable cost; 
•   Equity in sharing expenses and income, i.e. benefits from the CPR; 
•   Democratic, transparent and inclusive management of the CPR, with 
support from external agencies, relevant departments of the state and 
NGOs; 
•   Monitoring by the users themselves; 
•   Graduated sanctions for violations of CPR rules; and 
•   Conflict-resolution mechanism, such that there can be quick access to 
low-cost, local forums for resolving conflicts.  
 
For the above a set of enabling conditions is also necessary: 
•   Government decision to handover lakes to CPRs of users on secure and 
medium- to long-term leases at reasonable cost; 
•   Support from relevant government departments and officials to CPRs 
establishing secure user rights and the boundaries of their resource; 
•   Infrastructure development to meet the new needs of increased fish 
production and to bring the water body into the orbit of state governance; 
and  
•   Provision of working capital through an MFI or other such official (as 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Bangladesh has had comprehensive experience of community based management for 
inland capture fisheries from several projects (revenue and externally funded) over the 
last 10 to 15 years. The lessons were extensively used for the elaboration of a strategy 
and a programme, which will seek to consolidate gains in and expansion of community 
based management linked to institutional and legal reform and a recognition and 
strengthening of the roles of civil society and the private sector. 
 
The Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock adopted the National Fisheries Strategy in 
January 2006. It had been developed by the Department of Fisheries over an extended 
period through a consultative process involving all relevant stakeholders. The strategy 
sets out to guide the implementation of the National Fisheries Policy, the PRSP and the 
Road Map for PRSP. 
 
The strategy covers eight areas (“sub-strategies”); inland capture fisheries, marine 
capture fisheries, aquaculture, aquaculture extension, shrimp culture, quality control, 
human resources development, and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
The strategy has a pro-poor focus and guiding principles are people’s participation for 
community based resource management, decentralization of planning and decision 
making, conservation and enhancement of fish stocks, protection against habitat 
destruction, pollution, and degradation of bio-diversity. The strategy emphasizes the 
need for reform of access rights (lease systems) and institutional development for 





The National Fisheries Strategy was adopted by the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock 
in Bangladesh in January 2006. Subsequently the Department of Fisheries also 
prepared an Action Plan for implementation of the strategy. Through a parallel process, 
the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock developed a Road Map for implementation of 
fisheries aspects of the Bangladesh Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The 
Road Map was also approved in 2006. The approaches in the three documents are the 
same and they cover the same issues. 
 
The Road Map and the National Fisheries Strategy identify threats to the inland capture 
fisheries from overexploitation, habitat destruction and pollution, and devise measures to 
overcome the challenges for the benefit of poor fisher households and other resource 
users. Both advocate the promotion of community based fisheries management as a 
poverty reduction approach in line with aims to decentralise management, as well as 
giving genuine resource users a say in management matters. The Road Map 
emphasizes the role of inland capture fisheries for poverty reduction. 
 3 
The Department of Fisheries is at present preparing a Programme for Inland Capture 
Fisheries Development for the implementation of the strategy and Road Map. The 15 
year programme will address priority issues for inland capture fisheries development and 
management. It has ambitious aims and targets for the expansion of community based 
inland capture fisheries in Bangladesh. 
 
The National Fisheries Strategy, with a focus on the Inland Capture Fisheries Sub-
strategy, and the Programme are briefly presented in this paper. Further details on the 
strategy and action plan have been published in a report by the Department of Fisheries 
(2006). 
 
THE NATIONAL FISHERIES STRATEGY   
 
The National Fisheries Strategy was developed by the Department of Fisheries through 
a consultative process involving and engaging a wide range of stakeholders and 
considering the then ongoing preparation of the PRSP. The strategy has eight sub-
strategies addressing 
 
•  inland  capture  fisheries 
•  marine  capture  fisheries 
•  aquaculture 
•  aquaculture  extension 
•  shrimp 
•  quality  control 
•   human resources development, and 




The main objective of the National Fisheries Strategy is to: “Encourage the various 
partners and agencies utilizing or supporting the management of the fisheries resource 
to promote its sustainable use in order to meet the objectives of the National Fisheries 
Policy and other policies guiding the development in Bangladesh.” 
 
The strategy also sets out to formulate a mission statement or vision for the Department 
of Fisheries and its role in this process: “To provide support to the sector so that 
Bangladesh’s fisheries resources can be managed sustainably for optimum economic 
and social benefits through the cooperation of all stakeholders.” 
 
There are key concepts which apply to all sub-strategies, such as long term objective 
planning, decentralization, people’s participation, coordination and collaboration of all 
stakeholders, the regulatory framework, focus on the poor, gender, alternative income 
generation and environmental management. 
 
Community based approaches to fisheries management figure prominently in the sub-
strategy for Inland Capture Fisheries, with the following objective: “To attain sustainable 4 
management of the inland capture fisheries for the local fishing and user communities 
through collaboration of all concerned partners.” 
 
LESSONS FROM COMMUNITY BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 
 
Attempts were made during the preparation if the inland capture fisheries sub-strategy to 
capture lessons related to community based fisheries management from earlier and 
ongoing development interventions, such as CBFM-2, funded by DFID and implemented 
by the Department of Fisheries and World Fish Center; MACH project funded by USAID; 
Fourth Fisheries Project (which ended in 2006) funded by World Bank, DFID and GEF; 
and Oxbow Lake Project  (phase 1 funded by IFAD and phase 2 by Danida).  
 
Other donor funded projects and programmes which have contributed to the lessons are 
the IFAD funded project working on community management of water bodies in 
Sunamganj District and the Agriculture Sector Programme Support, Phase 2, sponsored 
by Denmark, with field components in Patuakhali, and Noakhali and support to 
institutional strengthening of the Department of Fisheries.  
 
In addition to these there have been projects funded by the Government of Bangladesh, 
which have addressed issues of community involvement in fisheries management. 
Among these are the ongoing Creek and Beel Management Project in Western 
Bangladesh and the Jobai Beel Project Naogaon and Fisheries Management in Water 
Bodies under the New Fisheries Management Policy (1999 – 2004). International 





These projects have demonstrated the feasibility of community based fisheries 
management, which gives the users a say in management, gives them direct benefits, 
leads to improved management and consequently higher production and income for the 
users. Further, community based management has been effective in addressing habitat 
destruction, biodiversity and pollution, and ensuring sustainable use of renewable 
resources. 
 
Thus the feasibility of community based fisheries management has clearly been 
demonstrated. However, there are issues with long-term sustainability of the community 
based organisations. They are under constant threats like being captured and/or 
manipulated by the local elite and they may become dysfunctional because of internal 
conflict. The projects providing the lessons have recently ended or are about to end and 
there are few examples of community based organisations continuing their functions 
without project support. 
 
The strategy identifies a set of crucial issues to achieve the objective of sustainable 
management. These include a reform of the lease and access systems to promote 
sustainable management of resources as well as community based management. 5 
Decentralization is a key issue to work effectively with communities and support them to 
establish their management systems. The strategy advocates the establishment of 
Upazila Fisheries Committees, which will have a say in resource allocation and the 
approval of management plans for water bodies and strengthening of the Department of 
Fisheries to deliver public goods. This will support the engagement and strengthen the 
role of local government. It also emphasizes technical management through sanctuaries, 
control of fishing effort, and habitat restoration. Support services like extension and 
research as well as the need for alternative income generating activities are elaborated 
in the sub-strategy. 
 
Specifically for community based management the strategy stresses empowerment of 
fishing communities to take a leading role in management decisions. This will be 
achieved through an expansion of the number of community based fisheries 
management organisations, which have been granted long-term access rights to the 
resource. Through these organisations the users will have legal resource user rights. 
This in turn demands that the organisations are properly registered either under the 
provisions of the Social Welfare Department (larger wetland management) or as co-
operatives (smaller, well defined, fisher based organisations). 
 
The strategy recognizes that there is a need for flexibility with regard to the 
organisations and the appropriate type of organization will vary between locations. They 
may be member based (fishers) or an organization representing different stakeholder 
groups. A key element is the Upazila Fisheries Committee, which should have powers to 
administer the fisheries where community based management is feasible. The 
government will support community based management through different means and 
Upazila Fisheries Officers should be given training in inland capture fisheries and 
community management. The role of NGOs in community mobilization is stressed as 
well as the establishment of linkages and networks between community based fisheries 
management organisations to have a voice in decision-making. 
 
 
INLAND CATPURE FISHERIES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
 
The tasks for inland capture fisheries management and development are ambitious. 
Community based fisheries management needs considerable investment in community 
mobilization and organization as well as technical management measures. It is however 
anticipated that the initial high costs should be compensated by lower management 
costs in the longer term (for example through self-policing of management measures). 
 
The Government of Bangladesh has allocated revenue funding for fisheries 
management as well as special funding through the Annual Development Fund for 
projects. While the government’s commitment and funding is the backbone for the 
implementation of the strategy, there is need for additional external funding. The 
Department of Fisheries is at present (early 2007) preparing a programme for inland 
capture fisheries development. The programme is based on the priorities in the sub-
strategy. 6 
 
The lessons from interventions show that the issues are multifaceted and complex 
including the legal framework, institutional development, community mobilizations and 
technical management measures. The programme takes this into account and proposes 
a series of interventions, which have been grouped in interdependent and interactive 
themes or components. 
 
The starting point for the programme is the lesson that the establishment and expansion 
of community based fisheries is a time consuming process and demands a long term 
commitment. Sufficient time should be allocated for identification of sites and 
mobilization of communities before actual interventions can be effective. The 
programme has therefore been designed for 15 years in three phases. 
 
The overall objective as stated in the draft outline is: “to ensure sustainable community-
led management of inland capture fisheries resources and equitable distribution of 
benefits” 
 
There is also the need to address central institutional issues before further expansion of 
community based fisheries management. These have been outlined above and include: 
•   the legal framework (discussed in another paper presented at the CBFM-2 
conference) 
•   lease system and access rights to promote sustainable management and 
empowerment of genuine resource users.  
•   the establishment of Upazila Fisheries Committees. 
 
The issues differ between different types of water bodies, in particular beels and similar 
water bodies, where there will be nominal lease fees and priority will be given to 
community groups, rivers, where there is now open access and a need to establish 
access control and private floodplains where there is need to ensure sustainable 
management of the resources. 
 
Programme support for institutional development includes support to networking 
between existing community based organisations, human resources management and 
development in the Department of Fisheries and NGOs. The programme outline also 
recognizes the need for strengthening the Inland Capture Wing and the Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation Unit of the Department of Fisheries. 
 
A key task requiring substantial resources is an inventory of inland capture fisheries 
resources in Bangladesh. There has been constant destruction of habitat because of 
natural reasons but also through reduced dry season flow of water from neighbouring 
countries, the development of infrastructure, agriculture, industry and housing. The 
status of the resource today is not known and an inventory is essential for planning 
purposes including the identification of critical areas to maintain fish resources and 
prevent further decline. 
 7 
The uncertainties regarding the longer term sustainability of community based 
organisations were discussed above. There are now some 250 such organisations and a 
need for consolidation. One theme is monitoring, support and action research related to 
the organisations and their functions. The research topics may include sustainability 
factors, equity issues, gender, decision making and conflict resolution and more 
technical issues like fish stock development, biodiversity, impact of protected areas 
management, as well as habitat destruction and pollution. 
 
There are some 10,000 to 12,000 jalmohals in Bangladesh, many with good potential for 
community based fisheries management. At present, as stated above, only some 250 
community based fisheries management organisations have been established. A key 
priority is therefore an expansion of community based management. An ambitious target 
has been set in the draft programme to reach 2000 community based organisations in 
15 years. These will be in major river systems, where the experiences of community 
management are limited, in  major wetlands of national and international importance, 
and “other water bodies”, which in the context of the project include baors, creeks, and 
beels (up to 1000 ha). 
 
Fisheries management inevitably means restrictions of access and fishing effort, closed 
seasons and areas (sanctuaries) and gear control. In the short term poor fishers will 
suffer during closed seasons and need compensation for loss of income. In the longer 
term there will often be a need for permanent reduction of fishing effort and thus a 
reduction of the number of fishers. These impacts of fisheries management measures 
should also be seen in the light of fish resources often being the last resource for 
otherwise marginalized poor people. The programme will address the livelihoods of poor 
fishing communities and the need for alternative income generation activities. 
 
The final component of the programme in its present form is technical management 
measures. This is intended as a “fund” being accessible by the Upazila Fisheries 
Committees. The funds should be used for investments in sanctuaries, habitat 
restoration and other enhancement measures, beyond what is provided during the 
phase of establishment of community based organisations and the implementation of 




The formulation of the Inland Capture Fisheries Sub-strategy, its Action Plan and the 
drafting of the Programme for Inland Capture Fisheries Development have shown the 
importance of looking beyond the direct community management issues, with 
mobilization, organization and training. The legal environment enabling the development 
of community based fisheries management must be in place and the long term access to 
the resource by genuine resource users must be ensured. The existing access rights 
and leasing system are not conducive to community management and proper 
management of the resource. 
 8 
Decentralization is a key element in the promotion of community based management to 
effectively use limited resources. This includes an increased role of the local government 
as well as the proposed Upazila Fisheries Committees. This will also redefine the role of 
the Department of Fisheries and demand new approaches and modes of operation to be 
effective. 
 
There is a danger that an adopted strategy becomes a rigid instrument for development. 
It is important that the National Fisheries Strategy and in the context of this paper the 
Inland Capture Fisheries Sub-strategy, are constantly monitored, regularly evaluated, 
reviewed and revised, and that the learning during implementation is effectively 
captured. The strategy was adopted in 2006 and is now being implemented. A regular 
review process should be initiated not later than the second half of 2008 with the aim of 
having a revised strategy adopted by the end of that year. The process should follow the 
same pattern as during the preparation of the strategy that is being inclusive, 
consultative and participatory to capture experiences and lessons gained. 
 
Already at this stage it is probably safe to state that there is one area in which the sub-
strategy is weak: gender. The present role of women in the sector and their potential role 
have not been sufficiently analyzed. This is one area to which the next revision of the 
strategy should pay attention in order to formulate concrete actions to give full 
recognition to the role of women in fishing households. 
 
Another area where the strategy needs further elaboration is the human resources 
development sub-strategy. There are strong arguments to widen the scope to human 
resources management of which development is only one, but a crucial, part. 
 
The proposed programme is ambitious but will give considerable benefits to the target 
group. The 2000 community based organisations will allow more than 0.5 million people 
to be part of the decision-making process on management. The fishing area will cover 
some 800,000 ha and provide an additional production of 120,000 tonnes per year at an 
estimated value of US$ 85 million. 
 
The implementation of the programme depends on lessons learnt from earlier 
interventions. The implementation mechanisms must be efficient and effective and the 
approaches and modes of operation rationalized to make best use of all exiting channels 
and sources of support. 
 
The donor community pays more and more attention to alignment of their support with 
Government policies, strategies and procedures in line with the Paris Declaration. The 
National Fisheries Strategy is a clear expression of the Government’s priorities and will 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Production from capture fisheries saw rapid, sustained growth from the 
1950s through the 1970s, but by 1990s global capture fisheries has become 
stagnant, warranting a sustainable approach to its exploitation. With capture 
fisheries stalling and demand for fish growing, many countries turned 
towards developing the aquaculture sector to meet the supply gap. Over the 
decade, the expansion of aquaculture has led to a rapid growth in fish 
production. However, as aquaculture expands its production, its use of 
capture fisheries as food for farmed fish will increase, taking count that 
currently nearly one-third of the world’s wild caught fish is consumed as fish 
feed. As aquaculture in the developing world continues to exhibit steady 
growth in production, sustainability of this trend is now open to question 
given the rapid degradation of the capture fisheries. Establishing community 
organizations for managing fisheries is a promising means of improving the 
resource condition, particularly for countries with large inland and seasonal 
floodplains. However, as the paper outlines, this arrangement should not 
reduce the role of the government, but emphasizes on delivering net 
benefits. Also it is necessary to set up legal framework for community based 





The last 50 years have witnessed paradigmatic shifts in fisheries 
management, both in terms of balance between overall goals and balance in 
the distribution of authority and power (Siar et al. 2006;  Jentoft and Mccay, 
2003;  Hanna, 2003). This was brought by the gradual shift of view from fish 
as an inexhaustible resource and the freedom to fish anywhere and anyhow 
in the 1950s to the realization of rapidly declining fishery resources in the 
1970s to the concept of the world’s oceans as “common heritage of 
mankind” in the 1980s. As views changed, fisheries management policies 
also shifted from favouring the state as the resource managers to market 
orientated management through Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs), 
which sets the limit to individual fisher and fishing firms on the amount of fish 
that may be taken from the fishery in any one year.  
 
However, in the context of Asian developing nations, this form of 
management never took off. This is due to the fact that in the Asian 
developing countries alone, almost 65 percent of the world’s fishers, framed 
as the poorest of the poor, continue to depend on fish for food and livelihood 
survival. Most are small scale fishers who catch fish in near shore waters 
and inland water bodies and rely on labour intensive fishing technologies 
(The WorldFish Center 2005). The over populated fishing industry, coupled 
with poverty issues and open access characteristic of water bodies, made 
ITQ as an impossible management tool.      3
 
In many of these poor developing nations, their policy makers opted towards 
developing aquaculture and imposed legislative changes which focused on 
regulation and enforcement to control fishing efforts. However, this has 
failed to prevent over-exploitation of fisheries resources. Pomeroy and 
Viswanathan (2003) pointed out that most of the costal and inland fisheries 
in Asia are still over-fished.  
 
It is argued that the failure is because this form of management is very much 
still a centralized top-down approach, focusing on objectives relating to fish 
resources and based exclusively on formal biological science (Viswanathan 
et al. 2003) and mostly disregards the experiences of fishers (Degnbol 
2003). As a result, the modern laws and regulations that have been put in 
place to manage fisheries, has not been well received by resource users, 
leading to the violation of these regulations by fishers whether they are 
industrial, medium scale or individuals fishing for their daily food and income 
and failure of the government to enforce the regulations due to a lack of 
resources (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998).  
 
Subsequent recognition of the failures of exclusively government managed 
fisheries led some of the governments to explore co-management and 
community based management as options to improve fisheries 
management. However, a key constraint lies in creating institutional 
arrangements that can sustain community participation to ensure the 
benefits really reach the poorer sections of the community and that it is done 
in a sustainable manner.  
 
This paper looks at the broader governance approach needed to sustain 
community participation in fisheries management, with an emphasis on 
developing Asian countries.  This is seen through the role of the government 
in delivering net benefits and the need to set up legal frameworks for 
community based management.  
 
 
FISH SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN ASIA 
 
The supply of and demand for fish have changed dramatically during the last 
three decades. Global demand for fish has risen rapidly with rising 
populations and increasing per capita income. The rise in demand has been 
met by a rapid growth in production and increased global trade. Asia is the 
leading contributor to this expansion accounting for over 63 percent of total 
fish production, and as much as 90 percent of all aquaculture output (FAO 
2006).  
 
During the 1950s and 1960s, capture fish production in Asia increased by an 
average of 6 percent per annum but this declined to 3 percent during the 
1970s and 1990s (FAO 2006). In contrast to the declining growth in capture   4
fisheries, aquaculture in the region has been growing rapidly, by about 10 
percent per year during the 1950s and 1960s to 9 percent during the 1970s 
and 1980s and over 11 percent since 1990s (FAO 2006). In Asia alone, 
aquaculture production growth boomed from 5.1 percent of total fish 
production in 1950 to 46 percent in 2003. It is easily one of the fastest 
growing food-producing sectors in the region, with production tripling from 
11.8 million tonnes in 1990 to 40.1 million tonnes in 2003 (FAO 2006). The 
steady growth of aquaculture production has been billed as a means of 
taking up the production slack in capture fisheries for many of the 
developing Asian countries. 
 
The last two decades have also witnessed substantial increases in per 
capita annual consumption of fish from all sources in various Asian counties 
(Dey et al. 2005). Globally, the annual average per capita fish consumption 
in developing countries has nearly doubled the level since early 1970s. In 
contrast, in developed countries it remained almost stagnant at 23.5 kg (Dey 
et al. 2005) since 1985. Given the high population growth in developing 
countries, especially in Asia, the increase in per capita annual fish 
consumption in these countries is worth noting. Dey et al. (2005) pointed out 
that fish consumption varies widely between economic groups. As income 
increases, the per capita annual fish consumption will also consistently 
increase. Projections for demand indicate rising aggregate consumption for 
all major developing Asian countries (The WorldFish Center 2005).  
 
However, the continuing rise in the global population and demand, including 
export demand, coupled with a stagnation of production in global capture 
fisheries has given rise to concerns that fish production will be unable to 
meet future global demands. In 2005, it was estimated that about half of the 
marine capture fishery resources were fully exploited and the other one-
quarter were either over-exploited, depleted or recovering from depletion 
and thus had no possibility for further expansion in the short or medium term 
(FAO, 2007) and will require time to recover. The continuous expansion from 
aquaculture is expected to fill the supply gap. 
 
Despite the growing production of both low and high value aquaculture, 
there are concerns with this burgeoning industry. Among the issues, is that 
the rapid expansion of the aquaculture sector is placing pressure on capture 
fisheries. Primarily, this is seen through its increasing demand for captured-
fish as feed. High value aquaculture that produces carnivorous fish and 
crustaceans has strong demand for these feed inputs (Delgado et al. 2003). 
Since, the relationship between capture fisheries and aquaculture is an 
interdependency relation to certain extent, restoring the capture fisheries 
resource base is a necessity.  
 
One of the ways to do this is through improved fisheries policies and 
management systems.  
   5
FISHERS AND FISHERIES  
 
Fish producers are classified into capture fishers and aquaculture farmers. 
The former refers to persons who harvest from natural fish stocks, whether 
marine or inland, under open (or nominally restricted) access rights. The 
latter refers to persons who culture fish either in freshwater or brackish water 
ponds and cages, which are operated with full private ownership/rights. A 
grey area is culture-based inland fisheries, in which the natural productivity 
of the aquatic ecosystem is utilized, though fishers need to acquire access 
rights (to community tanks, ponds and reservoirs). In this system, fingerlings 
are stocked in communal ponds and fish harvesting is done collectively or 
individually.  
 
An estimated 41 million people (FAO 2007) depend on fisheries for 
livelihood, in which capture fisheries account for 72 percent of the labour 
force. Fishing households involved in capture fisheries are found to be 
poorer and less educated than their counterparts in the aquaculture sector 
(The WorldFish Center 2005), with earnings as low as UD$1 per day (Table 
1).  
 
Table 1: Average household income of aquaculture farmers and capture 
fishers. 
Unit: US$/year 
Aquaculture Farmers   Capture Fishers 
Country  Freshwater Brackishwater Marinewater Inland  Marine 
Bangladesh   2,112  14,257  na  500  2,100 - 7,200 




1,600 350  -  5,200 
India   1,580  6,000  na  500 - 800  500 - 1,200 
Indonesia  
447 - 
2,027  2,136 - 7,350  9,431  67 - 650  1,541 - 4,058 
Malaysia   898  18,376  na  na   - 
Philippines na  5,892  na  na  7,090 
Srilanka  2,907   -  na  1,128  1,128 - 3,000 





1,230  2,500  na  na  1,500 - 5,000 
 
Source: The WorldFish Center, 2005. 
 
The relatively low socioeconomic profile results from the large number of 
fishers' dependant on the sub-sector and the dwindling catch. Most of the 
world’s fish stocks are about 30 percent of the levels that existed a decade 
ago. Silvestre et al. (2003) indicated that fishers’ daily catch has reduced   6
compared to few years back. Studies also indicate that the large number of 
costal fishers involved in capture fisheries are more vulnerable to risk as 
most do not have any landed property, in addition to being exposed to 
catastrophic natural disasters such as the tsunami.  
 
Clearly, there is an urgent need for do-able actions and workable policies to 
restore the state of capture fisheries, not only to meet the global demand for 
fish but to ensure a sustainable and improved livelihood for the huge number 
of poor relying on fish and fisheries. Considering that millions of poor people 
from the developing countries continue to depend on fisheries for their 
livelihood and food security –- rebuilding and improving the resource 
condition through sound and effective implementation of fisheries 
management definitely merits serious consideration. This daunting task is 
considered more serious in the developing countries of Asia given the sheer 
size of fisher population involved in fisheries and their complete reliance on 
the development of the sector for their livelihoods. 
 
CO-MANAGEMENT TO COMMUNITY BASED MANAGEMENT: THE 
WORLDFISH EXPERIENCE  
 
In the late 80’s, the WorldFish Center initiated a number of co-management 
experiments and pilot activities1. The activities centered on studying the 
delegation of management responsibility and authority between local-level 
(informal and customary) institutions and the state-level (national, provincial 
and municipal) institutions. Co-management fitted in as a middle course 
between state-level concerns in fisheries management for efficiency and 
equity, and local-level concerns for self-governance, self-regulation and 
active participation.  
 
Ostrom (1990) pointed out that co-management is very advanced in that 
most of the vertical linkages between the fishing communities and local and 
senior levels of government needs to be institutionalized, so that the system 
is fully “nested” at all levels of governance. That is, decisions made at one 
level interact with other levels so that there is both policy stability at higher 
levels of governance and also capacity to innovate at lower levels 
(Pinkerton, 2003). Hence, at one point, for co-management arrangements to 
be sustained, it will be important to form formal functioning institutions at the 
grass-root level. Community members representing these “formalized” 
                                                 
1 One of the largest project implemented by the WorldFish Center, with the Institute for Fisheries 
Management and Coastal Community Development (IFM) and national research partners in Asia and 
Africa is the the Worldwide Collaborative Research Project on Fisheries Co-management (Fisheries 
Co-management, Phase 1 and Phase II, 1994-2003). The project documented the results and impacts 
of fisheries co-management by assessing the processes and models implemented at the national 
government and community levels in 17 countries, including Bangladesh. Phase I documented 
comparative case studies on co-management arrangements in different socio-political and cultural 
contexts. Phase II focused on the benefits, strengths, and weaknesses of the co-management 
approach in terms of sustainability, efficiency, and equity. 
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institutions will be more confident and assertive in establishing 
communication with the existing institutions at higher levels of governance. 
 
In 1996, the Center began piloting community participation using institutional 
approaches under the Community Based Fisheries Management (CBFM) 
project in Bangladesh. While co-management cantered on partnership 
arrangements between centralized government management systems and 
local institutions (informal, traditional, customary), CBFM looked at 
establishing formal institutional arrangements at the community level first 
with the help of local NGOs, supported by governmental agencies. This led 
to the establishment of fisher-led, community-led and women-led community 
based organizations to manage fisheries.  
 
While there are many similarities between the concepts of co-management 
and CBFM, there are differences in the focus of each strategy. These 
differences centre on the level of participation of government, and on when 
the government becomes involved in the process. CBFM focuses on 
establishing and empowering local level institutions through community-
focused approaches, with minor support from the government throughout 
the establishment and empowerment process. While co-management 
focuses not only on these issues but involves the process of establishing 
partnership arrangement between government and the local community and 
resource users, hence making CBFM a central element of any co-
management arrangements. 
 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION: A BASIC ELEMENT FOR GOOD 
GOVERNANCE  
 
Viswanathan et al. (2003) argues that the potential advantages of 
community participation in fisheries management include efficiency and 
equity. Community participation in management is more economical in terms 
of administration and enforcement than centralized systems. It involves self-
management where the fishers take responsibility for a number of 
management functions, e.g.: patrolling during the fish ban season. Co-
managed arrangements allow the community to develop a management 
strategy with higher probability of meeting local needs and conditions and 
are more legitimate in their eyes. This is because, community members 
understand their problems, needs and opportunities better than outsiders do.  
 
In addition, management is usually accountable to local areas and not to 
larger regions. Through co-managed arrangements, fishers view it as an 
incentive to respect and support the rules because they complement cultural 
values, are self-imposed, and because they are seen as individually and 
mutually beneficial. Since the community is involved in the formulation and 
implementation of management measures, a higher degree of acceptability 
and compliance can be expected (Viswanathan et al. 2003). Community   8
members can enforce standards of behaviour more effectively than 
bureaucracies can. Community participation in introducing or improving 
management strategies can also minimize social conflict and maintain or 
improve social cohesion in the community.  
 
In Bangladesh, the WorldFish Center and its local partners have 
successfully introduced community based management for managing the 
inland fisheries resources, by conferring the responsibility for looking after 
the aquatic resources to those whose livelihoods depend on them. Groups 
of poor fishers are now practicing sustainable fisheries management by 
establishing fish sanctuaries, controlling the use of destructive fishing gears 
and banning fishing during the spawning season in project sites. On site 
results indicate that annual fish production (kg/hectare) increased on 
average by 13 percent per year (Mustafa and Halls 2006). A significant 
observation is the ability of women folk to generate income for the 
households that reduces the dependency on fishing through micro-credit 
assistance (see Ruhi et al. 2006). Many are involved in small scale fish 
farming, poultry rearing, vegetable farming and traditional handicraft. An 
evaluation of the on-going community based management process in 
Bangladesh by FAO (2007) indicated that it had contributed to the 
development of self-help initiatives, local ownership and decision-making in 
communities. 
 
Looking at broader fisheries governance 
 
The success of co-management and CBFM field trials indicates that 
community participation in fisheries management is essential towards 
improving fisheries production and fishers livelihoods. However, these 
success stories are based on the short term focus of the projects. 
Experiences with projects piloting co-management and CBFM in many 
countries have demonstrated success, but in many cases the initiatives were 
not sustained after project support came to an end. Sustaining the 
incorporation of co-management and community based management into 
fisheries management will require a broader governance approach. This 
includes the role of government as an equal stakeholder and the need for a 
legal framework for community based management, all somewhat under-
stated in the many of our co-management or community based management 
related studies.  
  
Role of government – not just to delegate power but to deliver net 
benefits 
 
In a co-managed management, it is not easy to define what responsibility or 
cost sharing should fall under the institutions representing the local fishing 
community or what falls under the government. As Nielsen et.al. (1996) 
points out, devolution of some authority to manage fisheries away from 
central administrations to user groups may be one of the most difficult tasks.   9
The local community might not be fully prepared to accept responsibility. 
The burden of cost-sharing might discourage poor fishers who survive on a 
day to day basis from participating. One of the greatest challenges observed 
through the CBFM 2 project is the sustainability of the CBOs on a long term 
basis without further incentive based support (Rab and Ahmed, 2006). 
However, Pinkerton (2003) in her article on understanding the complexity of 
co-managed resources argued that it is important that in a well developed 
co-management process, the relationship with government must be seen by 
fishing communities and other stakeholders as a partnership delivering a net 
benefit than as delegation of powers.  
 
What is helpful to co-managing communities is that the government takes on 
the role of sponsor for technical support, credit, marketing assistance or 
protective legislation, such as occurred in the Philippines (Pomeroy and 
Berkes 1997). However, government is often also thought of as a 
stakeholder, given that it has a relationship with many affected actors and is 
itself affected by the outcome (Mikalsen and Jentoft 2001). This can occur 
as there is a risk for institutions formed and represented by the communities 
becoming bureaucratized and oligarchized in ways that run counter to the 
values and goals of the community they serve (Pinkerton 2003). They may 
have staff or committee members who do not necessarily communicate with 
community members in a regular and democratic way (Kofinas 1998), or 
even risk being overtaken by influential local community members. 
Therefore, as part of sustaining and ensuring an effectively managed 
community based institution, government could play the dual role of a 
stakeholder and sponsor for this institutional arrangement.  
 
In short, even as communities claim more control over the local 
management of fisheries resources, government will have to remain the key 
player. Rather than dwelling on the issue of what management 
responsibilities should be delegated, the focus should be how partnership 
arrangements could deliver net benefits to all. 
 
SETTING UP LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR COMMUNITY BASED 
MANAGEMENT 
 
In Bangladesh, the National Fish Policy 1998 commits to promote 
involvement of poor and traditional fisher-folks in the management and 
conservation of both open and closed water bodies although it does not 
directly mention community based management as an approach (Kabir, 
2007). This can lay the groundwork for forging partnerships, but the 
implementation of the legislation is a pre-requisite to sustain the partnership 
arrangements.  
 
Putting a legal framework in place for community level management in the 
co-managed partnership is essential as it indicates: 1) the political will and   10
support of governments; (2) legal recognition for the participating 
communities; (3) sustaining and strengthening institutions and linkages 
established under partnerships. Such a framework is useful to align the 
many co-management rights and activities within a matrix and this includes 
defining memberships and boundaries, habitat protection, enforcement, 
regional planning, data sharing, defining means of participation in voicing 
and setting broader policies.  
 
Fishing is an industry that touches on several policies, e.g., trade, rural 
planning, economic, gender and securitization; and several goals, e.g., 
poverty alleviation, environmental and resource sustainability, food security, 
sustainable livelihoods or biodiversity conservation, resulting in global and 
local priorities. At the global level, international treaties on fisheries 
management focus on poverty reduction. At the local level, the fisheries 
management agenda is very much focused on local economic opportunities 
and participation in decision-making process. Much is made of the disparity 
between the priorities of global and local fisheries management agendas. 
However real synergies exist between these agendas and these would be 
enhanced if governments served the double obligation of attending to 
international agreements while sharing power in setting objectives for 
fisheries management with the communities (Viswanathan et al. 2003) 





The continuing rise in the global population coupled with a stagnation of 
production in global capture fisheries led to the expansion of aquaculture. 
Asia led the growth, by contributing almost 90 percent to the world output of 
aquaculture. However, concerns remain as uncontrolled expansion will 
definitely increase dependency on capture fisheries for fish food.  
 
Since aquaculture and capture fisheries have an inter-dependent 
relationship, both need to be managed more effectively. Centralized 
fisheries management systems, which are made up from fisheries policies, 
institutions, and support systems are burdened by bureaucratic inefficiency, 
institutional weaknesses, and fragile human resource bases.  
 
Since the centralized, government-led system of protecting and managing 
fisheries resources is not working effectively in most cases, alternative 
approaches are necessary. In addition, there is an increasing consensus 
that fish and fisheries must be properly harnessed so that they will continue 
to provide sustenance for present and future generations. Community based 
management and co-managed arrangements in fisheries management are 
seen to be feasible options for bringing together the relevant levels of 
government and the users in pursuing a common set of goals to improve 
resource conditions and socioeconomic conditions of the community.   11
 
More than two decades of research have provided sufficient conclusive 
support for co-management and community based management as 
approaches for effective enforcement and equitable access for the poor and 
often voiceless fishers. However, it must be emphasized that a community-
based fisheries approach may not be applicable everywhere. It cannot 
succeed in isolation. It is a complex process involving continuous 
consultation, negotiations, information sharing, and conflict management 
between stakeholders for improving existing management systems. There is 
a need to scale up the process to sustain institutions developed under 
community based management. This includes understanding the role of the 
government as partners in delivering a net benefit rather than just delegation 
of powers. The success of co-managed partnerships depends heavily on 
political will. Hence developing a legal framework for community level 
management in that partnership is important in sustaining community based 
organizations. 
 
Community participation in decision-making is as crucial as government 
support and political influence in ensuring improved policies, fair regulations, 
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